Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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400 chapter nine

hope of success.

In the course of 1545, the anxiety of the Protestant

princes to arrange a settlement between England and France for their

own security intensied. e discussions of Philip of Hesse with Jean

du Fraisse indicate the Landgrave’s concern to maintain the balance

between England and France and to seek a settlement of their dis-

putes.

Fears about a ‘secret’ clause in the Treaty of Crépy induced the

Princes to seek the French alliance during 1545, as events seemed to

indicate a renewal of the Emperor’s attempts to impose religious uni-

formity on Germany.

From the 1545 Schmalkaldic Council onwards,

the Princes were working for peace between the two Kings who were

the best guarantors of their liberties.

Total reliance either on England or on France by the Protestants

would have been unwise in view of the recent unpredictability of both.

e Hessian minister Simon Bing told Fraisse in August 1545 that the

Landgrave Philip was ‘a neutral person who is in amity with both kings’

and it was for this reason that he and his allies had sent envoys to both

Kings to negotiate peace.

But Phillip was not regarded by Henry as

neutral; to him he was suspect over the German levies, as the cause of

his diculties there (‘de milite Germanico, quasi autor sit eius incom-

modi’), in other words, he regarded him as partly responsible for the

failure of English troop recruitment under Reienberg.

Meanwhile,

L&P, XX, I, 682; ibid., 1207 (16 July 1545). R. McEntegart, Henry VIII, the

League of Schmalkalden, pp. 208–209.

H. Baumgarten, Sleidans Briefwechsel, 39, 45, 61. Fraisse, introduction.

A. Hasenclever, ‘Die Geheimartikel zum Frieden von Crépy von 19. September

1544,’ Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, 45 (1926), 418–26, based on the copy in BL,

Egerton 990, fos. 412–413. e ‘secret clause’ was an annex to the treaty signed by

Francis I at Meudon. It committed him to help the Emperor in the ‘reduction et

pacication dud discord de lad. religion en la Germanie . . . pour y induyre, persuader

et faire consdescendre les estatz d’icelle’ and to declare himself enemy to all those

who opposed such a settlement. See also Fraisse’s allusion to a secret French promise

to help the Emperor against the Lutherans, Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France,

1st ser. 3, 278.

is despite grievances since 1540, see J.-Y. Mariotte, ‘François Ier et la ligue de

Smalkalde,’ 206–247; McEntegert, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, pp. 203–

204. On French policy in Germany in this period, see also D. Potter, ‘Foreign policy in

the age of the Reformation: French involvement in the Schmalkaldic War, 1544–1547,’

Historical Journal, 20 (1977), 525–544.

Fraisse put the situation exactly when, in September, he transmitted the French

case against the English to Simon Bing (Fraisse to Bing, 18 Sept. 1545. SAM, Pol.Arch.

1836, fo. 45r).

Bing to Fraisse, 21 Aug. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 48–49: ‘persona media, et quia ambos

reges pro amicis habet.’

Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 13 Nov. 1545, Winckelmann (ed.) Pol.Corr., III, 637.

‘

to entreate with the sworde in hand

’

401

the French were anxious to monopolise the benets of a German alli-

ance.

e French believed that Suolk might have inuenced Henry

to rely on German mediation.

Rory McEntegart, in his re-evaluation

of Anglo-Schmalkaldic relations, rightly incorporated the religious

dimension into the making of English policy in the 1530s but he also

noted that the years aer 1540 were ‘an anti-climax,’ it seems largely

because the political dimension of Anglo-Schmalkaldic relations was

uppermost. e renewal of contacts by Henry’s agent Mont in August

1544 and February 1545, an initiative created by the swing towards

the evangelicals in English court politics, was, McEntegart thinks, an

opportunity thrown away. Yet the years 1544–46 saw some of the most

intensive contacts between England and the German Protestants.

Talk of Protestant mediation began at the 1545 Worms Reichstag.

ere were discussions between the key French agent in Germany,

Bassefontaine, and the Strasbourg diplomat Jakob Sturm in April that

raised the possibility of an Anglo-French peace.

Sturm, even though

he knew little French himself, was a key power broker in Schmalkaldic

politics, under whom Strasbourg became a nexus for communication

with France. ere he assembled a group of French-leaning scholars

and diplomats such as Johann Sturm, rector of the Latin School, and

since his student days an agent of Cardinal du Bellay, Dr. Ulrich Geiger

(Chelius), the historian Sleidan and the latter’s father-in-law, Hans

Niedpruck of Metz.

German sources,

indicate that the initiative was

is is the impression given by Fraisse when he was trying to convince Hesse of

the value of the French alliance: Fraisse to Bing, 18 Sept. 1545, SAM, Pol.Arch. 1836,

fo. 45v.

Longueval to Fraisse, 19 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, p. 103: ‘Je ne scay si la mort de Mon-

seigneur d’Orléans l’aura retardé aussy que le duc de Suort est mort qui menoyt cette

praticque.’ On Suolk’s exaggerated reputation as a favourer of German contacts, see

Gunn, Charles Brandon, pp. 199, 203–205.

McEntegart, Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, pp. 203–206.

Bassefontaine’s journal in L. Paris (ed.) Négociations . . . François II, pp. vii–viii.

On him, see J.-D. Pariset, Les relations entre la France et l’Allemagne au milieu du XVI

siècle and idem., ‘La France et les princes allemands,’ 229–301. On Jakob Sturm, see

H. Baumgarten, Jakob Sturm (Strasbourg, London, 1876) but more recently T.A.

Brady, Protestant Politics: Jacob Sturm (1489–1553) and the German Reformation

(Humanities Press, 1993). Sturm was both the chief secretary and diplomat of the

city of Strasbourg.

T.A. Brady, e Politics of the Reformation in Germany. Jacob Sturm (1489–1553)

of Strasbourg (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1997), pp. 124–142, 201–213.

A. Hasenclever, ‘Neue Aktenstücke zur Friedensvermittlung der Schmalkaldener

zwischen Frankreich und England im Jahre 1545,’ in Zeitschri für die Geschichte des

Oberrheins, Neue Folge, 20 (1905), 224–251, [hereaer NA] and idem, Die Politik der

402 chapter nine

taken by Jacob Sturm when he approached Henry’s envoy Christopher

Mont late in May 1545.

e Dauphin and Jean du Bellay were prob-

ably sounded by Bassefontaine or Grignan, and Johann Sturm and

Ulrich Chelius set out for France late in July.

Charles V as Mediator Again, Autumn 1545

As we have seen, the French were aiming to stop the Emperor helping

Henry VIII by encouraging his role as mediator between them; once

again the Emperor’s confessor was active in this. Charles, preparing

for his campaign against the German Protestants, had no wish to see

them play a central role in diplomacy. Protestant mediation thus ran

in parallel with talks at the highest level under the Emperor’s aegis held

at Bruges in November 1545 and led on the French side by Admiral

d’Annebault, Chancellor Olivier and Secretary Bayard and on the

English side by Gardiner, irlby and Carne. Francis gave his assent

in principle to the talks at the start of October, on the basis proposed

by Charles that there should be a truce for two months and that the

two sides would negotiate in his presence. On 17th, he empowered his

ambassador with the Emperor to conclude such a truce.

e idea of

Schmalkaldener vor Ausbruch des Schmalkaldischen Kriegs (Berlin, 1901), pp. 53–96.

is focuses on German diplomacy. G. Salles ‘Une médiation des protestants d’ Alle-

magne entre la France et l’Angleterre au milieu du XVI

siècle,’ Revue de l’histoire

diplomatique, (1899), 27–46 is thin. C. Oberreiner, ‘Sleidan, Jean Sturm et Bruno en

mission diplomatique en 1545’ in the Revue d’Alsace, vol. 68 (1920) relied almost

entirely on English sources.

Christo Mont (Mundt) was a native of the Rhineland who had taken service

with Cromwell in the early 1530s and had been sent back to Germany as the virtu-

ally permanent English representative with the princes. He managed rather neatly to

retain his position even aer Cromwell’s fall.

C. Schmidt, La vie et les travaux de Jean Sturm, premier recteur du Gymnase, de

l’Académie de Strasbourg (Strasbourg, 1858) is not informative about this mission.

Ulrich Chelius (al. Geiger) had had close contacts with the France since at least the

1530s. He kept the court of France informed about aairs in Germany, e.g. his let-

ter to Francis I of 22 Nov. 1545, from Strasbourg, on the Frankfurt Reichstag and

the capture of the Duke of Brunswick. (BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 119–20) See also Bruck

to Elector of Saxony, 31 May 1545, Hasenclever, NA, pp. 225–226; Johann Sturm to

Jakob Sturm, 21 June 1545, ibid., pp. 227–228; Jakob Sturm to the Council of 13, 19

July 1545, Pol.Corr. III, 588.

Francis I to Grignan and Mesnage, 3 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fos. 58–59; Instruc-

tion to Mesnage, 17 Oct. 1545, ibid., fo. 56 and fr. 17888, fo. 142. By the end of the

month, when Reienberg’s levy had broken up, Annebault had decided to go without

the prior conclusion of a truce.

‘

to entreate with the sworde in hand

’

403

a prior truce was soon put aside as impracticable and other problems

quickly arose. e suggestion that Admiral d’Annebault would lead

the French party was put forward early on but only on condition of a

truce. Francis played hard to get here, insisting that Annebault must

deal rst with Henry’s mercenaries on the French frontier. In any case,

he was suspicious that Granvelle had told the English that Annebault

would also be negotiating a closer alliance with the Emperor; Francis

thought this had only encouraged Henry to seek his own closer alli-

ance with Charles and expected Franco-Imperial talks for a closer alli-

ance to take priority.

Gardiner and his colleagues received their instructions on 17

October, charged to ‘searche and enquyre out the very cause of his

[Annebault’s] cumming,’ to ‘let and empeche’ Franco-Imperial nego-

tiations and nally, if he found that the Emperor was working against

Henry, to ‘insinuate himself by such meanes as tyme and occasion shall

best minister, to the sayd Admyrall’ so as to block Franco-Imperial

understanding.

Francis had promised in the ‘secret’ schedule of 1544

not to make peace with Henry VIII without including the Emperor

and to declare against Henry in the event of an Anglo-Imperial war.

Henry had similar obligations to the Emperor under the Treaty of

1543. e Bruges talks thus became hopelessly entangled with fears of

double-crossing on both sides. Annebault and his colleagues arrived on

7 November and a long series of meetings followed, revolving around

a new Franco-Imperial marriage plan and the settlement of peace

with England.

Annebault and his colleagues were instructed to con-

sider the marriage of prince Philip with Francis’ daughter Marguerite

and accept the abandonment of Milan to the couple in return for the

remaining territories of Piedmont not in the King’s hands; compen-

sation would be arranged for the duke of Savoy as well as a possible

marriage of the prince of Piedmont to Jeanne d’Albret. Talks along

Francis I to Mesnage, 21 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 54.

Instructions to Gardiner, irlby and Carne, 17 Oct. 1545, St.P. X, p. 630 (L&P,

XX, ii, pp. 227–228).

BL Egerton 990, fos. 412–413.

Navagero to Venetian Senate, 11 Nov. 1545, ASV, AP, Germania, fos. 318–319;

Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland. Erste Abteilung: 1533–1559, 14 vols (Gotha, Ber-

lin, Frankfurt, 1892–1981), VIII, Nuntiatur des Verallo, ed. W. Von Friedensberg,

p. 409n. For the Emperor’s point of view, see CSP Spain VIII, 109, 130, 131, 146,

147, 169, 172, where the emphasis is on the fact that an Anglo-French settlement was

impossible without the Emperor’s mediation and that the Emperor’s relations with

both England and France placed him in a favourable situation (see ibid., 173).

404 chapter nine

these lines remained inconclusive since too many causes of aggrava-

tion remained. In Francis I’s instructions, the question of Henry VIII

was linked to the Protestants and the Turks:

If by chance the Emperor asked them that the King undertake to make

war on the Protestants and the Turk, the said lord will agree to defen-

sive aid against them, as long as he has peace with the English [King],

provided the Emperor will agree to the same against the English, the

Turk and even the Protestants if they attacked him. But if war were to

continue with the English, the King will agree an oensive and defensive

league as long as the Emperor were to do the same against the English.

However, if such a negotiation could be avoided it would be better and

if a reply about the Turk were necessary, at the worst it could be avoided

by the terms of the last treaty.

e Anglo-French talks began under Granvelle’s chairmanship on

10 November. Gardiner was agreeably surprised by Annebault, who

had been described to him as having ‘the name oonly, without wytte

or memory.’ He reported the French Admiral and his colleagues as

gracious and prepared to work for peace. When they came down to

terms, though, the French demanded the return of Boulogne and the

inclusion of the Scots; only then would they acquit their obligations

to England. For their part, the English demanded the pension, which

was immediately rejected by the French as impossible in wartime.

A private meeting took place between Gardiner and Olivier. ough

he was impressed by Bayard, the bishop disliked the French Chancellor

from previous experience (he thought him a crypto-Lutheran) and still

thought him a liar. e meeting, though, threw up some interesting

ideas on why Boulogne was such a sticking point. Olivier freely owned

that Francis I’s ‘bottom line’ was the recovery of Boulogne but both

ministers speculated on why such a place, that cost so much on both

Instruction to Annebault and colleagues, 31 Oct. 1545, BnF, fr. 3196, fos. 320–22,

printed in Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009) II, pp. 833–835: ‘Et si d’advanture led. Empe-

reur leur faisoit faire instance que le roy se voulsist obliger a faire la guerre aulx

protestantz et au Turc, led. seigneur accordera, au cas qu’il aye paix avec l’Angloys,

ayde deensive contre lesd. Protestantz et Turc, telle que led. Empereur le luy vouldra

accorder contre l’Angloys, le Turc et les mesmes protestantz, s’ilz luy venoint courre

sus. Mais si la guerre duroit encores avec l’Anglois, le roy accordera ligue oensive et

deensive, pourveu que l’empereur pace de mesmes contre l’Angloys. Toutesfois, qui

se pourra passer d’en traicter, ce sera le meilleur; et sy l’on est contrainct de respondre

du Turc, pour le pis, il en fauldra eschapper suivant le dernier traicté.’

Gardiner and irlby to Henry VIII, 6 Nov. 1545, St.P. X, pp. 652–654 (L&P,

XXI, ii, 740, p. 352); Gardiner, irlby and Carne to Henry VIII, 11 Nov. 1545, St.P.

X, pp. 666–667 (L&P, XXI, ii, 772).

‘

to entreate with the sworde in hand

’

405

sides to defend or attack, should be so much of a stumbling block.

Gardiner remarked that ‘when contencion for any thing dependith

upon honnour the reasons upon charge be not estemed’ (Francis had

aer all told him in 1538 ‘I coulde noo skyl of princes honours’), yet

thought it dangerous for Francis to be allowed by his advisers to think

that he could never ever relinquish a place. Other rulers had always

had to compromise. Olivier’s answer was that ‘ther coulde noo labour

prevayle as he thought in it the french king hath it soo to hart.’ e

overall impression is of two technocrats baed by the demands of

royal honour.

We know that at the same time the Duke of Norfolk, on Paget’s

prompting, wrote to his son the Earl of Surrey ‘that ye animate not the

King too much for the keeping of Boulogne; for who so doth, at length

shall get small thanks.’ e Duke sent his son an even sterner rebuke

through his servant omas Hussey: ‘for what his grace and the rest of

the cownsell workith in for the render of Bowleyne and the conclewd-

ing of a pease in vj days, you with your letters sett bake in sixe owers.’

Norfolk ‘sertenly knowith the realme of England nott possible to beare

the charges of the same.’ Yet Gardiner reported to Paget that ‘I am

wondrous desirous of peace, but I assure youe I cannot awaye with al

to leve Bolen as the French men wold have it.’ He also suspected that

the French wanted to create the impression that they could come to

terms with England without the Emperor. at would be the worst

outcome ‘and yet I wyl ease that matier wel ynough.’

e impression

created by these exchanges is that of a real debate going on behind the

scenes among royal advisers about the point of the war.

ereaer, the talks moved to Antwerp; there the Franco-Imperial

discussions continued without result from 18th to 24th, when the French

Gardiner and irlby to Henry VIII, 15 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 130–131 (L&P,

XXI, i, 798): on Olivier: ‘because I knew him sumtyme for a Lutherian, and was

wel acquaynted with hym in Fraunce, and nowe and thenne disputed togither.’ On

Bayard: ‘he is very wise, very sobre, and, as went from him by stertes, by conjecture,

seen in good lernyng. He spake sumtyme Laten, for his purpose apte, apposite, et

eleganti pronunciacione. He is coleryk and, in his angre, with auctorite annexed, very

stowte . . . I thinke they have noo man canne speke more ne better in ther aayres

thann he canne.’ (Gardiner to Paget, 11 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters, pp. 181–182)

(L&P, XX, ii, 774).

Norfolk to Surrey, 1 Oct. 1545, Nott, e Works of Henry Howard Earl of Surrey,

p. 178; Hussey to Surrey, 6 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 28–29(30–31) (L&P, XX, ii, 738);

Gardiner to Paget, 14, 15 Nov. 1545, Muller, Letters, pp. 191–194 (L&P, XXI, ii, 794,

799).

406 chapter nine

envoys le. e only achievement by the French was to assure them-

selves that the Emperor’s main objective was the gathering of funds for

his war in Germany and that, in the words of Martin du Bellay, who

was present, ‘as long as the Emperor did not start war with him, he was

determined not to do so against him.’

e resident French ambas-

sador, Mesnage, pressed Granvelle not to entertain approaches from

Gardiner. Francis, he said, thought the Emperor a Catholic prince who

would not enter closer alliance with a schismatic ruler other than to

persuade him to return to the Church. Granvelle swatted that piece of

cheek by pointing out how many times Francis had negotiated with

Henry. e Emperor’s confessor passed on to Mesnage, through his

condant, Guzman, now abbé de Longpont, ‘the desire of the Emperor

to treat for friendship with me and declare himself enemy of the King

of England.’ Francis was notably unimpressed.

e English had three general objectives: to make peace with France

if possible; to clarify the Anglo-Imperial Treaty of 1543 and the rescue

the English commissioners held by Reienberg (see ch.7). On the last

point, nothing was achieved and Gardiner characteristically blamed

Philip of Hesse for their plight.

As for the French, Gardiner reported

them in no mood for compromise; he was also particularly averse from

a peace brokered by the Protestants.

In fact, Gardiner was remark-

ably ambivalent in his attitude to peace in these talks. At the start,

he seemed rather gung-ho, claiming that whether Boulogne was kept

or lost, English reputation was high (perhaps he had been inuenced

by attering remarks in Flanders). All the same, he was in favour of

peace: ‘I esteeme nothing Bolen in comparyson of the mastery we have

Annebault to Mesnage, 30 Nov. 1545; same to Jean de Monluc, BnF, fr. 17889,

fos. 344, 17890, fo. 191; Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), II, pp. 772–773; du Bellay,

Mémoires, IV, p. 322: ‘là où ne le Roy ne luy commenceroit la guerre, il n’estoit pas

deliberé de la luy faire.’

Mesnage to Annebault, 28 Nov. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fos. 115–118; Francis I to

Mesnage, 3 Dec. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 51; Francis to Mesnage, 14 Dec. 1545, BnF fr.

17890, fos. 49–50): ‘la volunté que ledict Empereur avoit de traicter amytié avecques

moy et se declairer ennemy du Roy d’Angleterre.’ ‘tous les propos que vous tient ledict

confesseur et ceulx aussi que vous dict l’abbé de Longpont viennent certainement de

la bouche de Granvelle et que l’on ne leur dict riens que ce qu’ilz veullent que nous

saichions.’ Mesnage was to get what he could out of them and give the impression that

Francis’ aairs were ‘gaillards’ and ‘en si bon estat de tous coustez que je ne suis point

pour m’estonner quelque manace que l’on sceust mectre en avant.’

Gardiner to Paget, 5 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 22–25 (L&P, XX, ii, 732); Muller,

Letters, p. 161.

Ibid., p. 162.

‘

to entreate with the sworde in hand

’

407

wonne in kepyng of it, and defendyng our realme alone.’ A few days

later he was generally gloomy about the prospects (as his colleague

Paget was to be again in 1549):

We be in warre with Fraunce and Scotland; we have an enemyte with

the Bishop of Rome; we have no frendeshippe assured here; we have

receyved such displeasour of the Lansgrave, chief captayne of the

Protestantes, that he hath cause to thinke we be angrye with hym; our

warre is noysom to the welth of our owne realme, and it is soo noysom

to al marchauntes that must traque by us . . . as they crye out here won-

derfully. Herwith we see at hom a gret apparaunce of lak of such thinges

as the continuaunce of warre necessarily requireth. And whenne, to put

awaye this warre, we shewe ourself content to take a peace, we may have

it, but soo miserable to saye truth, as the French men ore it, that therby

the Kinges Majesties noble courage shuld be soo touched as we ought

to feare the daungier of his person . . . to syt styl with such a peace as to

rendre Bolen and let the Scottes alone, oonly for a lytel money, not payd

but promysed. I call two myllyons a lytel money to us that have spend

fyve. . . . In consideration herof we must saye, Fye of such a peace as

might be soo displeasaunte. And yet in the warre is miserie.

Perhaps Henry might be able to sacrice his honour for expediency ‘or

elles, for his gret lernyng, understand that to be most honnorable that

is most expedient for the realme.’ But there was much doubt about

‘expediency’ especially if used to accept a treaty that reduced English

prestige and clout. ‘I feeare me that shal not be thought expedient.’

A Franco-Imperial agreement in any case would annul the Emperor’s

obligations to Henry for the defence of Boulogne and if peace were

brokered by the Protestants, the realm would be corrupted by their

‘most abhominable and monstrose opinions.’ He could not believe

the Protestants had better terms to oer than Annebault and Bayard,

favourites of Francis and Mme d’Etampes. What then should England

do? Should it accept poor peace conditions? No, the King would never

live with them. Should the war be continued while the Emperor was

a ‘doubteful freende’? Probably not. e problem was that there was

no third way. Gardiner had argued himself into a corner and was per-

haps unnecessarily pessimistic.

He underestimated the problems for

France.

Gardiner to Paget, 7 Nov., 13 Nov. 1545, SP1/210, fos. 51–52, 127–132 (L&P, XX,

ii, 749, 788); Muller, Letters, pp. 185–190.

408 chapter nine

Gardiner stayed on in the Low Countries to negotiate the other part

of his commission, the revision of the 1543 Anglo-Imperial Treaty.

Here the problems were delicate, though a solution more attainable.

Article 6 of the Treaty had only committed the Emperor to defend

Henry’s existing territories on the Continent, not Boulogne. Article 24

guaranteed free passage through the Emperor’s lands for troops com-

ing to English aid. In both cases, circumstances had changed and art.6

was reinterpreted while art.24 was among those removed. An agree-

ment was reached on 20 December and the treaty (of Utrecht) was

signed on 16 January 1546. is signally failed to include Boulogne

in the Emperor’s commitments.

Unsurprisingly, ratication of the

revised treaty was delayed into the spring by the Emperor’s denial

of owing a subsidy under the old treaty. Whatever worries Charles

and Granvelle may have had about Henry and Francis making peace

through Protestant mediation, they were not prepared to commit

themselves to defending Boulogne for England.

For the French, of course, their priorities were exactly the reverse;

that the Emperor should not commit himself to defend English ter-

ritory. Jacques Mesnage had been under orders throughout late 1545

to ensure this. By early February Francis I had wind of the new treaty

and wrote to Mesnage to ask if it included a commitment to defend

Boulogne. e Emperor, who called the treaty a simple ‘declaration,’

denied this categorically but when Mesnage pressed further to argue

that Charles was not committed to defend any other of Henry’s terri-

tories, on the grounds that Francis, in order to recover Boulogne, was

entitled to wage war on Henry in any of his territories, the Emperor

sheltered behind vague words that Francis should not undertake too

much (‘trop plus entreprendre’) against Henry. Granvelle emphasised

this point by saying that the Emperor was now less obliged to Henry

than he was before.

Treaty of Utrecht, 16 Jan. 1546, L&P XXI, i, 71, ratied in February.

Francis I was still concerned in March about ‘quelle asseurance l’evesque de

Wincestre sera party d’avec l’Empereur.’ (letter to Mesnage, 8 March 1546, Pierpoint

Morgan MA 147.

Mesnage to Francis I, Utrecht, 30 Jan. 1546: ‘Ung personnaige se disant aec-

tionné a vostre service m’a ce jourd’huy dict que l’Empereur a traicté avecques le Roy

d’Angleterre telz articles comme ilz avoient traicté à Barselonna en l’an vcxliii, et dict

l’avoir entendu d’homme qui a veu lesd. articles. Il ne m’a peu dire si par led. traicté ilz

ont promis estre amys d’amys et ennemys d’ennemys.’ BnF, fr. 17890, fos. 133–134; on

9 Feb. Mesnage reported the details of the treaty as excluding Boulogne pretty accu-

rately (ibid. Fos. 125–126); Francis I to Mesnage, 15 Feb. 1546, BnF chier Charavay,

271,161; Mesnage to Francis I, 24 Feb. 1546, BnF fr. 17890, fos. 115–23.

‘

to entreate with the sworde in hand

’

409

e death of Francis I’s younger son, Orléans, in September 1545

had prompted the need to re-negotiate the agreement, included in

the Treaty of Crépy, for settling outstanding disputes by his marriage

to a Habsburg princess. In his response to Mesnage’s report of the

Emperor’s lack of commitment to Henry, Francis had expansively wel-

comed the idea of a new marriage alliance between his daughter and

prince Philip; the causes of war between them might be great but their

good will towards each other would prevail and ensure that concord

(‘ses pays et les miens ne seroit que une mesme chose’) and that their

union would lead to renewal of Christendom. But this was an unci-

phered letter and likely to have been for the Emperor’s consumption.

is raises the dicult question of the extent to which French

policy was coherent or torn by struggles for power between the vari-

ous advisers of Francis I, Annebault, Tournon and Mme d’Etampes.

François Nawrocki has now begun to clarify the problem, especially

in his insistence on the closeness of outlook between Annebault and

Tournon and their independence of Mme. d’Etampes.

It has been

argued that Annebault and Tournon wished for a closer understand-

ing with the Emperor while cardinal Jean du Bellay stood for a closer

alliance with the German princes.

is is probably too tidy a picture.

Judging by the terms of his instructions already quoted, Francis was

using the Bruges talks to test Anglo-Imperial understanding.

Despite

Annebault’s subtle handling of the direct talks with the English envoys

aer the Emperor’s departure, there was no hope of compromise over

Boulogne and at this stage the impression of double-dealing created late

in 1544 remained. Martin du Bellay, a member of Annebault’s suite,

described Gardiner as ‘this wicked bishop of Winchester, I wish the

devil had taken him, along with his master and all his subjects. I fear

greatly that the music will clash and our pipes will sound dissonant.’

Francis I to Mesnage, 28 Feb. 1546, Pierpoint Morgan MA 147.

Annebault’s real aim may have been to negotiate a marriage between Margue-

rite de France and Philip and thus secure an Imperial alliance, replacing the original

project of 1544 for a marriage between Orléans and a Habsburg princess. is is appar-

ent from CSP Spain, VIII, 172. e English were informed about this by Granvelle.

Nawrocki, ‘Annebault,’ part II, pp. 356–358, 386–390, 414–417.

M. François, Le cardinal de Tournon, p. 203.

Instructions, October 1545, see note 46 above. Francis outlines the oers made to

the English so far and states that, despite soundings, Henry has refused to submit his

case to the arbitration of the Emperor, Instruction to Fraisse, c. June/July 1545 (BnF

fr. 17888, fos. 57–58). Annebault le Brussels about 27 November. See his letters to

Mesnage, 27 and 28 Nov. 1545, BnF fr. 17889, fo. 289; 17890, fo. 154.

‘ce meschant évesque de Vincester, je vouldroye que le dyable l’eust emporté,