Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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380 chapter eight
e next morning, three pilots and three captains went out to recon-
noitre the entrance to the haven. It was, they reported, impossible to
attack.
135
What, then, was to be done? e captains decided whether
to move on to the Narrow Seas in order to overawe Boulogne or to
occupy the Isle of Wight. A place had been spotted by de Taix and
the engineer Jean de Saint-Remy, but it would have required the army
to occupy it for three months, when supplies could not be guaran-
teed. e easy way out was taken: to await the King’s instructions. Du
Bellay, unusually, expressed his own view. While deferring to Taix and
Saint-Rémy, ‘it seems to me that, in view of the King’s wish to secure
himself against his enemy the King of England, an opportunity was
there to do this which does not happen very oen. But God disposes
of matters as he pleases.’
136
One last encounter happened on the Isle of
Wight when the galleys stopped to take on water somewhere around
St Catherine’s point, the captain of the Ponant galleys, Blacas d’Aups
was killed by the English in an ambush on 21 July.
137
e second phase of the campaign now began but rst it was essen-
tial for Annebault to make good the losses he had suered. e Grande
Maîtresse and other ships were still under repair and it was neces-
sary for him to get his colleague Tournon to push this forward in the
Norman ports.
138
Supplies were also running short and Annebault had
to urge Matignon to get them moving since ‘the enemy’s navy gets
stronger daily and ours weakens.’
139
Annebault set sail for Dover along
the English coast, landing raiding parties at Newhaven and Brighton.
140
135
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 294–298.
136
Ibid., IV, pp. 297–298: ‘il me semble que veue l’aection et le moyen qu’avoit le
Roy de se mettre en repos contre son ennemy le roy d’Angleterre, il se presenta une
occasion pour ce faire, laquelle mal aisement de long temps s’orira; mais Dieu con-
duit les choses en la forme qu’il luy plaist.’ Du Bellay also thought that the 400 men
and 3000 pioniers ultimately le at Boulogne could have been landed on Wight and
maintained themselves for a month (ibid., IV, p. 300).
137
Du Bellay, IV, p. 298. La Roncière, Marine, III, p. 423.
138
Tournon to Matignon, 31 July, 2 Aug., 3 Aug. (‘de faire extreme diligence ou
radoub de la Grande Maistresse et autres navires’), 4 Aug., 5 Aug., 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14,
15, 16, 17 Aug. 1545, Correspondance de Matignon, pp. 130–140 all pushing for the
repair of ships.
139
Annebault to Matignon, rade of Boulogne, 4 Aug. 1545, Correspondance de
Matignon, no. CCII, pp. 132–133: ‘l’armée de l’ennemy se fortie journellement et [l]a
nostre se aoiblit.’
140
Stowe, Annales (1592), p. 994; Council to Norfolk, 31 July 1545, BL Harl. 6989,
fo. 138: P.S. ‘e Frenchemen be nowe upon the cost towards Dover between Hithe
and Lyde, eight miles from the lande. ey have sent their galees to Boloyn. ey
have made two or three descentes but all to our advantage.’ For a study of whether
the admirals
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war 381
en he crossed the Narrow Seas to Boulogne, where he had arrived in
the roads by 4 August.
141
ere he was able to land 4000 soldiers and
3000 pioniers to concert plans with marshal du Biez for the establish-
ment of the Outreau fort.
142
But the wind in the south, the French eet
made towards the English coast and was sighted o Rye on 9 August,
estimated at about 200 sail. Warned that Lisle and the English eet
were approaching, Annebault was in a dilemma; the seas were excep-
tionally rough and the winds unpredictable. e galleys may have been
dicult to handle. He risked being driven towards Flanders or trapped
against the English coast. Faced with the decision, he decided that,
should the wind die down, he would make out into the Channel and
take advantage of the French coast for shelter and to be able to use his
galleys, presumably hidden behind headland. e winds were bad the
next day but moderated the next. Annebault transferred to a galleon
in which he hoped to confront the English Admiral in person. All was
ready for a major confrontation, when the galleys sighted the English
eet on 14 August.
143
Was it the case, as Annebault thought, that the English eet was
getting stronger? To face the French, Lisle at the end of July had
62 ships and 10,390 men, though these were to be joined y sail
from the West Country and Bristol, including seven great hulks of
888 tons each, and 1,200 of soldiers beside sailors. Most of the western
ships, galleasses, shallops and rowbarges, were detailed to the wing
of oared vessels on 10 August.
144
In his instructions of 10 August he
the well-known drawing of the French raid on Brighton in the BL represents that of
1545, see A. Anscombe, ‘Prégent de Bidoux’s raid in Sussex in 1514 and the Cotton
MS. Augustus I(i).18’ in TRHS, ser. 3, 8 (1914), 103–111. Stowe’s entry makes fairly
clear that the drawing does represent 1545.
141
e report that Annebault was suering from an ear abcess at this time, propa-
gated by La Roncière, Marine, III, p. 424 and based on CSP Spain VIII, p. 223 is mis-
dated both in that compilation and in L&P, XX, i, 615. It should be dated February
1545; on raids on the English coast, APC, I, pp. 213–214.
142
La Roncière, III, pp. 424–425. Alvarotti to Ercole II, Caudebec, 4 Aug. 1545,
ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 201r: Prince of Mel told him ‘che Mons. Almiraglio
era anchora quivi in terra à quell forte di qua da Bologna, che si faccia gagliardamente,
et l’armata era quivi in quelli contorni, di modo che non poteva venire uno vello di
Inghilterra senza fare conto seco et che havea preso 3 navi di vivere.’
143
Du Bellay, IV, pp. 300–303 gives a detailed account of all this, though it is at times
dicult to follow. La Roncière, III, p. 426 attempts a perhaps imaginary clarication.
144
Cecil MSS, 137, fo. 76 (L&P, XX, ii, app. 27): a corrected version of Lisle’s rst
instructions, gives 64 ships plus the victuallers’ which be eight good ships.’ e cor-
rected version of the 3 August paper that mentions that the eet is ‘to be joined
to the forsaid battle’ by 50 Western ships, seven of which are great hulks of 888
382 chapter eight
was able to list 104 sail and 12,000 men, still half as many ships as
the French.
145
He had, though, nalised his battle plans on 3 August.
Part of these concerned communications, the display of Saint George
banners in particular places by dierent parts of the eet. e watch-
words ‘God Save the King’ to be answered by ‘long may he reign’ were
established. e rst of these documents was drawn up by 3 August. It
has been argued that this shows the inuence of Spanish naval tactics.
e Admiral proposed to order his ships in a vanguard in three ranks,
composed of the most powerful hired merchant ships and the king’s
own galleons and great ships, and supported by a strong rearguard of
smaller armed merchantmen. e key was to have two wings of oared
ships, galleasses and rowbarges. e vanguard was to be ordered in
three ranks rather like a blunt wedge. In the rst rank come eight
of the large merchantmen, mainly Hanseatic vessels (the Samson and
Johannes of Lubeck, the Trinity, Morion, and ‘Sepiar’ of Danzig and
the Mary of Hamburg);
146
in the second, ten of the King’s ships and
one private vessel; in the third, nineteen second-rate merchantmen.
e tactical aim was clearly that the heavy Hanseatic ships should
receive the rst shock and break up the enemy’s formation for the
royal ships, while the third rank could then be in position to support.
e wings, which were specially told o to keep the galleys in check,
contained all the king’s galleons of the latest type.
147
Lisle modied
this arrangement in a new set of instructions on 10 August. His eet
had been increased by the arrival of some of the west-country ships,
but the formation still retained the blunt wedge design, though simpli-
ed. ere was now to be a vanguard of 24 ships, a ‘battaill’ or main
(qu. 300?) ton apiece, and there are 1,200 soldiers, besides sailors. (For a list of 29
western ships soon to be ready, see L&P, XX, ii, 17.)e eet list compiled before the
sinking of the Mary Rose (Hateld House, CP, 201 fo. 57) lists 68 ships and 10,811
men. at compiled aer the sinking and at the start of the second half of the cam-
paign (NA SP1/205, fo. 46, L&P, XX, ii, 27.2) gives 69 ships.
145
Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, I, p. 77. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV,
p. 301: ‘cent bons navires.’
146
In May 1545, Francis I had complained to the Emperor ‘que ceulx d’Embourg et
aultres Ostrelins ont envoyé une partye de leurs navires armees en guerre en Angle-
terre pour en servir ledict Roy d’Angleterre.’ e Hanse had sent other ships into
France for trade claiming that their ships in England had been arrested but Francis
knew better and had arrested them. (Francis I to Mesnage, 3 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890,
fos. 58–59).
147
Instructions of 3 August: Julian S. Corbett, Fighting Instructions, pp. 20–22;
L&P, XX, ii, app. 27 for a version with amendments in the Cecil papers which sup-
pressed the idea of two wings.
the admirals
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war 383
body of 40 ships, and one ‘wing’ of 40 oared ‘galliasses, shallops and
boats of war.’ Ships were moved around from the earlier dispositions
(the Argosy of Southampton formerly in the vanguard, was now in the
battle, for instance though the Hanseatic ships were still in the front
line) A note was added in the revised version: ‘All these are but one
wing and are appointed to be in the weather gage-to attend only upon
the galleys.’ e ‘wing’ however, was still capable of acting in two divi-
sions, for, unlike the vanguard and ‘battaill,’ it had a vice-admiral as
well as an admiral.
148
Lisle had been le uncertain aer Annebault’s departure from the
Solent about which way to move but he nally le Portsmouth on the
morning tide of 12 August and struggled to make headway to Beachy
Head, with the wind in the east to south-east. Finally, he made visual
contact with Annebault’s eet on 15th. At 10 in the morning from
the Henry Grace a Dieu, oshore near Shoreham, he reported to the
King that:
thenymyes and we have sight one of thother, stryving who shalle gett
thadvauntage of the wynde; theyr gallys rowth faste for yt, and our Wyng
dothe thayre beste; they have yet thadvauntage of the same; never the les
they make no haste, soche as they mought do, and yf they were disposed
to fyght. Wherfor I thinke we shall not fyght this daye. ey have wether,
as they wold wishe, for it blowth littell wynde; . . . ey seame to be many
more shippes in nomber then we be; but the victorye restyth not all-
wayes in the nombers of shippes, nor men, but only in the goodnes of
God, workinge with Him, as moche as men maye, to serve the towrne;
wherin, God willinge, we shalle do that may ly in us, accordinge to our
dutys. And if it shalle plese Him to sende us a comodyus wynde, I have
good hope Your Majeste shalle here soche news of our procedinges
with theym, as shalbe extable unto the same, to the lawde and prayse of
Allmyghty God, who graunt yt so.
149
e location of the conict is given by one of the Italian galley com-
manders in French service as ‘in a very calm sea more than 25 miles
from the port of Wight.’ which would t the seas somewhere between
Shoreham and Beachy Head.
150
is is the conict described by Paget
in dramatic terms: between Lisle and the French eet ‘was such shott
148
Instructions of 10 August: Fighting Instructions, pp. 23–24; St.P., I, ii, 810.
149
Lisle to Henry VIII, 15 Aug. 1545 St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXVII.
150
ASM, Francia B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 226r (Alvarotti, 18 Aug. 1545, information from
captain Turchetto): ‘in una calma grandissima et lungi dalla isola et porto di Vuich
più du 25 miglia.’
384 chapter eight
at least Ml shott of canon . . . and the lyke hath not been harde of a
great tyme and yet thankes be to God no hurte don to us save the
breaking of thee howres and our ordinaunce hurde crasheng in their
shippes and galees.’
151
e following day was one of inconclusive manoeuvring in chang-
ing winds that generally favoured the galleys:
and all the same daye, frome noone untill night, they assailed us with
ther gallyes, but ther hole eete approached us not, untill it was aer
son settyng; before which tyme ther gallies were repulced, and then both
they and we came to ancker, within a leage one of an other: and yarly
in the mornyng they were dislodged; for by the tyme yt was daye, they
were asfarre into the wynde of us, as we might escrye them oute of my
mayne top.
152
However, Lisle singled out parts of his eet that had done well against
the galleys:
the Mystres, thAnne Gallaunt, the Greyhounde, with all Your Highnes
shalupes and roweng peeces, dyd ther partes right well; but especially
the Mystres, and thAnne Gallaunt, dyd so handle the gallyes, aswell with
ther sydes, as ther prowes, that your greate shippes in a manier had
letill to doe. er hole eete dyd still kepe thadvauntaige of the wynde,
makyng no hast towardes us, untill the son was almost set, by which
tyme ther gallyes were well beaten, and repulsed towardes them.
153
e French account of the combat is necessarily dierent in detail
though not in outcome. According to La Garde’s report to the Dauphin,
drawn up on 23 August, he led the galleys forward against the English
vanguard and damaged two of their ships. en, repeating his manoeu-
vre in the Solent, he withdrew, tempting the enemy to follow and come
up against the main French battle under Annebault. When the wind
changed, though, the Strozzi brothers decided to modify the plan. Piero
Strozzi, close to the Dauphin was reported as saying that
151
Paget to Norfolk, 25 Aug. 1545 NA SP1/206, fo. 156(219) (L&P, XX, ii, 209) –
the combat ‘satersday was sevenight’ i.e. 15 August. e account goes on ‘and yet
the ght endured from Friday ij a clock aer dinner until Saturday eight at nyght
at which tyme the wynde rising my L Admyral hoist his sayles . . . and ankored nere
them and in the night fearing we wold have faught with them, as in dede, the wynde
somewhat ryseng, was determined by my L Admyral, they dislodged and gone clere
out of sight.’
152
Lisle to Gage, from the Henry Grace a Dieu, o Beachy Head, 17 Aug. 9 pm,
St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXVIII (L&P, XX, ii, 151).
153
Lisle to Henry VIII, 17 Aug. 1545, St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXX.
the admirals
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war 385
Because of the cowardice of captain Paulin many actions which would
have been to the honour of the King were le undone, denounc-
ing Paulin . . . saying that Sunday 25th of last month with the English
navy out of its port in the straights and not yet in order of battle, that,
aer much dispute they had together, captain Paulin, the lord Prior [of
Capua] and San Piero in the end agreed to attack with their galleys and
judged victory likely.
en Polin de La Garde le the battle with his galleys ‘and this he was
lacking in his duty.’ Nor surprisingly La Garde put his own point of view
to Francis I.
154
is, with the dierences that had already arisen in the
Solent, led to a major campaign on the part of the Italians to blame La
Garde and Annebault for the failure of the campaign.
155
e result had
been massive confusion in the galley squadron and, though Du Bellay
does not mention this quarrel, he stresses the fury of the combat.
156
154
Alvarotti to Ercole II, 4 Sept. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 2, fo. 9: ‘per causa
et vigliacheria del capitano Polin si era restate di fare molte fattioni che si havreb-
bono potuto fare ad honore et utile del Re querelandoso del prefatto Capitano
Polino . . . dicendo che il sabbato che fu all 25 del passato, qualche videro l’armata
inglese fuori del porto in quella bonazza, et che non era ancho molto unità, che dopo
il molto ragionamento che hebbero insiemi, il capitano Polino il s. Priore et esso
S. Pietro, che al ne conclusero di andare con le loro galere ad assalirla, guidicando di
ripportarne vettoria.’ ‘et che in questo egli ha manchato del debbito suo.’
155
Yet again Giulio Alvarotti conveys the thinking of the Italian galley command-
ers on this battle. Gian Paolo Casella had come back to court with Piero Strozzi, who
said ‘che hano veduto l’armata inimica alli x, all 13, alli 14 et alli 15 di questo et che
quasi ogni volta havriano potuto combattere ma che in somma questa nostra non ha
mai volute combattere, non sa dire la raggione . . . . cosi conferma uno capitano Cesa-
rino da Genova che era pur in questa galera. Dicono che alli xv tutte due le armate se
videro verso la isola Voich; tre galere fra le quale era questa del signor Pietro Strozzi
andarono à taccare quattro navilii inimici, i quali per haver vento prospero haveriano
gelato à fondo dette galere se il signor Priore non le soccorrea; le galere ingrossaro n
al numero di xvi et donaro di molte canonate alle navi inimiche ma non ne acciaro
pero alcuna al fondo. Due galere abandorono et furno cacciate di modo che n hora
non hanno se siano salve o perdute. L’armata nostra vedeva il tutto, né mai se mosse,
di modo che questo soldati dicono apertamente che in fato monsr almiraglio non ha
volute combattere.’ (to Ercole II, Dieppe, 17 Aug. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1,
p. 217v (decipher). Paris Corregrano and Captain Tuchetto, in Strozzi’s galley, said
that on the Sunday morning, 15th, they spied the English eet and went into attack
but that ‘Il Capitano Polin come vide quel gran tirare d’artigliarie volto indrieto et
con lui tutte le altre galere, excetto il signor Prior che con le tre sue ando acanto al
signor Pietro, et tirava grandemente egli ancora alle navi .. concludeno che ne Polino
ne Monsr Almiraglio hanno volute combattere’ (Alvarotti to Ercole II, 18 Aug. 1545,
ibid., B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 228r–v, 223r.
156
‘Relation du combat naval entre les François et les Anglois en l’année 1545, le
jour de Nostre-dame d’aoust.’ (Sénarpont, 27 août 1545) ed. M. Chambois, Bulletin
historique et philologique du Comité des travaux historiques, 1891, pp. 325–329. Du
Bellay, IV, pp. 304–305: ‘L’escarmouche fut bien chaulde, car le matin il fut veu en
386 chapter eight
Finally, though, Lisle had to conclude that the French had slipped
away during the night. Annebault had in fact decided to put an end to
the campaign, perhaps exasperated by the indiscipline of the Strozzis,
perhaps despairing of the weather. At all events, his eet was back at
Le Havre on 16 August, a month aer his departure. e same day the
Admiral himself put in to Dieppe to join Francis at Arques. Du Bellay
says that he had to refresh his ships and land the sick.’
157
Lisle, who
was then back in the Solent, had spies out who reported Annebault’s
homecoming:
thAdmirall went on lande to the towne of Newhavon, with a greate
nomber of gentlemen in his compenye; but there was neither shotyng of
ordnaunce, nor any other apparaunce of rejoysyng at his commyng. . . . but
ther men of warr comith daillye from ther shippes, bringyng on land
ther harnes, ther coers, with other ther necessaries; and such a nomber
of sick and miserable creatures, as comith oute of the shippes, they never
sawe. ey seye it is not possible for ther armye to retourne any more
to the sea, this yere, both for skarcitie of victualles, and for lack of men.
For the moast part of theis, that have been oute, had rather be hanged,
than go furth agayne. ere ys no maner of couraige nor gladnes, nor
apparaunce of comforth amonges them. e common people (talking as
they dare) grudgeth, seyeng ther Kyng hath been at greate chardges and
nothyng doon.
158
e cold welcome for Annebault at Le Havre was not necessarily a
mark of royal disfavour but one ambassador certainly reported that
the withdrawal of the French eet to Le Havre le the king of England
‘signor del mare.’
159
ere is no doubt that supplies were desperately
short. One galley commander armed that the eet had consumed
in a month provisions assembled for three, without damaging the
mer plusieurs corps morts et forces pieces de bois, et ne fut pas tiré moins de trois
cens coups d’artillerie tant d’un costé que d’autre.’
157
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 305: ‘refreschir son armée et descendre grand nom-
bre des malades.’
158
Lisle to Henry VIII, St. Helen’s Point, 21 Aug. 1545, St.P., I, ii, p. 823, no. CCXXXII.
Loades, Northumberland, p. 72 suggests that that this outbreak of plague may explain
why Annebault seems so ineective in this campaign. It is, though, dicult to imagine
how much longer he could have kept his ships supplied.
159
‘Da M. omaso del Vecchio et dal vicino ho inteso che Sua Maestà ha fatto la
maggior chiera dela mondo à Mons. Almiraglio, et ha ditto che non poteva portarsi
et goverarsi al mondo meglio di quello che ha fatto.’ But the same source went on to
claim that neither the Admiral nor La Garde wanted to ght. (Alvarotti, 20 Aug. 1545,
ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 232. Guidiccione, 31 Aug. 1545, ANG, III, p. 386.
the admirals
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war 387
enemy.
160
On the face of it, the massive eort expended by the French
on this campaign does seem to have evaporated into thin air. It has
been argued that, given a little more luck and better winds, the French
Admiral could have defeated his English opposite number.
161
Yet time
aer time, the employment of galley tactics in the Channel, with such
a theoretical edge in times of changing winds, seems not to have served
its purpose. e English were throughout inferior in numbers but con-
sistently managed to avoid the traps set for them. As the Venetian
ambassador Marino Cavalli commented, Annebault withdrew from
the Isle of Wight with little honour and, unable to escape the English
eet, all he could do was to land men at Boulogne to build the fort of
Outreau, a fortress that seemed unlikely to achieve its purpose.
162
Lisle, as we have seen, returned to Portsmouth (24 August) aer
the main engagement, assured that the French eet had returned to
port. Yet until 23 August there were still French ships in the narrow
seas, as Wriothesley commented, so that supplies could only be got to
Calais and Boulogne by night.
163
Lisle received orders to send ships to
‘keep’ the narrow seas, revictual his ships, and then proceed to attack
the French coast, evidently in revenge for the ravages of the French
the previous month.
164
Consequently, on 2 September he sailed to
Normandy to capture Tréport, where he burned the town, some vil-
lages and manor houses and an abbey, destroying thirty ships in the
harbour. But his own ships were now infected with plague and he
had to call a halt and return to base.
165
How was the outcome of the
campaign viewed in England? Once Lisle had returned to England and
the campaign was over, a solemn Te Deum was sung at Saint Paul’s
160
Alvarotti to Ercole II, 17 Aug. 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, fo. 217v, infor-
mation from Gian Paolo Casella.
161
Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, p. 386.
162
Relazione of Marino Cavalli, Alberi, Relazioni degli ambaciatori veneti, ser. I, 6 vols
(1839–1862) I, pp. 275–6 (L. Firpo, Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti, (Turin, 1965–),
V, pp. 219–20.
163
Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 160.
164
‘An order devised for . . . my Lord Admiral,’ NA SP1/207, fos. 8–10 (L&P, XX, ii,
229): Lisle is to ‘set hym self towards the French cost and . . . shall take his commodite
as the wynde and weder will sorte to burne and wast such townes and villages and
other places . . . as he shall may burne conveniently.’
165
Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 160 misdates this 18 September. Hall, ed. Whibley, II,
p. 353 does not give a date. Guidiccione to Farnese, Amiens, 5 Sept. 1545, ANG III,
p. 203. Council to Hertford, 5 Sept. 1545, St.P., V, no. DLXI, p. 508; Lisle and others
to Henry VIII, 14 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fo. 176 (St.P., I, p. 833): only 8488 men
were le uninfected and of these 4784 were available for the eet at sea aer coastal
defence had been arranged.
388 chapter eight
‘to give laude and prayse to God for the victorie that God had sent the
Kinges Majestie in Scotland, and that the French armie was departed
from Bolleyne.’
166
No such pomp is recorded in France. e two eet commanders
had in a sense to account for their actions. Despite the attacks on
Annebault’s valour and honour by the Strozzi brothers, Francis I,
though he was undoubtedly dismayed by the outcome of the cam-
paign (followed shortly aer by the death of his favourite son), seems
not to have held him personally responsible. François Nawrocki has
made a good case for the diligence and prudence of the Admiral as a
commander but admits that he was not made for battles at sea.
167
is
is not to re-emphasise Charles de La Roncière’s surely exaggerated and
mistaken idea that the French eet was in a state of chaos by 1547 as a
result of L’Artigue’s defection and poor administration.
168
As for England, Lisle, an habitually introspective man, told Paget
that he was ‘not of the estimation to have the mayning of so mightie
a chardge, I do thynck I shuld have doon his majeste better service
in some meaner oce, wherin to be directed’ rather than himself be
director. Great commands, he asserted belonged to those who had
great credit and were feared.
169
He had not sunk the French eet but
had fought it o and exacted some revenge on the French mainland.
Of course, unlike his French counterpart, he had no serious attacks on
his honour to contend with and had beneted from royal patronage
over the previous year to the extent that he had become one of the
richest landowners in England. Nevertheless, if he expected to reap the
reward of a greater oce such as that of Lord Great Master (in succes-
sion to the recently-deceased Suolk), he was to be disappointed.
170
Naval conicts continued in the Narrow Seas right up to the sig-
nature of the peace since the crossing had to be controlled to ensure
regular supplies to the garrison at Boulogne and Ambleteuse. is is
despite the King’s apparent desire to lay up his great ships on the argu-
ment that the French were unlikely to come forth that year. ‘Waers’
were still needed for victualling and the French threat had not gone
166
Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 161.
167
Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, pp. 385, 388, 390.
168
C. de La Roncière, Marine, III, pp. 453–454; idem, ‘Henri II, précurseur de Colbert,’
Bib. Ecole des Chartes, 66 (1905), 633–654.
169
Lisle to Paget, 17 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/208, fo. 2r (L&P, XX, ii, 391).
170
Loades, Northumblerland, pp. 72–73.
the admirals
’
war 389
away.
171
Spies reported to Lisle at the start of April 1546 that a sup-
ply eet of 100 ships was ready at Bordeaux to be escorted to Etaples
by three new galleasses from Bayonne of 300 t. each, two great ships
of Bayonne of 400 another another of Brittany of 600. ere were 16
ships ready at Dieppe (led by the Sacre) and two galleys. Fieen ‘tall
ships’ were ready at Le Havre to take on soldiers and at Honeur there
were three galleys with 15 more being rigged at Rouen. Lisle was only
waiting for the King’s ten rowbarges and a tall ship from the West
Country led by Reskymer to intercept the Bordeaux eet if not attack
the base at Etaples.
172
On 10 May, Lisle, having le the peace talks for
a while to rejoin his eet in the Downs, noted that Paget
dyd see sume of the gallys take theyr helys, and in case the wether had
not byn so extreme and also so contrary to come to the resycue of theym,
you shold have hard of better sporte. Never the les they do reioyse little
in this wether for yf yt were but only this wether that puttith theym from
theyr feate, I do here saye that the bekens a built fayre lenghe in Sussex
were fyred this daye. I do moche merveyle yf it be soo that they wold
rayse the contreys for so smalle a nombre.
173
Polin de La Garde and the baron de Saint-Blancard had up to 18
galleys based at Etaples, detailed to help supply the French fort and
to interrupt English communications. On 21 May 1546 there was
encounter in which Saint-Blancard’s galley was captured.
174
e action
seems to have begun with an attempt by the French galleys at Portel
to capture some supply ships coming into Boulogne. e next day,
lord William Howard came into the harbour, there was an exchange
of re and on the following day the main English eet including the
Great Mistress, Anne Gallant, Salamander and Greyhound, came in
view. A later prize hearing by the Admiralty Court gives a picture of
the battle very similar to the nal stages of the campaign of the sum-
mer of 1545. Witnesses from the French crew claimed that the French
galleys, seeing the English ships approaching them, Polin de La Garde
sent a frigate around the galley eet to single out six of the best to ‘take
171
Council to Lisle, April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 517; Lisle to Paget, 2 April, ibid., 520;
Lisle to Council, 4 April, ibid., 538.
172
Lisle to Paget, 7 April 1546, St.P., I, 841 (L&P, XXI, i, 563).
173
Lisle to Paget, 10 May 1546, Plas Newydd, Anglesey MSS, Box 1 no. 8, fos. 13–14.
174
Bernard d’Ornezan, baron de Saint-Blancard was the son of the galley com-
mander Bertrand (d. 1539), who led the famous expedition to the Levant in 1538 about
which Juan de la Vega wrote Le voyage de la croisière du Baron de Saint-Blancard. e
younger Saint-Blancard remained in captivity in England until January 1547.