Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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360 chapter eight
cost would have been around 300,000 lt. per month, a colossal sum,
though one which of course did not reect the initial investment cost
in ships.
61
Land forces were simpler; as a point of comparison, the cost
of 16,300 troops in garrison throughout northern France for a month
in 1558 was 377,781 lt. and a major eld army in the 1550s cost between
500 and 700,000 lt. pm
62
Monluc later recalled that ‘the King’s desire
for vengeance on the King of England put him to massive expense.’
63
As it happens, the total expenditure on the French crown for naval
aairs in 1545 is known; it was 1,929,845 lt., of which 1,379,248 lt. was
for extraordinaires, in other words for the campaigns in the Channel
and Scotland.
64
is was the most expensive year for the navy in
Francis I’s reign.
In the middle of June, the English Admiral, Lisle, was preparing
a pre-emptive strike against the French eet before it was ready by
sailing into the Seine estuary. is illustrates some of the contrasting
tactics of the two navies. Lisle, alerted to the assembly of French ships
between Hareur and Le Havre in ‘le Fosse,’ aimed ‘eyther to make a
present of sum of the best of them unto Your Highnes, or at the leest
to set fyre on them.’ To do this, he aimed to set some small ships to
appear to pursue some old hulks (then under arrest in the Downs) into
the estuary of the Seine, have them re some artillery before withdraw-
ing so he could deploy the whole eet in an attempt to capture the
Philippe and its neighbouring ships and set them on re.
65
Appalling
weather and the fact that the English eet had still not assembled
61
Saint-Mauris to Covos, 7 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, p. 382: mentions 300 ships. Cavalli,
Relazione, in L. Firpo, Relazione di ambasciatori veneti al senato 14 vols, (Turin, 1965–).
F. Nawrocki, ‘Annebault’ (2009), I, p. 375, using an Etat de prévision (BnF Moreau 737, fos.
169–173) for the eet being assembled early in 1547 (see below, Conclusion) notes that
44 ships (mainly galleys) were scheduled to transport 5000 troops. Five times as many
in 1545 would have required 220 ships but the galleys could not have carried more
than 50 soldiers and only the great ships between 300 and 500 men. e total number
of ships must therefore be closer to 300. Nawrocki computes the cost of 300,000 lt. by
extrapolating from the cost of this eet, 72,709 lt. for the rst month. 5000 soldiers
were to be paid 25,000 lt. p.m. e ‘soulde et entrenement’ of a galley for one quarter
in peacetime was 2700 lt. (Quittance of Villegaignon, 15 Feb. 1550, BnF fr. 26133,
no. 438).
62
BnF Clair. 346, fos. 77–92; Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 218.
63
Monluc, Commentaires (Pléiade), p. 179: ‘le désir que le Roy avoit de se venger
du Roy d’Angleterre le t entrer en une extreme despense.’
64
See Potter, Renaissance France at War, appendix 6 based on BnF fr. 17329
fos. 82–112.
65
Lisle to Henry VIII, undated but around mid-June 1545, St.P., I, no. CCXII,
pp. 787–788 (L&P, XX, i, 987).
the admirals
’
war 361
delayed this project. Lisle was only able, just before 24 June, to send
the Newe Barke, the Jennett (a galley) and some boats from of Rye to
scour the sea as far as Dieppe.
66
Van der Del reported on 27 June that
Lisle had le to attempt some exploit against the French eet. e only
substantial account of his attempt to enter Le Havre is by Edward Hall,
who recorded that the English shot o their artillery into the French
eet o Le Havre but that the French galleys came out against them
‘whiche Galies had greate advauntage, by reason of the calm wether:
twyse eche part assaulted other with ordinaunce but sodainly the wynd
rose so greate, that the Galies could not indure the rage of the seas.’
For their part, the English had to withdraw to Portsmouth for fear of
sandbanks. A Spanish agent at Rouen reported on 3 July that ‘nues-
tras galleras’ had put to ight the English armada which came to Le
Havre, ‘with great loss to the English.’
67
Lisle returned to Portsmouth,
where he attended Council meetings with the King to prepare coastal
defences.
68
e sailing date had been set for 8 July and all was thus ready for
the grand review of the eet by Francis I from the neighbouring cli
tops of Chef-de-Caux on 12th.
69
e eet was drawn up around the
Admiral’s great agship, one of the most powerful of the age, the great
carrack Philippe, constructed of 800 t. under Admiral Chabot and car-
rying 100 bronze cannons.
70
e kitchens were working overtime to
entertain the great princes and nobles and by some misfortune they
caught re. e re quickly got out of hand and the fact that the ag-
ship was carrying an enormous store of powder and artillery ready
primed made the vast explosions worse. Built to be unsinkable, the ship
66
Lisle to Council, c. 24 June 1545, St.P., I, no. CCXIV, pp. 791–792 (L&P, XX, i,
1023).
67
Hall, ed. Whibley, II, p. 351; Van der Del, 2 July 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1087; ‘French
news’ 3 July 1545, NA SP1/203, fo. 57 (L&P, XX, i, 1101): ‘con gran perdida de los
yngleses.’ Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 284–285 places this attack ‘peu de jours’ aer
the King’s arrival at Toucques on 27 June. He records that ‘trente cinq navires angle-
sches, qui tirerent à coup perdu en terre’ but that they retreated before the galleys. See
also Bernardo de Medici to Duke of Tuscany, 14 July 1545, Négociations de la France
et de la Toscane, III, p. 166 and Saint Mauris to Los Cobos, 27 July 1545, CSP Spain,
VIII, no. 104 reports that Lisle’s raid caused panic in Francis I’s entourage (he was
three leagues away), with his baggage being prepared for ight.
68
Loades, Northumberland, p. 69.
69
NA SP1/203, fo. 57: ‘la magestad del rey ha mandado que a los ochos deste mes
salga toda l’armada.’ Saint Mauris reported the day of the incident as 15th (letter to
Los Cobos 27 July, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 104).
70
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 286.
362 chapter eight
burned ercely but slowly, destroying a vast store of munitions, valuable
provisions and expensive armour. ough the Admiral was safe, 1200
soldiers and sailors were killed.
71
ere was much rejoicing in England
when this news arrived. Charles Wriothesley recorded that the:
great carycke called Rumpye La Conte, by misfortune of fyre was burnte;
many lords, ladyes, and gentlemen beinge in hir, with great ordinance
and substance and a million of goulde in hir, which was to have payd his
men of warre their wages, was burnt and lost and noe creature saved.
72
Monluc recalled in an addition to his Commentaires, that from the
time he saw the great carrack destroyed, ‘I had a bad feeling about
our campaign.’
73
At all events, the Admiral was able to transfer to the
Grande Maîtresse and the eet put out into the Channel.
The Navy of Henry VIII
What kind of navy could the English bring out against this monster eet?
Opinions varied about its size and quality. Some observers thought that
the English were stronger in the Channel
74
while others thought the
eet had been allowed to deteriorate. e Duke of Suolk thought the
eet disorganised and that nothing was ready and there had certainly
been problems. Wyndham, for instance, in June 1544 was despatched
westwards with the New Barke, but ‘so goodly a vessel, so well fournys-
shed with ordnance hathe but hale a barrel of powder.’
75
On the other
hand, we know that it was precisely in the 1540s that the organization
71
For the sources on this, see Nawrocki, I, pp. 376–377.
72
Wriothesley, Chronicle, p. 157. Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 286 says that the
King’s money was saved. Wriothesley put all this in the context of unusual tempests
and lightning strikes in France and England. Why he produced such a strange name
for the great carrack is uncertain.
73
Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault, Pléiade), p. 179: ‘j’eus mauvaise opinion
de nostre enterprise.’
74
e view of the informant of the Imperial ambassador in France in February
1545, L&P, XX, i, 615.
75
La Ronciere, Marine, III, pp. 410–411 (references do not coincide) gives an exces-
sively bleak view of the English eet; Suolk was, though, generally negative about the
state of the eet in the summer of 1545: e.g.: ‘many of Your Hieghnes maryners and
souldiours have fallen sick, and many of them not able to contynue the sees, whiche
we thinke groweth by the greate hete, and the corrupcion of ther victuall, by reason
of the disorder in the provision, and strayte and warme lying in the shippes.’ (St.P., I,
i, no. CCXX) See also St.P., X, pp. 303, 368. Russell to the Council, 17 June 1544, NA
SP1/188, fo. 172(193) (L&P, XIX, i, 724).
the admirals
’
war 363
of the navy took much clearer form, with the nucleus of the Navy Board
in being by 1545, including the vice-admiral, controller and treasurer.
e Navy Board seems to become visible in the archives from about
1545 though some innovations (for instance Cromwell’s appointment
of Stephen Vaughan as agent for the purchase of naval supplies in the
Netherlands) probably go back to the late 1530s. e initiative for this
may stem from the energy of John Dudley, viscount Lisle, appointed
Lord Admiral in January 1543 in succession to Russell, a post he kept
until the end of the reign. ere is good reason to think that he was a
more energetic and interventionist Admiral than many of his prede-
cessors, from the start spending time at the Deptford dockyards and
displaying a clear grasp of essential detail.
76
At the beginning of Henry VIII’s reign, an ad hoc network of agents
(such as the clerk of the ships) received disbursements of funds from
the Council for every small item of expenditure. e Clerk of the Ships
was largely responsible just for the Portsmouth dockyard founded by
Henry VII. is developed into a coherent administrative structure in
which the Treasurer of the Navy, from the 1530s down to his suicide in
1544, William Gonson, a ship-owner and merchant based at Deptford,
received large sums from direct taxation or the Augmentations Oce
to spend on his own initiative. So, in 1539, Gonson was allocated £500
for naval expenditure; Loades has argued that normal peacetime naval
expenditure stood at around £5000 p.a. in the 1530s, rising to £10,000
in the crisis of 1539. Alongside Gonson was John Winter (d. 1545),
Treasurer for Marine causes, who also received sums direct from
Augmentations, and whose son William was already one of the most
active naval commanders. e Treasurers of the navy in 1545–1546
received payments of at least £22,214 and probably more.
77
is was
only the tip of the iceberg. As has been seen, Henry VIII’s total naval
expenditure between 1542 and 1547 was £265,024.4.3 (see chapter 5
and Appendix 8).
76
E.g. his letter to Paget from the King’s house at Deptford, 7 Nov. 1543, NA
SP1/182, fo. 73 (L&P. XVII, ii, 348).
77
e best studies of all this are C.S.L. Davies, ‘e administration of the royal navy
under Henry VIII: the origins of the Navy Board,’ EHR, 80, no. 315 (1965), 268–288
and Loades, Tudor Navy, pp. 74–102, who suggested that Lisle was the dynamic force
behind change in the 1540s. In general terms, most recently, N.A.M. Rodger, e
Safeguard of the Sea. A Naval History of Britain, vol. I, 660–1649 (London, 1997, pbk,
2004). For naval disbursements, 1545–1546: L&P, XX, i, 782, 881, 1268; ibid., ii, 156,
1051; ibid., XXI, i, 100, 116, 208, 386, 635.
364 chapter eight
In that period, the sum allocated for shipbuilding and repair
was £45,230.18.8, though this was dwarfed by the cost of wages
(£127,846.10.7). ere were a few ‘great ships’ of 1000 tons or above
(the most famous example being the Henry Grace a Dieu/ Great Harry
built in 1513), medium sized ships of around 500 tons and a host
of lesser types, including conscripted merchant ships. Early in 1535,
Norfolk and Fitzwilliam arranged to show Chapuys two new ships,
one nearly nished the other much less so, being built on the ames
in the Deptford dockyard that Henry had developed since the 1520s.
e ships were probably the Sweepstake (300 tons) and the Less Bark
(400 tons), though the unnished vessel could also have been the rebuilt
Mary Rose. Norfolk in particular was bullish, repeating ‘that it was a
ne thing for a king of England to have such ships to give pause for
thought to those who would attack him’ praising their size, structure
and armament. Chapuys was clear about the message he was meant to
receive: with such ships Henry ‘could ght the whole world.’
78
In the crisis of spring 1539, a eet of 120 ships had been put
together according to Marillac.
79
e King at that time probably had,
at the most, 47 ships of his own (all but ten over 100 tons).
80
is
was an exaggeration. In 1540, asked for his assessment of the English
eet, Marillac reported that the King had 13 or 14 ships of his own at
the most (a serious underestimate), three of which, the Great Harry
(a monster that could carry 700 men, 400 of them soldiers), the Mary
Rose and the Peter Pomegranate, were ‘great ships’ of 1000 to 1500 tons.
e rest were lighter but well stocked with artillery. Otherwise, there
were in England only 7 or 8 ships of greater than 400–500 tons, these
belonging to courtiers and rich London merchants. As for the rest,
78
Chapuys to Charles V, 14 Jan. 1535, NA PRO31/18/2/2, no. 127, fo. 8 (CSP Spain,
V, i, no. 126; L&P, VIII, no. 48). ‘que c’estoit une belle chose à ung roy d’Angleterre
d’estre pourveu de telz vaisseaulx pour faire penser ceulx qui luy vouldroyent courir
sus’ ‘pourroit combatre tout le monde.’ Chapuys says that the dockyard was half-way
between London and Greenwich, which must mean Deptford (he was living at Step-
ney). e Deptford shipyard was fully operational, though it is oen claimed to date
from 1542.
79
Marillac to Francis I, 15 April, Kaulek, p. 90: ‘il n’y a pas moings de quatre vingts
à cent navires de guerre pretz et appareillez pour combatre.’ 5 or 6 ships were con-
stantly on patrol in conjunction with the coastal beacons. (the corresponding despatch
to Montmorency for this day is corrupted but seems to hint at 150 sail). Same to same,
20 May 1539, Kaulek, p. 98: plans to form a eet of 120 ships carrying 10,000 men.
80
M. Oppenheim, A history of the administration of the Royal Navy and of mer-
chant shipping in relation to the Navy from 1509 to 1660 (London, 1896), pp. 49–51;
Loades, Tudor Navy, p. 94.
the admirals
’
war 365
there were light vessels, only suitable for local seas and not passing
further than Bordeaux. At need the government also hired ships from
friendly Hanseatic cities or arrested Ragusan, Genoese or Venetian
ships. Fiy decent ships was the limit for war even though the English
claimed they could call on 100 and ‘if they could assemble 70–80 sail,
that would be the greatest eort they could make in an emergency.’
81
Marillac also noted in 1540, of sailors in the English eet, that ‘la
pluspart sont estrangiers.’ is perhaps reects the increasing short-
age of recruits by the 1540s. In response to this, in January 1545, the
death penalty was imposed by proclamation for desertion from the
King’s ships. On the same day there was an increase in wages from, 5s
a month to 6/8d at a time when it was estimated that 5000 men would
be needed, though likely to be raised with diculty.
82
Another response
to the problem was an extraordinary attempt to create an equivalent to
French galley slavery for the King’s oared ships. Rogues and ruans
were to be scoured up for this purpose. Nevertheless, when a French
galley was taken, its ‘forsados’ were well treated and Admiral Lisle, for
one, showed a degree of compassion for them. When taking the Galley
Blancard round from the ames to Boulogne he had them towed ‘to
kepe the forsados in ure and breth as they must contynewally be, oth-
erwise they wilbe shortly nothyn worth.’ He had them provided with
new clothes since they were ‘most miserable without any manner of
thyngs to hange upon theym.’
83
All the same it had to be accepted that there were too many alterna-
tive sources of employment. e Duke of Norfolk reported in June 1545
that all the sailors of Norfolk and Suolk were either serving the King
or gone to Iceland for the shing.
84
Privateering also provided an
81
Marillac to Francis I, 1 Oct. 1540, Kaulek, pp. 226–227 (L&P, XVI, 110): ‘s’ilz
faisoient jusques à soixante-dix ou quatre-vingtz voiles, ce seroit le plus grand eort
qu’ilz pourroient faire en un extrême besoing.’ ‘Ledict seigneur, Sire, a communément
environ treize ou quatorze naufz sciennes pour le plus’ though in very good order, built
in the previous years of emergency and including the three ‘great ships.’ Loades, Tudor
Navy, p. 93, has interpreted this as ‘30 or 40’ and indeed 13 or 14 must be too low.
82
25 Jan. 1545, Hughes and Larkin, I, nos. 244, 245 pp. 346–348.
83
Proc. 26 May 1545, L&P, XX, i, 812: inveighing against ‘detestable vices and
fashions commonly used at the Banke and such like naughty places, where they much
haunt and in manner lie nightly for the accomplishment and satisfying of their vile,
wretched, and lthy purposes,’ such ‘ruyns, vagabondes, masterles men, common
players and evil disposed persons’ are to picked up for service in the King’s galleys.
Lisle to Paget, 15 July 1546, NA SP1/221, fo. 200 (L&P, XXI, i, 1281).
84
Norfolk to Paget, Orfordness, 27 June 1545, L&P, XX, i, 1045.
366 chapter eight
attractive alternative form of work for sailors. As James MacDermott
has shown, the 1540s saw a signicant increase in this activity as well
as of its strategic signicance. In September 1544 William Hawkins
and two others were commissioned to raid the King’s enemies in a pri-
vate capacity though drawing on supplies from the West Country.
85
e other reason for the shortage of sailors was the expansion of the
navy. It is the case that royal ship-building was in the doldrums before
1540 and largely conned to rebuilding. In January 1539, a survey of
the King’s ships in the ames revealed that the Mary Rose, Peter
Pomegranate and Mynyon, were ‘new made’ but their masts, although
ready, were not set up and would take 3 months more. e Primrose
and Sweepstake were also new made and could sail at 20 days’ notice,
while the Great Galye, Lesser Barke, Genet and Lyon would be ready
in 20. Only the Trinity was ‘in good poynte.’
86
Some of these ships
were in origin very old: the Mary Rose (1510, rebuilt 1536–1539), Peter
Pomegranate (1510, rebuilt 1536–1539), the Great galley/Barke (1515,
rebuilt 1538–1539) and the Henry grace a Dieu (1514, rebuilt 1539).
But though they might have seemed antiquated (the average life of
a ship in the Mediterranean, as we have seen, was 12 years, though
in northern waters this may have been longer), they were fully re-
equipped for the wars of the 1540s. e same ships were being sur-
veyed again in 1542 by Gonson, most of them needing planks replaced
or ‘skarfe’ removed in dry dock.
87
ere was a rapid programme of
new building aer 1542 when 18 new ships of 300–450 tons were
built. A programme of building rowbarges was particularly evident in
1546 aer the 1545 campaign revealed the value of oared vessels (the
Cloud, Double Rose, Flower de Luce, Gillyower, Harp, Maiden Head,
Portcullis, Rose in the Sun, Rose Slip, Sun, ree Ostrich Feathers).
88
In 1544–1545, 11 ships, mostly galleasses over 100 tons, were added
by various means to the eet (including the Anne Gallant, Brigandine,
Greyhound, Great Mistress, Hare, Hind, Roo, Sakre, Swallow). Prizes
(L’Artigue’s La Ferronière renamed Lartique, the Mary James and
Salamander, all taken in 1543), were also brought into service. In
85
James MacDermott, England the Spanish Armada: e Necessary Quarrel. (New
Haven, Conn. and London, 2005). ch. 1. L&P, XIX, ii, 340 (6) grants to Hawkins.
86
Hateld House, Cecil Papers, 201, fo. 39v, ‘e number and state of the
Kinges . . . shippes in the Tamys.’
87
Ibid., fo. 4: ‘e opinions of William Gunson paymaster and controller and
Edward Water, Clerke of the Kinges majsties ships.’ (1542).
88
Oppenheim, Administration, pp. 50–51.
the admirals
’
war 367
March 1546, 4 new ships were being built at Deptford (together, 1,000
tons, 720 men).
89
In addition, in 1544–1545 the crown hired, and oen
later bought, a number medium to large sized ships (for example the
Jesus of Lubeck, 600 tonnes) which did duty in the vanguard of the eet
in 1545. Also pressed into service were ‘hulks’ (heavy merchants ships,
carvel or clinker) from Germany, Spain and Italy, 4–500 tons with
crews typically of 26–28, which were already equipped with a range of
small artillery pieces, rearms and slings.
90
By 1544–1545, then, the royal navy formed a nucleus of 60–70 ves-
sels to which conscripted merchantmen could be added at need. While
some English ports, such as Southampton and the Cinq Ports, were
in decline, others such as Bristol and Newcastle were ourishing. In
1546, half of Newcastle’s 50 ships were reported as ready for the King’s
service.
91
Navigation was still largely the domain of the ship’s master;
the captain had a dierent role. e King’s ships were captained some-
times by experienced sailors but oen by soldiers and, judging by the
navy lists throughout these years, captains were not regularly attached
to one particular ship. Between 1544 and 1545, the captaincies of the
royal ships were completely changed. To take a couple of examples, in
1544 the sailor Adam Outlawe was in command of the Great Shallop
and then the Cavendish Shallop (both of Dover) when he ferried the
Duke of Suolk over to France. Later in the year, he was captain of
the royal ship the New Barke. Outlawe died at the end of 1544 and
the New Barke was then captained by William Tyrell (who had cap-
tained the Swallow in 1544) in the summer of 1545.
92
In 1544, the royal
ship Sweepstake was captained by Edward Wates but in the summer of
89
L&P, XXI, i, 498.
90
For dates of construction in the light of recent research, C.S. Knighton and
D. Loades, e Anthony Roll of Henry VIII’s Navy: Pepys Library 2991 and British
Library Additional MS 22047 with related documents (Aldershot: Navy Records Society,
2000), appendix II, pp. 160–168. e most comprehensive list, drawn up in 1550 is
‘e declaration of names of such shipps as did serve in the warrs againste Fraunce’
from Feb. 1545–July 1546 in CUL, Dd.XIII. 25. On hulks: ‘Shippes in the ryver of
ames xxviij July 1545 thought meate to serve’ NA SP1/204, fo. 150 (L&P, XX, i, 1295).
91
G.V. Scammel, ‘War at sea under the early Tudors,’ Archaeologia Aeliana, 38
(1960), 73–.
92
Archbold (ed.), ‘Diary of the expedition of 1544,’ p. 503; 1544 lists: L&P, XIX, ii,
502.4; Gonson’s accounts, ibid., XIX, ii, 674. Outlawe’s will: NA PROB 11/30. 1545 list,
Hateld House, CP, 201, fo. 57. Outlawe and Dustone Newdigate had been operating
o the east coast in 1543 (L&P, XVIII, i, 200).
368 chapter eight
1545 by the Hereford gentlemen Sir George Cornewall, who had led
his retinue in the siege of Montreuil the previous year.
93
‘Great ships’ were essentially battle-ghting machines, heavily
equipped with artillery and high ghting castles; they could be rather
unhandy. Carracks were lighter but still deep draught ships, broad and
round with tall castles. In 1544, three ships of over 400 tons were built:
the Pauncey, the Grand Mistress and the Anne Gallant. e latter two
were four-masted galleons of 450 tons, with two gun decks. ey were
in some sense hybrid vessels. ey also had oars and so should be
dened as galleasses, though were principally sailing vessels, forerun-
ners of the galleons of the Elizabethan era.
94
Seven ships of similar
size were built. e Salamander was captured in 1544. Most English
ships shared the characteristics of their competitors. Where they had
the edge, and this was oen noted, was in artillery. ere was a wide
variety of bronze and iron guns but the numbers grew signicantly
between 1500 and 1540. en, the 1540s saw a rapid development of
the iron industry in the Weald, masterminded by parson Levett, Henry
VIII’s curiously chosen commissioner for cannon balls. In 1543, Levett
employed Ralph Hogge at Buxted and Mareseld, advised ironically
by the French iron master Pierre Baude, to cast the rst iron cannon
there. is made the mass production of reliable and cheaper cast iron
cannon possible.
95
By the end of the war, the courtier Sir John Gage
was receiving grants of iron works in the area.
96
e Mary Rose had
96 guns, six of them the heaviest. Even relatively modest ships such
as the Lion (160 tons) had 33 guns. What is more, it was precisely
in the middle of the 1540s that the idea of the broadside seems to
have emerged.
97
e evidence for this is apparent in a comparison. e
93
L&P, XIX, i, 502.4, Cecil MSS, 201, fo. 57.
94
Loades, Tudor Navy, p. 95.
95
John Stowe, e Annales of England (London: R. Newbery, 1592), p. 986: ‘is
yere [1543] the rst cast pieces of yron that ever were made in England were made
at Buxteade’; C. Ffoulkes, Gun-founders of England with a List of English and Conti-
nental Gun-Founders from the XIV to XIX Centuries (Cambridge, 1937), pp. 71–81;
J.S. Hodgkinson, e Wealden Iron Industry (Stroud, 2000); B. Awtry and C. Whittick,
‘e lordship of Canterbury, iron founding at Buxted and the continental antecedents
of cannon-founding in the Weald,’ Sussex Archaeological Collections, 140 (2004 for
2000), 71–81. Parson William Levett was ordered to prepare over 1000 iron balls in
July and was paid £200 for iron pieces and shot in August 1545 (APC I, pp. 213, 230).
96
A royal grant of 1546 to Gage included a ‘forge or style or of iron’ in the forest
of Ashdown, a ‘furneys’ in West Hoathly, ‘certain iron mills’ formerly leased to Sir
Anthony Browne (ESRO, G 19/6).
97
Loades, Tudor Navy, p. 96.
the admirals
’
war 369
‘Book of Orders for the War by Land and Sea’ was written at Henry’s
command by omas Audley. At this time, port-ring guns had been
in use for about twenty years but were still seen as of use mainly for
the confusion of the enemy. Hand-to-hand ghting remained the main
preoccupation.
98
Lisle issued his own ghting instructions in 1545
which, in their preoccupation with formation and distance between
ships, at least imply a ‘line abreast’ formation for most of the navy
which would enable the use of broadside shot once the rst line of
ships in ‘line ahead’ had penetrated the ranks of the enemy:
It is to be considered that the ranks must keep such order in sailing that
none impeach another. Wherefore it is requisite that every of the said
ranks keep right way with another, and take such regard to the observ-
ing of the same that no ship pass his fellows forward nor backward nor
slack anything, but [keep] as they were in one line, and that there may
be half a cable length between every of the ships . . . e rst rank shall
make sail straight to the front of the battle and shall pass through them,
and so shall make a short return to the midwards as they may, and they
[are] to have a special regard to the course of the second rank; which
two ranks is appointed to lay aboard the principal ships of the enemy,
every man choosing his mate as they may, reserving the admiral for my
lord admiral.
Aer the employment of gunre, the main objective, which was still
‘laying aboard’ the enemy could be carried out with a greater hope of
success.
99
98
‘A Book of Orders for the War both by Land and Sea,’ BL Harl. 309, fo. 42;
J.S. Corbett, Fighting Instructions, 1539–1816, Navy Record Society, 29 (1905),
pp. 15–17.
99
‘Lord Lisle’s instructions from the Fleming MSS,’ ibid., pp. 20–23; Loades, Tudor
Navy, pp. 132–133. See also Instructions of 10 Aug., St.P., I, ii, no. CCXXVI: ‘1. First,
yt is to be consithered, that every of the capitaignes, with the saied shippes, appointed
by this order to the Vanwarde, Battaill, and Wyng, shall ryde at ancker, according as
they be appoynted to saile by this saied order; and that no shipp of any of the saied
Wardes or Wyng shall presume to comme to an ancker before thAdmirall of the said
Ward. 2. Item, that every capitaign of the saied Wardes and Wyng shalbe in every
thyng ordered by thAdmirall of the same. 3. Item, when we shall se a convenient
tyme to ght with thenimies, our Vanward shall make with ther Vanwarde, if they
have any; and if they be in one compenye, our Vanward (takyng thadvauntaige of the
wynde) shall set uppon ther foremost ranck, bryngyng them oute of order; and our
Vice-Admirall shall seake to bourd ther Vice-Admirall, and every capitaign shall chose
his equall, as nere as he maye. 4. Item, thAdmirall of the Wyng shalbe alwayes in the
wynde, with his hole compenye; and when we shall joyne with thenimies, he shall kepe
still thadvauntaige of the wynde, to thentent he, with his compenye, maye the better
beate of the gallies from the greate shippes.’