Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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390 chapter eight
the wind’ of the English ships and the others to be ready (‘every man
naked with his oar in his hand’) for the assault. If the attack failed, La
Garde was to re the warning shot for all to retire. e French galleys
gave chase towards Cap Gris Nez ring continually, when the English
ships turned and La Garde red his warning shot. Saint Blancard’s ship
was taken when he stayed to re several shots at the English ‘for his
pleasure.’
175
Admiral d’Annebault protested against this capture when
he came to England for the ratication of the peace and ‘warme wordes’
ensued between him and Lisle.
176
Odet de Selve continued the pressure
aer the restoration of diplomatic relations and the ship was prob-
ably released by Somerset in the spring of 1547 in return for English
prisoners.
177
Henry Golding’s ship, the Bark Ager had been captured
by the French in 1545 and was retted in Normandy for a voyage to
Brazil only to be recaptured by Golding early in 1546. Golding was
then commissioned in May 1546 to put to sea as a privateer.
178
It took months for privateering between the two countries to die
down. Lisle made clear in April 1546 that merchant ships coming from
Spain, Portugal or Flanders were being robbed by English ‘adventur-
ers’ sometimes pretending to be Scots and sometimes completely in
disguise and feared that the Emperor’s subjects would soon be besieg-
ing the English government with complaints. Lisle continued his activ-
ities as Admiral until the end of the reign. During his visit to France
for the ratication of Peace in the summer of 1546, he met the navi-
gator Nicolas de Nicolay, sr. d’Arfeville, who later recalled that Lisle
had taken him back to his ships where Jean Ribauld was also serv-
ing. He was present in March 1547 when Lisle (now Earl of Warwick)
captured at Dover a small Scottish eet (including the Lion) and the
Scottish ambassadors on their way to France.
179
175
Hertford to Henry VIII, 21 May 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 874; BL Harl. 249, fo. 1
(L&P, XXI, ii, 319). e presence of the captain of the Galley Subtle among the Admi-
ralty commissioners simply suggests that he may have been present at the action.
176
Council to Wotton, 31 Aug. 1546, St.P., XI, p. 284 (L&P, XXI, i, 1530).
177
ere was an agreement to return the galley to France (though the slaves were
freed). It is not clear whether this was carried out (L&P, XXI, i, 1344; ii, 116, 129, 158,
405, 662). Adair, ‘English galleys’ pp. 500–501 argues convincingly for the spring of
1547. Saint-Blancard was unlucky enough to have a prize ship he had taken between
England and Scotland taken in 1547 (Marillac to Henri II, 13, 27 Oct. 1548, Henri II
to Marillac, BnF fr. 3098, p. 87).
178
Hall, Chronicle, ed. Whibley, II, p. 358; APC, I, p. 420 (L&P, XXI, i, 853). For
his activities aer the peace, ibid., XXI, i, 1462; ii, 11.
179
‘Observations touchant la diversité des navires’ by Nicolas de Nicolay, BnF, fr.
20008, pp. 51–55.
CHAPTER NINE
‘TO ENTREATE WITH THE SWORDE IN HAND:’
1
IMPERIAL AND PROTESTANT MEDIATION (1544–1546)
England, France and the Emperor, 1544–1545
e Anglo-French war should logically have ended in September 1544
but it continued until the summer of 1546. Why? e problem of peace
and war could not be separated from the relations of both Francis and
Henry with the Emperor Charles V and aairs in Germany. Charles
had sought in the peace to tie Francis in to a programme of settlement
of their conicts and common action against Protestantism. is was
bound to have implications for their relations with Henry VIII. As
we have seen, Charles had been warned by his sister Mary in July
1544 that, should Henry gain possession of Boulogne and Montreuil,
he would negotiate for a separate peace. ere was thus little trust
to begin with. Charles’s line with his own subjects was that he had
not started negotiations with Francis until he knew that Henry had
started talks of his own, that Henry had let him down and that he had
not even had enough artillery for the siege of Montreuil.
2
Immediately
aer the peace of Crépy, Charles had tried to arrange an Anglo-French
peace in order to cover his ostensibly dishonourable action in aban-
doning his English ally; Nicolas Wotton observed that it would be as
well to assume that this would not succeed.
3
e bishop of Arras was
sent to Calais and assured Annebault that that Charles’ representa-
tives had pressed Henry non-stop in favour of peace (‘ont continuelle-
ment fait instance pour rendre led. roy d’Engleterre enclin à la paix.’)
Cardinal du Bellay and president Rémon (who had been involved in
the talks before the end of the siege) were appointed and instructed
on 10 October to return to Ardres to negotiate through Granvelle as
1
Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 102r.
2
Mary of Hungary to Charles V, 24 July 1544, Vienna HHSA, P.A. 55, fo. 88.
‘L’alternative du traité de Crespy’ ibid., Frankreich, Varia 6 (no fol.), Papiers de Gran-
velle, III, p. 76.
3
Wotton to Paget, 26 Sept. 1544, St.P. X, p. 90 (L&P XIX, ii, 309); Charles V to
Henry VIII, [Sept. 1544], St.P. X, p. 101 (L&P, XIX, ii, 343).
392 chapter nine
mediator. At Calais, they held talks chaired by the bishop of Arras
with Henry’s remaining councillors on the Continent: Norfolk,
Suolk, Gardiner, Hertford and Paget.
4
ough the outlines of the
peace as ultimately agreed were on the table, Francis was adamant
about Boulogne and declared that ‘he would not hand over an inch of
his kingdom’s land,’ though would pay the life pension and commit
himself to the perpetual pension and the arrears. e English insisted
that Henry would not give up Boulogne unless France abandoned
Scotland. When the French referred to the arbitration of the Emperor,
talks broke down. Tournon told the bishop of Arras that the French
‘are stirred up against the King of England’ and Bayard added that
‘they will sell wives and children to get him out of Boulogne.’
5
Not sur-
prisingly the talks scarcely got going. e French envoys hung around
at Gravelines for three more weeks while Gardiner and Hertford went
to Brussels to nd out where the Emperor stood. en they gave up
and went home.
6
Late in September 1544, a state visit led by Queen Eléonore to
Brussels enabled the French to hammer out the details of the treaty of
Crépy. Several problems remained unresolved, notably whether Henry
VIII should keep Boulogne and what to do about Protestantism.
Cardinals de Tournon, Lorraine and Meudon also went to Brussels to
seek agreement here and it was this that in eect, though not openly,
4
Du Bellay and Remon to Granvelle, 14 Oct. 1544: ‘nostre principale addresse est à
vous, qui estes pour l’empereur le moyen de ceste communication.’ Documents on this
negotiation, from HHSA, are in transcripts in NA PRO 31/18/3/2 (Scheurer, Corres-
pondance de Jean du Bellay, III, nos. 639–641). Instructions to du Bellay and Remon,
10 Oct. 1544, BnF fr. 17889. fos. 76–77; Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III,
no. 638. Pierre Remon drew up a ‘Sommaire’ of all these negotiations some months
later (ibid., no. 642). e ambassadors with the Emperor forwarded a French set of
peace terms on 22 November (St.P., X, pp. 218–219). Even Granvelle ‘estemed them
not’ and thought them ‘slender.’ Imperial narrative of the talks: Arras, Chapuys and
Courrières to Charles V, 19 Oct. 1544, HHSA, England, Berichte, 11, fos. 175–178.
5
‘il ne leur baillera ne laissera ung seul pousse de terre en [son] royaume.’ Francis
told Arras that Henry’s demands for retaining Boulogne and for the restoration of the
pension were unacceptable and that ‘il aymeroit mieulx perdre quatre satoulles que
de laisser ung palme de terre aud. Roy d’Angleterre.’ Arras to the Emperor, 24 Oct.
1544, HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5, fos. 171r, 172v: ‘tous sont fort animez contre le
Roy d’Angleterre’ . . . ‘l’on vendra femme et enfans ou l’on le mettra hors de Boulogne.’
A year later, Francis was still saying that ‘sans la restitution de Boullongne et la com-
prehension des Escossoys je continueroys la guerre jusques au dernier jour de ma vie.’
(to Mesnage, 3 Oct. 1545, BnF fr. 17890, fo. 58v).
6
Scheurer, Correspondance, III, pp. 273–275.
‘
to entreate with the sworde in hand
’
393
that cut Charles’s support for Henry.
7
Charles, in return for peace
and the recovery of territories lost in 1543, would have in eect to
renege on his alliance with Henry VIII. e French had their losses of
1544 returned, gave up on their Turkish alliance and agreed to cease
operations in North America and the West Indies. e provisions in
the secret article of Crépy about the General Council were to be car-
ried out and Francis’ younger son, Orléans, would be invested with
Milan or the Netherlands. On Boulogne, Francis would not compro-
mise. Henry, in any case, had been outraged at what he thought of as
Charles’s ‘betrayal.’
While all this was going on, Gardiner and Hertford were sent by
Henry to put the Emperor under pressure to support him and assert
Henry’s claim that he had not consented to the Emperor’s separate
peace. ey reported from Brussels on a puzzling variance between the
Imperial ministers and the Emperor, who ‘doth the best he canne with
the Frenchmen.’
8
e King’s councillors at Calais submitted an advice
paper to Henry on 6 November which concluded that no hope was to
be had of the Emperor. More startlingly, they advanced the argument
that the pension of 100,000 crowns, though a ‘goodly revenue,’ was
scarcely worth the expense of trying to reclaim it. Better to demand
Ardres and Boulogne in its place. e pension could sleep and his son
reclaim it if he chose.
9
Henry’s advisers were being cautious here not to
rue their master’s feathers; aer all, the prospect of Francis’ granting
Ardres and Boulogne to Henry in return for the pension was remote,
to say the least. Watching from Calais, Paget was half-despairing, half-
acerbic in a private observation. Peace he thought unlikely because
Francis would never accept the conditions on oer and, if forced to
do so, would only accept them at the Emperor’s hands. Charles would
send to Henry about this:
For it will never synk in to my hed that he will entre the warre again.
is peax which he hath taken hath marred all, for though he will be
7
e mémoire that Tournon presented to the Emperor specied that Henry
could only be accepted in the treaty on giving up Boulogne, François, Le cardinal de
Tournon, p. 198.
8
Hertford and Gardiner to Council, 31 Oct. 1544, NA SP1/194, fo. 192 (L&P, XIX,
ii, 518).
9
Council to Henry VIII, 6 Nov. 1544, St.P., X, pp. 175–177 (L&P, XIX, ii, 563): on
the pension: ‘bycause that for to recover it the charges groweth to so muche, which
commenly in all apointementes, both pryvate and publique, the playntif obteynith
never againe.’
394 chapter nine
contented to declare hym self enemy to the French, what avantage or
socour shall the Kinges majeste have towarde the defence of Bullen
whereto by the treaty he is not bownde? He shall mak a guerre garyable for
the facon sak but never wil enter again the warre with a mayn force . . . is
I must tel youe my folishe fantasy which maketh me to moorne when
I see the untrew practises of the world against a prynce that meanyth
always trewly, and to trewly for such as they be; I woold to Godes pas-
sion his majeste could cretizare cum Cretense.
10
Paget had put his nger on the problem that undermined the Emperor’s
position vis-à-vis Henry; he remained technically his ally but no lon-
ger a reliable one. Relations with the Charles continued to cool. On
the borders of Calais, Burgundian commanders rapidly changed from
allies to unfriendly neutrals, for instance in denying supplies to the
English.
11
Henry’s proclamation of 20 December 1544 authorised
coastal communities to equip ships ‘for the annoying of His Majesties
enemies,’ which eectively meant the shipping between France and the
Low Countries. e renewal of Franco-Imperial relations meant a vast
booty of Flemish goods carried in French ships was open for plunder;
lawsuits about this constituted much of the work of English envoys
in Flanders over the next two years. It is clear from his dealings with
Francis that Charles had no intention of inclining to Henry’s demands
for aid against the French and the Scots, nor would he license the pas-
sage of mercenaries for Henry through the Low Countries.
12
Charles, at least in appearance, made further oers of mediation
in March 1545.
13
But it may reasonably be concluded that he was not
unhappy to see France and England at each others’ throats, whatever
he said in public. e Emperor had looming problems to cope with.
Compensating Francis by investing his younger son with signicant
territory may have been a way out of war in 1544 but was not in the
realms of practical politics. As Henry’s envoys to Charles observed, the
peoples of the Low Countries could not just be handed over. ‘Here they
aske why they have payd ther money to be defended from Fraunce,
10
Paget to Petre, 3 Nov. 1544, SP1/194, fo. 218v (L&P, XIX, ii, 544). Paget was
fond of this Latin proverb and repeated it with the same point in a letter to Petre of
16 Mar. 1545, L&P, XX, i, 373.
11
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 17 Oct. 1544, AGR, EA, 119, fo. 39.
12
BL Harl. 424, fo. 16; Grey Friars Chronicle, p. 48; Morette and Mesnage to Francis
I, 29 Jan. 1545, 8 Feb. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 59–60, 45–6. Francis I to Mesnage,
6 May 1545, BnF, fr. 27890. fo. 60.
13
Paget and Wotton to Henry VIII, 25 March 1545, St.P. X, p. 359 (L&P, XX,
i, 425).
‘
to entreate with the sworde in hand
’
395
and nowe shuld be ored up unto them.’
14
As the Emperor’s relations
with Francis I soured, his old interest in nourishing hostility between
England and France began to re-emerge.
Scotland also remained one of the thorniest points of conict. As
has been seen, the return of Beaton in 1543, French intervention and
the repudiation of the Treaty of Greenwich, the English invasion
and burning of Edinburgh of May 1544, the Convention of Stirling
(November 1544), the re-establishment of the Auld Alliance, all
these rmly placed Scotland in the French camp. Should Scotland be
included in a peace and on what terms? e northern kingdom had
been le out of the treaty of Crépy and was thus still at war with the
Emperor; Henry VIII strenuously opposed its inclusion.
15
If Francis
had ever contemplated throwing Scotland as a bone to Henry in return
for peace, he soon forgot this. David Paniter, the Scottish envoy who
had been sent to get help from France in 1544, moved on to Brussels
to press the Scottish case there with the help of the French envoys
Morette and Mesnage (envoy to Scotland in 1543, now ambassador to
the Emperor). It rapidly became clear that French backing for Scotland
was incompatible with peace with England.
For all these reasons, then, the settlement of a peace between England
and France became extremely dicult. In an unusual letter of thanks
for a gi of wine from Jean du Bellay (January 1545), Francis Bryan,
an old friend who met him again at Calais in September 1544, remem-
bered that he had been strongly in favour of peace. In a veiled and alle-
gorical passage, he remarked that God was mistaken in teaching the
Apostles to seek and nd without suggesting where to look. At Calais,
du Bellay had not tried the right way; when a dissonant note entered a
song, a new one should be tried to attain harmony and Bryan oered
his help.
16
An impetus to peace was provided by Francis’ mistress,
Mme d’Etampes, generally more hostile to the Emperor than to Henry.
14
Hertford, Gardiner and Wotton to Henry VIII, 22 Nov. 1544, St.P., X, p. 219.
15
Gardiner told Olivier at Calais on the inclusion of Scotland that ‘il ne voit point
que cela fut mis en avant, sinon pour fascher son maistre et le tenir tousjours en que-
relle’ (BnF fr. 2937, fols. 55–59, ‘La somme des propos d’entre le chancellier et l’éves-
que de Wincestre, du quinziesme novembre.’) In December 1544, Francis instructed
Mesnage to press the Emperor to persuade Henry (BnF, ms Fr. 17889, fols. 2–4,
instructions, 9 December 1544). M. Merriman, e Rough Wooings, pp. 186–190;
E. Bonner, ‘e French Reactions to the Rough Wooings’ (1998), p. 54.
16
Francis Bryan to Jean du Bellay, 26 Jan. 1545, Scheurer, Correspondance, III, pp.
288–289.
396 chapter nine
It is true that in February 1545, the Venetian envoy Cavalli reported
that, despite her previous preference for peace with England, she had
decided in favour of continuing war with Henry VIII on the argument
that it would damage the reputation of Admiral d’Annebault, once her
protegé but now resented by her as too independent. us:
Madame d’Estampes, knowing that all the responsibility will fall on
the shoulders of the Admiral, whose total ruin she wants, is in agree-
ment with this plan, hoping that the many diculties and problems of
this enterprise will overturn the Admiral. I have all this from the best
source.
17
Yet April 1545 saw a curious episode in which Mme. d’Etampes’s secre-
tary was sent to explore peace with England. is followed an informal
exchange of letters in March between Paget (then in Brussels) and the
Queen of Navarre. e game was a dangerous one in that the letters
seem to have been passed on to the Emperor’s ministers and showed
Paget in an uncomplimentary light, calling the Emperor a hypocrite.
He lamented that ‘it is looked we shuld speke furst and as it wer sue
for the thing, which I like not and moche the worse for that they use
our overtures.’ ‘Every other man is for himself, not ruling their aay-
res by the straight lyne of honour and equite but wring honour and
equite as they fantazie.’ Why should the English not do the same? At
the Emperor’s court, ‘dissimulation, vanitie, atery and unshamefast-
nes reign’ while the French, ‘looke for nothing yet, for they have layde
here suche a bayte for them that they will byte at no other thing untill
they se they be deluded.’ e exchange is a vivid testimony to Paget’s
sense of frustration.
18
It is, of course, possible that the French ministers
were seeking to capitalise on English panic induced by the imminent
build-up of the French eet in the Channel in order to extract a cheap
peace deal. is is unlikely in view of the serious eorts of mobilisa-
17
ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Capi, Lettere di ambasciatori, Francia, busta 10: Marino
Cavalli to chiefs of Council of Ten, 3 Feb. 1545 (CSP Venice, V, no. 327, p. 132):
‘Madama di Tampes, conoscendo che tutto il carrico serà su le spalle del armiraglio,
del qual lei desidera la total ruina, è concorsa anchor essa in opinione, sperando con le
molte dicultà et contrarii che vi è in questa impresa, precipitar il ditto s
r
armiraglio.
Tutto questo ho saputo per ottima via.’
18
Paget to Henry VIII, 10 March 1545, St.P., X, p. 333 (L&P, XX, I, 334); same to
Petre, 11 March 1545, SP1/199, fo. 9 (L&P, XX, I, 342); Paget to Henry VIII, 16 March
1545, St.P. X, p. 347 (L&P, XX, ii, 372); same to Petre, 16 March 1545, SP1/199, fos.
49–50 (L&P, XX, I, 373); Paget to Petre, 25 March 1545, SP1/199, fos. 89–90 (L&P,
XX, I, 426).
‘
to entreate with the sworde in hand
’
397
tion already in train and just as likely was the tendency for Tournon
and Annebault to pass on condential information to the Emperor in
an attempt to improve Franco-Imperial relations.
19
A full account of the exchange with Mme d’Etampes was given by
the Privy Council when it described how a prisoner at Boulogne had
asked to return to France and arrange an exchange between him and
Sir Richard Wingeld. While at the French court, Longueval had told
him that, if Henry had any inclination to peace, he would be active and
Mme d’Etampes would help. e message was passed back to Henry,
who said he would listen for the quiet of Christendom. But when her
secretary arrived at Boulogne to demand its restitution, he was dis-
missed.
20
A somewhat dierent account was given by Italian envoys
in France. According to the Ferrarese Alvarotti, Mme d’Etampes’s
secretary was indeed sent around 1 April with a safe-conduct from
Henry VIII ‘negotiate for peace, which it seems the King of England
has no small desire for.’ He was back by the middle of the month
asking for a better safe conduct and reporting Henry’s unfavourable
response.
21
Bernardo de Medici also conrmed that the envoy had not
been able to pass Boulogne and had only spoken to Lisle, with whom
he had established some form of personal contact. ere was talk of
demolishing the fortications of Boulogne and payment of the pen-
sion and arrears (as high as 1,300,000 écus) as the basis for a peace
but he added that he had brought no great hope of a conclusion. e
French Council saw in this no great taste for peace.
22
Despite all this,
Mme d’Etampes renewed her eorts over the following months.
Cavalli may have been wrong about Mme d’Etampes’ ultimate
objectives but there can be no doubt that, despite all these eorts for
19
Marino Cavalli to Council of Ten, 6 Jan. 1544/5, ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Capi,
Ambasciatori, Francia, busta 10: ‘l’armiraglio et Tornon erano su una strada di palesar
tutte le cose sue a Cesare, et che la negociatione del Dandino tutta, anche cerca le
oerte contra Anglesi era sta mandata a mons
r
di Granvella.’
20
Council to Wotton and Carne, 28 April 1545, St.P. X, p. 408 (L&P, XX, i, 593).
21
Alvarotti to Ercole II, 3, 15 April 1545, ASM, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, pp. 20–21:
‘trattar la pace, della quale pare che Inghilterra non habbi minor desiderio’ (15 April
1545, pp. 71–80).
22
Bernardo de Medici to Cosimo I, 22, 25, 29 April 1545, ASF, Mediceo, lza
4590, Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, III,
pp. 153, 156–157, 158–159: ‘non ci essere buono appicco di pace.’ e Imperial minis-
ters also heard the same story and used the talks to explain why the Emperor’s oers
of mediation had got nowhere. See Wotton to Paget, 27 April 1545, St.P., X, p. 401
(L&P, XX, I, 588).
398 chapter nine
peace, early in 1545 a decision was taken in France to renew the war
with England on a grand scale (see chapter 6) even though Francis
was seriously ill for while at Fontainebleau. Yet preparations for war
went hand-in-hand with peace talks. e very report to the Emperor
(February 1545) that spelled out Francis I’s grand military strategy
against England also suggested that the ultimate objective was a truce
with England so that pressure could be put on the Emperor to full the
terms of the peace of Crépy-en-Valois in handing over an inheritance
to the duke of Orléans. Naturally, as was widely known, the Dauphin
opposed this and can be found among the war party.
23
Further peace
talks have to be understood in this context.
In the summer of 1545, with naval and land war in full swing, Henry
again made another attempt to get the Emperor to, as he would have
seen it, discharge his obligations under the treaty of 1543. On 23 June,
he wrote to Charles and instructed Nicholas Wotton to tell him that
he expected, under the terms of their treaty, that the Emperor would
provide aid even before the expected French invasion. In a series of
meetings through July, it became obvious, if had not been before, that
Charles was simply not prepared to do this. Both he and Granvelle
argued that the Emperor had been forced to make a separate peace
with Francis because Henry had failed to march beyond the Somme
with his army. ey urged Henry to make peace with Francis but
were told that Henry could not compromise on Boulogne, a town he
had ‘bought so deare.’ For his part, Charles was mainly concerned
to avoid the enmity of either side while his negotiations in Germany
were in such a delicate state. Henry’s ambassador at Worms was clear
about his case: now the war had started again in earnest, Henry had
to think about his honour; his claim to the pension arrears was clear
but he was willing for Charles to arbitrate about the costs of the 1544
campaign. As for Boulogne, he had won it in fair war and would not
give it up without substantial compensation. Charles told his sister
Mary that, however hard he had tried, he could nd no means to get
a compromise on either side. He thought it unlikely there would be
peace without his arbitration but told Mary they should both show
willing ‘without however pressing either side further than their incli-
23
Intelligence sent to Emperor by Saint-Mauris, early 1545, CSP Spain, VIII,
no. 115 (L&P XX, i, 619) (this is dated in L&P late April but should be dated accu-
rately as 6 February).
‘
to entreate with the sworde in hand
’
399
nation shows and they show willing to be persuaded for the reputation
on which it seems both base their cases. Otherwise both would per-
haps become suspicious of us.’ By the end of July, Henry had ceased to
marvel at the Emperor’s excuses and Wotton was quite clear in letters
to Paget and Wriothesley that ‘colde or hote, I can not perceive that
they make enye haste to grawnte enye ayde yet.’
24
For the Emperor, the embarrassment was deservedly exquisite, espe-
cially when the French tried to do exactly the same. Towards the end
of September, Jacques Mesnage was told by Charles that Henry would
seek his aid to repel the attack on the terre d’Oye, to which the French
ambassador replied that the Emperor was only obliged to help defend
the territory that Henry had held in 1543, not the land he had acquired
since. Charles said that this indeed was true and that he would not
contribute aid to defend Boulogne but the terre d’Oye was a dierent
matter. Mesnage then raised what became the standard French argu-
ment to ward o Habsburg interference; Charles need not give aid to
Henry when the French invaded English territory as a consequence of
the war over Boulogne. Charles, bemused by this, said that this was
one point of view (‘ce que dessus est une glose sur le texte dud. con-
tract.’) e French envoy then had recourse to attering Charles’ role,
through brokering peace, of settling the ‘heresies et inconveniens’ of
Christendom.
25
The German Protestants as Mediators
e problem with Charles as a mediator is obviously that he had no
long term interest in getting his fellow monarchs to make peace. In
the months following the treaty of Crépy, a much more active role
in peacemaking was taken by German Protestant diplomats. eir
good oces were used on the eve of the naval war, though with little
24
L&P XX, i, 1013, 1132, 1133, 1203, 1204, 1226, 1242, 1261, XX, ii, 132. Quota-
tions from Wotton to Henry VIII, 7 July 1545, St.P. X, p. 508 (L&P, XX, i, 1132) and
Wotton to Wriothesley, 19 July 1545, SP1/204, fo. 64 (L&P, XX, i, 1226). Charles V
to Mary of Hungary, 6 Aug. 1545, BnF, fr. 7122, pp. 326–345: ‘sans toutesfois presser
ni l’une ni l’autre des parties plus avant de ce qu’ils verront l’inclination et qu’ils
pourront apperçevoir qu’elles mêmes desireront d’être persuadés pour le reputation,
en quoy vraisemblablement l’une et l’autre des parties se fonderont, car autrement ce
seroit occasion d’entrer en suspicion par adventure en l’endroit de tous deux.’ (pp.
344–345).
25
Mémoire of Mesnage for Annebault, Sept. 1545, BnF fr. 17888, fos. 25–6.