Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I

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430 chapter ten

staying in the background.

As such, they perhaps showed that the

Admiral thought little was to be hoped for from the Emperor.

Aer the breakdown of the negotiations in December 1545, both

sides began to rearm. Saint-Mauris reported from France that in early

December that ‘il s’est publié’ that war would be resumed in the com-

ing year under the Admiral’s command and that a major expedition to

Scotland was planned.

ere were, though, signicant practical prob-

lems in the way of renewing the ghting. e French were counting on

the German princes to make life dicult for the Emperor, though this

would be of little use against England.

Lack of money was their main

problem (Francis had already borrowed 700,000 écus from Lyon) and

the rise in food prices meant that it would be dicult to equip a new

army until the next harvest.

In January 1546, as we have seen, a new

English expeditionary force was ready to cross to Boulogne under

the command of the Earl of Hertford in order to fortify Ambleteuse,

while pressure on the French fortress of Outreau led to the drawn

battle between the earl of Surrey and marshal du Biez.

Henry’s pride

prompted him to negotiate “sworde in hand”

but nancial problems

were bearing down on him.

A plan was mooted for the storming of

Etaples should further talks fail, but the King only accepted it while

still hoping for peace:

his highnes myndeth nott so moch this enterprise butt he can be well

contented to have an honorable peax.

e English suspected that the French intended an immediate renewal

of war

but this was not the case. Cardinal Ippolito of Ferrara, Francis’

is is to a degree speculation and should not detract from the essential politi-

cal unity between Annebault and Tournon throughout 1545 and 1546 (Nawrocki,

‘Annebault,’ II, pp. 385–391).

Saint-Mauris, newsletter, 7 Dec. 1545, AN K 1485 (microlm).

Cardinal of Ferrara to Ercole II, 16 Mar. 1546, ASM, Principi Estensi, B 60/147,

p. 2, in which Francis dwells on his close relations with the Protestant princes: ‘eso

Conte (Palatino) et Signori Protestanti s’intendevano ben con Sua Maestà Christianis-

sima et si sforzavano di mostrarle il buon’animo che hano verso lei . . . .’

HHSA, P.A., 62, fo. 114. For the pressure of war expenditure on France in the

mid-1540s, Hamon, L’argent du roi, pp. 46–47.

Potter, Du Biez, pp. 50, 213–217; Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 327–329.

Lisle to Henry VIII, 26 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 102r.

See above ch. 5 and Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance’ pp. 75–99.

Hertford to Henry VIII, 28 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 125v. Council to Hert-

ford and Lisle (late April 1546), NA SP1/217, fo. 135r.

Council to Petre, 11 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 40r: ‘We have also sent letters

the admirals

’

peace 431

rich, cynical and entertaining boon companion, remarked that Francis

was counting on peace in 1546 and would only strengthen his frontier

fortications in case the English refused to come to terms.

True, the

French may have feared the Emperor’s intentions in Piedmont and

were to do so for the rest of the decade,

but on the whole Francis was

counting on the Emperor’s pre-occupation with Germany in 1546.

Basically, neither the English nor the French could aord, nancially,

to start large-scale hostilities in 1546, especially as the Europe-wide

economic crisis was at its height in that year. is was to override the

unsolved problems of Boulogne and Scotland. Actually, the monthly

cost of non-routine military expenditure in France (the extraordinaire

to my lorde of Hertforde to be in a readines in case of the breache of communicacion

of peaxe to prevent the Frenchemen in taking of the poincte againste Bolen haven

on the other side the water.’ (L&P, XXI, i, 790). Jacques Granada, who had spoken

to Du Biez and to the Rhinegrave, claimed that, if peace were not made, the French

would take the eld and attack the new fort at Ambleteuse aer the Almain Hill, a

plan strikingly similar to the French attack of 1549 (SP1/218, fos. 31–32, L&P, XXI,

i, 779). at a forward policy was not part of French intentions has been shown, but

what is important about this is that the English believed it likely.

Ippolito d’Este, Cardinal Protector of France, was closer to the King than many

at this time (M. Hollingsworth, e Cardinal’s Hat: Money, Ambition and House-

keeping in a Renaissance Court (London, 2006)). His letters are crucial. In March

he sent his brother, Ercole II, an extremely important appraisal of French policy in

which he observed: ‘ne io penso che habiamo da veder per questo ano altra guerra che

quel . . . d’Inghilterra, che a mio iudicio anco non sara senon quanto vora eso Inglese

perche questa Maestà non intende di far per adeso altro che restara veder quelche

vora far il nimico et atendera guardare et conservar queste sue frontiere che habi

segnato di forticare questo ne ne quali non manca di fare fa gli ardamante tute

queste provisioni di munitioni, viveri et altre cose necessarie a questo eeto. quando

anco vedesi chel nimico volse pasar piu oltre et facese sforzo ha di gia anco provisto et

cosi fa tenir prestido dici mila Suiceri et altre fanti ale mani da volersene poi quando

sara il bisogno; et credo ben che in tanto non manchera d’andar in volla pratiche di

pace et d’accordi tra questo Re et quel d’Inghilterra et tra questa Maestà et la Cesarea.’

Cardinal Hippolito of Ferrara to Ercole II, Limours, 16 Mar. 1546, ASM, Casa e Stato,

Carteggio tre principi Estensi, B 60/147, n.p., p. 3, passage in cipher.

Despatches of Saint-Mauris, March–May 1547, HHSA, Frankreich, 14–16 passim.

Saint-Mauris may have overestimated Francis’ fear of the Emperor in 1546. e

Cardinal of Ferrara observed that Francis was, unusually, sanguine about the Emper-

or’s intentions. Mesnage, said the French King, had received warm words of friend-

ship when he asked the Emperor about his negotiations to end the state of war with

Scotland. Charles had said that his relations with England remained the same as in the

previous year and that he contemplated nothing in conjunction with England. ‘mi dise

anco come pur scrisi che non pensava che sto fuse per fare per questo ano inovatione

ne cosa alcuna contra di Lei, anzi che da questo et altri segni parea che si dimostrase

d’alcuni giorni in qua piu amorevoli et grati propositi, il che Sua Maestà pensa che

proceda dal haver trovato sto questi principi protestanti piu duri et piu dicili . . .’

(Cardinal of Ferrara to Ercole II, 16 Mar. 1545/6, p. 2, cit. sup., my own decipher).

432 chapter ten

des guerres) had been at its height in 1544 and dropped sharply in 1545

and further in 1546. e cost to France of the war roughly halved aer

the peace with the Emperor but it was the accumulation of expenditure,

inexorable since the start of war in 1542, that was to tell.

(Appendix

12) What is remarkable is that the two monarchies were sustaining

broadly comparable war nance eorts in 1544–1546. Henry VIII’s

war expenditure in 1542–1547 has been calculated at £1.6 million, or

four times the cost of the campaigns of the early 1520s. £560,000 was

spent in the year from Michaelmas 1544 alone. ere was more than a

hint of desperation in Wriothesley’s letter of September 1545: ‘yet you

write to me still pay, pay, prepare for this and that.’

A Mediator from Venice

e origins of the neutral mediation that brought about the peace

are well-documented, though the motives remain obscure. e chief

mediator of the peace was a Venetian nobleman and ship-owner,

Francesco Bernardo, who had seen two of his ships arrested for ser-

vice in England.

One of his preoccupations in 1546 was the salvage

of goods from his ship the Sancta Maria and Sanctus Edwardus, laden

with goods bound for Leghorn, which sank o Southampton in July.

He commissioned a syndicate also involved in the Mary Rose salvage

operation.

At the time, Venice was only represented in England by a

secretary, Zambon, until the conclusion of the peace but on 20 March

P. Hamon, L’argent du roi. e global burden of the taille attained 4.6 million

livres in 1544–1545 (ibid., p. 66). Monthly expenditure on the extraordinaire dropped

from 520,000 lt. in 1544 to 131,157 in 1546 (ibid., pp. 44–47). Nevertheless, the year’s

expenditure on the extraordinaire in 1545 was still 2,893,929 lt. (dropping to 1,581,091 lt.

in 1546). Directly attributable military expenditure stood at 4,069,018 lt. in 1545 and

2,801,260 lt. in 1546 (BnF fr. 17329, fos. 82r–112v.)

Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance,’ pp. 91–93, Wriothesley to the Council, L&P,

XX, ii, 366. e French money of account, the livre tournois stood at between 8 and

9 to the £ sterling. French expenditure on purely military matters can be calculated at

5,999,183 lt. in 1545 (between, 600,000 and 700,000 £ sterling in a country with ve

times the population). BnF fr. 17329, fos. 82–112.

Francesco’s father was Ser Benetto and grandfather ser Francesco and all his fam-

ily are listed as knights (CSP Venice, V, nos. 523). G.B. Crollalanza, Dizionario Storico

delle Famiglie Nobili e Notabili Italiane (1886), ‘Bernardo di Venezia.’

G. Ungerer, ‘Recovering a black African voice in an English lawsuit: Jacques

Francis and the salvage operations of the Mary Rose, c. 1545–1550,’ Medieval and

Renaissance Drama in England (2005), 255–271.

the admirals

’

peace 433

we learn that the Venetian Ambassador in France, Marino Cavalli, had

told Giulio Alvarotti, the Ferrarese ambassador, ‘that a Venetian gen-

tleman of the house of Bernardi, nephew of M. Maeo Bernardi, who

usually lives in London, recently arrived on business’

Bernardo came

from a family established in banking but which had experienced di-

culties as a result of his uncle Maeo’s sailing close to the wind in the

1530s. He had possibly been trying to corner the Anglo-Venetian wool

trade and was certainly accused both of quarrelling with the Venetian

envoy in England, Carlo Capello, and denigrating the Republic. As a

result he had been banned by the Venetian government from England.

Ser Maeo seems to have transferred his interests to the Levant and

le those in England to his nephew. But further murky complications

arose from Maeo’s murder later in 1546 by the notorious Ludovico

da l’Armi. is took place at a time when warrants were out for the

arrest of Maeo Bernardo for divulging state secrets to France. Da

L’Armi had his own dealings with France and may have been aiming

to silence Maeo.

Francesco Bernardo was a man with contacts, but how these had

developed is unclear. Aer the peace, Giulio Alvarotti reported that,

when a new papal nuncio was scheduled to come to France, one of his

objectives was to reconcile England with the Church using Bernardo

as intermediary even though, as the nuncio thought, ‘he does not have

that much credit with this king’ e Venetian ambassador replied that,

though Bernardo had not been open with him, he was sure ‘that if

this gentleman could hope to have the honour of such a negotiation,

that he would seize the opportunity with both hands.’ is is a clear

Alvarotti to Ercole II, Paris, 20 Mar. 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 2, fo. 100r:

‘che uno gentil’huomo Viniciano di casa Bernardi, nipote di M. Maeo Bernardi, il

quale per ordinario sta in Londra, è venuto hora qui per alcuni suoi negotii.’ In the

absence of the Venetian ambassador’s reports for this period, Alvarotti is the best

source; he was in the condence of both that ambassador and the Cardinal Hippolyto

of Ferrara.

CSP Venice, III, no. 474 (13 June 1522); no. 561 (1 Oct. 1522); IV, no. 864

(15 March 1532); nos. 910–911, (June 1533).

E. Harrison, ‘Henry the Eighth’s gangster: the aair of Ludovico de l’Armi’

in Journal of Modern History, 1943, p. 272. Maeo’s goods in the Levant had been

returned to him by the intervention of the French envoy Rincon in 1541 (A. Tausser-

at-Radel, Correspondance politique de Guillaume Pellicier, I, pp. 202, 216, 319) which

implies Maeo was a member of the Consiglio dei Dieci at some period.

434 chapter ten

enough opinion of his motives.

Alvarotti himself was in no doubt of

Bernardo’s contacts:

he went to the court to speak to the Admiral as if on his own initiative

about peace between England and France, though nevertheless was sent

by the Admiral of England with a broad patent, which the Venetian

ambassador has seen. He spoke to my lord Admiral one evening, who

did not show him much cheer. Nevertheless, he referred all to the King

and the following morning he had him inspected by M. Monluc to see

if he knew him. e latter armed that he was a Venetian gentleman

and that he knew him.

is brought a gentler attitude from Annebault, who was now prepared

to listen and enquired aer Bernardo’s lodging. e latter replied that

he was staying with his friend and relative Cavalli, the Venetian ambas-

sador, and the Admiral asked him not to reveal anything about his

negotiations. Needless to say, this was in vain. Alvarotti even learned

that Annebault had prepared an even more ample commission than

Lisle’s.

e story is broadly conrmed by a report to the Emperor.

is adds the suggestion that Bernardo had told Annebault that Henry

was reluctant to continue the war and that he was willing to hand over

Boulogne when all the arrears and 5 millions for war expenses had

been paid. Apparently Francis had persisted in his refusal to accept

English occupation of Boulogne, but was willing to give hostages and

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 28 June 1546, ASM, Francia, B 23, fasc. 1, fo. 78v (deciph.):

‘egli na tanto credito con quel re.’ ‘che se detto gentil’huomo potra sperare di haver

honore di un tal negocio che vi entrara dentro con le mani et con le piedi.’

Alvarotti to Erco1e II, 24 Mar. 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 2, fo. 118v (deci-

pher): ‘ando alla Corte a parlare à Mons. Almiralgio come da se de intromettersi à par-

lare della pace tra Inghilterra et Franza, ma nondimeno in fatto egli era mandato dallo

Almiraglio d’Anghilterra con una patente grandissima, la quale esso Ambasciatore

Veneto ha veduta; parla con Mons. Almiraglio una sera, il quale non li fece troppo

buona chiera. Nondimeno, refer’ il tutto al Re, et la mattina sequente li fece vedere

a Mons. Monluch per vedere se lo conosceva. Gli armo ch’egli era gentil’huomo

Vinitiano et che lo conosceva.’ Much the same information is given by Guidiccione,

papal nuncio, who adds that Bernardo was also nephew to Pietro Lippomano, bishop

of Verona, counted Admiral Lisle among his friends and that Monluc had been instru-

mental (to Cardinal Farnese, 29–30 June, ANG, III, pp. 437, 439).

HHSA, P.A. 62 fos. 113–14, news report c. 14 April 1546: ‘Il y a environ trois

sepmaines que ung nommé Francisque Mapheo [sic] marchant venicien demeurant à

Londres se treuve en court de France, et t tant qui parla à l’admiral dud. France, luy

disant qu’il estoit là envoyé par l’admiral d’Angleterre pour enormer oud. coustel de

France si l’on vouldroit accommoder à quelque paix, et que le Roy d’Angleterre n’es-

toit deliberé de continuer la guerre, car il prevoit que tous deux se destruysoient.’

the admirals

’

peace 435

guarantees for the debt of 1 million.

Lisle and Paget later claimed that

Jean de Monluc had been the ‘principall worker in this mater’ and had

broached it to the Venetian ambassador in France, who in turn had

approached Francesco Bernardo.

Later rumour had it that Bernardo,

who had had an understanding with Monluc before the talks began,

had promised the English Council the retention of Boulogne, payment

of the pension and the Scottish marriage.

is may have been an

attempt by the English to cover up the fact that Bernardo had started

his mediation in England but it is clear enough that his proposals were

quickly welcomed in France. e Venetian government had its own

motives and was anxious to distance itself from any implication that

it was involved, in order not to oend the Emperor.

Yet, the involve-

ment of the ambassador in France is all too clear.

Venetian policy was involved through Jean de Monluc, brother of

Blaise, who latter acted as a kind of sponsor for Bernardo. Monluc had

been on embassy to Venice in 1543–1544 and then to the Ottoman

Empire in 1545, when Franco-Imperial relations were warm enough

to warrant a move on the part of France to arrange a peace between

the Sultan and the Emperor’s brother Ferdinand. Having travelled

via Venice, it is highly probable that he was in contact with Maeo

Bernardo, whose interests in the Levant were important.

But

Francesco Bernardo’s claim that he had a written commission from

Lisle, conrmed by Alvarotti and Saint Mauris,

contradicts Lisle’s

claim that Monluc made the rst approach. It is clear that Monluc

had a personal interest and was, additionally, described by Paget as

Report from France sent to the Emperor, 14 April 1546, HHSA, P.A., 62, fos.

113–114: ‘le Roy d’Angleterre seroit content que l’on le paya à six termes des arrerages

des pensions’ starting from the beginning if any term were defaulted on and providing

security in international bankers. ‘Davantaige que led. François paya pour une fois à

l’Anglois cinq millions d’or pour les interestz et fraiz de la guerre.’ Boulogne would

be retained until full accomplishment of these payments. ‘Mais quant à soy retenir

Boulongne . . . le François le rebouta plattement.’

Lisle and Paget to Henry VIII, Calais, 20 April 1546, St.P., XI, p. 105.

Van der Del to Charles V, 27 May 1546, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 266, L&P XXI,

i, 938.

CSP Venice, V, no. 381.

P. Tamizey de Larroque, ‘Notes et documents inédits pour server à la biographie

de Jean de Monluc, évêque de Valence,’ Revue de Gascogne, viii (1868), 397–410, at

404–407; for his report from Constantinople, E. Charrière, Négociations de la France

dans le Levant, 4 vols. (Paris, 1848), I, pp. 596–612.

Saint Mauris to Covos, 1 April 1546, CSP Spain, VIII, no. 233. is was the rst

Saint-Mauris had heard of Bernardo.

436 chapter ten

‘thadmyrales mynyon bycause the . King favoryth hym well.’

According to Saint Mauris’s informant, the King ordered him imme-

diately to accompany Bernardo to England but later countermanded

him when he suspected that Henry was dissembling and preparing to

descend on France.

Directly aer his interviews with Annebault, Bernardo returned

to England to confer with Henry and the Council and was back in

Paris by 4 April, though on this return journey, he was detained for a

while at Calais.

Bernardo told the Venetian ambassador that Henry

was willing to make peace on condition that he retain Boulogne and

its connes until Francis repay the pension owed and English war

expenses (this time 6 millions in gold); dates could be arranged. He

would be content for the Scots to be included as French allies and

for all outstanding diculties to be settled by a meeting of commis-

sioners at Calais.

is account agrees closely with the instructions

given to Lisle and Paget on 17 April, the only dierences being that

the English were to seek to retain Boulogne permanently at rst, and

only aerwards agree to restore it on terms. War costs were to be

estimated at 3 million crowns.

Bernardo went to see Annebault at

Fontainebleau, speaking with him a long time, and the latter had then

seen the King, but whether anything would result Alvarotti could not

tell, especially as Bernardo had been taken ill. Actually, he was lying

in a fever at the Admiral’s house and had been bled by the Cardinal

of Ferrara’s physician. However, when Alvarotti talked to the Cardinal

about the negotiations he found out that Bernardo had told Annebault

about English troops being sent over to besiege Mont Saint Etienne.

Paget to Petre, 20 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 46r (L&P, XXI, i, 633); HHSA,

P.A. 62, fo. 113v: ‘Et ainsi se partit led. Maphio de court pour retourner en Angleterre,

avec lequel le Roy envoya Monluc pour parler à l’admiral dud. Angleterre et enchemi-

ner en quelque ville sur les frontieres l’entrevue des deux admiraulx. Mais ainsi que

led. Monluc estoit desja à deux lieues oultre Paris, le Roy le contremanda à diligence

pource que ou mesme instant il avoit heu advertissement que l’Anglois ne faisoit faire

lesd. ouvertures sinon que pour l’abuser.’

Lisle to Paget, 1 April 1546, ‘and as tochenge f. b., he was stayed here lenger then

nedyd and cold nat be sueryd to departe tyll I came . . . e cause was alledged that he

shold nat see the marching of the armye, but ther was way enoghe or the trompett to

have lede him bye.’ NA SP1/216, fo. 77r–v (L&P, XXI, i, 509). is is the rst mention

of Bernardo in English sources.

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 4 April 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3, fo. 19 (deciph).

St.P. XI, p. 102.

the admirals

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peace 437

No doubt he hoped in this way to persuade the French that the time

had come to talk.

By 6 April, Alvarotti knew Francis’ answer: willingness to give

Henry 1 million crowns in return for Boulogne, to be guaranteed by

the merchants of London, Antwerp, Lyon or Venice. Bernardo had

replied that he could do no more as the English, who wished to retain

Boulogne as a gage, would not be satised. e Admiral had nally

agreed to this condition and they had then begun to speak about the

amount of pension arrears. Bernardo claimed that the English had

received nothing for thirteen years, a debt which, with the 100,000 cr.

owed to an English duke and the 5,000 a year due to another English

grandee amounted to 1,560,000 crowns. is did not include war costs

(‘l’interessi della guerra’) amounting to six millions.

Bernardo was to return to Lisle in three or four days and ask him to

send a man to Guînes. Meanwhile, Monluc was to go to Ardres:

and has an explicit commission from my lord Admiral, on the part of

the Most Christian King, to do what he can to get them to accept one

million in gold and restore Boulogne, liquidate the arrears and make an

agreement together.

In fact, it seems that Bernardo went back to London rst and did not

arrive at Ardres until 8th, while Monluc was there by 14th.

Meanwhile,

the English instructions, drawn up by Paget and amended by him,

were issued along with a commission made out originally to Paget and

Lisle alone but with the names of Hertford and Wotton added as an

aerthought.

Besides the points mentioned already, the commission-

ers were empowered by the King to delay the date of payment of the

arrears, if the French were unable to scrape together the money. Paget,

though, arranged to have a clause added ordering special regard to the

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 4 April 1546, cit. supr.

Alvarotti to Ercole II, 6 April 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22, fasc. 3. fos. 26–7

(deciph.).

Ibid., same to same, 12 April 1546, ibid., B 22, fasc. 3, p. 56 (deciph.): ‘et ha stretta

commissione da Monsignor Almiraglio, per parte di Sua Maestà Christianissima, di

far quanto potra perche concentino di accettare un millione d’oro, et restituire Bolo-

gna, et dello restante liquideranno et l’aranno d’accordio insieme.’

Lisle & Paget to Henry VIII, 20 April 1546, St.P. XI, pp. 105–106.

For the instructions, NA SP1/217, fos. 16–19 (L&P, XXI, i, 610); for Paget’s own

copy of them Anglesey MSS, Box 1, fo. 33 (no. 18); for a dra of the commission

SP1/217, fos. 20–21. Wotton was included in the commission when it was heard that

Remon was to be sent on the French side to pen the treaty.

438 chapter ten

preservation of the Anglo-Imperial treaty. On the day before the seal-

ing of this commission, Henry had revealed something of the negotia-

tions to Cornelius Scepperus, Charles V’s envoy. No, doubt his aim

was to prevent the talks being used against him by the French and to

gain the advantage of claiming from the start that he was being sought

by them.

is news cannot have been too welcome to the Emperor

and Scepperus told Carne on his return to the Netherlands that the

French merely wished to attack the English ‘a l’improviso’ under cover

of negotiations. Paget, for one, considered this unlikely:

such foles as I am do rather beleve them to be nothing but reedes sowen

to kepe downe the corne, and to put bees in our heddes as we woold also

suspect they myght do the lyke with the Frenchman. I do not beleve that

armyes though they have winges can ye.

Preparations

In any negotiation, certain basic imperatives apply: clear objectives,

a bottom line beyond which compromise is not possible and a willing-

ness to walk away from talks if agreement is not possible. In addition

to this, it is obviously essential to have some understanding of the

objectives and limits of the other side. e complexity of Renaissance

diplomacy stemmed partly from the fact that initial positions were fre-

quently taken up (honour, rights) which oen did not sit comfortably

with ‘interest’ (to set aside for the moment any idea of ‘national inter-

est’). e advisers of rulers clearly understood this problem in wres-

tling with it. e statement of extreme demands, though, had a useful

rhetorical eect in concentrating minds on more realistic objectives.

How were these imperatives worked out in practice? From Paget’s

arrival at Calais on 20 April, the reports from the English envoys come

in a continuous stream and give a full picture of the English side of

the negotiation. Unfortunately, the French despatches have not been

preserved (partly through archival accident and probably also because

much information was conveyed in person to the court by Monluc),

though Alvarotti gives many insights into policy in the royal entou-

rage. In fact, the French ministers must have been given some hint

Scepperus and Van der Del to Charles V, 16 April 1546, CSP Spain VIII,

no. 246.

Paget to Petre, 14 May 1546, NA SP1/218, fo. 125v (L&P, XXI, i, 831).

the admirals

’

peace 439

of a reasonable attitude on the English side. e Cardinal of Ferrara

remarked that

By what the Venetian gentleman you know gives me to understand, my

lord Admiral hopes to come to a good conclusion because he indicates

that the English Admiral has a commision to come to reasonable terms.

On all this, though I may hope, I shall hold nothing for certain until I

see the outcome . . .

Actually the French commission is dated 21 April and is made out to

Annebault, Bochetel and Pierre Remon, premier président at Rouen.

Presumably, the undated French instructions were issued at the same

time. ese ordered the commissioners to set aside the conicting

arguments on the rights and wrongs of the pension issue and oer for

arrears a total of 1,251,841 écus (made up of 994,737 for the arrears

of the 2 millions contracted in 1525 and 142,104 for the arrears of life

pension to begin on the full payment of the 2 millions in 1545 and

115,000 for salt arrears) with 300,000 for Henry’s expenses at Boulogne,

with Boulogne to remain as a gage for payment. e total French oer

on the table was thus 1,551,841 écus. Any payments for the arrears

of pension due during wartime, however, were specically excluded.

Cardinal of Ferrara to Alvarotti, Montargis, 20 April 1546, ASM, Francia, B 22,

fasc. 3, fo. 69r (copy enclosed in Alvarotti’s despatch of the 23rd, ibid., fos. 95–100):

‘per quel che fa intendere quel gentilhuomo Vinitiano che sapete, Monsignor Ammi-

raglio spera di haverne à fare qualche buona conclusione, percio che colui signica

che l’ammiraglio Inglese porta comessione di condescendere à cose ragionevoli.

Di che se ben’ anch’io ne spero ogni bene non voglio pero tenirne niente di fermo sin

che non ne vegga il successo.’ e Admiral had le Montargis on 21st to meet Lisle

and Paget. Bernardo told the French that the English would get quickly to work, so

he was giving the maximum encouragement to both sides. (Lisle and Paget to Henry

VIII, 20 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 44r, (L&P XXI, i, 632). He had a1ready written

to his uncle, Maeo Bernardo, that there was ‘grete hope of agreement . . . which God

grant to take eect’ (Harvel to Paget, Venice, 24 April 1546, NA SP1/217, fo. 91, (L&P,

XXI, i, 675).

Powers to negotiate, 21 April 1546, NA E 30/1315 (CAF, V, 70, 15024), and

inserted in the original of the treaty (AN, J 651

, n° 18bis); L&P XXI, i, 640.

Instructions: copies (17th–18th c) in Paris, AE, Mémoires et Documents, Angl-

eterre 3, fols. 85–94; BnF, fr. 2937, fos. 103–114 and fr. 17829, fols. 25–38v (18th c.)

Transcript: NA, PRO 31/3/14, fos. 255–260. Aer referring the commissioners to the

arguments detailed in the instructions to Soissons, Remon, and Babou, likely still in

Remon’s possession, Francis I ordered his commissioners to set the arguments aside

and come to a discussion of what was legally due. ‘Et premierement mond. s

l’admi-

ral et autres deputez pour la premiere ore diront que le roy est contant de satisfaire

au roy d’Angleterre de ce qui se trouvera vallablement et veritablement deub par les

traictez passez entre le roy et luy.’ e King was willing to pay the remainder at the

loan of 2 millions negotiated in the Treaty of 1525 (994,737 écus). As for the arrears