Kennedy G. Imperial Defence. The Old World Order, 1856-1956

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to be ‘the vital requirements of preparedness for hot war’ that was more

and more a pretence. Hot war needs also included ‘the air defence of the

UK with special reference to atomic attack, the security of the North

Atlantic sea route and our home waters. Our commitments to Western

Europe for the defence of the land frontier in Europe’. Second in import-

ance in hot war were ‘the UK share in the defence of the Egyptian base

and the control of the Mediterranean sea route for as long as possible with

the US navy and its denial to the enemy’.

The military commitment to

the Egyptian base was not only questioned from within the embassy in

Egypt, but also by the State Department. The FO was informed of their

belief that Egyptian nationalism would not be overcome by a head-on con-

frontation. The bigger question was whether British forces anywhere in

the Middle East could serve as a stabilising factor in the Cold War or, as

the Americans came to believe, a source of provocation to the nationalists.

It was a vital question for the way in which the British were attempting to

use ‘defence’ needs as a justiﬁcation for a military presence justiﬁed by

Cold War needs by the possible ﬁghting of a hot war irrespective of its feas-

ibility. The reality was that the military and the FO were now both commit-

ted to the Cold War as a means of removing the imperial stigma while still

ensuring that the old imperial values of projecting power in the world

remained to beneﬁt Britain’s global status. The alleged military defence

needs would continue to provide a justiﬁcation for this essentially imperial

strategy.

This was what was conﬁrmed in the major revision of global strategy in

1952 which also had to take account of the economic circumstances dictat-

ing defence expenditure cuts. Unfortunately, these seemed to have grave

implications for the speciﬁcs of a Middle Eastern defence strategy that was

already struggling realistically to be able to defend anything more than

the base in Egypt. However, the disparity between resources and their

deployment in the circumstances of hot war was much less if their main

rationale was presented privately as Cold War. Yet the problem in deploy-

ing all British troops, which Eden and the FO were aware of, was growing

particularly in Egypt.

Thus the defence of the United Kingdom and Western Europe was a

Category A obligation for the FO while that of the Commonwealth and

the Middle East were only Category B. The FO paper which was pre-

sented to the Cabinet as an accompaniment to the military’s global strat-

egy paper was entitled ‘British Overseas Obligations’. It noted that ‘the

essence of a sound foreign policy is to ensure a country’s strength is

equal to its obligations’ and consequently if the effort required to main-

tain them was beyond the capacity of existing resources, a difﬁcult choice

had to be faced. Yet it was not one that inevitably meant reducing com-

mitments. If Britain were to do that, the British people would see their

country ‘sink to the level of a second class power, with injury to their

essential interests and way of life’. Damage to the Commonwealth and to

62 J. Kent

the special relationship which Britain allegedly had with the United

States and Europe would also follow as these relationships depended

‘largely on our status as a world power and upon their belief that we

are ready and willing to support them . . .’ Finally there is the general

effect of loss of prestige. It is impossible to assess in concrete terms

the consequences to our ourselves and the Commonwealth of our

drastically and unilaterally reducing our responsibilities . . . But once

the prestige of a country has started to slide there is no knowing

where it will stop.

While both papers were primarily concerned with defending the threat

to Britain’s world role, the COS global strategy paper had more imperial

implications. This imperial role could now be maintained or justiﬁed on a

global basis because of the Cold War, which was formally placed at the

forefront of military global strategy. The suggestions made by Field Mar-

shall Slim for winning the Cold War had as their ﬁrst priority the mainte-

nance of adequate forces in overseas theatres (Asia and Africa) to hold

back aggressive communism.

Furthermore, the chiefs briefed the prime

minister on the importance of the Middle East by arguing that if Britain

evacuated Egypt it would not only be a blow to its position as a great

power, but it also would create a vacuum which the Russians would enter

immediately. The result would inevitably be ‘Communist regimes in all

Arab states eventually extending from the Eastern Atlantic to the Indian

Subcontinent’.

The COS 1952 global strategy paper deﬁned the Cold War as the top

military priority compared with the hot war requirements needed to ﬁght

a global war or even what was required for the provision of deterrent

forces.

And with the Cold War coming before deterrence and ﬁghting a

hot war, the key issue in 1952 was winning the Cold War to prevent an

international armed conﬂict. Yet unlike the FO, the military had little

time for Europe and preferred to refer to Her Majesty’s Government

(HMG) ‘pursuing a policy in the ﬁeld of imperial and foreign affairs . . .

to maintain out interests in various parts of the world which are threat-

ened by the Cold War tactics of Russia and China’.

The problem which

may have inﬂuenced the global strategy paper considerably was the need

for defence cutbacks in 1952, and the pressures to reduce the defence

budget were to continue to grow. In other words, it was now even more

difﬁcult to accommodate the hot war requirements of NATO

let alone

when combined with the Cold War requirements that were now seen as

key to the maintenance of Britain’s global role.

Another major problem for military/strategic requirements designed

to achieve power political ends was inherent in the Cold War military

deployments. While garrisons and the stationing of British troops could be

done more cheaply than providing the necessary forces for the hot war,

The Foreign Ofﬁce and defence of the empire 63

the focus on empire ran up more and more against the mounting

problem of nationalist movements. Whether in the formal or informal

empire, they were either opposed to the continuation of British rule or, in

the case of Egypt, to the maintenance of British inﬂuence they represen-

ted. Fighting the Cold War was bad for the Western position precisely

because of its association with the empire, which had been the main

British reason for the power political connection in the ﬁrst place. The

immediate consequence was the strengthening of the FO position that the

maintenance of a military presence in Egypt should not continue to be

insisted on at the expense of the kind of hostility from the Egyptians

which it was now provoking. Hence Eden was less willing to confront

nationalism by 1953 and was prepared to abandon the peacetime occupa-

tion of the Suez Canal base for an agreement guaranteeing its availability

to the British in wartime.

The situation following the ﬁnalisation of the global strategy paper was

further changed by the explosion of the hydrogen bomb by the United

States in 1952 and then by the Soviet Union in 1953. The explosive power

from fusing the atom was 1,000 times more than that developed by the

purely ﬁssion atomic weapons, and the reliance on large military bases

naturally came to be regarded as less appropriate in the thermonuclear

age. However, at the end of 1952, the military were coming round to

accepting the FO line that the peacetime evacuation of Egypt might be

desirable and necessary. Studies were authorised on the basis of planning

with no base in Egypt and on the forces available being reduced to one

division and 160 aircrafts – a cut of one division and 200 aeroplanes. In

short, radical cutbacks were altering military strategy in operational terms

and favouring a shift from Cold War priorities and sizeable bases to

emphasising the nuclear deterrent as the number one requirement for

global strategy which was formally instituted in 1955.

It is important to note that the imperial alliance between the FO and

the COS remained a ﬁrm one once the agreement to leave Egypt had been

decided. The FO had their own reasons for wanting bases in Iraq irrespec-

tive of any spurious justiﬁcation for a military presence designed to symbol-

ise prestige and inﬂuence through the ostensible provision of military

capabilities to defend the Middle East. The FO was still committed to an

imperial role but now again added to a European one which would make

Britain more attractive as an ally to the Americans. The way of doing it in

the 1950s was, in effect, to play the leading regional role on behalf of the

Western alliance in Cold War areas of the Middle East and Black Africa.

The diplomatic achievements of Eden at Geneva in 1954 were not

designed to do more than play a supportive role alongside the Americans

despite the different approaches to Southeast Asia by the two powers. The

Middle East was different and regarded as a British Commonwealth

responsibility, hence the efforts, for example, to get the Australians and

New Zealanders to agree to provide an air squadron or two.

There had

64 J. Kent

also been suggestions of a Middle East Command to make a British pres-

ence in Egypt more justiﬁable, and when 1953 began, this had become a

proposed Middle East Defence Organisation designed to take the imperial

stigma but not the prestige away from a British military presence.

However, when Dulles toured the Middle East in the summer of 1953,

he was confronted with the failure of such ideas and struck by the resent-

ment that the imperial British presence was provoking in Egypt.

It was

the start of exactly what the FO feared, namely, the Americans deciding

that they now ought to make their own policies for the region and not rely

on taking the lead from the British in military matters. As Roger Allen, the

head of the African Department, noted, the American attitude to the

supply of military equipment to the Middle East made it clear that they

wanted to now establish a position to the detriment of the long-standing

British position in the region.

The FO saw problems in this new, more

independent American position, whereas the chiefs, always more inclined

to have faith in the value of American benevolence, were more concerned

with indigenous challenges to Britain’s regional position. The military

now shared the FO’s concern that hostile Egyptian nationalists could

make the base a liability,

‘as our strength declined it became increasingly

important to show we meant business there’.

This was an example of

how strategic requirements were interpreted in order to demonstrate

Britain’s global status and its valuable presence in the Middle East, rather

than having any viable operational rationale.

The prospects seemed good for a choice being made to spend increas-

ingly scarce military resources on the nuclear deterrent, and the conven-

tional forces deemed necessary for the deterrence to work and to enhance

Britain’s credibility in Europe. Yet, in fact, Britain’s imperial status as a

global power had to be consolidated because of the retreat from Egypt in

the eyes of both the military and the FO. The stationing of British forces

for Cold War reasons, ostensibly linked to the defence of the Middle East,

required a new base and a new strategy. The military gave attention to this

before the agreements on the evacuation of the Suez Canal Base were

signed with the Egyptians in the summer and autumn of 1954. The three

possible areas which came to mind in 1954 and 1955 were Cyprus, Iraq

and Jordan. None of them proved viable long-term prospects and

although Cyprus and Jordan faded from consideration in 1956 without

causing any major disasters, the quest for an Iraqi base was to lead directly

to the Baghdad Pact. Not only did this prove to be unpopular with both

Arabs and Israelis, it also proved unpopular with the French and after

some initial enthusiasm American support for the Pact soon began to

wane. It was the Pact which epitomised the farcical role of operational

capability in relation to strategy and politics and without which the Suez

debacle would have been much less likely. And then the last imperial gasp

would have been far less humiliating in bringing to an end the imperial

defence of the Middle East based on the Levant.

The Foreign Ofﬁce and defence of the empire 65

The old imperial traditions were clung to most fervently by the military

when formulating British global strategy in defence terms. Despite the

hydrogen bomb, the Cold War rationale for force deployments to fulﬁl a

global role and its associated prestige remained. It was again argued that

to abandon signiﬁcant Cold War commitments would make hot war more

likely and cause damage to Britain’s position, inﬂuence, security and com-

merce.

Therefore, the military view was that it was necessary to retain all

overseas bases except Korea, Trieste and the Suez Canal zone to maintain

Britain’s position as a world power.

With the departure from Egypt, the

Cyprus base, which had replaced Egypt as Middle East HQ, was discussed

in similar terms. It was not the strategic assessments of what military opera-

tions the base was needed for that were producing the need for military

facilities on sovereign British territory. It was the political wish to demon-

strate a British presence in the Middle East that provided the rationale for

British sovereignty and in the military’s own terms made the base essen-

tial. The strategic arguments were, as the chief of the Air Staff pointed

out, subsidiary to the political requirements.

The extent to which the desire for the political status from a global

role was dictating military thinking on defence and security within an

imperial context was now absolutely clear. It was precisely revealed again

when the COS expressed agreement on Cyprus with the BDCC that

‘British inﬂuence and prestige in the Middle East as a whole could not

be retained without the retention of our present military position in

Cyprus which was therefore strategically essential’.

While the military

were considering Cyprus, the other and more disastrous quest for a base

to replace Egypt was being pursued by the FO. Again the motivation was

the need for the retention of an important presence in the Middle East as

a contribution to Britain’s global role. This would conﬁrm, especially to

Washington, Britain’s special position in a changed strategic world where

large-scale forces no longer served the same needs. It was precisely

because of the perceived military contribution, allegedly to the defence

strategy for the Middle East, but in reality to the maintenance of British

prestige in the region, that the FO could continue to see political value in

forming the Baghdad Pact.

The problems foreseen with the Baghdad Pact were recognised in the

FO and it remains unclear as to whether the military arguments strength-

ened the hands of those most in favour of a continued imperial role in the

Middle East. One ofﬁcial referred to ‘seizing the bird in the hand’ of the

Turco-Iraqi Pact in order to provide the umbrella for the continued mili-

tary presence in Iraq.

Extending it would remove, so it was hoped, the

stigma of a British presence signifying imperialism. From the FO point of

view, the value of the Baghdad Pact was ﬁrst noted in terms of the need to

convince others that Britain could defend them and thereby prevent the

United States undermining the British position. How much this view was

increased by defence pacts in the less-developed world like the Southeast

66 J. Kent

Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Southeast Asia is difﬁcult to tell.

What is certain is that the Baghdad Pact, like the other post-war military

alliances in the West, was primarily created for political reasons. As well, it

was a disastrous mistake to ally with an Arab rival to Egypt so soon after

Nasser had successfully removed Western imperial inﬂuence in the form

of a military presence on Egyptian soil. The Baghdad Pact aroused viru-

lent Egyptian opposition, as the British and the Americans were relying on

Nasser to play a key role in Plan Alpha, the Anglo-American attempt to

bring about a settlement of the Arab–Israeli dispute. And it constituted

the ﬁrst disastrous contradiction in the British attempt to maintain an

imperial defence commitment in the heart of the Middle East that ended

with Suez.

The Baghdad Pact and the attempt to use it to maintain British prestige

and inﬂuence ironically came to depend on deceptions over the availability

of nuclear weapons as the political battle between Britain and Egypt over

Middle Eastern leadership of the Arab world intensiﬁed. More important,

it coincided with the latest FO attempt to press again for a European con-

nection, expressed in power political terms through nuclear cooperation as

opposed to global inﬂuence exercised through an imperial and European

combination. The British military had to face the unpleasant fact that for

political reasons the outer ring strategy for the defence of the Middle East

required more and more resources as British defence cuts were only able,

after 1953 and 1955, to provide less and less. When the last desperate card

to retain British imperial inﬂuence in the Middle East was played in the

form of military aggression to remove Nasser, the imperial losses were con-

siderable. In general terms, the idea that British foreign policy could pre-

serve a global role through playing the leading role in the Middle East on

behalf of the Cold War needs of the Western alliance sank with the block

ships in the Suez Canal. Yet, even that was not enough to prevent the

British abandoning the delusions of grandeur that might be sustained by a

military strategy divorced from the political requirements of decolonisation

but not from the projection of British power on a global basis.

Ironically, as Egyptian opposition to the Pact began to cause difﬁculties

weeks before the Suez crisis, the FO began to consider ways in which the

military commitment to an imperial defence strategy might be offset by a

greater commitment to Europe. As before, this perception grew from

consideration of Britain’s position as a global power, which required more

military focus on Europe because of the political beneﬁts. It was not a

clear choice in favour of a pre-Suez European strategy but a way of again

combining the empire and Europe which followed consideration of the

future of the Commonwealth in June 1956. The review by the Common-

wealth Relations Ofﬁce forecast that Britain’s position would become less

dominant, but that Britain could continue ‘to derive increasing inﬂuence

as a world power from its headship of the Commonwealth’.

But inﬂu-

ence from Europe and nuclear weapons would be a possibility now that

The Foreign Ofﬁce and defence of the empire 67

defence needs could no longer be so easily met through an imperial

defence strategy. And Selwyn Lloyd suggested precisely this in early 1957.

Changes had taken place since the war as the Commonwealth replaced

the empire and global strategy replaced imperial defence. But there were

large similarities once the FO and the military were fully committed in the

1950s to Britain’s global role. The means of developing this were clearly

the same in that operational rationales were developed to justify the mili-

tary deployments out of area that provided for the status and prestige such

deployments were perceived as representing in global terms. The hard

choice of an either or policy between Out of Area and European defence

when military strategy focused on imperial deployments while the FO

were desperately trying to gear force provision to the political require-

ments of NATO in Europe was avoided. It was only by combining the two

strategies that the resource needs of the European and global com-

ponents could be prevented from becoming an issue. Yet, the reality was

that Britain could not meet the resource needs of either area in whatever

military role. By such ‘defence’ means was the Empire/Commonwealth

justiﬁed and a weakened imperial role maintained even after Suez.

Notes

1 For the arguments on this perception of Empire’s changing importance, see

R. F. Holland, In Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role 1900–1970

(London, 1991). On the base in Egypt, see J Kent (ed.), British Documents on the

End of Empire Series B Vol 4 Part I xlv–l (London, 1998).

2 J. Kent (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, xlii.

3 The arguments between the FO and the COS over a Western European bloc

and the role of the post Hostilities Planning Committee have been well

covered with different interpretations in J. Lewis, Changing Direction: British Mil-

itary Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence 1942–1947 (London, 2002) and J.

Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War (Leicester, 1994).

4 AIR 9/267 Memo by ACAS(P) 24 Feb 1946 and see CAB 131/2 DO(46)40

Memo by Bevin 13 Mar. 1946.

5 FO 371/50912 Memo by Sir O Sargent ‘Stocktaking on VE Day’ outlines the

early ideas on the relationship between the smokescreen of liberalism and

Britain’s power political and imperial needs.

6 For the development of the Third World Power idea, see J. Kent, British Imper-

ial Strategy, Chapters 5 and 6.

7 FO 371/50912 Memo by Sir O Sargent ‘Stocktaking on VE Day’.

8 CAB 131/2 DO(46)47 2 Apr. 1946.

9 On Montreux at the end of the war, see CAB 80/97COS(45)551 and 573 and

the annexes 28 Aug. 1945 and 11 Sept. 1945; J. Kent, British Imperial Strategy,

69–71.

10 On the arguments during the war about the Straits and their signiﬁcance, see

CAB 81/41 PHP(43)5 16 Aug. 1943;CAB 84/55 JP(43)294 20 Sept. 1943.

11 The imperial role needed on a global basis had been conﬁrmed for the mili-

tary by the Second World War – contrary to the ending of direct colonial rule.

Hence Montgomery’s commitment to using Black Africa as a source of man-

power to replace the Indian army FO 800/451 Report by Montgomery to Bevin

25 Sept. 1947 and Glubb Pasha arguing for the importance of colonial areas

68 J. Kent

for military bases – ‘A Chain of Gibraltars’ FO371/91223 Memo by Glubb 23

May 1951.

12 CAB 131/2 COS(46)43 13 Feb. 1946.

13 CAB 131/2, DO(46)27 Memo by Attlee for the Defence Committee 2 Mar.

1946.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 In 1946, the FO was deep in negotiations with Egypt over the future of the base

in the Suez Canal Zone. See J. Kent (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire

(BDEEP) Series B Vol 4 Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East 1945–56 Part I.

17 FO 371/53286 2 Mar. 1946.

18 CAB 131/12 DO(46)47 Memo by COS 2 Apr. 1946.

19 See J. Kent, ‘Bevin’s Foreign Policy and the Idea of Euro-Africa’ in M. Dockrill

and J. W. Young (eds).

20 CAB 129/23 CP(48), 4 Jan. 1948.

21 See FO 371/62557 Bevin to Creech Jones on 20 Aug. 1947 on the linkages

between the Marshal Plan and the colonies and CAB 134/1217. Memo by

Dalton 3 Jan. 1948.

22 Kent, British Imperial Strategy, 187–200.

23 CAB 129/37 Pt I CP(49)205 25 Oct. 1949.

24 DEFE 4/23 COS(49)113 3 Aug. 1949.

25 See DEFE 4/11 COS(48)39 Conﬁdential Annex 17 Mar. 1948 for the views of

Sir John Cunningham and Lord Tedder on the Russians retreating eastwards

in any conﬂict rather than attacking westwards.

26 DEFE 5/20 COS(50)141, annex 28 Apr. 1950.

27 DEFE 4/16 COS(48)145 11 Oct. 1948 JP(48)106 annexes 7 Oct. 1948.

28 CAB 131/9 DO(50)45 7 June 1950.

29 CAB 129/37 Pt I CP(49)208 18 Oct. 1949.

30 DEFE 4/10 and 11 contain numerous discussions about force provisions in

Europe and the difﬁculty of providing for a ‘stop line’ when the forces did not

exist to enforce it. See also DEFE4/14 COS (48)96 9 July 1948.

31 DEFE4/16 COS(48) 124 8 Sept. 1948 conﬁrms the British military belief in the

impossibility of defending the Rhine.

32 For interpretations of NSC 68 that relate Cold War policies to hot war ones, see

John W. Young and J. Kent, International Relations since 1945 A Global History

(2004).

33 DEFE4/30 COS(50) 49 24 Mar. 1950.

34 It is vital to be aware of the distinction between these terms in the military

assumptions of the early 1950s on both sides of the Atlantic. Most interpreta-

tions of military policy and the rearmament implemented in the wake of the

Korean War are seen in foreign policy Cold War terms and the interpretations

of NSC 68 fail to understand it.

35 CAB 131/9 DO(50)45 7 June 1950.

36 DEFE 4/32 COS(50) 84th, Annex, 7 June 1950, Minute by Brigadier C Price

(Secretary to COS Committee) to the C’s-in-c Middle East, 31 May 1950.

37 CAB 131/9 DO(50)45 7 June 1950.

38 DEFE 4/25 COS(49)154 19 Oct. 1949.

39 CAB 131/9 DO(50)45 7 June 1950.

40 Amongst the many works on ANZUS for documents, see R. Holdich, V.

Johnson and P. Andre (eds), ANZUS Treaty 1951 (2000).

41 CAB131/11 DO(51)70 2 June 1951.

42 DEFE 5/20 COS(50)141 28 Apr. 1950.

43 DEFE 5/24 COS(50)363 15 Sept. 1950.

44 CAB 129/43 CP(50)310 12 Dec. 1950.

The Foreign Ofﬁce and defence of the empire 69

45 FO 371/90176, Cairo to FO 5 Feb. 1951.

46 DEFE 4/38 COS(50)210 19 Dec. 1950; DEFE 5/29 COS(51)129 22 Mar. 1951.

47 CAB 129/45 CP(51)95 30 Mar. 1951.

48 CAB 128/19 CM(51)23 2 Apr. 1951.

49 CAB 131/9 DO(50)45 7 June 1950.

50 Ibid.

51 CAB 129/53 C(52)202 18 June 1952.

52 WO 216/459 Memo by Field Marshal Slim 17 Dec. 1951.

53 DEFE 5/35 COS(51) 759 annex 18 Dec. 1951.

54 CAB 131/12 D(52)26 17 June 1952.

55 CAB 131/12 D(52)45 31 Oct. 1952, cited in D. Goldsworthy (ed.), BDEEP

Series A Volume 3 The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951–57

Part I (1994), 36–7.

56 These in Feb 1952 were deemed to be a total of 96 divisions; M. Dockrill,

British Defence since 1945 (Oxford, 1988), 50.

57 See D. Goldsworthy (ed.) op cit 26–36, 39–41, citing CAB 129/55 C(52)316 3t

1952, CAB 129/55 C(52)320 3 Oct. 1952, CAB 129/56 C(52)39 3 Nov. 1952.

58 See CAB 129/59 C(53)65 Cabinet Memo by Eden 16 Feb. 1953.

59 DEFE 4/77 COS(55)51 27 June 1955.

60 The Australians agreed to provide two squadrons in 1952 and the New Zealan-

ders one in 1953.

61 For the MEC, see J. Kent (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, lxii–lxviii.

62 FRUS 1952–1954 The Near and Middle East Vol. IX Pt I 379–86.

63 DEFE 4/66 COS(53)124 3 Nov. 1953.

64 DEFE 4/72 COS(54)92 27Aug. 1954 JP(54)58 24 Aug. 1954.

65 DEFE 4/72 COS(54)92 27 Aug. 1954 Record of Lt-Gen. Sir Neville Brown-

john’s (VCIGS) remarks.

66 DEFE 5/47 COS(54)332 9 July 1953; DEFE 5/47 COS(53)336 11July 1953.

67 DEFE 4/70 COS(54)53 10 May 1954.

68 DEFE 4/72 COS(54)94 6 Sep. 1954.

69 DEFE 4/77 COS(55)50 27 June 1955.

70 FO 371/115488 Minute by J G Ward 2 Feb. 1955.

71 CO 1032/51 and June 1956 cited in Goldsworthy Doc 26.

72 CAB 129/84 CP(57)6 5 Jan 1957 cited in Goldsworthy Doc 28.

70 J. Kent

4 The Treasury and defence

of empire

George Peden

The Treasury’s inﬂuence on imperial defence is often overlooked, as can

be seen from the very different treatment accorded to it in different

volumes of the Oxford History of the British Empire. In the nineteenth-

century volume, ﬁnance is described as central to the resolution of stra-

tegic choices, and examples are given of Chancellors of the Exchequer,

Gladstone and Disraeli, successfully curbing army and navy expenditure.

In the twentieth-century volume, there is only a passing reference to

Treasury ministers pointing out the huge disparity between Britain’s mili-

tary commitments and her ﬁnancial resources in the late 1940s.

There is

no mention of Treasury control of defence expenditure between the wars,

although that is the period for which complaints by military historians

about ‘Treasury meanness’ are most common.

There is nothing on the

Treasury in the chapters on imperial defence and the Royal Navy (RN)

and the British Empire in the historiographical volume.

The Treasury’s inﬂuence can be understood only in the context of its

role, which evolved over the period covered by this book.

The Chancellor

of the Exchequer is responsible not only for taxation and public loans, but

also for controlling central government’s expenditure. One of the conven-

tions of a parliamentary system of government is that money for central

government expenditure should be voted in advance by the House of

Commons, sitting as the Committee of Supply, and audited to ensure that

it has been spent as voted. Each spring departments submit to Parliament

estimates for expenditure in the coming ﬁnancial year (starting in April).

In 1861, Gladstone won the Cabinet’s agreement to the principle that the

estimates should be subject to detailed criticism by the Treasury before

Parliament was asked to approve them, to ensure that the taxpayer would

be getting value for money. However, the Admiralty and War Ofﬁce esti-

mates were regarded as highly conﬁdential and went to the Cabinet

without previous discussion with Treasury ofﬁcials, who normally had less

opportunity to criticize proposals for defence expenditure than in the

case of civil departments, who consulted the Treasury in advance of their

estimates going to the Cabinet. Even so, the Chancellor would delay

Cabinet approval until his ofﬁcials had had the opportunity to compare