Introduction
The concept of Imperial Defence,
1856–1956
Greg Kennedy
Imperial Defence in the century, immediately following the end of the
Crimean War until the embarrassment of the Suez Crisis, was not a con-
stant. It was not a constant in the sense of how it was conceived in the
mind of the British strategic policy-making elite entrusted with the
defence of Britain and its empire. Although the concept of the empire was
inextricably linked to the British identity, the manner in which the empire
existed and how it was to be defended was constantly evolving. Directly
linked to this issue of consistency is the fact that resource allocation,
funding, technology and politics created other strategic inconsistencies in
the Imperial Defence formula.
1
At times it was a vibrant and full part of
the national identity, while at other points in that century large parts of
England and the empire found the concept troubling at best. This lack
of consistency was the result of the diversity of the constituent parts
involved in creating an overarching national defence policy.
Those elites were charged with protecting Britain and its empire in a
security environment that had to take into account a wide range of factors.
The most important factors were managing changes in the domestic polit-
ical environment; shifts in national economic fortunes; technological
advances in the art of war due to increase or decrease in industrial capacity
and ability; changes to the international balance of power system, changes
to the system of administering security issues; and changes in the societal
values among the British and Imperial populations. It is fair to say,
however, that the concept of imperial defence, as an intellectual exercise,
was, despite a lack of consistency in image or manifestation, a reality.
2
This
reality was not always supported by obvious or tangible action on the part
of those diverse elites, entwined in the process of providing the national
security strategy. The elite entrusted with the formulation of the imperial
defence policy laboured to obtain imperial security through a mix of coop-
erative ventures with other states who at least shared some of their own
interests and constructed an armed forces which was sufficient to defeat or
at least deter potential opponents. But at all times, in a uniquely British
fashion, the elite was governed by the need to ensure that the construction