DAVID SADLER
130
a period of job-less growth) when it too began to decline, particularly from 1979 to 1981. In
those two years output fell by 17 per cent and capital investment by 30 per cent; the million
jobs lost represented a fall of 16 per cent. After 1981 output and investment both began to
recover, whilst employment continued on a downward path, reaching 5 million by 1985.
Thus the period after 1981 witnessed a second phase of job-less growth.
The immediate causes of the collapse in manufacturing in the UK from the late 1970s to
the early 1980s included a government policy of high interest rates (in pursuit of the control of
inflation and a reduced Public Sector Borrowing Requirement), and a relaxation of financial
controls (which encouraged capital flight from the UK), in a context where a weak
manufacturing base was already struggling to cope with a second deep international recession.
The consequences were dramatic. In 1983 the UK recorded its first-ever balance-of-trade
deficit in finished manufactured goods, and that indicator has remained in deficit to the present
day. Output in real terms did not recover to pre-1979 levels until the late 1980s. Severe
contraction in certain sectors of manufacturing, particularly those under state ownership such
as coal and steel, was reflected in intense regional and sub-regional economic downturns,
especially in the old industrial regions of central Scotland, north-east England and South
Wales. With a concentration of growth in the early to mid-1980s in a broad arc stretching from
the ‘M4 corridor’ between Bristol and London and round to East Anglia, concern was expressed
over the resurgence of a North-South divide, evident in contrasting economic conditions. The
national economy appeared to be in the midst of a major economic transformation, in which
individual places and regions had sharply diverging profiles and prospects.
Around the mid- to late 1980s, there was considerable debate about the underlying
reasons for the poor performance of manufacturing industry in the UK relative to other
countries. Several competing explanations were put forward involving the links between
manufacturing and other sectors of the economy, ranging from (what was seen as) an undue
dominance of the financial services sector, to the nature of the relationship between finance
capital and manufacturing. Some other contrasting explanations stressed labour productivity
and poor management as key explanatory factors, while still others focused on the role of
innovation and R&D, and the under-representation of small firms within the national
economy. Evaluating the causes of the UK’s manufacturing decline became a growth industry
in its own right.
At the same time too, manufacturing in the UK—and the UK economy more generally
—was in the midst of a recovery, albeit one which was hesitant at first. By the close of the
1980s an economic boom, partly engineered by national government policies (in a context
of renewed international growth), had seen manufacturing recover its levels of output of ten
years previously. The cycle peaked at the end of that decade, however, and a slump set in
again in the early 1990s, with gradual recovery only apparent in the mid-1990s. This picture
—of boom, bust and recovery, in a setting of long-term decline—underpins the performance
of manufacturing in the UK since the mid-1980s.
In that period employment in manufacturing initially continued a steady decline, falling
from 5 million in 1985 to 3.9 million in 1993, although it began to reverse that longstanding
trend from 1994 onwards, growing to 4.1 million by 1997 (Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1). Thus
absolute employment in manufacturing contracted during the boom years of the late 1980s—
continuing the phase of job-less growth—and only began a recovery with the conditions of
the mid-1990s. In relative terms however, manufacturing employment contracted continually,
from 23 per cent of the UK’s workforce in 1985 to 18 per cent by 1997.