Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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384 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

taken prisoner. Marchetti would later surmise that the Austrians had been

alerted coincidentally at this time to expect the return from Italy of some

escaped Austrian prisoners.

287

But Austrian evidence now reveals that their

vigilance was most probably due to the confession of Bohumil Va

cha (captured

on Val Bella) who had confessed before execution that 30 spies were about to be

dressed in Austrian uniform and sent over to commit sabotage.

288

The same

crumbling under interrogation was evident with the new captives. Both S

torch

and S

marda confessed surprisingly copious details of their mission, stressing

that they had only undertaken it in order to return home, having originally

been forced to join the Czech Legion. This argument may have saved S

marda

from the gallows for in addition he would argue at his court martial that he had

not deserted but been taken prisoner in October 1915. Possibly, as Hanzal

suggests, he was `turned' by the Austrians, but it seems more likely in the

absence of new evidence that at his trial he was simply successful in renouncing

the Czech Legion and disclaiming any personal responsibility.

289

In contrast,

the Austrians executed S

torch and gave the event the widest publicity on both

sides of the front. Friends and contacts whom the two had implicated in their

confessions were rounded up and sent to an inhospitable part of the mountain

front. In retrospect, Marchetti asserted that although the expedition had failed,

it had achieved the `moral impact' he had envisaged, particularly because it had

been publicized by the Austrians themselves; their counter-propaganda had

proved counter-productive, and had led according to Marchetti to an increase

in desertions to Italy. In fact, this was only partially true. The expedition also

backfired on Marchetti, due to some subtle Austrian counter-propaganda which

actually hit its target.

Following the

Riva expedition the 10AK propaganda office began a new

campaign of disinformation to make the Czech Legion suspect in Italian eyes.

It sent over to the Italians, by leaflet and wireless, coded messages in Czech

which referred mysteriously to an organization entitled `D.R.U.P.'.

290

The

messages implied that D.R.U.P. was an association of Austrian spies hidden

among the Slav volunteers, and that while S

torch had

been a `true legionary'

and therefore been executed, Jan S

marda had escaped that fate because he

was a `drupan' or Austrian agent. The 10AK followed up this communication,

ostensibly sent out for the benefit of their `drupani' in Italy, with a second

message which announced that Popadic

, Mikulõ

k and the other officers who

had deserted at Val dei Concei on 9 July were all `drupani' who had been

sent to the `7th eagle's nest' and needed to be `well hatched' (presumably

`instructed').

291

With these methods the Austrians were moving beyond their

previous propaganda technique of warning the Italians openly by leaflet, or

frightening the Czech legionaries with public executions. They were cleverly

exploiting the persistent misgivings which many of the Italian military retained

about the Slavs' actual reliability.

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 385

If such misgivings were fuelled by a deep-seated mistrust of Yugoslav aspira-

tions, they

seem to have been intensified in some quarters after an incident in

early June when eight Czech legionaries had rebelled against their officers and

been over-hastily executed by General Graziani.

292

Indeed, despite Pivko's

frequent assurances to the contrary, it was untrue to suggest that all volunteers

were 100 per cent reliable. We know from Czech sources that dozens of Czech

officers who were in Italian prison camps were of an `Austrian mentality'. Some

Czechs had certainly felt pressurized into joining the Legion; some were judged

unreliable after recruitment, so that already by June 120 had been expelled.

293

In the last months of the war there were even some cases of Czechoslovak

legionaries deserting back to Austria.

294

It was therefore not surprising that

when the D.R.U.P. messages appeared, and were decoded, the CS was initially

anxious about unreliable or `Austrian' volunteers. In early August, it warned the

army and also its allies at Versailles:

Information has

been received from a reliable source that the introduction

on a large scale among Czecho-Slovak troops on the Italian Front of defeatist

and pacifist elements and spies is being organized by the Austro-German

secret propaganda service.

295

When Pivko made a tour of the various army sectors in early August he quickly

learnt about D.R.U.P. and sensed correctly, from talking to the Intelligence

heads, that a certain degree of suspicion had surfaced again in military circles:

Every day

I detect new traces of untiring enemy propaganda against the

Czechoslovaks and I would justifiably conclude that the Comando Supremo

has issued confidential instructions that the Czechoslovak volunteers should

be controlled and their movement at the front restricted.

296

This seems to have been true. According to Finzi, the CS had ordered that the

Legion should not be used at the front again until D.R.U.P. had been properly

investigated.

The whole

deception was finally exposed on 15 August at a meeting in the

1st army sector attended by Pivko, Finzi and other Italian officers.

297

Pivko

defended those who were accused of being `drupani', including S

marda since it

seemed unlikely that he could have dissimulated for almost three years in

the Italian war zone. Indeed, Pivko went further, alleging that those `primit-

ive Slavs'

who continued to fight for Austria were motivated by `primitive

duty' to the Emperor and lacked the intelligence to be capable of espionage.

Although those present undoubtedly never shared Pivko's straight division of

Slavs into `primitives' and `idealists', they agreed that D.R.U.P. was an Austrian

invention to throw suspicion on the volunteer units. One Italian officer

386 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

remarked, `we are dealing here with clever and yet clumsy propaganda'. The

clumsiness in fact seemed evident only now that the trick had been exposed.

The Austrians

could not know this, and in the final months of hostilities the

10AK continued to issue the coded messages, relying for their content prin-

cipally upon

the statements of captured Czech legionaries. A third D.R.U.P.

message, sent over in September, advised Czech prisoners who had been coerced

into the Legion to enter D.R.U.P. where they would be `rendering the best and

most valuable service to the fatherland'. A fourth message, deciphered by Italian

Intelligence in early October, announced that Andrej Ruziak (a Slovak legionary

who had deserted back to Austria) had been a `drupan', and also tried to throw

suspicion upon Yugoslav volunteers whose `drupani' allegedly had links to

socialists.

298

These efforts were now falling on deaf ears, but the D.R.U.P.

disinformation had nevertheless had some impact in August, ensuring perhaps

that Italy used the Czech units less efficiently in that month. It was one example

in the last months that the propaganda duel between Italy and Austria-Hungary

was not completely dead. The Austrians, basing their arguments on what they

believed to be true, had subtly tested Italy's attitude to the Slav volunteers, and

had discovered a surprising number of chinks in the Italian armour.

By September,

the strength of Italian propaganda when compared to the

Austrians' had been reaffirmed, and the faith of Italian Intelligence in their

Slavs had been steadied. It was evident in the intensive practice of trench

propaganda, but especially in Italy's use of Czech volunteers to penetrate

again into the enemy war zone, an activity which (despite the D.R.U.P. claims)

was significantly not practised by the Austrians. The most successful Italian

expedition was linked to a Czech attack which took place, as described above,

in late September on Cima Tre Pezzi in the lst army sector. As an extra benefit

from liaising with the Czech cavalry regiment opposite, Marchetti was able to

smuggle two Czech agents across the lines on a mission of sabotage and espi-

onage in

the rear.

299

clav Vopa

lensky

and Rudolf Petr, equipped with false

papers and bombs disguised as jars of marmalade, moved forward along Val

d'Assa and, after blowing up two munition dumps, a teleferiche, and some

aircraft hangers, finally reached Trento itself. There they found far tighter

controls on their movement than they had anticipated, but they managed to

return on the same route and reported back to Marchetti having survived `five

days in the crater of an active volcano'.

300

It was an example which the other

Intelligence heads were keen to emulate. In the last weeks of the war, 3rd army

Intelligence sent a Czech and an Italian on a joint mission into the rear of the

Lower Piave; reaching their destination by boat, they mixed with disgruntled

Italian civilians and were able to dispatch pigeons which carried their informa-

tion back

to Italy.

301

Such journeys into the occupied zone of Venetia had certainly been occur-

ring since

August. Under British supervision, the Italians over the summer had

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 387

learnt how to drop agents by parachute into enemy territory (rather than the

aeroplane needing to land). It was a development still in its infancy, but some

Italians and also some Slav volunteers seem to have participated in the ex-

periment, being

set down in the war zone and `obtaining useful results' which

they despatched back to Italy by `pigeon-post'.

302

The Austrian authorities were

not unaware that such infiltration was occurring. Parachutes had been discov-

ered as

well as baskets of carrier pigeons; one `carrier' had even been shot down

in flight.

303

But while they vainly sent out orders for increased vigilance, the

Italian Intelligence heads were one step ahead, confidently experimenting with

new techniques and often turning to their propaganda troops to carry them

out.

From afar

in London, Henry Wickham Steed over the summer had been

keeping the British EPD informed about the campaign on the Italian Front.

He suggested to the EPD Committee that, while there had been major successes

in June, the campaign had then been frustrated and allowed to weaken because

of Italy's political vacillation over the cause of the oppressed nationalities. In

addition, what Steed called the `spirit of propaganda' at the front had been

affected because the Italians were not keen to make a decisive attack on Austria-

Hungary without Allied military support.

304

Both of Steed's statements were

not quite accurate in view of what we now know about the campaign in Italy.

Although the struggle over Italian official policy had continued unabated,

had caused frictions at the Padua Commission and hampered the creation of

a Yugoslav legion, it had not prevented the Italian military from continuing the

propaganda campaign quite intensively in these months.

Nor had

the `spirit of propaganda' lost its attraction for the Italians, except

perhaps temporarily during the D.R.U.P. affair. On the contrary, all the indica-

tions are

that they viewed front propaganda as a viable substitute for an

orthodox military offensive at a time when the Monarchy might still be strong

enough to resist. As Finzi asked Orlando on one occasion, `should one now give

a violent shake without being certain that the pear, perhaps not completely

ripe, will fall from the tree?': better, undoubtedly, to wait and help in the

process of ripening the fruit.

305

This policy over the summer was pursued

with a new sophistication, both by manifesto and propaganda patrol, aiming

at all the opposing nationalities, even the Magyars and Germans, and thereby

reaching new psychological and geographical targets in the heart of the Mon-

archy. The

campaign's major strength, as the Austrians recognized, was that it

mirrored and interacted with the social and political crisis in the Empire, acting

as a catalyst upon existing moods and currents. Clearly, it also had its weak-

nesses which

the Austrians occasionally tried to exploit. But the reality of

trends in Austria-Hungary and in the wider war meant that the Austrians'

outlook in the final months was largely defensive. They felt besieged by a

superior enemy propaganda which seemed to be permeating everywhere.

388 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Notes

1. Tullio Marchetti, Ventotto Anni nel Servizio Informazioni Militari (Trento, 1960) p. 365.

2. Cesare Finzi,

`I.T.O'. Note di un Capo del Servizio Informazioni d'Armata 1915±1918

(Milan, 1934) p. 253.

3. See IWM,

Wilson MSS, 22/14, Delme

-Radcliffe to Wilson, no. SBM 248, 1 August;

22/15, Radcliffe to Wilson, no.SBM 250, 2 August 1918; Marchetti, Ventotto Anni,

pp. 370ff. The Minister of the Treasury, Francesco Nitti (a long associate of Diaz's),

was also constantly urging Diaz to be cautious: Alberto Monticone, Nitti e la Grande

Guerra 1914±1918 (Milan, 1961) pp. 282±7.

4. CCC, Cavan

MSS, 1/3, `Italy', pp. 13±14.

5. See Manfried

Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers. O

sterreich-Un

garn und der Erste

Weltkrieg (Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1993) p. 591.

6. PRO, FO

800/212, Northcliffe to Balfour, 6 June 1918. The EPD during June was

receiving regular telegrams from Delme

-Radcliffe about the Padua Commission.

7. PRO, FO

800/329, Balfour to Northcliffe, 8 June 1918.

8. The Times,

12 June 1918.

9. Seton Corresponden

ce, I, nos. 218±19.

10. PRO, FO

371/3135, Derby to Balfour, t.741, 15 June; BL, Northcliffe MSS, vol. X,

Add.Mss 62162, Minutes of the 6th EPD Committee meeting, 9 July 1918. Benes

Sve

tova

lka, II, p. 233 terms this `perhaps the most important' diplomatic act by

the French on behalf of the Czechoslovak cause in view of its consequences.

11. AJA, JO

60E/III/1(1), Kujundz

to Trumbic

, 2 July 1918.

12. Pichon's statement

appears to have been mentioned only in the Czech newssheet,

manifesto 159: C

eskosloven

ska

Samostatnost no. 7, 21 July (KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flug-

zettel I').

13. See, for

example, manifesto 159, C

eskoslovenska

Samostatnost no. 7; BL, Northcliffe

MSS, vol. X, Add.Mss 62162, Minutes of 6th EPD Committee meeting.

14. Manifesto 139,

a Slova

ci!' (Czech/Croat with no. 138, `Polacy!' on reverse: KA,

11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I'). Lansing's statement was also used explicitly to refute

Austrian scorn at the Versailles Declaration: manifesto 179, Jugoslavija no. 8, 27 July

(AJA, JO 111/4). For background to the statement, see Paulova

, Jugoslavenski Odbor,

pp. 460±1; Z

ivojinovic

America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia, pp. 148±9.

15. PRO, FO

371/3135, C.J. Phillips to Drummond, 15 June, enclosing memorandum

by Mic

; Jankovic

and Krizman (eds), Gradja, I, no. 161 and note 13, p. 217; AJA,

JO 27/72, De Giulli to Trumbic

, 17 June 1918.

16. In late

July Crewe House was preparing a Croat translation of Balfour's speech with

icthe aid

of a JO member Mic

e Mic

(SWP, `Crewe House Activities', 26 July). But the

only mention of the meeting in Padua's propaganda appears to be manifesto 237 in

Czech: C

eskosloven

ska

Samostatnost no. 10, 10 August. News of it did, however, reach

Zagreb via a different route: see Glas Slovenaca Hrvata i Srba, broj 158, 2 August 1918,

p. 2, quoting

a report from the Berne Tagespost.

17. Steed, Through

Thirty Years, II, pp. 230±1.

18. AJA, JO

31/50, Trumbic

notes, 19 July 1918. The commitment was unequivocal:

Trumbic

noted Pichon's words as `we are unreservedly supporting you'.

19. For Pas

view, see Paulova

's perceptive comments: Jugoslavenski Odbor, pp. 469±70.

20. For the

following, see Benes

, Sve

tova

lka, II, pp. 260ff; and the documents in PRO,

FO 371/3135, notably Benes

to Steed, 16 July 1918.

21. Benes

Sve

tova

lka, p. 280.

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 389

22. Ibid., p.

290. See Guglielmo Emanuel's article, `Il Delenda Austria dell'Inghilterra', in

Corriere della Sera, 15 August 1918.

23. AJA, JO

19/56, Notes by Trumbic

on conversation with Bissolati in Rome, 16 August

1918.

24. Steed's key

role in ensuring that propaganda in Italy was transferred to Crewe House

seems clear from BL, Northcliffe MSS, vol. XCIV, Add.Mss 62246, Steed to North-

cliffe, 31

May; and by early June the transfer was complete (ibid., Northcliffe to

Steed, 2 June). Cf. Steed, Through Thirty Years, II, p. 216.

25. TTA, Steed

MSS, Steed to Orlando, dated 24 June 1918 (but the copy in Steed's

private papers is dated the 15th as in his memoirs).

26. PRO, FO

371/3228, Rodd to Balfour, d.202, 16 June 1918.

27. S

epic

Italjia, Saveznici i Jugoslavensko Pitanje, p. 329. Trumbic

's remarks were inter-

cepted by

the Austrians from a British radio station: see HHStA, PA I/771, Generalia

XII Slawische Umtriebe 1918.

28. Trumbic

sent a similar message at this time to Diaz, but it was bolder in declaring

that Italy was fighting for the freedom of the Yugoslav race: AJA, JO 35/104, Trumbic

to Diaz [undated]. It was not mentioned in Padua's propaganda.

29. Quotes from

manifesto 135, Jugoslavija no. 6, which gave in full the speeches made

by Trumbic

and Orlando on 26 June (KA, 11AK, Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.451, File

`Flugzettel I').

30. AJA, JO

28/66, Kujundz

to Yugoslav Committee Rome, 8 August; JO 31/50, Trum-

bic

notes on talk with Pichon, 19 July 1918.

31. Malagodi, Conversazion

i della Guerra, II, p. 369; PRO, WO 106/825, Radcliffe to DMO,

no. BM 452/42, 24 June 1918; DRP, File `Private letters out', Radcliffe to Lord

Stamfordham, 10 July 1918.

32. S

epic

Italija, Saveznici, p. 327.

33. Tosi, La

Propaganda Italiana, pp. 197±8.

34. Albertini, Epistola

rio, II, no. 870, p. 946.

35. The New

Europe, no. 88, 20 June 1918. See also Seton Correspondence, I, no. 219.

36. PRO, FO

170/1145, Rodd to Balfour, pte t., 10 July; FO 800/203, Rodd to Balfour, pte,

14 July; Seton-Watsons, The Making of a New Europe, pp. 295±6.

37. For the

organization of Crewe House's Italian Committee, see BL, Northcliffe MSS,

vol. LXXXVIII, Add.Mss. 62240, chart 2 attached to Stuart to Northcliffe, 24 June

1918.

38. PRO, FO

371/3228, Erskine to Balfour, t.548, 23 July 1918. See also O'Donovan's

report on his Italian tour: BL, Northcliffe MSS, vol. XI, Add.Mss 62163.

39. For Salvem

ini's view, see especially his letter to Ojetti of 5 July: Salvemini, Carteggio

1914±1920, p. 400.

40. S

epic

Italija, Saveznici, p. 325; Tosi, La Propaganda Italiana, p. 198. Delme

-Radcliffe

noted how papers loyal to Sonnino (such as Il Resto del Carlino) were increasingly

writing articles which insisted on Italy's right to Dalmatia: PRO, FO 371/3474,

Radcliffe to DMI, t.10440, 9 June.

41. Pivko, DRUP,

pp. 8±10; Albertini, Venti Anni di Vita Politica, III, p. 352.

42. This at

least was Pivko's view according to what Salvemini informed him in

writing (DRUP, p. 8). It is not evident from Salvemini's published correspond-

ence, but

he later replied himself to Coppola in L'Unita

(see Carteggio 1914±1920,

pp. 403ff).

43. Ojetti, La

Propaganda sul Nemico, in G. Amendola et al., Il Patto di Roma (Rome, 1919),

p. 131.

390 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

44. Pivko, DRUP,

p. 9; Albertini, Venti Anni, III, pp. 352±3. Ojetti's exasperation is also

blatant in a letter to his wife: Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie, p. 552.

45. `Il settimana

all'estero', Il Resto del Carlino, 10 July 1918.

46. On 24

May, for example, members of the Yugoslav Committee had not felt able to

participate fully in the anniversary celebrations in Rome because of the presence of

Italian flags from `exclusively Yugoslav regions': see Dinko Trinajstic

's account in

AJA, JO 35/128, 24 May 1918.

47. AJA, JO

19/168, Trumbic

notes on meeting with Ojetti (Hotel Regina, Rome), 12 July;

DRP, File `Private letters out', Radcliffe to Stamfordham, 10 July.

48. Albertini, Epistola

rio, II, nos. 841 p. 939, 851 p. 950, 852 p. 952.

49. Ojetti, Lettere

alla Moglie, pp. 560, 563±4; Albertini, Epistolario, II, no. 851, p. 951.

50. Ibid., no.

855, p. 953.

51. Ibid., no.

851, p. 951; Tosi, La Propaganda Italiana, p. 237 note 132: Ojetti to

Orlando, 26 June and 27 July 1918.

52. Ojetti, Lettere,

pp. 559ff, 561±2; PRO, FO 371/3228, Erskine to Balfour, t.547, 23

July. Steed's reasoning (which took into account other perceived Italian obstacles

such as disharmony in the Padua Commission) is clear from Ante Mandic

's report to

Trumbic

in AJA, JO 8/14a, 25 July 1918. See also Salvemini's letters to Ojetti of

22 and 26 July (Carteggio, pp. 408±13) for a sharp impression of Orlando's `fence-

sitting'.

53. For a

thorough study of this rivalry, see Tosi, La Propaganda Italiana, pp. 191ff.

Sonnino was now gradually setting aside his former indifference to propaganda

and public opinion.

54. See PRO,

WO 106/817, Delme

-Radcliffe to DMO, no. SBM 249, 2 August; no. SBM

271, 11 August.

55. Ojetti, Lettere,

pp. 570±1.

56. AJA, JO

19/56, Trumbic

notes on talks with Bissolati. See also PRO, WO 106/817,

Radcliffe to DMO, no. SBM 271, 11 August; WO 106/1384, Radcliffe to DMO,

t.10684, 12 August.

57. Bodleian Library,

Oxford, Milner MSS, Box 108, Delme

-Radcliffe to DMI, t.10474,

18 June 1918. I am grateful to Christopher Seton-Watson for this reference.

58. AJA, JO

19/139, DMI to Delme

-Radcliffe, t.60750 cipher, 22 June 1918.

59. Albertini, Epistola

rio, II, no. 839, p. 937.

60. Ibid., nos.

840, 841, pp. 938±40 (Albertini's letters to Borgese and Emanuel).

61. Ibid., no.

848, pp. 947±9: Ojetti to Albertini, 8 July 1918.

62. See for

example ibid., no. 844, p. 943; Ojetti, Lettere, p. 553.

63. Baker's view:

PRO, WO 106/817, Baker to Secretary of Enemy Propaganda Commit-

tee, no.

BM 452/62, 21 July. Jambris

ak's view: AJA, JO 19/116, Jambris

ak to Trumbic

18 June 1918.

64. PRO, WO

106/817, Baker to Secretary of Enemy Propaganda Committee, no. BM

452/62, 21 July; Antoni Szuber, Walka o PrzewageÎ DuchowaÎ , pp. 125±6, for Zamorski's

own explanation; Ojetti, Lettere, pp. 559, 562±3.

65. Umberto Zanotti-Bia

nco, Carteggio 1906±1918 (Rome and Bari, 1987) p. 645. Unravel-

ling the

misunderstandings at Padua was no easy matter. By late July, for example,

Jambris

ak was complaining to Diaz not about Ojetti, but about the British (Rad-

cliffe was

singled out) whom he alleged to be slandering him in their propaganda.

Steed could not understand Jambris

ak's reasoning: see AJA, JO 8/14a, Mandic

Trumbic

, 25 July.

66. Albertini, Epistola

rio, II, no. 842, pp. 940±1.

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 391

67. Seton-Watsons, The

Making of a New Europe, p. 306 note 35.

68. PRO, FO

371/3474, Erskine to Balfour, t.543, 21 July; and the correspondence of

O'Donovan with Phillips and Delme

-Radcliffe in July in FO 170/1145.

69. PRO, FO

170/1145, Balfour to Rodd, t.1022, 12 July; SWP, Draft EPD Report, p. 48.

There is no evidence that the conference was planned in response to propaganda

from the Central Powers as Tosi suggests: `Romeo A. Gallenga Stuart e la propaganda

di guerra all'estero', Storia Contemporanea, II (1971) p. 534.

70. James R.

Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee

on Public Information 1917±1919 (Princeton, 1939) pp. 256±8.

71. Documents in

PRO, FO 371/3474 detail Crewe House's attempts from March to

secure the official appointment of a French and American delegate for the commit-

tee; Steed

and Borgese were to serve on behalf of Britain and Italy.

72. See Chaix

to Colonel Le Roy Lewis, 20 July, in PRO, FO 371/3474, Derby to Balfour,

d.588, 27 July 1918; Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, p. 258; A. Klobu-

kowski, Souvenirs

de Belgique 1914±1918 (Brussels, 1928) pp. 10, 265.

73. Mock and

Larson, Words that Won the War, pp. 258±9.

74. AJA, JO

35/45(2), JO Paris to Trinajstic

, 5 August; PRO, WO 106/817, Radcliffe to

DMO, no. SBM 249, 11 August. For the full list of participants at the conference, see

SWP, Draft EPD Report, pp. 90±1.

75. Stuart, Secrets

of Crewe House, pp. 151±2.

76. The other

three committees all agreed on the need for more Allied exchange of

information, but made few important decisions with regard to Austria. On the

`prisoners' committee' the Italian delegate simply announced that most prisoners

in Italy were `Austrians'! (report in BL, Northcliffe MSS, vol. XI, Add.Mss. 62163).

77. Seton Correspo

ndence, I, no. 221, p. 331.

78. Albertini, Epistola

rio, II, no. 862, p. 965: Emanuel's report.

79. For the

following, see ibid., pp. 966±7. Emanuel's account, as related to him by

Borgese, is valuable in revealing the passion with which the debate in the policy

committee unfolded.

80. Most recently

the Slovene leader, Anton Koros

ec, had been among those who made

such speeches to that effect in Trieste on 30 May 1918 (a point which had been taken

up also by Francesco Coppola in his article of 10 July in Il Resto del Carlino): see S

epic

Italija, Saveznici, p. 328.

81. S

epic

account (Italija, Saveznici, p. 338) adds substance since he used Borgese's final

report to Gallenga. S

epic

, however, interprets Borgese's stance during the discussion

as insincere, simply adopted in order to defeat Steed; this seems improbable for

Borgese had always been a realist (like Albertini) and was only too conscious of

disunity in the Yugoslav camp.

82. Stuart, Secrets

of Crewe House, pp. 173±6. The full committee reports submitted to the

Allied governments can be found in PRO, CAB 24/61, G.T.5492 (and in HLRO,

Beaverbrook MSS, BBK E/3/44).

83. SWP, Draft

EPD Report, pp. 108±11.

84. Stuart, Secrets

of Crewe House, pp. 183±4, 199.

85. Albertini, Epistola

rio, II, pp. 968±9.

86. The following

account of the Corriere polemic is based largely on Albertini, Venti

Anni di Vita Politica, III, pp. 355±70.

87. For an

Austrian view of this polemic, and its possible use in `patriotic instruction'

among troops of southern Slav nationality, see KA, FAst 1918, Fasz.5997,

Res.550.

392 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

88. Albertini, Epistolario,

II, no. 869, p. 980; Ojetti, Lettere, p. 576. Later, Albertini would

even judge that the Corriere had won the polemic (ibid., p. 1013). Both Trumbic

and

the British ambassador felt the opposite at the time: AJA, JO 19/173; HLRO, Lloyd

George MSS, F/56/29, Rodd to Lloyd George, pte, 25 September.

89. Malagodi's term:

Malagodi, Conversazioni della Guerra, II, p. 383. For Orlando's

outlook, see especially his conversation with Malagodi, pp. 371±3.

90. Ojetti to

Albertini, 28 August: Albertini, Epistolario, II, no. 870, p. 982.

91. Gallenga was

all the more motivated to join forces against Sonnino as the latter,

having found out about the Allied propaganda conference, had complained to

Orlando and demanded that Gallenga's ministry be made subordinate to his

own: see Tosi, La Propaganda Italiana, pp. 211±13. Nitti appears to have been

convinced by Amendola's advice that the best way to avoid crisis was to shift the

balance in the cabinet towards Bissolati: see Albertini, Epistolario, II, no. 873, p. 987.

92. Malagodi, Conversaz

ioni della Guerra, II, pp. 385±8. See also Trumbic

's notes of

27 August in AJA, JO 19/173.

93. Albertini, Epistolario,

II, pp. 1066±7 note 440.

94. For Sonnino's

continued influence from September, see Tosi, La Propaganda Itali-

ana,

pp. 214ff; and his remarks to Charles Merriam: PRO, FO 371/3137, Merriam to

Sisson, 9 September 1918.

95. AJA, JO

28/48(1), `Pregled rada, Manifesti sul nemico'; JO 28/48(2), `Giornali sul

nemico'.

96. Ojetti, Lettere,

p. 560; Albertini, Epistolario, II, no. 855, p. 953.

97. Manifesto 90,

`Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci!' (Croat and Slovene: KA, EvB 5758/26661).

98. Manifesto 99

[issued in most languages], `Soldaten! (KA, EvB, Fasz.5758/26661,

5744/4538; OHM, sz.1485, 1415/10; AJA, JO 19/95); Diaz war bulletins of 18 June

and 6 July (OHM, sz.1353/1/2/3; OHM, sz.1264/1).

99. Zanotti-Bianco, Carteggio

1906±1918, p. 635. For the leaflets, see: `Soldaten des

oesterreich-ungarischen Heeres' (KA, EvB, Fasz.5753/19324); `Soldaten! In Oester-

reich und

in Ungarn ist die Revolution ausgebrochen!' (OHM sz.7354; in Croat:

HIL, Fasz.4517 `Propaganda Anyag'). For an Austrian reaction to `these tendentious

lies': KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2295.

100. SWP,

Draft EPD Report, p. 40. See, for example, manifesto 99 [Italian and German

editions], `Soldati combattenti per l'Austria-Ungheria!' (OHM, sz.1415/10, 1485);

manifesto 94 [Romanian], `Ostasi roma

ni!

(AJA, JO 19/94; IWM, 3(45) File 39);

and manifesto 170, `Soldaten! Zehntausende von eurem Bru

dern

sind an der Piave

und den Montellomassiv gefallen' (rare leaflet, only discovered in VHA collection).

101. Manifesto 108 [issued in most languages], `Ai soldati combattenti...' (numerous

copies in

OHM, sz.1252; KA, Flugzettel Sammlung; AHZ, Dobrovoljac

Arhiv, etc.).

The actual Austrian losses appear to have been half this figure but for Padua's

claims: manifesto 112, Polak no. 5, 6 July (KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I').

102. Manifest

o 168, `Jugoslaveni!' (KA, Flugzettel Sammlung). The same message was

the subject of manifesto 165, `Magyar Katona

k!' (KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I');

manifesto 173, `Jaky

dojem v Rakousku...' (ibid.); and manifesto 167, `Polacy!' (KA,

EvB, Fasz.5761/31651).

103. Much

was made of Below's `appointment': see manifestos 165; 161, `Magyar Kato-

k!'

(OHM, sz.01188); and the following, all in KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I':

153, Ukraõ

n'ci! [Ruthene]; 152, `Polacy!'; 154, `Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci!'; 147, `Solda

ni!';

163, `CRoma

a Slova

ci!'. That false intelligence about Below was widespread

on the Allied side is clear from American sources: Challener (ed.), United States

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 393

Military Intelligen

ce 1917±1927 (New York and London, 1978) IV, 20 July, p. 5; 27

July, pp. 13±14.

104. Manifest

o 215, `Magyar Katona

k!' (OHM sz.1486). Manifesto 303, `Magyar Kato-

k!',

refuted claims that the Germans had reached Paris (KA, 11AK Fasz.451,

`Flugzettel I'). A number of leaflets wrongly dated the start of the offensive as 14

July and Foch's counter-offensive as the 16th.

105. Manifest

o 286, `Oesterreichisch-ungarische Soldaten!' (issued in German, Magyar,

Slovene, Polish: copies in OHM sz.1325±7; VHA; KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I');

manifesto 330, `Graphischer Aufriss der grossen Entent-Offensive in Frankreich'

(issued in German, Magyar, Croat: KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel II'; VHA; Stuart,

Secrets of Crewe House, opposite p. 48). Reports about the Western Front formed

regular items in Padua's four weekly newssheets.

106. Manifest

o 317, `Soldaten!' (OHM sz.80.20.1).

107. See OULK, VII, pp. 336±7, 433ff, for the divisions' despatch and their deployment

at Verdun.

108. Manifest

o 318, `Slovenci, Hrvati in Srbi' (Slovene: KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I

and II'); manifesto 319, `Zhovnõ

ri-Ukraõ

n'cõ

!' (Ukrainian: KA, 11AK Fasz.448,

Pr.2000); manifesto 215, `Magyar Katona

k!'.

109. Manifest

o 148, `Die erste Million amerikanischer Soldaten ist schon in Frankreich'

(OHM sz.1250; HIL, Fasz.4517; KA, EvB 1918 Fasz.5755/26619), and copies also in

Magyar (manifesto 174), Czech (164), Slovene (149), Romanian (150) and Polish

(151). On this theme, see also manifestos 267, `Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci!' (KA, Flug-

zettel Sammlung)

and 361, which depicted an American soldier bawling out

`4 Millionen Amerikaner...' (VHA; and in Polish in Z

ipek

(ed.), Domov za Va

lky,

V, p. 93).

110. Manifesto 235, Jugoslavija no. 10, 10 August (section in Slovene: KA, 11AK Fasz.451,

`Flugzettel III').

111. Manifest

o 269, `Was alles Amerika beitra

gt...' (copies in German, Italian, Polish,

Ukrainian: KA, EvB Fasz.5761/32114; IWM, 3(45)/39; OHM, sz.1212); BL, North-

cliffe MSS,

vol. X, Add.Mss 62162, Minutes of the 8th EPD Committee meeting, 6

August 1918.

Deutschland und O112. Manifest

o 252, `Soldaten die ihr fu

sterreich-Ungarn ka

mpft'

(German, Magyar: OHM sz.1555; IWM, 3(45)/39); manifesto 235 (section in Croat);

manifesto 208, Jugoslavija no. 9 (AJA, JO 111/4; KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I').

113. See

manifesto 323, `Glad' (Croat and Czech editions: KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel

III'; KA, EvB Fasz.5762/33878); manifesto 125, `Nachrichten u

ber

den Hunger'

(German, Italian, Polish, Romanian: IWM, 3(45)/39; OHM sz.1248); manifesto

143, `Gøo

d w Austryi' (Polish and Romanian: KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I');

manifesto 112, Polak no. 5.

114. Respectiv

ely German ambassador (on 6 July) and German commander in Ukraine

(on 30 July): see manifesto 178, C

eskosloven

ska

Samostatnost no. 8, 27 July (AJA, JO

111/4); and manifestos 257, 267 and 275.

115. Manifesto 237, C

eskoslovenska

Samostatnost no. 10, 10 August (HIL, Fasz. 4517);

manifesto 258, Jugoslavija no. 11, 17 August (AJA, JO 111/4); manifesto 263,

`Magyar Katona

k!' (OHM sz.78.41.1): `you Magyar soldiers, instead of Russian

grain,

are likely to receive an order to start this Russian war again thanks to Kaiser

Wilhelm and his Junkers'.

116. Figures

in AJA, JO 28/48(1), 28/48(2), 28/48(3). It is not clear whether the figures

quoted refer to the number of leaflets composed or printed or distributed during