Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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374 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

used in combat rather than simple propaganda; they would thereby gain the

kind of recognition in `conventional warfare' which the rest of the Czech

Legion was acquiring. As the summer progressed, there was an increasing

tendency for Czech propaganda and Intelligence duties to become merged

with some combat experience, a sign that the Italian military were not only

trusting the volunteers but viewing their role more flexibly. It was also signi-

ficant that,

despite a number of disasters which befell the units, and a steady

level of Italian mistrust which the Austrians would cleverly seek to exploit, the

volunteer movement continued to expand in the Italian war zone. It formed, at

least in the Czech case, a real vitalized alternative to set against the stale future

offered by Austrian officers in the trenches opposite.

During the

June offensive, the real commitment of Czech legionaries to the

ideal which they were propagating had been severely tested from both sides of

the front. When dozens of Czechs were captured or killed on the Piave, it

enabled the Italians and Austrians to publicize respectively the glorious or

shabby reality of the Czech ideal. Undoubtedly it was the Austrians, seeking

to besmirch the Czechs' reputation, who were more successful in the short

term, for their arguments seemed to reflect quite accurately the volunteers'

less than glorious behaviour or fate. On the Italian 4th army front, Czech scouts

who had continued to operate during the offensive had torn off their badges in

fear that they might be captured by the enemy. On the Montello, 35 Intelli-

gence troops

of the 8th army had been surprised and taken prisoner, 25 of

whom were tried and executed in a deliberately sordid manner. Those who met

their fate at Conegliano for example were shot, two at a time, so that they

would see the deaths of their comrades; some of the bodies were hung up along

with placards marked `Czechoslovak traitors of the fatherland'.

244

Jan S

eba, the Czech National Council representative responsible for co-

ordinating the

Legion in Italy, bitterly reproached Major Dupont and 8th

army Intelligence for what had happened. S

eba at least managed to persuade

Diaz not to employ the regular Czech division in combat during June because of

its lack of training. Only the 3rd army commanders, in a fit of rash enthusiasm

for exploiting the Czechs, managed to secure a battalion from the Legion.

They proceeded to put it into battle and the results amply justified S

eba's

warnings. 62 were killed, a dozen of whom suffered the ignominious fate of

their comrades of the 8th army.

245

While the Austrians could publicize this

disgrace as a warning to Czechs on both sides of the front, the impact of such

scare-tactics, which had certainly worked in the past, was diminishing in line

with the fact that the Czech national cause was becoming more of a reality at

home and abroad. Indeed, in view of this, as Czech propagandists were keen to

point out, the executions could have the opposite effect to that desired, imply-

ing that

the Austrian military were acting brutally and out of fear in the face

of a noble and victorious cause. This side of the coin was naturally propagated

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 375

by Padua whose leaflets eulogized the Czechs' heroic behaviour (on the anni-

versary of

Jan Hus's death) while pointing to the Austrians' cowardice in

hanging up the corpses and so abusing the dead heroes.

246

In any case, these Czech sacrifices were somewhat recouped when, on 29

June, Slav propaganda troops of the 6th army successfully participated in the

capture of Monte di Val Bella.

247

Although for the Italian Intelligence offices it

had been prescriptive that their Slav patrols should refrain from actual combat,

the commander of the 14th division, General Pantano, having witnessed Lju-

devit Pivko's

units at work in his sector, had suggested to Pivko on 13 June that

he ought not to be content with mere propaganda. In Pantano's words, `warfare

is a matter which must not be clumsy, or ossified in the same mould from day to

day, but elastic, adapted to the position and moment'. Since it would boost the

reputation of his volunteers, Pivko readily agreed to Pantano's request that he

supply two units for an attack north of Val Bella and quickly secured Finzi's

approval for the action. A few days later the plan had changed to recapturing

Val Bella itself which had just been taken by the Austrians. For this purpose

some Czech and Yugoslav scouts under respectively Pajger and Belos

evic

were

dispatched to the front line to investigate the terrain and the opposing forces;

they were discovered to contain a significant number of Croats. On the night of

23±24 June, the scouts engaged in some reconnaissance and propaganda work,

listening to the garrisons' conversation, and informing them orally and by

leaflet about the Austrian defeat on the Piave and `the outbreak of revolution

in the hinterland'.

248

The next morning the scouts led a small force of arditi in an initial strike at

Val Bella which secured 73 prisoners. The main assault, however, occurred on

29 June when, as Pivko vividly describes in his memoirs, about 160 of his

volunteers helped Italian troops to wrest the summit from the enemy. Pivko's

evidence seems here to be more reliable than the Austrian official history which

maintains that Val Bella was voluntarily evacuated only on 1 July.

249

But the

achievement was certainly less clear-cut than both sides liked to portray it. For a

start, the conquest had been made at a price, since 19 of Pivko's unit were

killed, including the hero of Carzano, Karel Mlejnek, while 60 had been

wounded. Nor had one Czech volunteer who was captured, Bohumil Va

cha,

behaved very heroically, since before his trial and execution he betrayed co-

pious details

to the Austrians including the suggestion that he had been forced

into the Legion. As his death was publicized in an Austrian propaganda leaflet,

the Czech legionaries could portray him as a hero.

250

On the other hand, the

operation does appear to have benefited considerably from the volunteers'

propaganda (in Croat) during the assault, and among the 800 prisoners taken

were a number of `Yugoslavs' who volunteered to join Pivko's unit. Most

importantly, the episode further enhanced the reputation of the Slav volun-

251

teers. In retrospect, General Graziani would consider the `energica e valorosa

376 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

azione' on Val Bella as the best deed of the Czech legionaries in Italy. And on

4 July at Bassano, when a review of Czech forces took place before King Victor

Emanuel and other dignatories, Milan S

tefa

nik, who was making a short visit to

Italy, met and congratulated Pivko as an `apostle of the Czechoslovak idea': his

action on Val Bella, he said, had struck not only at foreign enemies but also at

the enemies in Italy.

252

The example which Val Bella set, of propaganda troops not simply agitating

but playing some fuller role in an armed action, was one which was to be

repeated on many occasions in the final months of the war. From July to

October 1918 it was the Czech units which were the most active and most

integrated into Italy's army. At the request of the Czechoslovak National Coun-

cil, the

Czech propaganda companies serving under the six Italian armies were

now linked together as a 39th or Vy

zve

dny

(reconnaissance) regiment, which

gave them a greater sense of cohesion (they all took an oath to the Council),

even if they still remained divided up and subordinate to the Italian Intelli-

gence offices.

Their typical daily tasks remained constant: to assess the nature of

the forces opposite and, where possible, to entice them by means of leaflets,

alluring speeches or nationalist songs, occasionally broadcast by gramo-

phone.

253

While as usual the terrain both in the mountains and on the river

Piave was often a barrier to any personal contact, it is clear from Austrian

evidence that in the summer the Czech units remained a brooding presence

in most sectors, and simply by existing were making a psychological impact

opposite. On the Lower Piave, for example, KISA's propaganda report for August

was typical, complaining about enemy patrols

who have

not only made appeals for desertion with reference to better food

and good treatment in Czech, Ukrainian, Polish and Croat, but have even

agitated in the Hungarian language. The enemy also employs his propa-

ganda patrols

in order to discover the character of troops opposite. The

patrols are very sensitive to gunfire, and immediately stop their agitation,

only to start it again the following day in another spot.

254

In many sectors it seems clear that the Austro-Hungarian troops obeyed their

superiors and responded to the propaganda with bursts of gunfire. But, there

were certainly a few notorious incidents where individuals decided to desert to

the enemy. Such a case was three Czech officers from IR75 (stationed east of

Lake Garda), who deserted in mid-August, leaving behind a note saying that

they had gone not because of bad conditions or cowardice but in order to fight

for their independence.

255

Another instance occurred in late July from the

Polish IR113 (based on Col del Rosso); in the space of a week, 20 Poles deserted

to the enemy propagandists, and then wrote letters which were shot back over

the Austrian trenches:

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 377

Table 8.1

Propaganda and Reconnaissance Units, June±November 1918

256

Army sector Czechoslovak Yugoslav Intelligence head

(39th reg.)

Swiss Border- Vojte

Hanzal Oton Kovac

* Vecchiarelli

Lake Garda

(1/39)

Garda-Vallarsa Rudolf Vyc

ital

Hugo Plhak* Tullio Marchetti

(2/39: Reparto

(Reparto Posina)

Avio or

Borghetto)

Vallara-V.D'Assa Alexandr Prejda

(3/39: Reparto

Astico)

V.D'Assa-Brenta Frantis

Jirsa (5/39) Stane Vidmar* Cesare Finzi

Jindr

ich

Felix (6/39)

Brenta-Piave Jaroslav Nedve

(7/39) Delemir Vuletic

Attilio Vigevano

(later Antonõ

Basl)

Upper Piave-Mont

ello Emanuel Ambroz

(9/39) Ante Drobac Dupont

Lower Piave

Antonõ

n Zeman (10/39) Guglievic

and Ercole Smaniotto

Josef Gra

(11/39) (from September)

Bogoljub Popadic

Note: * Overall administration by Ljudevit Pivko.

Dear comrades! I'm writing to you to ask you not to be stupid but to leave

Austria, for Austria is a Sodom and Gomorrah and the Germans are in

control. You have nothing to do with Austria. Just come to Italy. Here

you'll find everything you want. The Germans and Magyars are butchering

you for they are not men but murderers, who murder the Polish people and

children. We have to survive in this world and here in Italy you'll find

everything. [Signed Franz Vozniak].

257

These desertions were certainly perceived by the Austrians to have been caused

by the enemy, and as a result the regiment was transferred to the Eastern Front.

But it is worth emphasizing that neither of these cases seem to have been a

common occurrence, although they were naturally given prominence by the

Allied propagandists. Far more common was for the propaganda patrols to have

an indirect impact opposite, acting as a catalyst and adding invisibly to the

demoralization which was stirring in the Austrian trenches.

When the

Czech propaganda units took part in combatant action, akin to Val

Bella, it was always the result of circumstances where their propaganda skills

could be exploited further in order to secure precise military objectives. For the

378 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

rest of the Czechoslovak Legion in Italy a combatant role was, of course,

expected, even though, after being stationed on a quiet sector of the front

next to Lake Garda, the Legion witnessed little action until attacked by the

Austrians on Dosso Alto in late September.

258

For the dispersed 39th regiment,

however, a merging of its propaganda duties with more conventional military

tasks was a novel phenomenon, reflecting the Italian army's new trust in their

abilities, as well as a desire over the summer to make a series of raids into enemy

positions in the mountains. One small example was a raid by Czech volunteers

of the 4th army into positions of the Czech IR28.

259

The 4th army unit had few

obvious successes in these months due to its nervous opponents as well as the

inhospitable terrain which included Monte Grappa. But an opportunity arose

when IR28 was moved forward on Monte Asolone, and a Czech officer, Va

clav

hos, deserted to Italy declaring that he had been on leave in Prague and

experienced the growing national enthusiasm there. On 28 July, Ky

hos led a

group of Czech volunteers back under the wires and, largely with his help, two

Feldwache or sentry units were taken prisoner. Although the evidence showed

that few Czechs had wanted to follow Ky

hos's example, the incident unnerved

the Austrians to the extent that they put 50 men into a `disciplinary unit' and

warned that the regiment could never again be wholly trusted.

260

In September, a similar but more substantial operation was undertaken by

Marchetti's Czech units of the lst army (the so-called Reparti Astico and Avio). As

with IR28, the action resulted from some close liaison work across the front

line, and the belief that propaganda troops could be used to capture units

opposite. When cavalry regiment 8 (6KD) was discovered in the front line at

Cima Tre Pezzi, and a group of Czechs led by corporal Josef Jelõ

nek showed

themselves eager to desert, Marchetti decided instead that these new Carzanci

should stay in position in order to make a much bigger operation possible.

261

For Jelõ

nek and his colleagues, it was a nerve-wracking experience which

smacked of Pivko's a year earlier, when the danger of discovery was always

threatening. For Marchetti's Czech scouts it was a welcome opportunity to use

their skills to win a more concrete prize: to capture a whole garrison. On 23

September, under Alexandr Prejda's direction, a group of 60 scouts crept out

and hid under a cliff beneath the Austrian positions; one was even able to meet

Jelõ

nek who escorted him around the sector in order to be fully prepared for a

`night attack into the bowels of the Austrians'. Then in the evening, during a

violent storm, the unit moved slowly forward and took the garrison prisoner.

Although the operation as a whole revealed that liaison between the propa-

ganda troops

and the Italian artillery was still inadequate, for the latter's flank-

ing fire

began too early to the annoyance of the Czechs, the exploit of Cima Tre

Pezzi netted 80 prisoners with minimal losses to the volunteers. On this occa-

sion the

Austrians do not appear to have suspected betrayal; they had even been

making some propaganda of their own against the Italians in this very place.

262

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 379

They could not suspect either that the operation had had an extra dimension. It

allowed, as we shall see, two Czechs to creep across into the Austrian war zone

on a mission of espionage and sabotage.

While the

Czech units had a ready supply of new volunteers from deserters or

the prison camps, the Yugoslav propaganda units were consistently weakened

by a lack of manpower until the end of the war. If this reflected in part a lesser

enthusiasm by Croats or Slovenes to volunteer, it was principally exacerbated

by political circumstances: the inability of the Italian government and the

Yugoslav Committee to agree upon the status of the units because of the

postwar implications. Trumbic

stayed in Italy for most of the summer, trying

to resolve the matter according to the Czechoslovak example so that all Yugo-

slav soldiers

in Italy would be treated as allies. He could feel pleased that they

were being concentrated together in the prison-camps and allowed access from

members of the Committee. But the next step was for enlistment to begin for a

Yugoslav legion, with volunteers given a free choice of whether to serve on the

Italian or Salonika Fronts and (an essential condition) obliged to become

members of the Serbian army, wearing Serbian uniform and taking an oath to

King Petar. Orlando was only too willing to raise more volunteers, since as he

told Trumbic

`the Italian army has gained significant benefits from the present

propaganda at the front'; but he balked at the conditions which Trumbic

laid

down.

263

If all volunteers took an oath to the King of Serbia it might well imply

that their area of origin was to form part of a future Yugoslav state. Similarly,

the establishment of a Yugoslav legion would signal full Italian commitment to

Yugoslavia, the kind of signal which Orlando was never prepared to give. On

13 August, when Orlando met Trumbic

, he would only repeat what he had

agreed with the Allies at Versailles, namely that `Serbian volunteers' in Italy

might be recruited for the Serbian army (and depart for Salonika), but that

`Yugoslav prisoners' should simply be organized in `national units' to serve on

the Italian Front. Orlando was fudging the issue so that, as with the propaganda

campaign as a whole, Italy secured the maximum military benefits without the

political commitments (sacrificing the Treaty of London). Trumbic

could

rightly be suspicious of the distinction which Orlando made between Serbian

and Yugoslav, for it smelt strongly of Sonnino's influence. It particularly left

unresolved the Committee's insistence that all volunteers in Italy had to take

an oath to the King of Serbia.

264

Since moreover the Committee had already been given the right of access to

Yugoslav prisoners, it was now able to frustrate Italian efforts to recruit at will.

Yugoslav officers in the camp at Nocera Umbra refused to enlist unless they

could become members of the Serbian army.

265

In the war zone, the Committee

introduced similar obstacles. In June, Trumbic

had agreed with Ojetti the

correct procedure for enlisting volunteers, and Ojetti had subsequently final-

ized the

new conditions at Padua with Jambris

ak and Kujundz

; a smooth

380 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

transition on Czechoslovak lines had seemed a possibility.

266

But in the absence

of Italian political sanction, any progress had immediately ground to a halt.

Increasing friction emerged because while Jambris

ak and Kujundz

proceeded

to publicize the Committee's conditions on recruitment among volunteers and

prisoners in the war zone, the Italian military were determined to use their

Yugoslavs along the old lines even if the question of the oath was unresolved.

While the CS itself had initially been prepared to accept the Committee's con-

ditions, military

priorities were naturally uppermost for Diaz, and this was a view

shared not only by the Italian Intelligence officers but also by Ljudevit Pivko.

The friction

was particularly apparent in the eastern army sectors where

Pivko's influence was weakest. In the west, Pivko's Yugoslav units appear to

have worked quite effectively, often contributing, as at Val Bella, to propaganda

actions where it was the Czechs who predominated. Ironically, much less is

known about Yugoslav propaganda in these westerly sectors. Oton Kovac

unit in the 7th army was, according to Pivko, exemplary in its standard of

discipline, and achieved `many brilliant successes' on the icy heights north of

Tonale.

267

In the lst army sector, the work of the Reparto Posina seems to have

been appreciated by its Czech equivalents.

268

And for the 6th army, the largest

Yugoslav unit under Stane Vidmar continued to conduct `extraordinarily lively

and successful' propaganda, singing Serbian and Croatian songs and even

calling out misleadingly that `80 000 Croats' were fighting in France for south-

ern Slav

freedom.

269

For Yugoslav volunteers in the 4th, 8th and 3rd army sectors, however, it was

a different story. The Committee had secured more influence there, retaining in

the 8th army a loyal contact (Nikola de Marchi) until late July. When Pivko

visited the 8th army in early August he had to listen to complaints from the

army commander, General Pennella, about the `politicizing' of the Yugoslav

unit at Noventa.

270

Pennella blamed the Yugoslav delegates in Padua for intro-

ducing politics

and weakening discipline among the volunteers, a view which

was shared by Ottavio Dinale, the Italian commander of the unit. A few weeks

earlier Dinale had written to Trumbic

, setting out the military priorities which

would then `inevitably' have political repercussions; rather than waiting for

volunteers to take an oath, he argued, the Committee ought to arrange for

extensive recruitment so that by sheer numbers a legion would spring into

being.

271

This was the view of Pivko too (even if he made some attempts to

get volunteers to take the oath). But the Committee was adamant and it added

another strain to the tense Italian±Yugoslav relationship at Padua. Finally, on

10 August in the Padua Commission's building, at a meeting attended by Finzi,

Pivko, Jambris

ak and Ojetti, Jambris

ak refused to adopt a more conciliatory line

until all volunteers had taken the oath. The next day he was informed that he

and the other Yugoslav delegates were henceforth banned from visiting or agit-

ating among

the volunteer units. Trumbic

reacted by withdrawing Jambris

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 381

from the Padua Commission altogether, a futile gesture which only weakened

further the degree of Yugoslav influence in the propaganda campaign. Ugo

Ojetti might well feel that all those at the meeting had had `no flexibility in

their hard heads', but it is clear that on this occasion he himself viewed the

Yugoslavs as the main culprits for they seemed to be placing needless obstacles

in front of the propaganda priority.

272

For Pivko, who wanted to expand the Yugoslav force along the lines advoc-

ated by

the Italian military, there were a few other options, but none of them

were successful. At Badoglio's request, he made a tour of the three eastern

sectors in order to try to secure greater control over the Yugoslav units. But

the 4th army unit in particular had already been detrimentally influenced, and

by September the Committee had persuaded it to give up any propaganda

duties: Vidmar's unit took over that sector as well.

273

Pivko faced the same

rebuff with his dream of setting up a Yugoslav brigade of 200 officers and 10 000

men. Having gained a CS blessing, he visited Trumbic

in late August hoping

that he too would agree and would persuade the officers of Nocera Umbra to

change their mind. Trumbic

, however, although he was prepared to approve

the work of existing volunteers, would not countenance any new units until

the question of the oath had been settled. With this deadlock, Pivko was

abruptly forced to abandon a site on Lake Garda which he had been preparing

as an ideal training ground for the new force.

274

Trumbic

's attitude meant that any expansion of the existing Yugoslav units

could only come from newly captured prisoners or deserters. For instance, 80

per cent of the 3rd army unit had been captured in early July and enrolled as

volunteers a month later (having escaped the influence of the Committee).

275

Perhaps the most notable example of deserters joining the volunteer units was

that of five reserve officers of BHIR8 who deserted at Val dei Concei on 9 July.

This sector west of Lake Garda was a favourite spot for the Czech propagandists

or a `real thorn in Austria's eye' as Vojte

ch Hanzal describes it. The group of

three `Yugoslavs' (Bogoljub Popadic

, Ante C

uric

and Martin Fedel) and two

Czechs ( Josef Mikulõ

k and Ladislav Jung) appear to have been led by Popadic

a teacher in civilian life. He had only just arrived at the front and just happened

to be the half-brother of Bogoljub Kujundz

whom he knew, perhaps from

Padua's manifestos, to be a member of the Yugoslav Committee. Whether the

other deserters needed much persuading seems questionable. After all, Fedel,

summed up by the Austrians as `stupid and cowardly', also had a Yugoslav link

since he was the nephew of the head of the Committee's Rome office, Dinko

Trinajstic

. And C

uric

and Mikulõ

k, even though decorated for bravery, had

given some hints of their intentions by requesting to be left at the front rather

than transferred to the hinterland.

276

After crossing the lines on 9 July, in a

manner very reminiscent of the 42HID desertions in May, the five officers

immediately composed a manifesto for distribution to their comrades, assuring

382 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

them that they had deserted due to bitterness at the way Bosnians were treated

at the front and urging them to follow their example.

277

A number duly did so,

including one of their own servants who brought with him a heavy suitcase.

On both

sides there were important repercussions from this. The Austrian

10th army commander, FM Alexander Krobatin, personally visited the battal-

ion. Noting

with satisfaction that no men had followed the officer-deserters [!],

he warned the assembled officers that the elder and more experienced among

them needed to oversee constantly the behaviour of younger and newer arri-

vals.

278

Meanwhile in the front line, troops from the divisional Sturmbatallion

were ordered to ambush the Czech propaganda unit which was still functioning

opposite. They succeeded in doing this on the night of 22±3 July, and captured

one Czech legionary, Josef Sobotka, who was tried and executed in full view of

the Italian trenches. As usual it was not the heroic end which Hanzal's history

would later proclaim, for Sobotka was quite ready to claim that he had been

coerced into the Legion. But Hanzal is on surer ground when he argues that the

`martyrdom' only strengthened the cause of the propagandists and their sup-

279

porters. One Czech legionary had been executed, but all five of the officer-

deserters had been eager to volunteer for propaganda work on the Italian side.

While Mikulõ

k and Jung joined the Czech unit of the 7th army, the Yugoslavs

were sent to Stane Vidmar's company; C

uric

would soon be employed on the

Asiago plateau, while Popadic

(a mark of the trust placed in him) was eventually

assigned by Pivko to command the Yugoslav unit of the 3rd army.

280

This pattern of recruiting deserters for the Yugoslav units continued until the

end of the war, though rarely with such significant achievements. Even in the

last weeks of hostilities Pivko was to be found touring the camps where new

deserters or prisoners were temporarily housed, urging them to volunteer while

calming any fears that they might never return to their families in the Mon-

archy with

the assurance that `the French and English will protect us'.

281

view of the state of the Yugoslav cause in Italy, the attitude of the Committee,

and the uncertain allegiance of many prisoners, it was no easy task. Because of

this, some of Pivko's officers were not averse to recruiting under false pretences.

Mate Nikolic

, for example, who continued to work for 6th army Intelligence at

Mirabella, interrogating prisoners and composing propaganda leaflets from

their statements, omitted to tell some prospective officer-recruits about the

camp at Nocera Umbra when urging them to join the `Yugoslav legion'. He

even told them that the volunteer units were working in complete harmony

with the Yugoslav Committee. Thus one Bosnian officer only learnt about

Nocera Umbra from a Committee supporter, but he was already suspicious of

`Nikolic

and friends' and had refused to volunteer; he noted contemptuously,

`Nikolic

gave me the impression of being an Italian mercenary who has all

means at his disposal to achieve his aim, which is to get as many volunteers

as possible for the legion.'

282

In contrast, Pivko appears to have been more

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 383

open. In late September, for instance, he was prepared to tell one Croat officer-

deserter about Nocera Umbra whereupon, after composing the usual leaflet for

distribution, the officer opted to go to the camp rather than join a Yugoslav

unit.

283

Thus it cannot be said that official Italy's attitude was the only reason

for the paucity of Yugoslav units. It also reflected, in contrast to the Czechs,

some basic realities about the Yugoslav movement. Many Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes had different perceptions about their future, and were less willing to

cooperate under the guidance of Italy or the Yugoslav Committee for a vague

Yugoslav ideal. The result was that, while the Czech Legion grew steadily to

17 000 by October 1918, the number of Yugoslav volunteers eventually totalled

only 943. Of these, as one might expect in view of Italy's territorial aspirations,

637 were Serb, with 176 Croats and 130 Slovenes; almost half the volunteers

were Serbs from Bosnia-Hercegovina.

284

Marchetti would write later that the Yugoslav units had achieved almost

nothing.

285

This was an excessive judgement, not substantiated by Pivko's

evidence, but it was one made chiefly in comparison to Czech exploits. The

Italian Intelligence offices faced no political dilemmas when employing the

Czechs, and in the last months of the war were confident enough to send some

on secret operations into the Austrian war zone itself. Such missions, which had

been started in June, are important firstly because they show that the Allied

propagandists were now daring to penetrate physically into the Empire, and

secondly because they provoked an ingenious counter-propaganda by the Aus-

trian 10AK

over the summer.

From May

1918 at least, Marchetti had been planning to send a group of

Czechs behind the enemy lines at Lake Garda.

286

If he envisaged their role

chiefly in propaganda terms, to publicize the Czech cause in the rear-areas and

have a simple `moral' impact, they were also to commit sabotage and gather

Intelligence. Four Czechs were chosen from Rudolf Vyc

tal's unit: Alois S

torch,

Frantis

Tobek, Leopold Jer

bek and Jan S

marda, the first two of whom had

deserted from artillery regiment [FAR] 13 in late May. Since S

torch and Tobek

were well acquainted with the `Abschnitt Riva' opposite, the plan was that

Tobek and S

marda would go to Riva to try and convert men of the naval

detachment, while S

torch and Jer

bek would proceed to Nago, since S

torch

had friends there in FAR13 and could easily spread propaganda and organize

agents to work for Italian Intelligence. Depending on the possibilities, the

group would then either return to Italy or go on to Bohemia.

At midnight

on 2±3 July the four, disguised as soldiers of FAR13 with pistols,

hand grenades, false papers and adhesive moustaches, left Malcesine on a

motorboat bound for the northern shore of Lake Garda. Most of the lake was

in Italian hands, enabling them to approach 100 metres from the Austrian

shoreline. But there they were suddenly surprised by enemy gunfire. Tobek

managed to swim away, but Jer

bek was shot dead. S

torch and S

marda were