Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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List of Illustrations

4.1 `A Joke against a Joke': Austrian propaganda,

lampooning Gabriele

D'Annunzio (KA: O

sterreichisches

Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv,

Vienna) 87

4.2 `Spaghetti Signori!':

Austrian propaganda,

satirizing the

Italians (KA) 88

6.1 The Padua

Commission in June 1918 (Antoni Szuber,

Walka o

PrzewageÎ DuchowaÎ , Warsaw, 1933) 206

7.1 Manifesto 16:

Trumbic

announces to Zagreb and

Ljubljana that

Italian±Yugoslav relations are excellent (KA) 266

8.1 Manifesto 169:

Serbs should reflect on the lessons of

Kosovo (KA)

347

8.2 Manifesto 243:

Two Czech brothers meet on Val Bella (KA) 354

8.3 Manifesto 131:

Czechs ought to follow the example of

Jan Hus

(KA) 356

8.4 Manifesto 109:

The death of Hungary is announced (KA) 364

8.5 Manifesto 228:

Austria's identity papers are marked

`Unscrupulousness', `Slovenliness'

and `Hunger' (KA) 368

9.1 America rejects

Buria

n's peace offer: Austria's final effort

at propaganda

against Italy (KA) 418

9.2 Manifesto 352:

A poem of Sa

ndor Peto

fi to inspire

the Magyars

(OHM: Orsza

gos Hadto

rte

neti Mu

zeum, Budapest) 425

List of Maps

2.1 Austria-Hungary in the First World War 17

4.1 The Italian

Front in 1918 83

5.1 The Italian

Front in 1917 132

5.2 The

Front east of Asiago ( June 1918) 146

Preface

In his most influential book published in 1927, Harold D. Lasswell, one of the

pioneers of the modern study of propaganda, wrote that when the First World

War had receded into the past it would be possible to write `at least a fragment-

ary history

of the international propaganda of the time'.

The following work is

a contribution to that history. Its purpose is to examine one facet of wartime

propaganda: the phenomenon which can be termed `front propaganda', or the

use of propaganda as a weapon of warfare against the enemy. Since Lasswell's

study appeared, only a few authors have attempted to assess this modernized

weapon of the Great War. The first, Hans Thimme, concentrated on the West-

ern Front

in his Weltkrieg ohne Waffen. Another, lesser-known, work was by a

Pole, Antoni Szuber, and dealt extensively with the Italian Front, the theatre

where he had served as a wartime propagandist; however, his study in Polish

could only reach a limited audience.

Later works, most notably those of

George Bruntz, Luciano Tosi, and Michael Sanders and Philip Taylor, continued

to emphasize the theme from a western perspective, in the latter cases setting

front propaganda in the context of a specifically national wartime development

of propaganda (British or Italian).

The result has again been to present a

fragmented picture of how the weapon was wielded among the belligerents.

Indeed, as this study will argue, the effect of these works, even though each has

contributed its own piece of the propaganda jigsaw, has been to distort

the historiography, building consistently upon long-established myths about

western, or more specifically British, superiority in the field of psychological

warfare.

This study

does not profess to give a complete picture of how front propa-

ganda was

exercised during the First World War. My aim is to restore a balance

to the historiography, particularly to move away from a British focus, and to do

so by investigating the propaganda weapon as wielded by and against the

Habsburg Empire. In turn, this serves to open up other facets of the Great

War which remain under-researched or often inaccessible to a western audi-

ence. Thus,

the analysis of front propaganda is concentrated upon the Italian

and Eastern Fronts, scenes in any case of the most significant propaganda

campaigns of the war (although they are barely mentioned in existing historio-

graphy). And

because the Habsburg Empire is the focus, either as propagandist

or as victim of enemy propaganda, the work naturally explores the strengths

and weaknesses of Austria-Hungary during its last war, assessing especially the

degree to which its citizens were successfully mobilized on behalf of the Empire

or were susceptible to arguments or information which could damage morale

xii

Preface xiii

and ultimately undermine the Monarchy's viability. In this way, while main-

taining front

propaganda as the key focal point, the book has a second major

purpose of contributing towards the historiography of the collapse of Austria-

Hungary.

The project

was initially envisaged with a British focus, as a study of wartime

British propaganda against the Habsburg Empire, but its concept was gradually

moulded into its current shape as a result of the evidence which I discovered

in Vienna, Budapest and Zagreb. I owe a special debt to Roy Bridge and Nicholas

Pronay of the University of Leeds, who first suggested the research project,

provided vital contacts in central Europe, and guided me with enthusiasm

and criticism through the early stages: their support has been invaluable.

During my research visits to foreign archives, I benefited greatly from lively

discussions in Vienna with Lothar Ho

belt,

Peter Broucek and Steven Beller. In

Budapest, my struggle in an environment where the language was wholly

foreign to me was significantly eased through the help of Ge

za Jeszenszky,

rton Farkas and Daniel Szabo

. In Zagreb, I was privileged to talk to the late

Dragovan S

epic

, one of the wise doyens of Croatian history, and also secured

untiring assistance from Zvonimir Passek in using the papers of the Yugoslav

Committee, and from Damir Zagotta at the Croatian State Archives.

Over the

years, many other anonymous individuals have assisted my research

in the Viennese Kriegsarchiv, the Hungarian military archives, the library of the

rte

neti MuOrsza

gos

Hadto

zeum in Budapest, and the Vojensky

Historicky

Archõ

v in Prague. I particularly thank the Kriegsarchiv (O

sterreichisches

Staat-

sarchiv) in

Vienna for permission to reproduce propaganda leaflets from its

collection. Since the material in this archive has recently been reordered, some

of my references are according to the old system ± but are still easy to locate.

Where propaganda leaflets are named in this book, the title has been left as in

the original (however erroneous the spelling).

In Britain

I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided at Churchill College,

Cambridge; the House of Lords Record Office; the Brotherton Library, Leeds;

and the British Library. I am particularly grateful to Christopher Seton-Watson

for many fruitful discussions and for his generosity with access to his father's

papers. In mid-1982 I visited the village of Aldbourne in Wiltshire and there

discovered, concealed in a chest in an attic, the papers of General Charles

Delme

-Radcliffe. I am indebted to his nephew, the late Peter Delme

-Radcliffe,

for the use of this material and am only sorry that he did not live to see how the

archive of his `wicked uncle' (as he termed him) added to an assessment of the

Italian campaign against Austria-Hungary. Others to whom I owe a debt for

shaping my thoughts include Zbyne

k Zeman and Norman Stone who read early

versions of the manuscript and made valuable comments; Geoffrey Wadding-

ton and

Frank Magee for their friendship and support in Leeds; the late John

Leslie; Chris Bartlett, whose incisive perceptions of the past have constantly

xiv Preface

enthused me during my years in Scotland; and John Hind, Krzysztof Nawotka

and Dieter Kotschick for help in the translation of Romanian and Polish

material.

My research

was also considerably aided through the hospitality and friend-

ship of

certain individuals: the late Eva Nyoma

rkay and Mr and Mrs Albert

Jakab, who warmly welcomed and introduced me to the world of Budapest;

Monika Maruska and Erik Roth in Vienna; Radenko Radojc

in Zagreb; Radek

Tesar

in Prague. Paul Roberts for many years tolerated my joys and anxieties

about the project, and accompanied me on visits to the Italian Front: his steady

encouragement did much to ensure the book's completion.

Finally, clutching

the theory that it is possible to name key historians who are

the making of another historian, I mention my mentors, Eric Pankhurst

(Stroud), Roy Bridge (Leeds) and Zbyne

k Zeman (Oxford), each of whom has

taught and enthused me. Dan Healey has been my constant support in the final

stages of the book, quietly confident about its completion: to him I am truly

grateful. My final thanks are to my parents, John and Benita Cornwall, who

provided a model for living. I dedicate the book to them.

JMC

Dundee

Notes

1. Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I (New York, 1927) p. 12.

2. Hans Thimm

e, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1932); Antoni Szuber,

Walka o PrzewageÎ DuchowaÎ . Kampanja Propagandowa Koalicji 1914±1918 (Warsaw,

1933).

3. George Bruntz,

Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918

(Stanford, 1938); Luciano Tosi, La Propaganda Italiana all'Estero nella Prima Guerra

Mondiale. Rivendicazioni Territoriali e Politica delle Nazionalita

(Udine, 1977); Michael

Sanders and Philip Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War 1914±1918

(London, 1982).

List of Abbreviations

[For archive abbreviations see bibliography.]

AK Armeekommando

AOK Armeeoberkommando (Austro-Hungarian High Command)

BH Bosnia-Hercegovinan

CIGS Chief of Imperial General Staff

CPI Committee on Public Information

CS Comando Supremo (Italian High Command)

d. despatch

DMI

Director of Military Intelligence

DOHL German High Command

EPD Enemy Propaganda Department (Crewe House)

FAR Field artillery regiment

FAst Feindespropaganda-Abwehrstelle (Enemy Propaganda

Defence Agency)

FJB Feldja

gerbataillon

FM Feldmarschall

FML Feldmarschalleutnant

GM Generalmajor

GO Generaloberst

Gstbs Abt Generalstabs Abteilung

HFB Hadifelu

gyeleti

Bizottsa

g (War Surveillance Commission, Budapest)

HGK Heeresgruppekommando

HID Honve

d infantry division

HIR Honve

d infantry regiment

HM Honve

d Ministry

Hptm Hauptmann (Captain)

ID Infantry division

IR Infantry regiment

KA Kriegsarchiv

KD Cavalry division

KISA Isonzo army command

KK Corps command

KPQ Kriegspressequartier (War Press Office)

k.u.k. kaiserlich und

nglich

A Kriegsu KU

berwachungsamt

(War Surveillance Office, Vienna)

Lt Leutnant / lieutenant

MilKmdo Military command

xvi List of Abbreviations

MK/KM Milita

rkanzlei im Kriegsministerium

MKSM Milita

rkanzlei

Seiner Majesta

Na. Abt

Nachrichten Abteilung

Obst Oberst (Colonel)

Op.Abt Operations Abteilung

OULK Austrian Official

History of the War

Pr. Propaganda

pte private

Qu.Abt Quartier Abteilung

SchD Schu

tzendivision

SchR Schu

tzenregiment

t. telegram

A Theory of Front Propaganda

During the four years of the First World War, both sides gradually introduced

an armoury of weapons which had never been seen or even imagined in

previous conflicts. Warfare, as one Intelligence officer observed with admira-

tion in

1918, was constantly taking new forms of which neither civilians nor

soldiers, nor even generals, were fully aware.

Most of the professional military

had begun in 1914 with long-held preconceptions about the way that their war

would develop. It would be short and sharp as in 1870 and include a major role

for the cavalry. Four years later, it was clear that the type of warfare previously

conducted had been dramatically re-shaped by the technological developments

of the previous half-century, by the need to mobilize all corners of society for

an idealistic struggle to the end, and by the lessons steadily learnt on the

battlefield about how different techniques or types of weapon could mesh

together. Aeroplanes, first used during Italy's war against Turkey in 1911±12,

became a regular sight over the trenches; their reconnaissance activity was

woven into the fabric of each belligerent's Intelligence network, even if para-

chutes were

still in their infancy and flying was still something to be marvelled

at as a dangerous business. The coordination of war from the air with war on

the ground was matched by a gradual harmonization of other new types of

weaponry with the traditional `material' of warfare, the infantry: of machine

guns; of artillery, which replaced the horse; of chemical weapons; and of front

propaganda or psychological warfare.

In many

ways, front propaganda was no different from other weapons in the

armoury. Through gradual use, it too would secure its own niche and be

coordinated with the range of weaponry already available. And like the other

types of new weaponry, the sophisticated campaigns of front propaganda

which emerged in 1917 were only possible because of the nature of the conflict

which had developed: they required as a basic starting-point the technological

and educational revolution which had occurred in European society in the

decades before the war. Propaganda, however, also differed from other kinds

2 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

of weaponry in its scope. It employed a whole range of techniques and media

for its transmission to the enemy, including the mass distribution of manifestos

from the air, `oral propaganda' in the front line, or a methodology which often

overlapped with espionage activities in order to smuggle material into the

enemy camp. Its full evolution in the second half of the war reflected in itself

a new stage in the Great War, a new type of mobilization by all of the belliger-

ents in

an effort to try to win the battle of ideas or human minds which the

conflict had increasingly become.

The concept

of trying in wartime to persuade the enemy to adopt a particular

mindset, or act in a particular way, was not a new one in the early twentieth

century. It was as old as the instances of recorded warfare. Herodotus tells how

in 480 BC, on the eve of the naval battle of Salamis, the Athenian commander

Themistocles tried with some success to get Ionians in the opposing Persian

forces to desert by cutting messages into rocks on the seashore.

Over 2000

years later during the American wars of independence, American forces tried to

secure the surrender of Quebec by shooting into the fortress appeals tied to

Indian arrows. By the late twentieth century this front propaganda was con-

tinuing. In

the Gulf War of 1991, the Allied coalition distributed 30 million

leaflets over Iraqi lines.

In the Kosovo war of 1999, NATO planes threw out

manifestos, urging Serbian soldiers to desert and Belgrade citizens to turn

against the regime of Slobodan Milos

evic

. If the propaganda arguments have

remained fairly consistent, the techniques employed have grown more soph-

isticated. In

the First World War, it was a considerable feat for Italian aircraft to

fly as far as Vienna and distribute manifestos; by the Second World War, British

planes were able to fly much further and perform the same task over Nazi-

occupied Prague. Over six months in 1918, Italian propagandists on the Italian

Front spread 70 million leaflets among the enemy; over six months in 1941,

Hitler's war machine would distribute 400 million leaflets on the Eastern

Front.

Radio broadcasts became a new feature of such campaigns during the

ideological struggle with Nazism, and continue to the present day.

Yet if later

twentieth-century conflicts honed and expanded the use of the propaganda

weapon, the conflict of 1914±1918 was a crucial stage in its evolution. It was

then that propaganda became systematic, practised and perfected according to

what might be termed `scientific' principles.

Here, at

the outset, it is vital to be precise about the type of propaganda

which we are going to discuss. `Propaganda' in its broadest definition might be

described as the `spreading of subversive, debatable or merely novel attitudes',

with the objective of persuasion.

It can be transmitted through official or

unofficial bodies, the work of state organizations or of private individuals. In

recent years, the latter `informal' dimension has increasingly been explored by

cultural historians seeking to interpret propaganda in its widest sense as any

form of persuasion upon the wartime populace.

State-sponsored propaganda

A Theory of Front Propaganda 3

was therefore only one element in this mass of competing mental phenomena.

Yet it usually secured more resources (and sometimes attention) through its

firm association with the political and military hierarchy which was running

the war; and its very formality and institutionalization also makes it fairly easy

to define and distinguish from other forms of propaganda. In addition, it is

worth emphasizing that, as far as wartime Austria-Hungary is concerned, the

phenomenon and impact of state propaganda has received little attention from

historians. Official propaganda could variously be described as persuasion or

mobilization of the population at home, the spread of ideas among neutrals or

allies, or the campaigns launched to attack or defend against the enemy. Some

historians, Michael Sanders and Philip Taylor for example, have duly tried to

encompass all state propaganda in a single analysis.

For while it can justifiably

be argued that many of those who worked with wartime propaganda envisaged

precisely this broad definition of the term, it is equally apparent that different

types of propaganda engaged in by a state may be, and often are, interwoven

with one another. Thus, to pre-empt what will be discussed later, although

the Habsburg Empire initially launched propaganda offensives against its

enemies, the enemies responded in kind and the Imperial authorities dis-

covered too

late that their own domestic propaganda was inadequate. Any

serious study of a wartime propaganda campaign becomes of necessity a study

not simply of the nature of its ideas, but also of how they might be circulated,

their potential impact among the targeted audience, and their actual impact

and results. In other words, in the manner of recent cultural historians, the

scope could be widened to include any ideas of any kind which had the

potential to uplift or depress the morale of a targeted audience: a very wide

scope indeed.

While remaining

mindful of this broad definition of propaganda, we will

nevertheless do well to heed the advice of those like Ute Daniel who have

stressed that any analysis of propaganda has to have fairly precise parameters

if it is to be meaningful or manageable.

The current study is focused upon

`front propaganda'. Such a term was often employed in the German and Austro-

Hungarian armies during the war with a specific definition, meaning the use of

propaganda as a military weapon, exercised across the front lines into enemy

territory.

This usually involved the reciprocal spread of information by the

belligerents across the trenches in a written or oral form, but could also be

extended to cover literature which was smuggled into an enemy country

through other routes, such as the neutral state of Switzerland. The definition

therefore is of propaganda against the enemy by direct methods and exercised

usually as part of a military campaign. It does not include propaganda which

might be hostile to the enemy but reached the enemy camp only indirectly.

Examples of the latter would be those public statements made against the

Habsburg Empire by the Western Allies during the war, or news of German