Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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44 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

revolution and shaking the German people from their monarchist loyalty. On

the other hand, it was clear that the Russian `People's Government' needed

peace to consolidate their revolution, but was being forced to prolong the war

for England's selfish ends. A major theme therefore would be to play on Russia's

continued imperialist policy: like the Tsar, the present Russian government was

allegedly still a tool of England, something underlined by a notorious pictorial

leaflet which implied that the cousins, George V and Nicholas II, had identical

influence over Russia's destiny.

While Hoffmann issued these guidelines to the army Intelligence officers,

including the Austrian armies within Eastern Command's sphere of influence,

on 11 April General Ludendorff communicated the guidelines to the Austro-

Hungarian High Command. The AOK thereupon immediately followed the

German lead. Already the new head of Austrian military Intelligence, Max

Ronge, had assumed overall control of Austrian front propaganda. He placed

control of the imminent Eastern campaign in the hands of Captain Pantelija

Borovica, head of the Russian section of AOK Intelligence.

In the following

months, Borovica had the difficult task of supervising Austria's new propa-

ganda machinery

on the Eastern Front. Here he would concentrate chiefly

upon southern sectors of the front under Archduke Joseph where Habsburg

troops predominated. But his job was complicated by the fact that from late

1916 most Austrian armies to the north were directly subordinate to German

Eastern Command, something which would place serious obstacles in the way

of coordinating an allied campaign which took full account of Austria-Hun-

gary's interests. The potential for the campaign to be weakened by conflicting

allied power-centres was abundantly clear from the start.

Gradually, however,

from April 1917 `propaganda positions' were set up in

each Austro-Hungarian division, consisting of an Intelligence officer, an inter-

preter and

three or four men (Nachrichtentruppen), all subordinate to the local

army Intelligence section. Their task was to spread propaganda among the

enemy forces, including (and again following a German suggestion) Nedelia,

the Austrian newspaper issued for Russian prisoners of war.

At the same time

they were expected while on patrol to gather useful intelligence, as well as

countering any efforts by Russian troops to make `counter-propaganda'. The

AOK instructed its army commands on how to receive Russian negotiators

(with schnapps and tobacco), and for overall guidance in oral propaganda

sent them a slightly revised version of the German guidelines. Passages were

altered to emphasize Emperor Karl's desire for peace and the `centuries-old

evolution and freedom' enjoyed by all under Habsburg rule.

From the start of the Central Powers' campaign oral propaganda was the

priority, especially with the Russian soldiers' committees. By Easter 1917 such

contact was already achieved with 107 out of the 214 enemy divisions. The

official cease-fire which was then announced produced the expected orgy of

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 45

fraternization in many sectors as both sides met to exchange gifts and propa-

ganda in

no-man's-land.

Yet for the Austrians not all results of this exercise

were positive. Some Russian negotiators showed themselves equally adept at

spreading revolutionary-socialist propaganda among their new `friends', and in

some instances the Russians reactivated their tactic of using Czech troops to

entice `Austrian Czechs' to desert. This produced a few unquantifiable successes

in the confused traffic at Easter. Moreover, it was precisely this danger, that

propaganda efforts would rebound on Austrian troops and threaten their own

discipline, which had made so many Austrian commanders hostile to the

campaign from the very beginning. General Alfred Krauss was not alone in

being `extremely unsympathetic to this activity'.

But the damage caused by propaganda was insignificant in comparison to

the immediate benefits of the campaign. The AOK and many subordinate com-

mands were

clearly impressed with the unofficial cease-fire which descended

on the front for many weeks, giving time for reconstruction of positions, saving

munition and lives, and eventually allowing six divisions to be transferred to

the Italian Front in the following months. They also felt, precisely because the

Russians responded in kind, that propaganda was proving itself to be a `modern

fighting weapon' which could not be ignored. The new task after Easter was to

expand the initial contacts and work on previously hostile sectors of the front,

while limiting any fighting which might galvanize the Russians to resume a

more defensive attitude. The AOK and DOHL now agreed that the official cease-

fire and

mass fraternization would be discontinued, and the Russian soldiers

informed that their superiors had seriously `abused' the period of rest.

But

meanwhile, German and Austrian Intelligence officers would continue their

propaganda, hinting to Russian parlementaires that their officers should now be

the ones to make some `peace initiatives'.

By late April this policy too was felt

to have made some progress, for contact had been established on southern

sectors with Russian soldiers either orally or by letter `almost everywhere', and

an unofficial cease-fire still prevailed. Contrary to the pessimistic line taken in

the Austrian official history, the Central Powers appear to have been reasonably

satisfied with the results obtained.

The beginnings of the campaign were therefore auspicious. But it is clear that

by May the Austrians were still not properly organized. It was Germany which

was taking the lead, especially on northern sectors of the front where the

Habsburg liaison officer with Eastern Command grudgingly observed:

Our belated

campaign not only had to be incorporated into the established

German organization, but also to assume a subordinate position. Prussians

remained the spokesmen of all negotiations, to the obvious astonishment of

the Russians who apparently still did not think our dependence on Germany

had gone that far.

46 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

This may be a slight exaggeration, reflecting the author's prejudices. But

there was some truth in it and in the hint of Austrian tardiness. For example,

when in early May Pantelija Borovica first contacted the Intelligence section

of the Austrian 2nd Army Command [2AK] he found propaganda work in its

infancy and already facing a number of difficulties.

Captain Terlecki, deputy-

Intelligence officer of the 2AK, revealed that only Eastern Command had

sent him instructions on propaganda work; and it was clear that it was the

German Intelligence officer at the 2AK who was most prominent in supervising

detailed negotiations with Russian parlementaires (which were felt to be beyond

the remit of simple propaganda personnel). Moreover, even if there had already

been some distribution of Nedelia and other newspapers in this sector, Borovica

was undoubtedly disappointed that very few `propaganda positions' had

actually been set up at the front; only opposite the XVIII corps had traffic

with the enemy been possible, partly due to hostilities elsewhere, but partly

because the 2AK lacked sufficient Russian-speaking propaganda personnel. It

was a situation which Arz and Emperor Karl discovered for themselves on visit-

ing the

front at this time.

And it caused Arz on 8 May to send a blunt order to all

the Austrian army commands: `our propaganda activity on the Eastern Front

has not been at all satisfactory. Our Intelligence officers are evidently doing

much less than the Germans.' In future, Arz specified, propaganda positions

were to be activated on all Austrian sectors, with a specialized Russian-speaking

personnel who would shield their potentially dangerous activities from ordin-

ary Austrian

troops: `I expect a good response to all orders concerning propa-

ganda, [since]

this branch of work is now of special importance for the course of

events.'

As a sign of the new urgency, Borovica himself set off a week later for

a brief tour of the Austrian armies under Eastern Command to discuss person-

ally the

operation with Austrian and German Intelligence personnel.

For the Austrian leadership the sense of urgency sprang directly from its

impatience to conclude a formal armistice in the East. It remained a truism in

particular for Count Czernin, the Habsburg Foreign Minister, that the Monar-

chy could

not endure another winter of war. On 12 April 1917, in a notorious

memorandum forwarded to Kaiser Wilhelm with Emperor Karl's approval, he

had warned: `If the monarchs of the Central Powers are unable to conclude

peace in the next few months, the peoples will do so over their heads, and then

the waves of revolution will sweep away everything for which our brothers and

sons are still fighting and dying today.' While the German military were

adamant that peace in the East must mean German annexation of Russian ter-

ritory (and

even compensation for Russia at Austrian expense), Czernin was

quite prepared to make peace for Austria-Hungary on the basis of mutual

renunciation of any annexations and reparations.

Arz von Straussenburg

had come to the same conclusion. On 26 April he agreed with Czernin that

the Central Powers ought now to use the existing mood among enemy troops

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 47

to push for a favourable peace with Russia. Since, Arz argued, `the impact of

informal gossip from trench to trench has exhausted itself', it was time to begin

direct talks with the Russian military leadership. Though not at all optimistic

about the latter's receptiveness, Arz envisaged more chance of success if the

Central Powers put forward concrete terms instead of cloaking their designs

with German euphemisms such as `honourable peace'. Assurances, that the

Central Powers would annex no Russian territory, would accept an independ-

ent Poland

and would `consider Russia's economic requirements' ± these were

worth making. For, as Arz concluded: `If Russia breaks out [ausspringen] from the

ranks of our enemies, it offers us such great advantages that it really pays to

build golden bridges.' With these ideas and the Emperor's backing, he

approached the German High Command, proposing that the Central Powers

make an official armistice offer to the Russians.

The High Commands were able to agree a new five-point programme,

approved by their respective foreign ministries, which was to be used for

propaganda at the front and as a preliminary basis for any armistice talks.

This programme, suggesting an armistice of three to four weeks, stemmed

directly from terms agreed at recent informal Russo-German negotiations in

Stockholm; but its innocent reference (point four) to `frontier rectifications' for

Germany in Lithuania and Courland belied the DOHL's vigorous insistence on

massive annexation of territory in the East if peace was to be concluded. This

fact underlay many of the existing tensions between the two allies.

Unlike the

Austrians, the DOHL saw no reason for a hasty or compromise peace, sensing

that the present course of events could only work to Germany's advantage.

General Ludendorff cryptically informed Arz:

The internal

disintegration of the Russian army will continue even without

the high pressure of our propaganda. Time is on our side on the Eastern Front

as well. And besides this propaganda channel I expect even greater success

through employing copious funds and agents in Petersburg and elsewhere.

What effect these methods were already having is difficult to assess. But the

Russian Commander-in-Chief at this very time felt that he knew Ludendorff's

objectives, noting in late April that defeatist propaganda in the Russian army

`comes from two sides ± from the enemy and from the rear . . . and obviously

stems from the same source'.

At the front, Ludendorff, even though like most

commanders initially sceptical of the benefits of propaganda, now expected it

would continue to infect the Russian rank and file. But he was dubious about

any immediate impact on their officers. He agreed instead to Arz's idea of

making an official offer of an armistice to the Russian High Command. If it

was rebuffed, as he too felt likely, the incident would at least be grist to the mill

of the propaganda campaign in the front line, convincing the Russian soldier

48 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

even more that it was his leaders who were the obstacles to peace. Yet, such a

rebuff was also bound to lead to a scaling down of the Central Powers' propa-

ganda campaign

since, as Ludendorff argued (and the Austrians agreed), there

was always the danger that too many overtures would be viewed as weakness by

the Russians and exploited in their counter-propaganda.

In fact, events in May 1917 developed very much as Ludendorff anticipated.

Although the allies' arguments struck many chords among Russian troops in

different sectors,

the Russian commanders, against all odds, were still man-

aging to

keep some lid on the unrest in the ranks. In this they were aided, or at

least so the Central Powers always imagined, by Entente advisers whose counter-

propaganda, `conducted

with great skill and unscrupulous means' had, so

far, `visibly won the upper-hand on the Eastern Front'.

In the middle of May

the Germans proceeded to test the water by sending out some officers, armed

with the armistice offer, to the Russian 5th army commander General Drago-

mirov; he

immediately exploited the incident for counter-propaganda, publi-

cizing the

event as an instance of the enemy's deviousness in trying to weaken

the Eastern Front. On 19 May the Germans and Austrians followed up their

move along the whole front. Almost 100 parlementaires were dispatched across

the trenches bearing proposals from Prince Leopold of Bavaria, Commander-

in-Chief of the Eastern Front, for a general armistice. The Russian response,

however, was still overwhelmingly negative with a number of the emissaries

being fired on or arrested as spies.

The DOHL and AOK readily admitted that this direct approach to the Russian

commanders had been a complete failure. Yet they had, as we have seen, always

viewed it as something of a gamble. It did not mean, as Arz and others would

later suggest, that the propaganda campaign as a whole had failed, nor ± as the

Austrian official history implies with selective quotations ± that the Central

Powers' `peace propaganda' was at an end.

True, on 29 May Arz informed

Czernin that `the means of the allied armies for continuing peace propaganda

in the Russian army are, as recent days have shown, now exhausted'. But he

acknowledged the results so far achieved: the Russians had been paralysed at a

time of decisive hostilities in the West (the 10th Isonzo battle in Italy and the

Nivelle offensive in France) and their infantry were still not capable of launch-

ing an

offensive for some time.

Indeed, as a number of German and Austrian

authorities observed, the steady flow of propaganda in May coupled with the

armistice offer had served to increase further the gap between the Russian

officer and his men. It had caused a rise in fraternization (contact with 70 per

cent of Russian or Romanian divisions by the end of the month), and provided

fertile ground for future peace initiatives. Most significantly, the `broad thrust

into the enemy front' in mid-May had supplied `a deep insight into the morale

and conditions of the Russian army', something not possible from casual

fraternization.

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 49

The whole experience therefore had perceptively strengthened the Central

Powers' sympathy for the propaganda weapon. Arz, for example, might well

feel that large-scale front propaganda should be discontinued, but he admitted

that it had performed a service; it should now be carried on on a reduced scale.

The aim would be to reach the Russian commanders indirectly through steadily

working on the receptive rank and file, and continuing to stress that the

Central Powers were ready to make peace.

Arz and his deputy, Colonel Alfred

von Waldsta

tten, seem by now to have shared the DOHL's optimism that the

Russian army was gradually disintegrating. Their propaganda could slowly

gnaw at it, adding to the poison seeping in from the rear, while they themselves

concentrated their attention on the other theatres of war.

3.2 The `breaking of Russia'

If the Austrians now felt that they knew something of the propaganda weapon's

potential, they had also received extra lessons in the difficulties of allied

coordination, both in policy and action. For while the AOK had regularly and

calmly discussed the methods and arguments of its propaganda with the Ball-

hausplatz, the

campaign had immediately produced some tension with the

German High Command which was much more inclined to send its ideas for

propaganda direct to the Eastern army commands. According to Captain Moritz

Fleischmann, the Austro-Hungarian liaison officer attached to German Oberost,

the DOHL was constantly trying to take full control of the propaganda cam-

paign, relegating

Austrian personnel to a subservient position and thereby

infringing the sovereign rights of the Monarchy. Arz, anxious to be congenial,

may have been only slightly irritated, but it certainly ruffled the feathers

of Czernin when he learnt of this development. Czernin's main anxiety, how-

ever, was

about the content of propaganda which the German military were

allegedly sending to the Russians. Even though he was well aware of the

DOHL's insistence on annexation of Lithuania and Courland, he assumed

that the Germans would abide by the propaganda guidelines agreed at the

end of April (and reaffirmed in late May).

According to these, the Russians

would only be told that Germany expected `frontier rectifications' with regard

to these Baltic regions.

In early June, however, Czernin learnt from Captain

Fleischmann that the DOHL during May had actually ordered Eastern Com-

mand to

tell the Russians that Germany in any peace settlement would have to

annex Lithuania and Courland. If this were true, the Central Powers' agreed

propaganda guidelines had been compromised, a prime example of the dangers

which could arise when propaganda was not consistent with agreed policy, in

this case revealing the German military's hidden agenda. Indeed, Fleischmann

argued that Russia's hostile response to the Central Powers' armistice proposal

was directly attributable to Germany's unconcealed annexationist goals; the

50 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

chances of fraternization had diminished and the Russians had been able to

publish the armistice offer `with snide remarks' [mit abfaÈllige Begleitworten].

Although the veracity of Fleischmann's report was later to be queried, on the

basis of his comments Emperor Karl proceeded to write to Kaiser Wilhelm on

7 June, complaining about Germany's behaviour. The Kaiser in reply rejected

the accusations, pointing to the steady disintegration of the Russian state

as evidence of the process to which German propaganda was continuing to

contribute.

At the front, meanwhile, the first task of the Central Powers' more modest

campaign was to fend off Russian counter-propaganda in the wake of the

armistice offer. The aim above all was to keep up links with the Russian rank

and file, while moving onto the offensive and attacking their superiors' `belli-

cose' attitude.

There would be no more official armistice offers and less talk

about what precise terms the Central Powers might offer or demand from the

peace; rather the emphasis would rest on their simple readiness for peace in

contrast to the Entente or the Russian Provisional Government.

Thus from

the beginning of June the propaganda went out, by wireless, telegraph as well as

written and oral contact, condemning those, like General Dragomirov, who

had rejected armistice talks. These commanders and the Petrograd government

were, so the argument went, still tied to the Entente and the secret annexa-

tionist treaties

of the old Tsarist regime. Instead they should be listening to the

vibrant mood of peace in their own armed forces; all the more so, as this

mirrored the conduct of the Central Powers who since Easter had limited

their hostilities, had demonstrated their willingness and their precise terms

for peace, but who could, if necessary, fight on and expand their war aims to

Russia's detriment.

The AOK might well expect that this message would have some impact

amongst the Russian rank and file. For it knew, from increased Russian air

and artillery activity, from deserters and from the replacement of enemy units

infected with propaganda, that Alexander Kerensky, the new Russian Minister

of War, was acceding to Entente wishes and organizing a fresh offensive.

This

was bound to be a hazardous enterprise for the Russians; the latent discontent

in so many Russian units smouldered and became increasingly evident as

preparations for the attack gathered pace. It is true that not all appeared black

to the Russian leadership. The Petrograd Soviet, for instance, stood firmly

behind the offensive as a sign of support for the Revolution; on 10 June it

indicated its response to the Central Powers' propaganda, rejecting their calls

for any separate peace and naming its own allies as `the working classes of

England and France'. This was something of a rebuff to the Central Powers. Yet

they could still draw comfort from the fact that the Soviet was not espousing

the Entente's war aims: its reply was testament to the divergent interests which

could be exploited in Russia.

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 51

Similarly, even if in June many Russian infantry units in eastern Galicia were

becoming more hostile to the German-Austrian propagandists, the latter still

had many positive advantages.

They were working on an army where there

were the first signs of mutiny amongst troops being moved up to the front.

Moreover, it was at this time that Bolshevik propaganda first began to spread in

the front line, especially in sectors in the forefront of the attack; it began to

constitute a major unsettling influence thwarting orderly preparations for the

offensive. It is important to emphasize that Bolshevik agitation was thoroughly

akin to the Central Powers' propaganda. It played on Russia's links to the

imperialist Entente, on their `secret treaties', on the issue of land reform in

Russia (a subject which German propaganda had already toyed with) and above

all on the futility of the Russian offensive.

It was an ideal accompaniment to

the Central Powers' campaign. For as one German Intelligence officer wrote

later: `As the Russians' offensive plans became clearer, it was all the more the

task of our propaganda to explain the motives of the Russian government, in

undertaking an offensive which we had done nothing to provoke, and to

ascribe their behaviour to agitation by the Entente.'

This was precisely the line which Pantelija Borovica took in mid-June when

seeking to coordinate Austrian propaganda along the front. He advised the 2AK

that the build-up of Russian forces opposite the Heeresgruppe Bo

hm-Ermolli

offered rich opportunities for propaganda, preferably by balloon behind the

Russian lines but also in tandem with neighbouring Austrian armies.

And

while the allies still took suitable military precautions as the offensive loomed,

they were reasonably optimistic about its outcome. Since so many Russian

divisions leading the attack were known to be already infected by their propa-

ganda, they

could expect that Russian demoralization would quickly become

evident during the offensive itself.

In fact, at first the propaganda boot was on the other foot, and worn by

Russia. The AOK had always been conscious in these months that the propa-

ganda weapon

could easily be used against its own army with devastating

results. Indeed, in June 1917 the 2AK was expressly warned by Ronge and

Borovica against trying to subvert enemy Ukrainian troops with specifically

Ukrainian propaganda, lest this rebound and infect the Monarchy's already

suspect Ruthene soldiers.

The AOK never showed the same caution when

aiming propaganda at Polish troops in the Russian army; and from July, as we

will see, the Central Powers were to target special arguments at the Romanian

forces opposite the Heeresgruppe Mackensen. But generally it was the case that

Baden was wary of playing the `nationality card' in case it caused a backlash in

the Habsburg army.

Yet for

Austria-Hungary's enemies this could, of course, be a trump card.

It was during their last offensive that the Russians decided for the first time to

use their Czech volunteer troops as a combatant unit. These Czechs, former

52 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

prisoners or deserters, had previously only been assigned to Russian units for

Intelligence or propaganda purposes. Over 3000 of them were now grouped

together in a `Czechoslovak Brigade' and marched to the front line at Zborov.

A British witness praised them as `grand men with chests like Aldershot gym-

nastic instructors'.

Even so, many of them undoubtedly had mixed feelings

about the forthcoming baptism of fire, for they were only too aware of the

Russians' low morale. Once in the trenches they saw how the enemy raised red

flags and tried to fraternize but, as one Czech described later, they knew how to

respond: `We agreed to send over to them a few ``pills'' [i.e. shells] which would

cure them of their efforts to propagate something which they themselves did

not want to hear about.'

They also sang Czech national songs with the express

purpose of undermining the morale of the Austro-Hungarian 19th infantry

division [19 ID] opposite, a unit primarily of Czech nationality.

This certainly

bore fruit. When on 29 June in sweltering conditions the Russian offensive was

finally launched and the Czechoslovak Brigade advanced, it was precisely this

division which collapsed and were taken prisoner in their thousands; one of the

regiments (IR75 ± 82 per cent Czech) lost 2300 men as prisoners.

Although

Zborov was of temporary military significance, for the land gained was soon

retaken by fresh German troops, it had major political importance which

justified its subsequent notoriety and place in Czech mythology. For the first

time in the war, citizens of the Habsburg Empire had fought in great numbers

in an enemy army. It set an example for Czech resistance on the side of the

Entente, leading directly to the establishment of a Czechoslovak Legion in

Russia, and giving the western Powers clear evidence of how Austria-Hungary's

nationalities might be used against the Monarchy to win the war.

The Central Powers too, however, viewed the Galician battle of July 1917 as

the `decisive test' for their propaganda campaign.

Until 19 July when they

launched a counter-offensive, their Intelligence troops showered the enemy

trenches with a range of propaganda material and successfully maintained

personal propaganda links. Relying on newly agreed guidelines, the propagan-

dists explained

to the Russians why they had to fight yet another battle (for the

imperialist Entente) and why any counter-attack would simply be in order to

retake Austrian soil.

But with a war of movement from July, as the Russians at

last retreated out of Habsburg territory (eastern Galicia and Bukovina), the

propagandists were being forced to adopt new techniques; oral propaganda,

which had been a staple of the campaign's early efforts, was no longer possible.

Instead, the scattering of newspapers over the retreating Russian troops became

of major significance. This included the newspapers issued for Russian prisoners

of war, Nedelia and Germany's Russkii Vestnik, as well as selected editions of the

Viennese socialist daily, Arbeiter-Zeitung (ironic, for in 1918 this paper would be

used for the same purpose but on the Italian Front against Austrian troops).

However, these were not felt to be adequate for the task of sending up-to-date

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 53

and relevant news to the enemy. Therefore printing presses were set up at the

army commands and supplied with material from the Intelligence heads in

order to produce daily propaganda papers such as Obzor and Posledniia Izvestiia.

The object was to avoid the unsubtle style used in previous manifestos as well

as any overly obtrusive commentary. Rather, the material would speak for

itself, providing factual information from the allied or enemy press about the

Central Powers' readiness for peace and the chaotic conditions in the Russian

interior.

It was a technique which the propaganda campaigns of 1918 would

perfect.

While the

AOK at Baden was becoming more flexible in its propaganda tech-

niques, it

was also by the early summer identifying new propaganda targets.

Sensitive to the dangerous repercussions of playing the `nationality card' against

the Russians, Baden nevertheless realized the need for specific arguments

when turning its new weapon against Romanian forces on the Eastern Front.

Romania, after entering the war on the Allied side in August 1916, had been

speedily crushed, Wallachia occupied by German troops, and the Roma-

nian army

reformed in the `rump' Romanian state under French supervision.

By June 1917 the Central Powers had begun to entice Romanian divisions

(chiefly opposite the Heeresgruppe Mackensen) with the offer of sending soldiers'

letters to their families in Wallachia. They followed this up with assurances of

good treatment for deserters and a regular newspaper service, informing the

Romanian forces about life in their `homeland'; it was the same technique

currently employed against the Russians, but a richer material was undoubtedly

available because of the German control of Bucharest.

Only by July did the

Austrians envisage more personal contact with Romanian soldiers and for

this purpose Baden drew up specific guidelines. The broad theme of these

was quite simple. Romania's current misfortune was to be ascribed almost

totally to the Entente Powers who, after deceiving King Ferdinand with false

promises, had left Romania in the lurch in late 1916; a few months later they

were allegedly administering (the rump) Moldavia in a disgraceful manner

which `must deeply offend every patriotic Romanian'. In contrast to the Entente,

who were pushing Romania further down the road to destruction, the Central

Powers offered Romania peace, a history of excellent prewar economic and

cultural ties, and the example of a just and prosperous administration in Wal-

lachia. In

view of this, the guidelines urged Romanians to cut loose from the

Entente's `pernicious tentacles' and to follow the example of those thousands

of Romanian prisoners who in June had returned to their homeland to lead

a quiet life.

While formulating these `simple truths', Baden could not avoid certain

unpleasant realities. Firstly, it was clear from the limited contact across the

Romanian trenches that Romanian hostility to Hungary was very strong, pos-

sibly strong

enough to undermine the effect of all other propaganda arguments.