Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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64 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

extra knife to twist, sharper than that which the Austrians were using against

Romanian soldiers on the Eastern Front.

A week

after Arz's letter to the DOHL, he received German approval (and

the agreement of the Bulgarian High Command), together with a rider from

Ludendorff urging that the propaganda dwell on Serbian homesickness and

avoid any discussion of Serbia's political future.

122

It was natural that the AOK

had to secure German agreement since the campaign would be launched from

the Heeresgruppe Scholtz ± it was not here a matter of Austrian subservience to

German wishes. After all, already by this time and before German approval,

the AOK had ordered a half-battalion of Croat troops to move from occupied

Montenegro to be placed under Stipetic

's direction, while two `tested Intelli-

gence officers',

Zeller and Friedl, had also already arrived at Usku

[Skoplje] to

await further orders. The idea at first was that Austrian propagandists would test

the water. Stipetic

was to establish, from the statements of captured Serbians

and from soundings by Zeller and Friedl across the trenches, the state of Serbian

morale and the best methods and arguments to use to accelerate desertion.

Only if success was assured would the battalion be moved up to the front.

In the

meantime, Baden set out certain principles to guide Stipetic

for the

future campaign. On the basis of the work on the Eastern Front, which was to

be daily communicated to Stipetic

, traffic with the enemy was to occur only in a

narrow zone away from enemy lines; the priority was to encourage desertion by

promising freedom and benevolent treatment for all who succumbed to their

longing to return home. A crucial role was to be played by the authorities in

MGG/S. They were a vital link in the traffic of correspondence; they were also

expected to discover pro-Austrian Serbs in the MGG/S for propaganda work at

the front, and to compose and supply the necessary literature for the campaign.

This material, according to Baden's guidelines, would dwell heavily upon the

normality of life in occupied Serbia, illustrating it with a bi-weekly newspaper

with photographs and letters, while explaining the dismal failure of the Serbian

uprising which had occurred in Bulgarian-held territory earlier in the year.

At the same time the propaganda would include, as on the Eastern Front,

a message of despair: that the military situation was hopeless for the Serbian

army; that they were bleeding on behalf of an Entente which had consistently

left Serbia in the lurch; and, as an extra twist, that Serbia's government-in-exile

was currently building up an enormous debt in the West which could only

result in Serbia's `complete dependence' on foreign states unless her army broke

immediately with the Entente. This latter argument, pregnant with irony, was

to be set blatantly alongside the `attractive photographs' of occupied Serbia.

123

By August 1917, on the basis of his Intelligence officers' promising reports,

Stipetic

decided to move the Croat half-battalion (of IR25) into the front line.

Having undergone extensive training in propaganda activity, the Croat

patrols were assigned to Bulgarian divisions and began to approach the Serbian

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 65

listening-posts. They were armed with correspondence from occupied Serbia,

with copies of Beogradski Novine (a Serbian edition of the Belgrader Nachrichten),

which was the only newspaper permitted in the MGG/S, and with a richly

illustrated supplement ± Avallah ± portraying ordinary life in the `homeland'.

124

The first results in mid-August were not auspicious. Their initial efforts to

deposit material, sing Serbian songs and make oral contact, were ostentatiously

interrupted by French artillery. But within a few days, the Croat enticements

began to bear fruit, causing Max Ronge to judge that `the spirit of the Serbians

seems thoroughly miserable, the moment for launching our propaganda cor-

rectly chosen'.

It was indeed the letter- and newspaper-traffic which particularly

stirred Serbian interests, causing a dozen Serbs to desert after a short period of

hostilities in early September.

125

On the other hand, French and Serbian offi-

cers seem

to have been quite successfully vigilant, even if in their `counter-

propaganda' they

were slow to play the `nationality card' by turning on the

Croat patrols and questioning their allegiance to the Habsburgs.

126

importantly, perhaps, the campaign was weakened by the inadequacy of the

Croat half-battalion. Although backed by some regular troops, the patrols were

too thinly spread out along a front of 40 kilometres; and efforts by Baden

to send reinforcements for this `promising activity' floundered repeatedly in

late 1917 on the Monarchy's manpower crisis, compounded by the shortage of

suitable Croat personnel.

127

It is not easy to follow the progress of the campaign after this initial phase.

Major Stipetic

's reports have not survived, nor have the relevant documents of

Austrian military Intelligence. The campaign, as we have seen, had teething

problems which may never have been resolved, and they were certainly exa-

cerbated by

tensions between Stipetic

and the Bulgarian High Command.

128

Yet recognition of Austria's efforts came in the summer of 1918 from British

military Intelligence. It judged that the Serbian army's morale was depressed

due to long periods in the trenches, unsympathetic treatment by the French,

and anxiety about their relatives in Serbia ± `all accentuated by clever enemy

propaganda'.

129

Stipetic

himself, similarly, appears to have been reporting back

to Baden signs of increasing war-weariness among the Serbians, and how a

range of measures were being taken by their officers to boost their morale.

130

During 1918, it is true, he may have been more worried about the state of

morale of the Bulgarian army than of the Serbians opposite. Even so, by the end

of the war when the Allies broke through on the Balkan Front, Austrian sources

agree that their propagandists had managed to persuade a total of nine Serbian

officers and 445 men to desert across the trenches, a modest triumph for the

campaign. The campaign may also have fulfilled its other aims: in forcing

French divisions repeatedly to relieve unreliable Serbian units, while at the

same time ensuring a steady flow of useful Intelligence from the trickle of

Serbian deserters.

131

66 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

If the results of the Serbian campaign could not compare with those wit-

nessed in

the East, the Austrian High Command might still feel that they were

proportional to the smaller target. After all, the Balkan Front since 1915 had

become something of a `side-show' for Austria-Hungary while Russia and Italy

had remained the principal dangers. From 1917, in any case, the propaganda

results there were as nothing compared to what the AOK expected in another

theatre. In late 1917 it launched its new weapon against a third target, Italy.

Notes

1. For example, Charles Roetter, in The Art of Psychological Warfare 1914±1945 (New

York, 1974), suggests that Germany showed particular skill with propaganda against

Tsarist Russia, but implies that any efforts in 1917 were a total failure (pp. 74±5).

2. Quoted in

Reginald Pound and Geoffrey Harmsworth, Northcliffe (London, 1959)

p. 593.

3. Leo Valiani,

The End of Austria-Hungary (London, 1973) pp. 81±2; and Z.A.B. Zeman,

The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire 1914±1918 (Oxford, 1961) pp. 52±4, 65, who also

discusses unofficial Ukrainian propaganda towards Austria's Ruthene population.

4. Jan Hajs

man,

eska

Mafie. Vzpomõ

nky na Odboj Doma (Prague, 1934) pp. 35±6;

hr, Das k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in OChristoph Fu

sterreich

1914±1917 (Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1968) p. 97.

5. Karel Pichlõ

Bohumõ

r Klõ

pa, Jitka Zabloudilova, C

eskoslovens

tõ

Legiona

õ (1914±1920)

(Prague, 1996) pp. 27±9, 52±3; Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis of Czechoslovakia (New

York, 1986) pp. 60ff.

6. Occasionally, even

in 1914, the Russians sent longer, more sophisticated appeals:

see leaflet, `Soldaten!/Katona

k!', in the leaflet collection of the Orsza

gos Hadto

neti

zeum,

Budapest [hereafter OHM], sz.1497/1±2.

7. J.Y. Simpso

n, The Self-Discovery of Russia (London, 1916) p. 137; Wilhelm Conrad

Gomoll, Im Kampf gegen Russland und Serbien (Leipzig, 1916) p. 167.

8. Rauchensteiner, Der

Tod des Doppeladlers, p. 183.

9. Max Ronge,

Kriegs- und Industriespionage. Zwo

lf Jahre Kundschaftsdienst (Zurich,

Leipzig and Vienna, 1930) pp. 250, 257.

10. Erich Ludendor

ff, My War Memories 1914±1918, 2 vols (London, 1919) I, pp. 380±1;

Wilhelm Deist (ed.), MilitaÈr und

Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914±1918, 2 vols (Dussel-

dorf, 1970),

I, pp. lvi-lvii.

11. See Kriegsarchiv

Vienna [hereafter KA], Evidenzbu

[EvB] 1917, Faszikel [Fasz.]

5696, Nr 4903: Friedrich Ritter von Wiesner to AOK Nachrichten Abteilung

[Na.Abt], 344/5, 13 March 1917; and for reports of the crucial meeting with military

representatives on 15 March: KA, AOK Operationsabteilung [Op.Abt] 1917, Karton

111, Nr 39500, report by Captain Edmund Glaise von Horstenau; Nr 39548, report

by Colonel Eisner-Bubna to Arz, E.Nr 2243, 19 March 1917.

12. Formerly no

less than five bodies had dabbled in this field: (1) the Military Intelli-

gence section

of the AOK; (2) the KPQ which supervised military news appearing in

the press; (3) the War Ministry's press service; (4) the War Welfare Centre (Kriegs-

rsorgea

mt); and (5) the notorious KU

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 67

13. Alan Wildman,

The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers'

Revolt (March±April 1917) [hereafter The Old Army] (Princeton, 1980) p. 216.

14. Wildman, The

Old Army, p. 347: `this propaganda offensive was blunted by lingering

Germanophobia' (all the more since the first German leaflets proposed that the Tsar

had actually desired peace but had been overthrown with the help of English

intrigue in order to prolong the war).

15. Z.A.B. Zeman

(ed.), Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915±1918: Documents from

the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry (Oxford, 1958), pp. 18±23. Zivin, who had

been sending agents and literature to Russia as well as agitating among Russian

prisoners of war in Austria, was taken on to the pay-roll of the German Foreign

Ministry from August 1916.

16. KA, Armeeoberk

ommando [AOK], Op.Abt, Karton 112, Nr 39793, Ludendorff to

Cramon, 27 March 1918; Wildman, The Old Army, p. 347.

17. See, for example

, one Russian leaflet appealing to memories of the German-Austrian

disaster 50 years earlier at Ko

tz: `Deutsches Volk in O

nigssgra

sterreich!' (KA, AOK

Op.Abt 1917, Karton 117, Nr 41105); and the various examples of Russian propa-

ganda of

late March to early April in the reports of the Austrian liaison officer at

Eastern Command (KA, AOK Verbindungsoffizier Oberost 1917, Karton 3887, Nrs

3907, 3924, 3976, 3986).

18. See the

wooden placard displayed in the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna:

`Soldaten der Deutschen und Oesterreichisch-Ungarischen Armee!', which probably

dates from this period and also urges the enemy to `topple their bloody Kaiser'.

19. Alfred Knox,

With the Russian Army, 1914±1917, 2 vols (London, 1921) II, p. 601.

20. Much of

the framework for the description which follows is clearly set out in an

extensive report by Hasse, the German Intelligence officer attached to the Heeresfront

of Archduke Joseph and head of the propaganda campaign on that sector of the

front: in KA, 11AK Generalstabsabteilung [Gstbs.Abt.] 1918 Propaganda Berichte,

Fasz.448, Pr.2031: `Zusammenfassender Bericht u

tigkeit an der

ber

die Propagandata

Heeresfront GO Erzherzog Joseph seit Beginn' [hereafter Zusammenfassender Bericht],

29 December 1917.

21. KA, AOK

Op.Abt 1917, Karton 113, Nr 40043, Ludendorff to Arz, telegram [t.], 11 April

1917, enclosing guidelines; Wildman, The Old Army, pp. 348±9; Zusammenfassender

Bericht, p. 2; Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (London, 1977) p. 379.

22. Ronge, Kriegs-

und Industriespionage, pp. 269, 275.

23. Indeed, it

was one of the first signs of the approaching campaign when on 27 March

General Ludendorff informed Arz that Oberost was intending to respond to Russian

requests for newspapers and send across the trenches Russkii Vestnik, the German

paper for Russian prisoners of war; Ludendorff suggested that the AOK take similar

measures (see KA, AOK Op.Abt 1917, Karton 112, Nr 39793).

24. KA, AOK

Op.Abt 1917, Karton 113, Nr 40043, AOK to army commands on the

Eastern Front, 11 April 1917.

25. For good

examples of the fraternization see Gala

ntai, Hungary in the First World

War, pp. 228±30, who indicates well the ambivalent attitude of many Austrian com-

manders but

does not place his discussion in the framework of an actual propa-

ganda campaign.

26. Alfred Krauss,

Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage. Erinnerungen und Urteile aus dem Weltkrieg

(Munich, 1920) p. 211; Zusammenfassender Bericht, pp. 3, 19; Ronge, Kriegsspionage,

p. 271. For

a summary of the Easter contacts at the front of the Heeresgruppe Bo

hm-

Ermolli,

see KA, 2nd Army Command [2AK] Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.514, Na Nr 1305.

68 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

27. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

pp. 2±3, 20. For an example of these arguments, see the

leaflet `Soldaty!' in KA, 2AK Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.514, Na Nr 1338.

28. Haus- Hof- und Staatsa

rchiv, Vienna [hereafter HHStA], Politisches Archiv [PA]

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Storck to Czernin, Nr 18802, 20 April 1917.

29. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

pp. 3±4. See OULK, VI: Das Kriegsjahr 1917 (Vienna,

1936) p. 100.

30. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Memorandum by Captain Moritz Fleischmann von

Theissbruck, 8 June 1917 (initialled by Count Czernin).

31. The same

seems to have been true for the 3AK further south. See, for example, the

views of one German Intelligence officer attached to the 3AK: A. Agricola, `Aus dem

Kriegstagebuch eines Nachrichtenoffiziers an der Ostfront', in Wolfgang Foerster

(ed.), KaÈmpfer an vergessenen Fronten (Berlin, 1931) p. 516.

32. KA, 2AK

Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.514, Nr 1576, `Hughes' conversations between Borovica

and Terlecki, and between Ronge and Terlecki, 3 May 1917.

33. KA, AOK

Op.Abt 1917, Karton 116, Nr 40690, Arz to all army commands, 8 May

1917 (draft by Alfred von Waldsta

tten). Compare the recent views of Rauchenstei-

ner, who

very much underestimates Austria-Hungary's own contribution to psycho-

logical warfare

on the Eastern Front: Der Tod des Doppeladlers, p. 442.

34. KA, 2AK

Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.514, [unnumbered], Borovica to Na.Abt AOK Baden

(Hughes), 15 May 1917.

35. Fischer, Germany'

s Aims, pp. 350±1; Wolfgang Steglich, Die Friedenspolitik der Mittel-

maÈchte 1917±18

(Wiesbaden, 1964) pp. 64±6.

36. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Arz to Czernin, Op.Nr 247 Geheim, 27 April 1917;

OULK, VI, p. 213.

37. The guidelines

were as follows: (1) Russia soldiers should demand of their leaders an

armistice of 3±4 weeks, (2) the Central Powers would not mix in Russian internal

affairs, (3) Russia would get a good deal over the Dardanelles and extra-European

questions if it renounced the conquest of Constantinople as an aim, (4) Russia would

gain economic support and no war indemnification; but there would be frontier

rectifications for Germany in Lithuania and Courland, (5) Poland would become a

state. However, the extent to which these guidelines were used in propaganda on the

Eastern Front is debatable: see Steglich, Friedenspolitik, pp. 100±1 and 443 note 248

for some discussion of this subject.

38. See Fischer,

Germany's Aims, pp. 370ff for the Erzberger±Kolyshko talks in Stockholm

and their repercussions. The clash of views between Czernin and the DOHL is well

documented in Steglich, Friedenspolitik, pp. 74ff: on 26 April Czernin publicly

renounced annexation of Russian territory in his organ the Fremdenblatt,but by

the end of the month had been brought round to the idea of `frontier rectifications'

for Germany. Similarly, the DOHL had been persuaded to adopt this more innocu-

ous formula

for the propaganda guidelines by Zimmermann, the German Secretary

of State (p. 83).

39. Their optimism

about complete victory was particularly strong at this time: Deist,

MilitaÈr und

Innenpolitik, pp. 744±6.

40. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Arz to Czernin, Op.geh.Nr 260/I, 8 May, enclosing

Beilage I: Ludendorff to Arz, Ia.Nr.3107 geh.Op., 6 May 1917. It is not clear

which funds or agents Ludendorff is referring to here, but presumably it may

be those of the Foreign Ministry whose `undermining activities' in Russia he

would later acknowledge: see Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia,p.71

note 1.

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 69

41. Wildman, The

Old Army, p. 336.

42. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Arz to Czernin, Op.geh.Nr 260/I, 8 May, enclosing

Beilage I: Ludendorff to Arz, Ia Nr 3107 geh.Op., 6 May 1917.

43. See, for

example, the response by Russian troops in the far south opposite the

Heeresgruppe Mackensen: KA, AOK Op.Abt 1917, Karton 116, Nr 40750/I, Verbin-

dungsoffizier beim

Oberkommando von Mackensen to AOK Op.Abt, N.res.Nr 213,

9 May 1917.

44. OULK, VI,

p. 221.

45. Ronge, Kriegs-

und Industriespionage, pp. 272±3; Wildman, The Old Army, p. 359.

46. Arz von

Straussenburg, Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges 1914±1918 (Vienna, 1924)

p. 151; Kampf

und Sturz der Kaiserreiche (Vienna and Leipzig, 1935) p. 76; Wildman,

The Old Army, p. 360; OULK, VI, pp. 219±21.

47. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Arz to Czernin, Op.Geh.Nr 290, 29 May 1917. Cf. the

words selected for OULK, VI, p. 219.

48. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

pp. 5±6; Ronge, Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 273. GM

Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the General Staff on the Heeresfront of Archduke Joseph,

wrote to Arz on 20 May ± the day after the Russians had so dramatically spurned an

armistice ± that the basis for peace with Russia `has been successfully prepared by our

propaganda' since `to the great dismay of the leading commanders the overwhelm-

ing majority

of Russian divisions are inclining to trust us': HHStA, PA I/1050, Liasse

66a, Storck to Czernin, Nr 19947, 27 May, enclosing Beilage 1: Seeckt to Arz, Nr

1480, 20 May 1917.

49. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Arz to Czernin, Op.Geh. Nr 290, 29 May 1917;

Zusammenfassender Bericht,p.6.

50. See, for

example, HHStA, PA I/1060, Liasse 66a, Waldsta

tten

to Czernin, Op.Geh.Nr

279/1, 16 May 1917, where Waldsta

tten advises that armistice talks need not be

forced since the position of the Central Powers was so favourable. By the end of the

month, Arz was rather more concerned that Russia could still recover and launch an

offensive.

51. For the

revised set of guidelines, see: HHStA, PA I/1050, Liasse 66a, Storck to

Czernin, Nr 19907, 26 May 1917; Czernin had pressed for the formula `frontier

rectifications' to be kept against resistance from Ludendorff: Steglich, Friedenspolitik,

p. 101.

52. Undoubtedly many

Russian soldiers interpreted this vague formula as the same as

annexation anyway: see KA, AOK Op.Abt 1917, Karton 116, Nr 40750/I.

53. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Memorandum by Captain Moritz Fleischmann von

Theissbruck, 8 June 1917.

54. Steglich, Friedensp

olitik, pp. 102, 104±5: Steglich questions the degree to which

Fleischmann's reports can be believed.

55. See Hoffman

n's views, in KA, 2AK Na.Abt 1917, Fasz. 514, Nr 2081, Hoffmann

(Oberost) to DOHL, Heeresgruppe Joseph, etc (Abt 1a Nr 3953/17 geh.), 24 May 1917.

56. See Robert

P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (eds), The Russian Provisional Gov-

ernment 1917.

Documents, 3 vols (Stanford, 1961) II, pp. 1158±9; and the propaganda

guidelines and wireless texts in: HHStA, PA I/1050, Liasse 66a, Waldsta

tten

Czernin, Op.geh.Nr 297/I, 3 June; Op.Geh.Nr 304, 3 June; Arz to Czernin,

Op.Geh.Nr 316, 14 June 1917.

57. OULK, VI,

pp. 223ff.

58. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

p. 6; HHStA, PA I/1060, Waldsta

tten to Czernin,

Op.Geh.Nr 304/I, 15 June 1917 (enclosing the Soviet's message, telegraphed to the

70 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Central Powers

on 10 June); Browder and Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Govern-

ment,

II, pp. 1159±60.

59. See Vladimõ

Klecanda, Bitva u Zborova. Vojensko Historicka

Studie o Bojõ

ch C

eskoslo-

venske

Briga

dy v Halic

i Roku 1917 (Prague, 1927) pp. 16, 151 note 17; OULK, VI,

p. 226. An

upsurge in Russian `counter-propaganda' seems also to be confirmed in

the weekly reports by Hasse, the German Intelligence officer attached to the Heeres-

front of

Archduke Joseph: see KA, 1AK Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.145.

60. Alan Wildman,

The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Road to Soviet Power and

Peace [hereafter The Road to Soviet Power] (Princeton, 1987) pp. 44ff, 73ff.

61. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

pp. 6±7.

62. KA, 2AK

Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.514, Nr 2649, Borovica to Hptm Baier (Hughes), 21 June

1917: enclosing additional propaganda guidelines.

63. See the

map in Beilage 12, OULK, VI.

64. KA, 2AK

Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.514, Nrs 2546, 2453, 2649: the 2AK had hoped to exploit

the Russian 105th Infantry Division [ID] with a band of reliable Ukrainian legion-

aries.

65. Knox, With

the Russian Army, II, p. 633.

66. Felix La

nsky,

`Jizerna-Zborov', in Adolf Zeman (ed.), Cestami Odboje (Jak z

ily a kudy

hly C

Legie), Dõ

l III: Poc

atky Odboje [hereafter Cestami Odboje], (Prague, 1927) p. 86.

67. See Josef

Koha

k, `Ve Zborovskych za

kopech', in Cestami Odboje, III, pp. 77±8.

68. See the

account in OULK, VI, pp. 244±52.

69. See especiall

y Klecanda's comprehensive account, Bitva u Zborova, pp. 31ff;

Zdene

k Tobolka, Politicke

jiny C

eskosloven

ske

ho Na

roda od r.1848 az

do Dnes

nõ

Doby,

4 vols (Prague, 1932±7) IV, pp. 303ff; and for the later legend, Zborov, 1917±1937.

Pama

tnõ

k k Dvaca

mVy

rocõ

Bitvy u Zborova. 2. C

ervence

1917 (Prague, 1937).

70. Zusammenfassender Bericht,p

.7.

71. See, for

example, the leaflet, `Russkim ofitseram i soldatam!' (in KA, 1AK Na.Abt

1917, Fasz.145); and the new propaganda guidelines issued in late July (which

mentioned Lloyd George's speech of 21 July as evidence of Entente imperialism):

HHStA, PA I/1050, Liasse 66a, Arz to Czernin, Op.Nr 43294, 26 July 1917, enclosing a

copy of Ludendorff to Arz, 1a Nr 4050 geh.Op. [undated].

72. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

pp. 10±11.

73. For an

excellent recent summary, see Keith Hitchens, Rumania 1866±1947 (Oxford,

1994) pp. 262ff.

74. KA, 1AK

Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.145, Nr 2519, `Feindlage vor Heeresfront Erzherzog

Joseph' [by Hasse], 1 June 1917: the Bukarester Tagblatt was being distributed.

75. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66c, `Frontpropaganda gegenu

ber

der ruma

nischen Armee,

Juli/August 1917': Nr 6322, Arz to Czernin, Op.Geh.Nr 329/I, 4 July 1917, enclosing

guidelines.

76. Ibid., Czernin

to Esterha

zy [Hungarian Prime Minister], Z.4018, 16 July 1917.

77. Ibid., Nr

7804, Storck to Baron Mittags (telephone), 4 August 1917, with note by

Czernin.

78. KA, 1AK

Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.145, Na Nr 3737, 4 August 1917.

79. Ibid., Na

Nr 5208: on the Heeresfront of Archduke Joseph, the number increased

during September from 35 to over one hundred deserters, and many cited `propa-

ganda' as

the reason for desertion (see also HHStA, PA I/834/8796).

80. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

p. 16. The Austrian official history, while mentioning the

demoralization in both of these corps, does not ascribe particular disasters to their

behaviour.

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 71

81. See Wildman,

The Road to Soviet Power, pp. 92ff for Russian behaviour during the

offensive. He notes (p. 121) that the confusion of these weeks as well as biased

sources makes many units' true behaviour, `the line between myth and reality',

hard to establish.

82. Ronge, Kriegs-

und Industriespionage, p. 299.

83. See, for

example, HHStA, PA I/1050, Liasse 66a, Storck to Czernin, Nr 23605, 14

October 1917: Beilage 1, where AOK draft propaganda guidelines suggested that the

Central Powers had in August voluntarily declined to advance into `the richest

areas of Russia'.

84. OULK, VI,

p. 407.

85. See the

opposition expressed by the commander of the Abschnitt Zloczow [2AK] in

KA, 2AK Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.514, Na Nr 3781, 25 August; and the Heeresgruppe Bo

hm-

Ermolli's

subsequent reluctance `at present' to resume propaganda activity (Nr

3785, 29 August 1917).

86. Ibid., Nr

3735, Borovica to 2AK (Hughes), 24 August 1917.

87. Wildman, The

Road to Soviet Power, p. 240.

88. See the

series of reports from the Heeresfront of Archduke Joseph (KA, 1AK Na.Abt

1917, Fasz.145) by the German Intelligence officer.

89. Leaflet, `Posvias

hchaetsia G-nu Kerenskomu!' (signed `Austrian Social Democrat')

in KA, 1AK Na.Abt 1917, Karton 98.

90. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Storck to Czernin, Nr 23605, 14 October 1917,

enclosing Beilage 1: `Richtlinien fu

die russische Propaganda'.

91. See Fischer,

Germany's Aims, pp. 434ff for the discussions on war aims in October

1917.

92. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, Arz to Czernin, Op.Geh.Nr 413/1, 21 October 1917.

93. KA, AOK

Op.Abt 1917, Karton 139, Nr 47427, Chef des Generalstabes des Feld-

heeres. Abteilung

Fremde Heere (Nr 6384a), 9 November 1917, with Anlage: `U

ber-

sicht u

ber

die Verhandlungen mit russischen und ruma

nischen Divisionen im

Oktober 1917'. According to this very precise survey, the oral contacts opposite

Austrian forces in October were very limited: for the Heeresgruppe Bo

hm-Ermolli

there were talks with only one division on one day, while for the Heeresfront of

Archduke Joseph there were talks at some point with 14 of the 46 divisions opposite

(30 per cent).

94. The text

of Lenin's peace declaration is printed in Appendix I of John Wheeler-

Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace. March 1918 (London, 1963) pp. 375±8.

95. Zusammenfassender Bericht,p

.9.

96. Zeman, Germany

and the Revolution in Russia, p. 75.

97. HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66a, AOK to Czernin, Op.Geh.435, 23 November 1917.

These new propaganda guidelines particularly singled out rumours that Japan

would declare war on Russia if the latter made a separate peace; these were to be

dismissed by the propagandists as yet more evidence of English lies. Almost iden-

tical guideline

s were sent to Germany's troops by Oberost: KA, 2AK Na.Abt 1917,

Fasz.514/5100.

98. Zusammenfassender Bericht,

p. 17.

99. Wildman, The

Road to Soviet Power, pp. 386±8.

100. It

remains, however, difficult to generalize too far in view of the varied response

within the different Russian corps; see for example the mixture of views within the

Russian 4th, 9th and 8th armies in early December: KA, 1AK Na.Abt 1917, Fasz.145,

Na Nr 7080.

72 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

101. Leaflet,

`Vsem!', signed by Trotsky, in KA, 1AK Na.Abt 1917, Karton 98 [appeared

3 December].

102. The

Austrians did make a few sporadic attempts at propaganda among the Russians

during this period, but were principally vigilant against Bolshevik machinations:

see the few examples of Austrian propaganda in January 1918 in KA, VI KK 1918,

Fasz.203.

103. Wildman,

The Road to Soviet Power, p. 384; HHStA, PA I/1050, Liasse 66a, AOK to

Czernin, Op.Geh.435, 23 November 1917; OULK, VI, p. 730.

104. Wolfdiet

er Bihl, O

sse von Brest-Litovsk (Vienna,

sterreich-Un

garn und die Friedensschlu

Cologne and Graz, 1970) p. 31; Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, p. 90.

105. Notably his article in Pravda on 11 May 1917: reproduced in Browder and Kerensky,

The Russian Provisional Government, II, p. 904.

106. See

Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia

1917±18 (Liverpool, 1979) chapters 1±3; and for a summary of the Bolshevik per-

spective: Robert

Service, Lenin: a Political Life, Volume 2, Worlds in Collision (Mac-

millan, 1991)

pp. 293±7.

107. When

Max Ronge took over as head of Austro-Hungarian military Intelligence in

April 1917 he had totally separated the defensive and offensive activity conducted

by the Intelligence Service.

108. Ronge,

Kriegs- und Industriespionage, pp. 327ff; Bihl, O

sterreich-Ungarn, pp. 33±4.

109. See

the views of some Hungarian letter-writers, picked up by the censor in Buda-

pest, about

events in Russia in 1917±18 in: Ga

bor Sa

ndorne

, `Az oroszorsza

forradalmi mozgalmak visszhangja a magyar dolgozo

hadifoglyokhoz õ

rt levelei-

ben', Pa

rtto

rte

neti

zleme

nyek, no. 2 (1958) pp. 136±44.

110. Franz Kreuz to his Italian captors: quoted in Ljudevit Pivko, Informatorji [vol. 2 of

Rame ob Ramenu] (Maribor, 1925) p. 32.

111. See, for example, the comments of a British officer present in Russia in late 1917:

E.P. Stebbing, From

Czar to Bolshevik (London, 1918) p. vi.

112. Ronge, Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 269.

113. Zusammenfassender Bericht, p. 18: ten were killed (including one German officer)

and 139

taken prisoner (including 28 Austrian officers and one German officer); a

further 13 personnel had been seriously wounded.

114. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.448, Pr.2030, AOK Op.Nr 766/21: `Die Propaganda-

verha

ltnisse

an der russ.Front im Vergleiche zu jenen an der ital.Front' [undated,

early February 1918].

115. Zusammen

fassender Bericht, p. 18.

116. See,

for example, the measured comments of Erich Ludendorff: My War Memories

1914±1918, I, p. 382.

117.

Zusammen

fassender Bericht, pp. 9±10, 13. The propagandists never seem to have

considered how far the Russian troops were literate.

118. See

Petar Opac

, `Solunski Front 1917.godine', in Slavenko Terzic

(ed.), Srbija 1917.

Godine. Nauc

ni Skup (Belgrade, 1988) pp. 144ff: the thousand included a hundred

officers dead or incapacitated.

120. HHStA,

PA I/1050, Liasse 66b (`Frontpropaganda gegenu

119. This

officers' plot led to the subsequent trial and execution ( June 1917) of Colonel

Dragutin Dimitrijevic

(`Apis'), former head of Serbian military Intelligence and

leading light of the Serbian terrorist group The Black Hand.

ber der serbischen Armee

Juli 1917±Sept 1918'): 6208, Arz to GFM Beneckendorf und von Hindenburg,

Op.Geh.Nr 319, 19 June 1917.

The Experience of Propaganda against Russia 73

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.,

Ludendorff to Cramon, t.3693 geh.Op., 26 June 1917.

123. Ibid.,

Arz to General von Scholtz, Na Nr 9316, 29 June; 6270, Storck to Czernin,

Nr 20958, 4 July 1917, enclosing `Richtlinien' for Serbian propaganda material.

124. See

Hugo Kerchnawe, `Die k.u.k. Milita

rverwaltung in Serbien', in Hugo Kerchnawe

(ed.), Die MilitaÈrverwaltung in

den von o

sterreichisch-ungarischen Truppen besetzten

Gebieten (Vienna, 1928) pp. 250±3.

125. HHStA,

PAI/1050, Liaise 66b, 8939, Storck to Czernin, Nr 22886, 17 September,

enclosing report by Max Ronge: `Serbische Propaganda. Re

sume

bis 8 September

1917', Na Nr 14289, 9 September 1917.

126. The

first signs of this came only in November 1917 when Croat patrols were actu-

ally informed

that the Serbian army was fighting for the unification of all Serbs,

Croats and Slovenes: see the leaflet in ibid., 11314, Storck to Czernin, Nr 24451,

21 November 1917.

127. See

KA, AOK Op.Abt 1917, Karton 136, Nr 46279, Arz to Stipetic

(t.), 12 October;

Nr 46981, AOK to Chef des Ersatzwesens (t.), 3 November 1917.

128. See

KA, AOK Op.Abt 1917, Karton 138, Nr 47075. The Bulgarian dimension is an

area for future research. In November 1917, a plan by the AOK to launch a further

campaign against Greek troops was felt by Ludendorff to be pointless in view of

the notoriously bad relationship between Greeks and Bulgarians (see HHStA, PA

I/1050, Liasse 66e: `Frontpropaganda gegenu

ber

griechischen Truppen, Oktober

1917).

129. Public Records Office, London [PRO], War Office [WO] 106/1384, Memorandum

on the Serbian situation by MI2(a), 28 June 1918.

130. KA, EvB 1918, Fasz.5756, Nr 23596, MGG/S to AOK (Na.Abt), 30 July 1918: report

about the Serbian Intelligence service, p. 43.

131. Ronge,

Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 302; Kerchnawe, `Die k.u.k. Milita

rverwal-

tung', p.

253. Assessing the actual reasons for the Serbian desertions is, of course,

far from easy. January 1918 witnessed an unprecedented number of Serbian deser-

tions to

the enemy (20), but the Serbian High Command attributed these to `events

in Russia' (see Dragoslav Jankovic

and Bogdan Krizman (eds), Gradja o Stvaranju

Jugoslavenske Drz

ave, 2 vols (Belgrade, 1964) I, document 97, p. 126).