Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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404 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

287. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, pp. 323±5. These were Austrian naval officers who in April

had taken part in a raid on Ancona and been captured.

288. See

KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.446, Fd.Ev.Nr 1086, VI KK to 11AK, t.zu Na Nr 704/5,

5 July; KA, 6AK Qu.Abt 1918, Fasz.3, Qu.Op.Nr 60799/1b, 6AK Qu.Abt to all district

commands, etc., July 1918.

289. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 185±8 for a discussion of S

marda; Marchetti, `Un tragico

Episodio', p. 156.

290. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.447, Fd.Ev.Nr 1346, 10AK propaganda report for

July: small Czech dictionaries were also deposited with certain letters mysteriously

underlined.

291. Pivko,

DRUP, pp. 27±33, 72±4.

292. See,

for example, Pivko, DRUP, pp. 46±7; Logaj, C

eskoslovenske

Legie, p. 106.

SNR-S293. See

VHA, Fond C

tefa

nik, Karton 1, 34/2/17, Rudolf Gabris

to S

tefa

nik, 29 July;

eba to S35/3/3, S

tefa

nik, 4 June 1918.

294. For

example, the cases of a Czech, Franz Rozsypal, and a Slovak, Georg Illuschak

(the names germanized) who deserted from Dosso Cassina on 16 September as they

did not want to fight against their `fatherland' and longed for their families: KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.442, Na Nr 1674. Illuschak stressed to his captors that Slovaks

in particular had not wanted to enter the Legion, something which the Austrians

sensed from other captured legionaries as well. See the statement (Na Nr 1725) of a

captured Slovak, Martin Badinka, who allegedly deserted back to Austria, and told

of Czech bullying of the Slovaks; the 11AK on 6 October 1918 noted for the AOK

that the actual `reality' of Czech±Slovak fraternity might be usefully publicized in

the Austro-Hungarian press.

295. PRO,

AIR 1/2296/209/77/20, Supreme War Council: Italian section to French,

British and American sections, no. 3571, 7 August; Pivko, DRUP, pp. 67±8.

296. Pivko,

DRUP, pp. 38, 86. See the concerns expressed at the time by Marchetti (p. 25)

and Smaniotto (pp. 59ff).

297. Pivko,

DRUP, pp. 71±91. Finzi's memoirs make no mention of D.R.U.P.

298. Pivko,

DRUP, pp. 91±2. For Ruziak, see: KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.442, Na Nr 1493;

KA, AOK Op.Abt, Fasz.381, Op.Nr 114127.

299. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 218±23.

300. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, p. 379.

301. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 316±24 for the mission of Rudolf S

rka. Similar missions

from the 7th and 8th army fronts were unsuccessful: pp. 156±7, 299±300. The

claims made by the Czech-American Emanuel Voska about his role in such mis-

sions are

unsubstantiated from other sources and probably exaggerated: Emanuel

Voska and Will Irwin, Spy and Counterspy: The Autobiography of a Masterspy (London,

1941) pp. 234±40. Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 128, certainly overrate

Voska's importance.

302. For

details of dropping agents, see especially Captain Wedgwood Benn, In the Side

Shows (London, 1919) pp. 278ff; and PRO WO 106/1550, C.H. Mitchell report on

the Intelligence service in Italy, 30 May 1919, pp. 111±13; Pivko, DRUP, p. 24, notes

the dispatch of a Croat agent as well.

303. See

KA, 6AK 1918, Fasz.16, Na Nrs 2797, 2857, 4159, 4553, 4601, 4847, for Austrian

discoveries and counter-measures.

304. BL,

Northcliffe MSS, vol. X, Add.Mss 62162, Steed's comments at the 8th and 12th

EPD Committee meetings.

305. Finzi,

`I.T.O.', p. 268.

Disintegration

9.1 The failure of patriotic instruction

As the end of hostilities appeared on the horizon in October 1918, one Austrian

commander in the Tyrol observed that while the enemy in its propaganda was

exploiting what was happening in the Austro-Hungarian hinterland, what

was far more dangerous for army morale was the wretched reality of what was

actually occurring there.

It might be seen as a repetition of what had happened

in Russia a year earlier. Then, the AOK had viewed Russia's domestic chaos as a

crucial element in undermining the cohesion of the Russian armed forces,

enabling the Central Powers' propaganda campaign to play its part in main-

taining a

close interaction between front and hinterland. In the autumn of

1918, the same process was at work in the Habsburg Empire with the mood of

front and hinterland often mirroring each other, and being reflected in turn in

the themes of Italy's psychological offensive. Although the Austrian comman-

ders until

the very end tended to see the hinterland as the source of most evils,

infecting their otherwise blameless and reliable forces, any such attempt to

delimit military and civilian spheres, or indeed to suggest that the `poison'

was only acting in one direction, was highly questionable by August 1918.

Rather, the final months of the war witnessed an interaction, with ideas not

only flowing into the war zone, but a mass desertion into the interior by troops

who passed on their experiences (and their perceptions of the enemy) to friends

and relatives.

In these

circumstances it could not be said that the armed forces were stand-

ing firm

on the Italian Front, even though most military reports gave that

impression, fuelling a widespread myth in the postwar years about the army's

wartime loyalty. A steady weakening of the troops was occurring, sometimes

imperceptible, but usually evident in the way that divisional conditions were

described. In the face of major material deficiencies which could not be allevi-

ated, the

AOK still vainly tried to maintain `patriotic instruction' in these

405

406 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

months, while at the same time launching a last propaganda offensive at the

Italians. If these moves seemed to indicate that the military leaders were stoical

to the end, the purpose of both of them was now largely defensive, with the

final propaganda gasp against Italy aiming principally to secure peace before

the army disintegrated. The Habsburg Empire therefore fought a last propa-

ganda duel.

Then its troops, responding to rumours of chaos in the interior

which were echoed in Padua's manifestos, began to mutiny and retreat before

the Italian army.

All historians

agree that the morale of the Austrian army never recovered

after the battle of the Piave. One divisional commander spoke for many when

in mid-July he observed `on all sides, regardless of nationality, rank or intelli-

gence, a

mental and physical depression'.

The defeat left the troops feeling

perpetually inferior to the Italians in their artillery and in the air. And the

demoralization was sustained over the summer by news of Germany's retreat

in the West, the growing national polarization in the Monarchy and, most

significantly, by an unabated material crisis in the war zone. It was notably the

latter which led General Arz in mid-August to call on his German ally to end the

war as soon as possible for, he predicted, the army could not survive beyond

December. The food crisis was hardly alleviated, for the harvests in Hungary

and Romania had been poor and the grain from Ukraine still remained an

illusion, leading by late August to a critical few weeks in the 11AK sector. It

was exacerbated by a clothing crisis which in turn fed illness and disease, and

by increasing burdens on an army which was consistently short of manpower.

From 1 July to 1 October the army on the Italian Front (in the front and rear

lines) shrank from 650 000 to 400 000, largely due to illness or desertion.

The combined effect of these demoralizing factors can be illustrated through

a series of reports which were made by AOK officers who visited various corps at

the front in the final months. When Captain Bauer surveyed the XV corps

(11th army) in early August, he found the troops in the isolated mountainous

terrain in an exhausted condition. Undernourishment was commonplace so

that a man's average weight in one division was 50 kg; the corps doctor

predicted that nearly half of those aged 19 to 21 would get tuberculosis. Bauer

observed that the younger soldiers in particular were tolerating the physical

and psychological hardships less well: `In some sectors there are almost

daily desertions. In most cases the reason for this is to be found not in treason-

able or

political tendencies but in the bad food conditions and general war-

weariness.'

A month later, when Captain Ge

za Schwarz visited the VII corps on the

Lower Piave, he discovered a section of the front which was weakly manned

(reminding him of the Eastern Front), where enemy aircraft constantly

swarmed over the positions. If there were the usual complaints about food

(the lack of meat, the hatred of dried vegetables), the absence of clothing was

Disintegration 407

particularly alarming, feeding a dramatic increase in malaria, dysentery and

influenza:

I saw

young officers with thin shirts which they will have to wear during the

winter as they are not entitled to any more uniforms until the spring. I also

saw men with totally ripped shirts and even some without shirts! Even the

washing of uniforms has to be strictly limited so that their material does not

become worn out.

It was an everyday crisis. While some troops were returning from hospital in the

rear with little bodily protection at all, a clothing survey on the mountain front

had found that hundreds of troops lacked boots or underwear. In one regiment,

for instance, 800 men were without boots and 400 without an undergarment.

When another AOK officer inspected the XX corps (10th army) he too noted

the clothing shortage and the small rations which were insufficient at such a

high altitude. But he gave an extra slant to his report:

Enthusiasm for

the war is completely missing. Most of the men are apa-

thetic, but

they will fulfil their duty bravely and unflaggingly, and will

according to their commanders hold out for another year or longer if it

is demanded. The longing for peace is widespread . . . [Morale is especially

affected] by conditions in the hinterland. Again and again one hears com-

plaints among

the officers or in the ranks about the total disorganization of

the hinterland and the inability of the government to remedy the economic

and political misery. Efforts of the company commanders to put heart into

the ranks by patriotic instruction are unsuccessful largely because of news

which they receive from the hinterland or the impressions which they bring

back from their time on leave.

These themes were steadily repeated in other reports which the AOK was

receiving by October.

The constant impression was of an army which was

maintaining its discipline, was regularly reported to be reliable by its com-

manders, but

was nevertheless in a deep depression due to the food crisis and

concern about the hinterland. In early October, after Bulgaria had collapsed

and asked for an armistice, a new element was creeping into the reports. As FM

Krobatin noted on 6 October, those who were intelligent were increasingly

concerned about the future of the state and whether all the sacrifices had

been in vain. Their lack of confidence in the face of the enemy was now

accompanied by increased anxiety about their own future.

Krobatin's report, like so many others, implied that the troops were generally

kaisertreu and reliable. Yet other evidence flew in the face of such a judgement,

suggesting as usual that many commanders were concerned not to besmirch

408 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

the name of their regiments, or were simply determined to make the best of a

pessimistic situation. Most notably, there was the steady increase in desertion

which must have been apparent to all. Krobatin himself had discussed this issue

in a lengthy report on 10 September to Archduke Joseph, who had succeeded

Conrad as commander of troops in the Tyrol. He indicated as the key reasons

for desertion, first the effect of the hinterland (war-weariness and nationalist

agitation) and second the permanent food and clothing crisis, two evils which

he felt to be stimulated and nurtured by `enemy propaganda'.

Krobatin could

rightly assume that the propaganda stemming from Italy was causing a steady

trickle of deserters across the front; for those few who had openly idealistic

motives, there were many more who responded to the Italians' allurement out

of largely material reasons.

Yet, as is clear from 11AK statistics for September

1918, the bulk of desertions in the final months was not to the enemy but in

the direction of the hinterland (Table 9.1).

These figures

cannot be taken as wholly reliable, but they enable certain

conclusions to be drawn. They show that the number of deserters to the

enemy from the Tyrol was steady but still moderate a month before the col-

lapse; and

that Czechs tended to form the largest percentage of that number.

They also reveal, not surprisingly, that the hinterland was the chief destination

for those who refused to fight any longer. Here, however, the figures concealed

a more alarming picture about the hundreds if not thousands of soldiers who

were exceeding their leave and making a decision not to return to their units.

Their number by the autumn has been set as high as 250 000, roughly the same

as the number of troops actually serving in the front line in the south-west.

Table 9.1 Desertions from the Austrian 11th Army, 1±30 September 1918

Direction Nationality* Total

Cz P R

M G U Sk Sl Cr S-Cr Other

Enemy 4 2 4 3 ± 1 1 ± ± ± 8 23

Probably to

enemy 3 1 ± ± 1 ± ± ± ± ± 1 6

Hinterland 6 7 2 8 15 ± ± 5 2 1 9 55

Probably to

hinterland 3 2 ± 1 5 ± ± ± ± ± ± 11

Unknown 2 ± ± ± 4 ± ± ± ± ± ± 6

Total 18 12 6 12 25 1 1 5 2 1 18 101

Total who

deserted to 55 15 11 7 11 11 ± 16 5



2 ± 133

enemy from

HGK**

Notes:

* Cz (Czech),

P (Polish), R (Romanian), M (Magyar), G (German), U (Ukrainian; Ruthene), Sk

(Slovak), Sl (Slovene), Cr (Croat) S-Cr (Serbo-Croat: sic).

** These were

the figures supplied by the Heeresgruppekommando of Archduke Joseph for September:

i.e. its figures

for the 10th and 11th army sectors.



Includes one soldier specified as a `Dalmatian'.

Disintegration 409

In view of this, the fact that there were no open mutinies at the front until

late October simply suggests that a certain cohesion and discipline was being

maintained in the front line, but not that the army as a whole was `standing

firm'. The real warning signs over the summer had been the increasing dis-

turbances in

march-formations bound for the front; in one incident in Galicia,

550 soldiers had deserted from a train heading towards the Italian theatre. By

October, the number of instances of insubordination was rising in the rear of

the war zone itself. One can also question the commanders' assurances of

reliability, that their troops would `fulfil their duty bravely and unflaggingly'.

The propagandists in Italy felt that the fruit of their efforts might not be

immediately clear, but that the `yeast was fermenting' and would eventually

produce a reaction during the next offensive if not earlier. It is impossible to

judge how many units had been infected by October, but there are sufficient

hints, not least the behaviour of troops during the final offensive, to show that

a hidden fermentation was occurring. More and more units, with an eye on the

hinterland, were certainly developing a particularist or `national' outlook

which was wholly at odds with any efforts by their commanders to instil in

them patriotic instruction.

This was not for want of any commitment by the FAst or the Unterrichtsoffi-

ziere in

the armed forces for, ironically, the last four months of the war were the

high point of patriotic instruction. In July, the AOK, on the advice of the FAst

leaders, and referring to Germany and Russia as notable examples of success

and failure in this regard, had urged the armies to build up their instruction

network.

Egon von Waldsta

tten and his new deputy, Major Eugen von

berth,

proceeded energetically with new initiatives.

They organized over

the summer another three training courses in Vienna (the last one in late

September to train a reserve of suitable instructors); they issued a range of

patriotic material including a regular package of information for instructors

known as the VaterlaÈndische Bildungsarbeit; they tried to stifle unpatriotic news-

papers and

warn of subversives in the hinterland; and they even experimented

with a competition whereby a prize of 200 crowns would be awarded to the best

lecture submitted on a patriotic theme.

It was very much part of Waldsta

tten's thinking to encourage the flow of

ideas and suggestions around the `network'. Indeed, the impetus to advance

patriotic instruction after the June offensive had come as much from FA per-

sonnel themselves

as from the centre in Vienna. The 6AK Unterrichtsreferent was

typical, writing on 6 July that a full organization was now being created in the

army sector with all divisions having their own Unterrichtsoffiziere. They were

beginning to visit the men, enjoying their trust through acting as spokesmen

for their material concerns, while warning them about the content of enemy

manifestos; the only problems, the Referent noted, were the damaging rumours

from the hinterland and the lack of sufficient patriotic reading.

Some instruc-

410 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

tors were able to compensate for the latter by producing their own material, but

for most of them the same problems would persist until the end. This is clear

from two examples. In mid-August Dr Karl Luka

cs, the Unterrichtsoffizier of the

half-Czech 12SchD, reported to the FAst that although he had been using FA

material in his work and was about to tell the troops about the fate of the

deserter Alois S

torch, he was hampered by a paper shortage and could not

reproduce FA leaflets for distribution. While everyday, thousands of enemy

manifestos were being brought in (for a reward of ten heller per leaflet), the

division was receiving few leaflets from the FAst: `How good it would be to

have, here and there, a few uplifting words, a few historic maxims from our

great statesmen and writers to distribute in thousands of copies to the officers

and men!'

A similar report, which illustrated the fierce competition of ideas at the front,

came to the FAst in September from the 6ID, a division with a strong

Slovene element. The divisional commander wrote that the Slovene newspaper

Straz

a had just been banned since its anti-German articles were on a par with

the arguments of enemy manifestos. He appealed for more material in

Slovene, which would emphasize Slovene loyalty to the Habsburgs on the one

hand, and the danger which Italy and southern Slav unity posed to Slovene

security on the other. In this case, as in that of the 12SchD, the FAst was

unable to provide sufficient literature because of the Monarchy's paper shortage

(at less than 40 per cent of its prewar production), while other ideas were

reaching the troops from the domestic press or enemy leaflets. One can

argue in fact that the FA local instructors were sometimes left too much to

their own devices, with insufficient guidance from the centre. And this was not

only apparent in the paucity of material. The FAst, for example, would

later criticize the 6ID Unterrichtsoffizier for the lectures which he delivered

in Slovene, for they exaggerated Slovene Catholic feeling to the detriment of

any Protestants who might be listening.

The incident is testament to

the instructors' persistent dilemma of how precisely to engage with each

nationality.

In terms

of the basic arguments which the FAst centre supplied to the net-

work, it

is true that they were quite successful in challenging many of the

presumptions behind Padua's manifestos. But at their core, when discussing

the Monarchy's future, they came far too late to compete with the reality of

what was happening in the hinterland. On 13 July at the War Ministry, at a

meeting between military and civilian ministries to discuss FA work, it had been

agreed that the FAst, the Foreign Ministry and the KPQ would coordinate their

propaganda work more closely, so that similar arguments would be exchanged

and circulated.

It was a rare example of closer liaison between the Austrian

authorities in the battle of ideas. For the FAst, a key theme in its material was to

attack the enemy's claim of superior morality, that they were standing for

Disintegration 411

`culture and humanity' against the militarism and oppression of the Central

Powers. For the reality was the exact opposite. It was not Germany which was

militaristic but America, ruled by the dictator President Wilson, which, as

enemy manifestos showed, was steadily building up its armaments. It was not

Germany which was striving for world domination but Great Britain which

already dominated 80 per cent of the earth. It was the Allies who were the real

barbarians: witness the Americans who lynched their Blacks; the Italians who

maltreated Austrian prisoners and forced them to fight against their own

fatherland; and the English who liked killing for sport and still maintained

flogging as a punishment in their army.

That the Allies were prepared to stoop

to any unscrupulous methods to achieve their imperialist ends was verified by

their implication in seven major murders during the war!

As for the Allied

slogan of self-determination for the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the FA officers

could present this with some justification as hypocritical and insincere. It was

only too evident from the Corriere campaign against Sonnino in late August

that Italy did not really believe in self-determination for the South Slavs but was

simply using them as a means to fulfil imperialist ambitions. It was also `clear',

though the FAst had far fewer arguments to hand, that Italy was using the

Czechs simply as cannon-fodder. The English too were complete hypocrites

who would never apply self-determination to Ireland or India. Rather, for the

Allies, the idealistic slogan was a way to destroy the Monarchy, and faced with

this aggression the Austro-Hungarian army had to continue its defensive war

until an honourable peace was secured.

It was when the FA officers turned from attacking the enemy to defending

the position and character of Austria-Hungary that their arguments looked

decidedly weak. As they repeatedly reminded their superiors, they could not

compete with the food crisis or the domestic turmoil which was publicized in

the daily press. Their patriotic instruction was only offering a defence of the old

Imperial system, emphasizing in particular the advantages of living in a large

state, the `national and cultural freedom' which allegedly existed, and the

unviability of small nation-states. They themselves offered no viable alternative

solution to the South Slav, Polish or Czech questions, not only because they

had none (since none of the issues had been resolved politically), but because it

remained a principle of the instruction never to engage in any political discus-

sion which

might introduce politics into the army. This gave the instruction an

air of unreality when it was conducted against the background of a radicalized

hinterland which seemed fully in tune with enemy propaganda. In the same

way, the FA personnel, for all their personal contact with their pupils, could not

fight the reality of the shattering defeat in June, the food and material crisis, or

the increasingly gloomy military situation on the Western and Balkan Fronts.

They might claim optimistically that all was not lost, that as in previous years

there could be a sudden change of fortune, but such claims were increasingly at

412 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

variance with the truth about an Empire which could not fight for much

longer.

When in late September Bulgaria collapsed, and the Central Powers (on 4

October) made a joint peace offer to America on the basis of Wilson's `Fourteen

Points', the possibility of defeat dawned on many in Austria-Hungary for the

first time. The AOK's position was clear. Admitting finally that the front could

not be hermetically sealed from the hinterland, they sent out a special directive

for use in patriotic instruction. The key theme of the directive was that the

troops should keep calm and stand firm until an honourable peace was

achieved. Wilson's `formula' might well be a basis for peace, but it was accept-

able only

so far as it did not endanger the vital interests of the Monarchy. It was

also to be acknowledged at last (the AOK in its own words no longer favoured

an `ostrich policy'), that a big transformation was occurring in the Empire. But

while Austria-Hungary would certainly have a different character after the war,

it would also definitely preserve its unity and be the entity for which the armed

forces had fought from the beginning. To avoid the kind of anarchy which had

occurred in Russia was vital, all the more so as the soldiers would thereby be

preserving some security for their loved ones at home.

The FA officers at the front seem to have energetically pursued these themes

in the final month of the war, spurred on by the FAst to hold fast at `this critical

moment'. Waldsta

tten instructed the network that, since events were moving

so quickly, they would need to use their own initiative even more, adapting

material as required and being constantly flexible.

It might be viewed as a

final positive and realistic approach under the circumstances. What was clear,

however, was that the subjects of their instruction were every day vacillating

more in their allegiance, under the impression of what was happening in the

hinterland. On 23 October, on the eve of Italy's last offensive, KISA's Unter-

richtsreferent was

quite candid about the obstacles faced by his subordinates.

After the collapse of Bulgaria all were convinced that victory was impossible

and that little was to be gained by fighting any longer. The troops might still be

under control, but the ideological challenge from the hinterland was mounting

daily:

Since the

national consciousness of all peoples of the Monarchy, even the

Germans, has not only come to the fore but can be openly displayed, we are

bound to face up to the threat from our newspapers and the links which exist

between front and hinterland (which cannot be broken now). On top of this,

there is general dissatisfaction, anxiety about life at home, the inadequate

food made less palatable by the absence of fat, and the lack of clothes and

undergarments: blatant facts which can only accelerate the process of disin-

tegration .

. . If before the start of the armistice we are to avoid and prevent

the catastrophe of our army facing a similar fate to that of the Russian

Disintegration 413

army . . . the authorities will have to behave and make decisions unreservedly

according to the spirit of the times [Zeitgeist]. There would be the most awful

consequences for those responsible if they closed their eyes to the nationalist

movements or tried to postpone taking decisions connected with the

[army's] dissolution.

If the FA network was finally being forced to bow to the realities of the

hinterland, it revealed all the more starkly that in the previous years neither

the military or political authorities had coordinated any effective patriotic

instruction in Austro-Hungarian society as a whole. As we have seen, the

official work of the KPQ and the KA had been limited in scope, and probably

most effective (if at all) in the German-Austrian regions of the Monarchy. As for

non-official patriotic initiatives by individuals or various groups in society, they

had steadily been eclipsed, more quickly in some regions than others, by simple

apathy towards the war effort or by nationalist initiatives which had their own

agenda. The celebrations in Prague for the 50th anniversary of the Czech

National Theatre, for instance, were on a scale which pushed into the shade

any pro-Habsburg rallies (such as that by Catholics in Vienna in July 1918).

this environment, the authorities' regular campaigns for war-bond subscriptions

might continue, sometimes with a flourish, as when Habsburg planes threw

out leaflets publicizing war bonds over Croatia in mid-1918 (a counter-propa-

ganda perhaps to Padua's efforts).

But any wider idea of patriotic instruction

was missing and was, arguably, impossible to implement anyway simple

because its ideals could never match the realities on the ground. FA work in

itself had always been envisaged as a strictly military operation, indicating

clearly the military's strong sense of its own sphere of influence which was

separate from the civilian. Thus, in contrast to Britain, Austria-Hungary had no

ministry of information under a Lord Beaverbrook, and in contrast to Italy,

there was no Gallenga Stuart to coordinate propaganda at home and abroad. It

can justifiably be argued as a key weakness of the Monarchy that while from

1917 its enemies abroad were pursuing an effective secondary mobilization in

their societies, in Austria-Hungary a counter-mobilization was allowed to occur.

Many civilians were indeed re-mobilizing, but with a nationalist, socialist or

pacifist agenda of their own, not on behalf of the Habsburg war effort.

In the

face of this, as we have seen, the Austrian military's usual reaction was

negative, to repress or censor wherever possible, a policy which was found to be

inadequate under the constitutional government of 1917±18. There were some

lone voices such as Ludwig Goiginger, commander of the XXIV corps, who

opined that FA work would come to nothing unless there was a `general

propaganda mobilization' of the hinterland. The FAst, in turn, was certainly

pleased when the Catholic episcopacy, or lecturers from the University of

Vienna, offered their services to boost patriotism among soldiers from pulpit