Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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424 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

With its Czech, Polish and Romanian material, the Padua Commission had

always been on surer ground. In the final weeks Ojetti challenged head-on the

suggestion in Austrian propaganda that the Czech Legion was a minor force

made up of individuals who were forced to join, for if such was the case why

had captured legionaries been executed? Why too had the enemy thought it

necessary to launch an attack on the Legion on Dosso Alto in late September?

On that occasion, the Austrians had been given `a good hiding', while the

Legion's exploits had called forth a range of eulogies from Benes

, Masaryk

and the Italian government.

The Czechs could thus be presented in the

manifestos as a fully Allied nation, all the more so as both America and Japan

had given them such a status in early September.

Poles too could be reassured,

from the mouth of Clemenceau himself, that France was determined after

victory to create a free Poland with its historic frontiers.

And Romanians

could finally be told about discussions in the e

migre

community in Paris,

which culminated on 3 October in the formation of a Romanian National

Council dedicated to creating a `greater Romania' at the end of the war.

While trumpeting the Allied principle of `democracy', the manifestos con-

tinued to

labour the themes of Prussian militarism or Austrian imperial auto-

cracy. Material

in Hungarian remained quite ingenious, using the Budapest

press to warn Magyar soldiers that their country faced bankruptcy not due to

the war but because Austrians and Germans were stripping it of funds. Sa

ndor

Peto

fi's

poetic tirade of 1849 against Austria was reproduced in full to indicate

the honourable course which Hungarians should follow.

Similarly, Poles

when told about Germany's plans to exploit and violate Polish soil in the

postwar period, were supplied with the words of the poet Adam Mickiewicz,

`Everyone who does not serve his country will perish'.

But for inspiration

from nationalist contemporaries within the Monarchy, Padua was less well

supplied with information during these final weeks. Perhaps largely due to

the speed of events, little could be said about the various national councils

assuming authority in Zagreb, Prague and elsewhere, and nothing at all about

the Emperor's Manifesto of 16 October which sought to impress the West with

a last-minute federalization of Austria. Most useful for Padua appears to have

been the turbulent session in the Vienna Reichsrat on 2 October, when the

outlook of Max von Hussarek, the Austrian Prime Minister, was effectively

condemned by Slav deputies; the Poles spoke on behalf of the `Polish nation'

to demand an independent Polish state, while for the Czechs Frantis

ek Stane

gave a notorious speech, claiming that the defeat of Austria fully met the wishes

of the Czech people who would be represented separately at the peace confer-

ence. This news, however, was only being distributed from Italian planes

three weeks later, by which time Ojetti was also announcing the full break-up

of the Empire and urging soldiers to hurry home to help their brothers achieve

liberty.

Disintegration 425

Illustration 9.2 Manifesto 352: A poem of Sa

ndor Peto

fi to inspire the Magyars (OHM)

The little material which survives from late October suggests that Ojetti

finally turned on the German-Austrians, the most loyal troops, as a special

target. With a delicious irony, they were told to demand from their officers

that they be shown their own newspapers, so as to read why it was pointless to

fight for something which no longer existed. As proof, Padua reproduced

articles from the Arbeiter-Zeitung showing that nobody believed any longer

426 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

that Austria-Hungary would survive the war; the dynasty, the church, the

common army were now incapable of holding together a state which had lost

the allegiance of its peoples. Recalling the way in which the Habsburg elite in

July 1914 had attacked the Serbians for refusing to submit to an Austrian

judicial investigation on their soil, the newspaper quipped that at the end of

hostilities it was the whole Habsburg Empire which would be subject to a full

investigation at the hands of foreigners.

In a final proclamation, scattered

over the retreating troops, the futility of resistance was driven home:

THE END!

Thoughts of

an Austro-Hungarian soldier.

Wilson has

declared that he cannot recognize the Austro-Hungarian govern-

ment. The

Allies are delivering their last blows to Germany and Austria-

Hungary. Bloody Count Tisza has declared that the war is lost.

Who can

number our enemies? When I look over to the enemy positions I see Italians,

French, English, Americans, Czechs, South Slavs, Romanians, Poles . . . ! Ter-

rible! The

whole world stands opposed to the house of Habsburg, even its

`loyal peoples'! Hungary has declared independence. The Czechs, Poles and

South Slavs have done the same. The Romanians of Austria-Hungary want to

unite with Romania. Even the Germans of Austria have left the disintegrat-

ing Empire

and want to unite with Germany. The Emperor has announced

that Italian territory must be ceded to Italy.

The clergy

are not standing by the state but going with the people. The

Pope has renounced any further help.

I alone

am standing here and allowing myself to be butchered! What for?

Austria-Hungary is lost; there is no point risking my life for a former Empire.

It only remains for me to save my skin.

It was a cry of despair, reflecting fairly accurately the fact that among the

nationalities it was the German-Austrians who, in the face of the Italian offens-

ive, showed

particular `combative spirit'. Slav units were much quicker to

revolt, learning of the news of independence in Prague and Zagreb (which

Ojetti too proclaimed); Hungarians had been called back to Budapest by the

new Ka

rolyi regime there. But German-Austrian soldiers were the most unsure

of what might await them in the future as the other peoples deserted the

Monarchy.

By early November the propaganda organizations of the belligerents were

moving into a phase of liquidation. In Vienna, Waldsta

tten, who until the end

was calling for discipline and order, and hoping that his network might still

have some peacetime educational or welfare role, was ordered by the AOK to

dissolve the FAst.

In London, the British EPD, the organization which Vienna

always believed to be the key centre of `enemy propaganda', also came to an

Disintegration 427

end when Lord Northcliffe quarrelled with Lloyd George and submitted his

resignation. Like Waldsta

tten, Henry Wickham Steed too had been thinking

that his organization at Crewe House might have a peacetime role to play, to

educate the German people about the Allies' ideals, but the folding of the EPD

removed the platform from under him.

Meanwhile on the Italian Front, the machinery of front propaganda had lost

its purpose. Yet even on 27 October the AOK was still sending out `propaganda

concepts' for use against the Italians.

Four days later, with the Austrians suing

for an armistice, Ojetti asked the Comando Supremo for permission to end the

work of the Padua Commission. It was significant, and wholly in keeping with

the impression which he had stamped on the Commission during its six

months of existence, that Ojetti's final leaflet was not aimed at the enemy at

all: it was scattered over the liberated cities of Trento, Trieste and Pula, pro-

claiming to

`brothers of the new Italy' that `in the name of Rome, liberty has

been resurrected on the sacred graves of our dead'. It was a suitable finale to

what Ojetti saw as Italy's mission, something expressed on 1 November when

he gathered the national delegates together for the last time and told them that

their work had been creative as well as destructive; with watery eyes, the group

shook hands and departed. If Ojetti, despite all his frustrations, felt the cam-

paign had

been a success, he was seconded in that view by the CS and the

Intelligence heads.

During the Austrian retreat, the latter had once again

employed their Czech and Yugoslav patrols as guides, interpreters or propagand-

ists, using

their skills as a supplement to more conventional weapons. Many

accompanied the Italian troops as far as Trento or Bolzano. On 4 November,

Cesare Finzi too made the journey northwards over the Asiago plateau, passing

the former enemy trenches, the roads cluttered with Austrian prisoners, in

order to enter liberated Trento. He then returned down Val Sugana and stopped

at Carzano. The site which had opened his eyes to the potential of the propa-

ganda weapon

was now a ghost town and completely silent.

Notes

1. KA, 11AK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.270, 1±17/50±4/9, III KK (GO Martiny) to 11AK, Op.Nr

262/11, 2 October 1918.

2. Karel Pichlõ

`Das Ende der o

sterreichische

sterreichisch-

ungarischen Armee', O

Osthefte, V (1963) p. 363.

3. KA, XIII

KK 1918, Fasz.182, 48ID Kmdo (GM Ga

rtner) to I KK, Op.Nr 707/16, 10 July

1918.

4. OULK, VII,

p. 361.

5. KA, AOK

1918 Op.Akten, Fasz.372, Op.Nr 110531, 13 August 1918.

6. KA, AOK

Op.Abt, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112802, 21 September 1918.

428 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

7. See the

photographs in KA, AOK Op.Akten, Fasz.373, Op.Nr 110848; KA, 11AK

Qu.Abt, Fasz.811, Q.Abt 11AK I.Nr 55105, XXVI KK to 11AK Qu.Abt, 13 August:

the last supply of undergarments had been in May 1918.

8. KA, AOK

Org.Gruppe, Fasz.380, Op.Nr 113801, Report of Hptm Alfred von Marquet

[undated], who visited the XX corps in early September 1918.

9. Hugo Kerchnawe,

Der Zusammenbruch der o

sterr.-ungar. Wehrmacht im Herbst 1918

(Munich, 1921) pp. 21±33.

10. KA, AOK

Org. Gruppe, Fasz.379, Op.Nr 113639, 10AK to HGK Joseph, Op.Nr 8012/1,

6 October 1918.

11. KA, AOK

Op.Akten, Fasz.376, Op.Nr 112195, Krobatin to HGK GO Erzherzog Joseph,

Op.Nr 5495, 10 September 1918.

12. See, for

example, the case in July of BHIR2, where 22 men seem to have deserted

largely to escape their critical material situation: KA, AOK Op.Akten, Fasz.371, Op.Nr

110295, BHIR2 to 55ID Kmdo, Nr 169/1, 23 July 1918.

13. For a

detailed discussion of the phenomenon of desertion in the interior, see

Plaschka, Haselsteiner, Suppan, Innere Front, II, pp. 63ff, 101.

14. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt, Fasz.272, 4±6/12±2, 11AK to corps, Op.Nr 3581, 4 October 1918.

15. See the

view of the 6AK, 29 September, which singled out Czech, Polish and Ruthene

regiments as rather suspect: Kerchnawe, Der Zusammenbruch, pp. 22±3.

16. KA, FAst

1918, Fasz.5994, Res.263, AOK Op.Nr 146335, 19 July 1918.

17. Ho

berth

arrived from KISA on 1 July, and took over from Dus

an Petrovic

who went

to be chief of staff of the 33ID on the Lower Piave. Ho

berth

was later praised by

Waldsta

tten

as being `thoroughly correct and very military in his behaviour' (FAst,

Fasz.5999, Res.987).

18. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5995, Res.441. Separate FA training courses were held in Budapest, on

8±20 July and 29 July±10 August (the lecture titles were much the same as in

Vienna).

19. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5995, Res.330, 6AK to AOK, Op.Nr 900/Ev-4, 6 July; the same urgency

was felt by the 10AK and 11AK: see Res.273/4 and 273/6.

20. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5995, Res.436, 12 rt.SchD Kmdo to FAst, Na Nr 938, 14 August 1918.

21. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5997, Res.645, 6ID Kmdo to FAst, Na.Nr 1507, 11 September. See also

Fasz.5998, Res.726; and Res.792 for FAst criticism.

22. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5994, Res.254, Waldsta

tten to AOK, 18 July, enclosing protocol of

meeting on 13 July 1918.

23. KA, FAst,

Fasz.6003, VaterlaÈndische Bildungsarbeit. Mitteilungen der FAst, Nr 4, pp. 18±19;

Nr 5, pp. 18±21; Nr 6, pp. 20±1; Nr 7, p. 16.

24. Namely, Archduke

Franz Ferdinand, Jean Jaure

s, Roger Casement, Rasputin, Mir-

bach, Eichhorn and Tsar Nicholas II: Fasz.5999, Res.962, 11AK `Beitrag' Nr 8

(F.A.174).

25. KA, FAst,

Fasz.6003, VaterlaÈndische Bildungsarbeit, Nr 2, p. 14; Nr 4, p. 20; Nr 6,

pp. 3±6.

26. Ibid., Nr

2, p. 6; Nr 4, pp. 4±5; Nr 6, Nachtrag p. 2.

27. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5998, Res.825, AOK to FAst, Op.Nr 148428, 8 October 1918, enclosing

guidelines.

28. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5998, Res.869, FAst to FA network, 14 October; Res.875, `Gegenwart-

saufgaben der

vaterla

ndischen Unterrichtes' [drafted by 15 October]. For army

responses: Res.872/1, 6AK to FAst, F.A.Nr 107/1, 14 October; and Res.892, 11AK to

AOK, F.A.Nr 158, 13 October: the 11AK set out various options for `instruction'

depending on whether an armistice was agreed.

Disintegration 429

29. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5998, Res.872/5, FA Referent KISA to FAst, F.A. Nr 169, 23 October

1918.

30. According to

the German ambassador in Vienna, by mid-July two-thirds of the

`Austrian public' assumed that the enemy would win the war: John W. Boyer, Culture

and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897±1918 (Chicago and

London, 1995), p. 438.

31. This incident,

in which Austrian planes distributed leaflets over the town of Vukovar

in Croatia, was mentioned in Padua's manifesto 258, Jugoslavija no. 11.

32. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5994, Res.223, FAst to Apostolische Feldvikariat, 2 July; Plaschka,

Haselsteiner, Suppan, Innere Front, II, pp. 134±5, 140±1.

33. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5995, Res.423, FAst to AOK, 14 August 1918 [drafted by Ernst Keil]. In

mid-September the War Ministry also urged both the Austrian and Hungarian

governments to begin such an action: Fasz.5997, Res.662, KM Pra

Nr 32650, 15

September 1918.

34. `Eine O

sterreichische

Propagandastelle', Reichspost, 25 September 1918, p. 3.

35. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5998, Res.747, Arz to FAst, Op.Nr 147866, 25 September; Res.841,

AOK to Ministry of Interior, Op.Nr 148279, 8 October 1918.

36. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5998, Res.839, Eisner-Bubna (KPQ) to FAst, Adj.Nr 14600, 7 October

1918.

37. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2328, AOK to armies, Op.Nr 766/270,

4 August: `Neue Weisungen fu

die Feindpropaganda gegen Italien'.

38. Propaganda reports

for August in: KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.447, Fd.Ev.Nr 1597, KISA

Op.Nr 8600, Beilage 11; KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.448, Pr.2337, 11AK Beilage 9; KA,

HGK Conrad/Joseph, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/400, 10AK Op.Nr 5771/2 Prop., 28 August

1918.

39. 6AK leaflet,

`Soldati italiani! Nuovamente sono comparsi...' (KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt,

Fasz.448). Only in October would the HGK Joseph produce a leaflet specifically

directed at Czechoslovak legionaries, urging them to return home without fear of

execution; it was a clear change of tactic based on the evidence of one captured

legionary as to what might appeal most to his former comrades (see leaflet, `C

Slova

ci!' in KA, 11AK Fasz.449, Pr.2429; and the statement by Franz Rozsypal in KA,

11AK Fasz.442, Na Nr 1674). Moreover, it was significant for the confusion which

might be generated, that the 11AK also distributed this leaflet to the enemy in Italian.

40. 6AK leaflet,

`La Risposta dei nazionalisti indiani a Roosevelt!' (KA, 11AK, Fasz.448);

see also the 10AK propaganda brochure issued in September, `Inghilterra e le piccoli

nazioni' (ibid.).

41. See 10AK

leaflet, `I successi dell'Italia in tre anni di Guerra italiana'; 6AK leaflet,

`L'Inutilita

della Guerra Italiana'; 10AK leaflet, `La colpa del prolungamento della

guerra e

dell'Inghilterra!' (all in KA, 11AK, Fasz.448). In one newssheet, Lloyd George

was depicted as a man who was fast going senile: Il Piccolo Corriere, 24 July (issued by

the HGK Joseph: KA, HGK Conrad, Fasz.66, Na 400a/404).

42. 6AK leaflet,

`Comunicato ufficiale austriaco del 26 Agosto 1918' (KA, 11AK Fasz.448).

43. 11AK leaflet,

`Come s'inganna il soldato italiano!' (KA, 11AK, Fasz.448, Pr.2004/37).

44. 6AK leaflet,

`Soldati italiani! L'Austria-Ungheria non mai desiderato...' (KA, 11AK,

Fasz.448).

45. Ronge, Kriegs-

und Industriespionage, p. 373.

46. HHStA, PA

I/505, Liasse XLVII/3/26, notes of Buria

n's meeting with the German

Foreign Minister (Paul von Hintze), 5 September; Stephen Buria

n von Rajecz, Austria

in Dissolution (London, 1925) pp. 388±92.

430 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

47. KISA leaflet,

`In alto i cuori, apunta l'alba di pace'; 6AK leaflet, `Soldati italiani!

L'Austria-Ungheria ha fatto ieri...' (both KA, 11AK Fasz.448); 11AK leaflets: `Basta

Sangue' (Fasz.448, Pr.2004/39); `Ancora un inverno in guerra?' (Pr.2004/40).

48. KA, HGK

Conrad/Joseph, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/414, 10AK to HGK Joseph, t. Op.Nr

8138/3 prop., 3 October.

49. Manifesto 375,

`Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci!' (OHM, sz.1434); manifesto 385, `Hodina mõ

dosud neuder

ila' (KA, EvB, Fasz. 5762/33878). See Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie, p. 585.

50. Leaflet, `L'Amer

ica spela la nota pacifista dell'Austria-Ungheria' (KA, 11AK Fasz.452,

`1918 11AK Na. Feindespropaganda'); 6AK leaflet, `Soldati italiani! Il governo ita-

liano ha

respinto la nostra proposta di pace' (KA, 11AK Fasz.448).

51. KA, FAst,

Fasz.5998, Res.863, AOK Na.Abt to Fast etc, Na Nr 22823/P, 10 October:

`Weisungen fu

die Feindpropaganda'.

52. KISA leaflet,

`La pace, sospiro dell'umanita

imminente!' (KA, 11AK Fasz.451,

`Flugzettel III'); 11AK leaflets: `Italiani!' (KA, 11AK Fasz.448, Pr.2004/44); `Le trattat-

ive di

pace iniziate' (Pr.2004/45); `Perche

fate ancora assalti?' (Pr.2004/46).

53. AOK leaflet,

`I Falsari!' (KA, 11AK Fasz.452); leaflet, `Ultime Nuove. La vittoria

dell'unione pacifista al congresso dei socialisti francesi' (OHM, sz.72409); and see

also the draft leaflets in KA, 11AK Fasz.449, Pr.2456, 2460.

54. Manifesto 431,

`Pace orõ

zboiu?'

(Romanian: KA, Flugzettel Sammlung; German:

VHA); Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie, pp. 600, 617: Admiral Thaon di Revel complained to

Orlando about this leaflet.

55. IWM, Wilson

MSS, 28B/11, Cavan to Wilson, 13 October 1918.

56. Kujundz

Lasic

and Szuber all fell ill in October, as did Zanotti-Bianco who had

only moved from Rome to Padua in early September on Ojetti's instruction: Ojetti,

Lettere, pp. 584, 612; Zanotti-Bianco, Carteggio 1906±1918, p. 653.

57. For details

see BL, Northcliffe MSS, vol.X, Add.Mss 62162, minutes of 13th and 14th

EPD Committee meetings.

58. Albertini, Epistolario,

II, no. 876, p. 989, and pp. 1067±8 note 441: Ojetti to Orlando,

16 September 1918.

59. Albertini, Epistolario,

II, no. 879, p. 992; Ojetti, Lettere, pp. 594, 600, 611: Siciliani

was also to be laid low with influenza.

60. On the

opening of Parliament on 3 October, Orlando made a speech recording

Italy's recognition of the movement for independence of the oppressed national-

ities, but

it did not go far enough for Ojetti, who viewed it as `mediocre, nothing

more than rhetoric' (Lettere, p. 598; PRO, FO 371/3228, Rodd to Balfour, t.712,

3 October).

61. PRO, WO

106/852, Cavan to CIGS, 9 September. See also Colonel Repington's talks

with Diaz and Badoglio on the 27th: Repington, The First World War 1914±1918,2

vols (London, 1920) II, pp. 422±5.

62. PRO, WO

106/852, H.B. Walker to CIGS, 25 September 1918.

63. Marchetti, Ventotto

Anni, pp. 380±2, 385.

64. Ibid., p.

386.

65. Finzi, `I.T.O.',

p. 273; AJA, JO 28/48, `Pregled rada'. The usual caution is needed in

evaluating these figures, but the general trend is confirmed by Szuber in his data for

Padua's Polish manifestos: Szuber, Walka o PrzewageÎ DuchowaÎ , p. 147.

66. Ojetti, Lettere,

p. 625. KA, 11AK 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2367, HGK Joseph to 11AK, Na Nr

2000/138, 11 September 1918.

67. Manifesto 411,

Jugoslavija no. 19, 19 October (section in Slovene: AJA, JO 111/4). See

also for Bulgaria's collapse: manifestos 390(a), `Soldati Roma

ni!'

(OHM, sz.1563) and

Disintegration 431

391(a), `Slovenci,

Hrvati in Srbi' (KA, EvB 1918, Fasz. 5762/33878): both with maps

on the reverse; 399, `Bugarska kapitulacija' (ibid.); 404, `Bulharsko pr

ijalo podminky

Dohody' (ibid.). Many others gave the same details (400, 405, 406).

68. For Allenb

y's advance, see manifesto 391(b), `Slovenci, Hrvati in Srbi' with map on

reverse (KA, EvB Fasz.5762/33878); manifesto 401, `Turecka

fronta v Palesty

(VHA); manifesto 408, Polak no. 19, 19 October (AJA, JO 111/4). Other leaflets issued

by the Intelligence offices gave maps showing Allied advances in Palestine and the

Balkans (KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel III').

69. Manifesto 364,

eskosloven

ska

Samostatnost no. 17, 4 October (KA, EvB Fasz.5762/

33878).

zstvõ

Spojencu70. Manifesto 360,

`Vite

u Saint Mihiel' (VHA); manifesto 365, Neamul

Roma

nesc

no. 17, 4 October (KA, EvB Fasz.5762/33878). For American propaganda

against the 35ID (which significantly received no material from the FAst), see Heber

Blankenhorn, Adventures in Propaganda: Letters from an Intelligence Officer in France

(Boston and New York, 1919) pp. 49, 125; Zolta

n Szende, Die Ungarn im Zusammen-

bruch. Feldheer/H

interland (Oldenbourg, 1931) p. 112. For Arz's fears: Zur Geschichte

des Grossen Krieges, p. 280.

71. See, for

example, manifesto 402, `Nove

pora

ky ne

mecke

ve Francii' (OHM, sz.1339);

and for advances in early September: manifesto 336, `Zapadni front. Pregledna karta

bitke u Flandriji i Pikardiji' (IWM, 3(45)/39).

72. Manifesto 425,

Jugoslavija no. 20, 24 October; and 426, Polak no. 20 (both in AJA, JO

111/4).

73. Manifesto 411,

Jugoslavija no. 19: [large headline], `Istoriska izjava talijanske vlade';

manifesto 396, `Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci' (OHM sz.1437; KA, EvB Fasz.5762/33878;

Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, opposite p. 49); manifesto 425, Jugoslavija no. 20.

74. AJA, JO

27/208, Trumbic

to Yugoslav Committee, Washington, 26 October 1918.

Trumbic

in October tried in vain with the aid of the British EPD to achieve the allied

recognition which had been accorded the Czechoslovaks.

75. Tosi, La

Propaganda Italiana, pp. 215ff. It was significant that by December Gallen-

ga's ministry had been absorbed by Sonnino.

76. Manifesto 409,

eskosloven

ska

Samostatnost no. 19, 19 October (AJA, JO 111/4);

manifesto 420, `Poselstvõ

prof.Masaryka c

eskoslovenske

mu vojsku v Italii' (Stuart,

Secrets of Crewe House, opposite p. 177). See Benes

, Sve

tova

lka, III, documents

161±7.

77. Manifesto 376,

`Take

Japonsko uzna

samostatnost c

eskoslovenske

ho na

roda'

(OHM sz.1318); hand-written leaflet [of an Intelligence office], `C

echove

Slova

ci!'

(KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel I').

78. Manifesto 380,

`Polacy! Waz

ne os

wiadczenia w sprawie polskiej' (Szuber, Walka o

PrzewageÎ DuchowaÎ , p. 129).

79. Manifestos 410

and 428, Neamul Roma

nesc

nos.19 and 20 (both in AJA, JO 111/4).

For the background, see Miron Constantinescu and

stefan Pascu (eds), Unification of

the Romanian National State: The Unification of Transylvania with Old Romania (Buchar-

est, 1971)

pp. 138±9.

80. Manifesto 352,

`Magyarok!' (OHM sz.802481); manifesto 370, `Austria-Magiarorsza

boru-adossa

gai' (KA, 11AK Fasz.451, `Flugzettel Unerledigt').

81. Manifesto 363,

Polak no. 17 (KA, EvB, Fasz. 5762/33878); manifesto 426, Polak no. 20

(AJA, JO 111/4).

82. Manifesto 427,

eskosloven

ska

Samostatnost no. 20 (AJA, JO 111/4); manifesto 426,

Polak no. 20. For the full speeches which caused a storm of protest: Stenographische

432 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Protokolle,

IV, 85.Sitzung, pp. 4312, 4315±16. The divergent outlook of individuals in

the Monarchy as peace approached is the subject of my article, `Austria-Hungary' in

H. Cecil and

P. Liddle (eds), At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes and Anxieties at the

Closing of the Great War, 1918 (London, 1998) pp. 285±300.

83. Manifesto 455,

`Soldaten!' (German: VHA; Romanian: OHM sz.1624).

84. Manifesto 487,

sterreichisch-

ungarische Soldaten!' (VHA collection), quoting art-

icles from

the Arbeiter-Zeitung on 11 and 12 October.

85. Tisza made

the statement on 15 October in the Budapest Parliament, and while this

seems to be the only mention in Padua's propaganda, it had already probably had a

major impact on the morale of Hungarian troops. See Glaise-Horstenau, The Collapse

of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, pp. 212±13.

86. Manifesto 492,

`Das Ende!' (VHA); manifesto 486, `Trpe

ti a umõ

rati! Proc

(VHA)

summarized such thoughts for Czechs.

87. See Fritz

Weber, Das Ende der Armee (Leipzig, Vienna and Berlin, 1931) p. 69; PRO,

WO 157/641, DIS no. 328, 31 October 1918: `Morale of prisoners'.

88. KA, FAst

1918, Fasz.5999, Res.969, FAst to AOK/KM, 30 October; Res.988, FAst to

AOK Op.Abt etc., 4 November 1918.

89. Steed, Through

Thirty Years, II, pp. 247±50. On the EPD's peace propaganda, see also

Seton-Watsons, The Making of a New Europe, pp. 315ff.

90. KA, 11AK

Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2470.

91. Ojetti, Lettere

alla Moglie, pp. 633±7, 642; AJA, JO 35/132, Trinajstic

to Trumbic

,12

November, for the outlook of the Yugoslav Committee.

92. Finzi, `I.T.O.',

pp. 280±2. The work of propaganda patrols during the final offensive is

described briefly in Hanzal, SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky; and Pivko, Nas

i Dobrovoljci, pp. 44, 47. Finzi

also (`I.T.O.', p. 277) used some agents for sabotage on the Asiago plateau.

Conclusion

Despite the vast historiography which exists about the First World War, the

phenomenon of front propaganda has remained either unexplored or trapped

amidst a range of myths fashioned on all sides in the 1920s. To investigate such

psychological warfare means not simply to discuss the wielding of a weapon

which by the last year of the war came to be an integral part of each belliger-

ent's armoury. It reveals much about the mentalities on either side of the

front, the hopes and fears which could be aroused in different individuals,

the important interaction between front and hinterland, and the perceptions

and prejudices which existed or evolved between enemies but also between

supposed allies. In the case of Austria-Hungary, by assessing various `national

mentalities', how they were perceived and how the stereotypes matched the

`realities', it is possible to gain a fuller insight into the reasons for the Empire's

disintegration in 1918.

From this

study it is also clear that front propaganda was not the special

preserve of the British or French, as many historians have assumed. On the

contrary, the Central Powers and the Italians were pioneers in various aspects of

the weapon. On the Eastern Front in 1917, it was the Central Powers who

pursued the first fully coordinated campaign of its kind, one which acquired a

mythical reputation due to the way that Russia collapsed. Against Austria-

Hungary in 1918, it was the Italians who were engaged in the most sophist-

icated example

of front propaganda, a campaign which may have been given

focus by British advisers but always retained a solid Italian base and outlook.

With its network of Intelligence centres, its carefully considered arguments and

its sheer methodical production of material, Ugo Ojetti's Padua Commission

might well earn the epitaph supplied by one of its officials as `the greatest

propaganda forge of the world'.

Yet such language should equally instil cau-

tion. One

of the key necessities in evaluating front propaganda is to strip away

the myth ± indeed the propaganda ± surrounding the phenomenon, much of

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