Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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334 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

highlight Italy's nationality policy in the enemy trenches. To this end, he

expected to run an Italian organization, assisted closely by the national deleg-

ates but

with only occasional reference to Allied `advisers'. From the start he

had been irritated by Baker, who seemed to regard himself as something more

than a British adviser. The scale of the irritation can be measured by his gripe to

Albertini that Baker kept his office locked when away from Padua. Baker had

insisted that all facilities be put at his disposal, but then at the Commission had

done nothing but disparage Italy, treating it like `the republic of Guatemala',

alleging that the campaign had been imposed on the Italians by Britain, and

above all encouraging mistrust among the Yugoslav delegates. This had done

some damage to what Ojetti believed to be his generally harmonious relation-

ship with

his balcanici; particularly, he felt it had pushed Jambris

ak to complain

to Delme

-Radcliffe in early June. Therefore it was not surprising in the political

climate of the early summer, with Ojetti himself anxious to clarify Italy's

nationality policy, that he viewed Baker as an obstacle to good Italo-Yugoslav

relations and even suggested that in this way the British were supporting

Sonnino.

Ironically, this was, of course, the very accusation which Baker was levelling

at Ojetti. Baker continued to misinterpret Ojetti's determination to run an

Italian campaign, his caution on the issue of Italo-Yugoslav aspirations, as

proof of his personal support for the Treaty of London. Undoubtedly Baker

confused Ojetti's views with those of Siciliani who was indeed a `Sonnino man'

whom Ojetti himself considered something of a liability.

On the other hand,

Baker's complaints were not unfounded, nor did they result wholly from his

own wounded pride or a certain aloofness. The evidence suggests that the

national delegates were increasingly unhappy at being treated as mere trans-

lators, with

their own writings subject to intensive Italian scrutiny and censor-

ship.

Indeed, it was the excessive level of Italian control which led Jan

Zamorski, the Polish delegate, to quit the Commission from mid-July. Offi-

cially, Zamorski

departed at that time with the purpose of attending the Paris

Congress. But it is clear that the Pole had precise grievances. He had been

informed by the Italians that he had to keep regular office hours in Padua.

For the headstrong Zamorski, who in Baker's words objected to `interference by

any military authority with his work which he does under orders of his National

Committee', it was the last straw. He left in a huff and refused to return until he

could be assured of his own independence; his place was taken by his deputy,

Antoni Szuber. Ojetti seems to have blamed Siciliani but also Zamorski himself

for this `irreparable loss' to the Commission.

In fact the incident was an

outcome which logically developed out of the ill-defined spheres of influence

in Padua, where the national delegates usually had their own agenda and found

Italian and military discipline as irksome as each other. By August, the

Romanian Cotrus was itching to leave too. And in the middle of the month,

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 335

Trumbic

would withdraw Jambris

ak because of deadlock over Italy's attitude to

the issue of Yugoslav volunteers.

In this way the Padua Commission was

becoming a lone Italian instrument, and one where only the more submissive

national delegates would remain.

Crewe House

naturally challenged any such tendency. As Steed had

reminded Albertini in early July, the Commission was supposed to be an

inter-Allied body, set up to propagate the anti-Austrian ideas of those who

alone understood the Austrian mentality, namely the national delegates.

Steed optimistically hoped that that ideal might be achieved if both Baker

and Ojetti could show some spirit of conciliation and collaboration.

But in

the following weeks, Baker's constant complaints suggested that nothing had

changed, while from what the EPD learnt from Albertini and O'Donovan it was

clear that Baker himself, even if he appeared good on paper, was tactless and

inflexible; on 20 July, Seton-Watson noted in his diary `that both Ojetti and

Baker must go'.

In the end Crewe House decided on a more defensive course.

After O'Donovan had failed to arrange a meeting of reconciliation for Baker and

Ojetti, the British simply recalled Baker to London for a month's counselling.

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that Crewe House could only deal

with the problem defensively and at arm's length. An alternative method was

to exploit the aura which had surrounded the EPD since its inception in order

to influence a change in propaganda technique among the Allies. In other

words, the EPD would seek to draw the threads of `Allied propaganda' together

in its hands, using the occasion to put some pressure especially on the Italians.

This was the purpose of the inter-Allied conference on Enemy Propaganda

which Northcliffe convened in London in the middle of August. It was always

undertaken partly in view of Crewe House's anxiety about Italy's ambiguous

policy and Italian exclusiveness at Padua. But in addition there was now pres-

sure for

better Allied coordination from a different quarter, the United States.

From July 1918, the American Committee on Public Information [CPI] which

had previously only had observers in Europe, began to establish itself more

seriously in Allied countries. It appointed James Keeley, former editor of the

Chicago Herald, as director of all CPI propaganda against the enemy, while a

young Harvard lecturer named G.H. Edgell was designated the American deleg-

ate to

the Padua Commission.

The Americans were quite aware that inter-Allied cooperation was in its

infancy. Since the propaganda conferences in Paris and London in March, the

only real development had been the Padua Commission (which had occasion-

ally been

sent some data by the CPI agent in Rome). But the small Allied

committee which Northcliffe's conference in March 1918 had proposed to set

up `to regulate a combined policy on enemy propaganda' had never material-

ized.

One reason was that establishing the centre at Padua had taken pre-

cedence. Another

key reason was that the French since the spring had been

336 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

reorganizing their propaganda machinery, and only by June was A. Klobu-

kowski, the

French envoy to Belgium, appointed to head it. Moreover, Com-

mandant Chaix

who by July was in charge of the Centre d'Action de

Propagande contre l'Ennemi in Paris, displayed an attitude remarkably akin to

Ojetti's in that he wished to run a purely French organization with only a few

Allied advisers.

The upshot was that when James Keeley reached Europe he

reported back to the CPI in Washington:

We expected

to find three organized and working Inter-Allied Propaganda

Boards, one in Paris, one in London and one in Padua, which would be

landmarks in the fields with which we would have to deal and to which we

would immediately designate liaison officers. These boards are ghosts...

This was a slight exaggeration, and all the more so if one compares Allied

propaganda links with the paucity of any substantial coordination among the

Central Powers for their propaganda campaigns. Nor was Keeley quite accurate

in judging that `there is considerable stirring of the ground but no clear and

scientific ploughing'. On the contrary, one might argue that the actual tech-

niques being

used on the Italian Front constituted a major breakthrough in

the field of psychological warfare. Keeley's impressions had the hint of a Steed

before he had visited Italy in the spring. But likewise, the Americans' arrival in

Europe suggested a reinvigoration of what had previously been attempted, with

this time the inter-Allied conference acting as the first step to something new.

The conference

was presided over by Northcliffe himself, whose recovery in

health had undoubtedly accelerated its convening as his name gave weight to

a serious British input. About 40 delegates gathered at Crewe House between

14 and 17 August. The British contingent included Steed, Seton-Watson, Granville

Baker, Campbell Stuart, S.A. Guest, and representatives from military Intelli-

gence; the

French included Klobukowski and the famous propagandist Emil

Haguenin; the Americans arrived under Keeley with four officers of US military

Intelligence. Ironically, it was the Italian delegation which was the weakest.

Northcliffe had hoped that Gallenga himself would attend, but the latter felt

unable to do so due to the political crisis at home and instead, with Orlando's

approval, he delegated the dependable Borgese. More significantly, no Italian

representative came from the Padua Commission (although Gallenga had

thought of designating Siciliani), so that the centre of much inter-Allied ten-

sion had

no real voice. Nor were envoys of the subject peoples present who

might have leant their weight in pressurizing the Italians; Crewe House had

urged Trumbic

and Jambris

ak to attend, but Trumbic

mistakenly continued to

feel that more could be achieved by staying in Italy.

These weaknesses in

representation in London only served to weaken the impact which the confer-

ence could

have upon Italian front propaganda.

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 337

In his opening speech to the conference on 14 August, Northcliffe ran

through the results already believed to have been achieved in the campaign

against Austria-Hungary: they included the mythical `victory' of delaying one

Austrian offensive in April and sabotaging another in June. He then singled out

for attention the crucial connection between effective propaganda and agreed

policy, emphasizing that the time had come for greater Allied coordination in

the campaign against the Central Powers. For this purpose, he suggested that

the conference divide into four committees which would discuss and report on

propaganda policy (the most important aspect), distribution by military and

civil means, propaganda material, and prisoners of war.

As far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, the decisions on 15 August of the

policy committee were by far the most significant.

When this committee

discussed Austria, Steed related recent history: the importance of the Rome

Congress, the damage done at Versailles which had been recouped to a certain

extent by Lansing's statement and British recognition of the Czechoslovaks;

and he stressed the need at last for a joint Allied statement of recognition of the

subject peoples' independence in time for the next Congress. Crewe House's

view was best expressed in a memorandum which Seton-Watson had prepared

for the conference:

It is

obvious that from the Propagandist standpoint what is most needed and

certain of the maximum effect is, so to speak, the codification of Allied

pronouncements regarding Austria-Hungary and its nationalities. The pre-

sent position

is that the Allied Governments have completely compromised

themselves in certain directions but have hesitated to draw the full advant-

age from

their action, like a bather who undresses but remains standing on

the bank.

Steed now particularly probed at Italy's ambiguous stance. He proposed that the

conference should ask the British, French and American governments to press

Rome to take the initiative in making a collective Allied declaration in favour of

a Yugoslav state as one of the conditions of a just and lasting peace. Such a

statement should also say that any secret treaty which seemed to be an obstacle

to the creation of Yugoslavia would have to be modified.

Guglielmo Emanuel, the Corriere correspondent in London, interpreted this

as `a real and directly frontal attack upon Italian foreign policy'.

It was left to

Borgese to reply. Although Borgese supported the creation of Yugoslavia and in

no way approved of the full implementation of the Treaty of London, he

vigorously and eloquently objected to Steed's proposal. Viewing it as blatant

interference by the Allies in a distinctly Italian sphere of influence, he also

significantly rejected the idea that Italy could abandon the treaty. He pointed

to the lack of consensus on the Yugoslav side: there was a history of `Yugoslavs'

338 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

questioning Italy's just aspirations to Trieste and the Littoral.

And at the same

time Trumbic

's Committee did not constitute an authoritative enough Yugo-

slav body

with which Italy might finalize a territorial settlement (a statement

which, coming from a `Yugophile' like Borgese, was a damning comment on

the Committee). Under these circumstances, he argued, it would be madness to

renounce the treaty; to do so would be to play into Austria's hands and deprive

Italy of an important safeguard for the future. In the end, Borgese was able to

convince the policy committee of his views, probably through having French

backing which placed Steed in a minority.

Indeed, the committee approved

one motion which advised Yugoslavs to avoid controversial discussion of the

Italian±Yugoslav borders (alleging openly that the Italian press had shown such

discretion!); and another which recognized Italy's `imprescriptible' right to

union with `the cities and regions of Trento and Trieste and the other regions

of Italian character'. These motions were a quid pro quo for the Italians accept-

ing a

watered-down version of Steed's original proposal. Yet Borgese still

ensured that there would be no direct Allied pressure on Rome for a Yugoslav

declaration. Instead, the resolution read out to the conference on 16 August

bowed to Italian judgement:

The Policy

Committee of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference resolves to

suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in promoting a joint

and unanimous public declaration that all the Allies regard the establish-

ment of

a free and united Jugo-Slav state, embracing Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just and lasting peace, and of the

rule of right in Europe.

It was for Borgese and his Italians a subtle victory over Steed's onslaught. It was

also tantamount to an admission by the British EPD that, in the propaganda

campaign against Austria-Hungary, Italian dominance was a reality.

In his

closing speech to the conference on 17 August, Northcliffe duly urged

Borgese to bring the resolution as quickly as possible to the attention of the

Italian government, since its effect might `hasten the process of disintegration

in the Austro-Hungarian Army'. Borgese concurred, reminding the British in his

reply that it was Italy which had always been the pioneer in the crusade against

Austria. Now, while pushing forward from a pro-Yugoslav platform, it had been

essential to give Italy some extra guarantees as security for the future; they had

been given, and would make the Italian propagandists' task a little easier. As a

result, and in view of the new Allied coordination, Borgese felt optimistic that

`not only the technical but the political proposals that have arisen at our

Conference will exercise the greatest possible influence upon the development

of events'.

The EPD could only hope that this would be true as far as Rome was

concerned.

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 339

If in this way the conference was exercising indirect pressure on Orlando,

through trying to raise the whole subject of propaganda to an Allied level, it

had done little in practical terms to inject a greater Allied dimension to the

campaign organized on the Italian Front. The issue of the Padua Commission

had been totally ignored to the benefit of a discussion of policy, admittedly the

field in which the British EPD had always been most actively engaged. It is true

that the conference finally resolved to set up a permanent inter-Allied body at

Crewe House to coordinate `Allied purpose and organization' in the campaigns

against the enemy.

But even if this idea had not been still-born (because of

the sudden end to the war) it seems doubtful, given the experience of the

conference in August, that such a body would have had any quick influence

in Padua. As we have seen, the campaign in the Italian theatre had been aided

by, but always somewhat detached from, British or Allied influences, and this

remained its character throughout. Northcliffe's conference revealed the limits

of British influence, and the distance which would have to be travelled to create

a truly Allied effort.

None the

less, the conference played its part in forcing Italy to clarify its

official stance towards a Yugoslav state. In that way it indirectly aided Ojetti,

who undoubtedly wished to demonstrate a clearer Italian position in his Yugo-

slav manifestos.

Even before the end of the conference Borgese had warned

Orlando that Italy ought to take the initiative in the Yugoslav question, for

otherwise others would do so, inflicting what he termed a `diplomatic Capor-

etto' on

the country.

As we have seen, those Italians who shared Borgese's

concern were already sure that Britain's recognition of the Czechoslovaks as

Allies had seriously compromised Italy's claim to be the leading protector of the

oppressed. It was this which finally persuaded Albertini to begin a new crusade

in the Corriere della Sera against Sonnino and the contradictions of Italian

foreign policy.

On 17 August, the first article in the campaign appeared,

written by Giovanni Amendola and entitled `La politica anti-austriaca in Inghil-

terra e

in Italia'. It recalled Britain's Czech declaration, lamenting Italy's failure

of initiative since the Rome Congress: `It seems to us that the hour has come to

set aside uncertainty and ambiguity and to give back to the nationality policy

that tone and certainty which it should never have lost.' In the next fortnight

the Corriere repeatedly attacked Sonnino for his rigid adherence to the Treaty of

London and his belief that it could be implemented without the destruction of

the Habsburg Empire. He was the main obstacle to Italy's `new course', a course

which in the spirit of Mazzini envisaged not territorial renunciations but rather

an emphasis upon support for the oppressed. The nationality policy would not

only guarantee that Italy defeated the enemy but would have long term bene-

fits too,

ensuring considerable Italian influence in the New Europe after the

war. The Corriere arguments, although supported by most of the interventionist

and nationalist press (including Mussolini's Popolo d'Italia), were fiercely

340 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

rejected by Sonnino's mouthpiece, the Giornale d'Italia.

By September, as

many leading politicians feared, the effect of the campaign seemed to be to

place Sonnino more firmly in the saddle than ever. At the CS anyway, most

officers had little sympathy for the Corriere ideas, viewing them as rather

academic and still at variance with their own perception of the `Austrian'

enemy. Equally, much of educated Italian public opinion was still not in tune

with the `new course', responding more readily to the crude simplicity sounded

by the Giornale. Despite this, Albertini had not totally missed his target. The

campaigners had been, in Amendola's words, the `disturbers of public calm',

highlighting the ambiguity of Italian policy and increasing the pressure on

Orlando to act.

In fact Orlando himself was convinced by the argument that Britain's recog-

nition of

the Czechoslovaks had marginalized Italy. He realized the need to

respond in some way to the chief resolution of Northcliffe's conference so as to

restore some credibility to his nationality policy. At the same time he still

wished to preserve a balance in his cabinet, to avoid a government crisis by

not offending too much the `porcupine Sonnino'

with whose views he

secretly sympathized. He consequently felt the Corriere crusade to be inoppor-

tune, since

it was raising the temperature of the foreign policy debate and

making his chances of mediation more difficult; his perpetual vacillation was

quite apparent to Ojetti whom he met again in the war zone in late August.

But his hopes of proceeding at a leisurely pace were dashed. Bissolati since

mid-August had been expecting a meeting a

trois with Sonnino to settle the

Yugoslav question. When the weeks passed and it failed to occur, he threatened

to resign if his two demands, a pro-Yugoslav declaration and a Yugoslav legion,

were not discussed in cabinet. It required repeated threats from Bissolati, pres-

sure from

Borgese, and American recognition of the Czechoslovak National

Council as a de facto government (3 September), before Orlando conceded the

need to bring the issue before the full cabinet. On 8 September, after three lively

sessions at which Bissolati was supported by Nitti, Gallenga and the Prime

Minister himself,

Sonnino suddenly accepted a resolution which went some

way towards that recommended by the Northcliffe conference:

The Italian

Government regards the movement of the Jugo-Slav peoples for

the conquest of their independence and for their constitution in a free state

as corresponding to the principles for which the Entente is fighting and also

to the aims of a just and lasting peace.

Bissolati viewed this as `complete victory'. He urged Ojetti to assure the

national delegates in Padua that Italy was now set on a steadfast course; the

battle had been rough but the Sonninos had been overcome.

Ojetti duly

proceeded, as we will see, to use the Italian statement to full advantage in his

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 341

Yugoslav manifestos from late September. Yet victory was really on the side of

Orlando and Sonnino. Orlando had managed to perpetuate his Janus-like

stance by making a concession to the Yugoslavs while at the same time clinging

on to both Sonnino and the Treaty of London. In the following weeks,

although continuing to assert Italy's support for the nationalities, he moved

increasingly towards a full realignment with the view of his foreign minister. As

for Sonnino, he had, in the face of the opposition on 8 September, made a minor

concession to nationality politics, but had altered none of his opinions about

the probable survival of Austria-Hungary; as he observed to the CPI agent in

Rome, `the bear should be caught before the hide is divided'.

His behaviour in

cabinet had simply been a tactical manoeuvre. Thus, together with Orlando, he

tried to prevent publication of the new pro-Yugoslav statement. Only after

Steed had published the text in The Times, and after another shouting-match

with Bissolati in cabinet, was it finally issued on 25 September by the Italian

news agency. Even then, its impact was diminished by the press announcing, to

Bissolati's disgust, that the declaration in no way abrogated the Treaty of

London.

Although in

appearance Italy had moved in the direction favoured by North-

cliffe's conference, the ambiguity in Italy's position remained and would do so

until the end of the war. It perpetuated tension between Rome and the Italian

propagandists for whom the nationality policy had always been the bedrock of

their campaign: they wanted an unequivocal Italian statement that their coun-

try was

fighting for the freedom of all nationalities under the Habsburg yoke.

However, it should be emphasized that the propagandists themselves were

never prepared to back the Yugoslav cause unreservedly. Ojetti, Borgese or

Bissolati might want Italy to make an open commitment to Yugoslav unity

for immediate and long-term benefits; but, as is clear from Borgese's remarks at

the August conference, they were quite aware of the dangers of spelling out

how the territorial settlement would affect Italy. In particular, although they

believed in distributing `Yugoslav propaganda' against the enemy, they always

seem to have retained a core of doubt about it. There were obvious signs that a

Yugoslav state might adversely affect Italian aspirations in the future.

There were

also signs (which we know to be accurate) that the image pub-

licized by

the Yugoslav Committee of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as `Yugo-

slav' was

a flawed one. On this subject, Ojetti and others were rather more

realistic than Crewe House which wholeheartedly embraced the Yugoslav ideal.

Nevertheless, the Padua Commission did not stop issuing material which

lauded the work of the Yugoslav Committee and its `good relations' with

Italy, even though one might argue that to work with such an openly Yugoslav

agenda (rather than appealing to Serbs, Croats and Slovenes separately) was

probably self-defeating. After all, Ante Trumbic

did not have the full trust

of Italy's government or military, and in the enemy trenches the degree of

342 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

specifically `Yugoslav' consciousness was always questionable. It was perhaps the

ultimate irony that Steed and his colleagues, who talked repetitively about a tight

link between propaganda and truth, were always pressing upon Padua a Yugoslav

agenda which did not reflect a `Yugoslav reality' either in Italy or in the Austro-

Hungarian trenches. This whole issue, apart from the problem of whether the

campaign was an Italian or Allied affair, was the one which consistently bedev-

illed Ugo

Ojetti's work at Padua. But it did not deflect him from energetically

pursuing his aim over the summer, and it to this which we must now turn.

8.3 Padua's summer campaign: the `Oppressed Nationalities'

Notwithstanding the tensions at Padua, over the summer Ojetti and the

national delegates still managed to compose hundreds of new leaflets. From

mid-June to mid-September 375 different manifestos were composed,

while

the Italian Intelligence offices issued separately a variety of leaflets to publicize

crucial events of the war or news of interest to their own sector of the front.

The momentum reflected CS enthusiasm about the potential of psychological

warfare. In late July, General Diaz himself told Ojetti that he was concerned

about the ambiguity of Italian policy, and wrote to Orlando, asking him to

increase the number of Slavophile manifestations which were so valuable for

propaganda.

Even during the Austrian offensive in June, the distribution of Italian propa-

ganda over

the enemy had not diminished. Padua had issued some special

material, including a leaflet from `Trumbic

' which spelt out the choice for

Croats and Slovenes:

The decisive

battle has begun. Either justice will conquer and the sun of

freedom for all nations will shine, or the coarse, brutal force of German

militaristic barbarism will conquer, which would signify: further slavery. At

this great moment it is the duty of every Serb, Croat and Slovene not only

not to fight on the Austrian side, but to thrust their bayonets into Magyar

and German

chests.

As the offensive progressed, Italian propaganda kept the enemy so regularly

informed about the course of events that its news reached them almost at the

same time as the official Austrian reports. Rumours that Conrad's troops had

reached the plains were refuted, while Diaz's daily war bulletins were distrib-

uted to

prove the strength of Italian resistance.

Not all the material, however,

kept within the bounds of reality. Ojetti was clearly irritated when he discov-

ered that

some Intelligence offices had been issuing leaflets which announced

that revolution had broken out in the Monarchy and that Boroevic

's forces

were marching there to restore order. His reaction suggests that he (rightly)

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 343

perceived certain limits which could not be exceeded if the material was to be

believed.

The same sentiments seem to have coloured his view on what was

suitable to publish after the offensive. Baker was only too ready to report to

London that the Italians had distributed `songs of exultation over Italy's great

victory'. In fact, while a few leaflets had more than a hint of chauvinism (that

Italy was fighting for `freedom and culture'), Ojetti was more concerned to rub a

little salt into the wounds than to brag excessively about Italy's victory.

100

The

manifestos more subtly contrasted the Austrian military's promise of booty and

peace on the eve of the offensive with the miserable results (allegedly 300 000

casualties).

101

They also turned particular attention towards `Germany's role' in

the fiasco. While the Austrian socialist Arbeiter-Zeitung could be quoted to show

that blood had been spilt for Germany alone,

102

Padua eagerly pounced on some

inaccurate intelligence according to which General von Below, one of the Ger-

man commanders

at Caporetto, had been appointed commander of all Austrian

forces in the Italy. The `arrogant Prussian war-lord' was even now planning to

send Austrian troops to the slaughter again in a `wonderful new offensive'.

103

In the following months, besides returning occasionally to the decisive Piave

defeat, Ojetti directed at soldiers of all nationalities a number of key themes to

prove that the war was lost for the Central Powers. It was a mirror image of what

Austrian propaganda had proclaimed about Italy in the spring of 1918. Padua's

message of despair might at times be over-dramatic, but it now seemed to

reflect accurately the vivid unfolding of events on the Western Front where

Germany had launched a last offensive on 15 July. Indeed, it was events in the

West, and then in the Balkans, which now most bluntly illustrated the concept

of defeat on the battlefield, for there was no such drama to match it in the

Italian theatre in the summer. Some leaflets ascribed Ludendorff's offensive in

the West to German anger at the Piave defeat:

The waters

of the Piave, dyed red with your blood, were still muddy and the

corpses of many tens of thousands of your comrades had scarcely started to

putrify when the German Emperor, furious at the defeat of the Austro-

Hungarian army on the Piave, ordered a decisive offensive against the

Anglo-French armies. Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered his lunch to be served in

Paris on 14 July [sic], the anniversary of French freedom.

104

Instead, the Kaiser was taught `a bloody lesson' on the river Marne. Padua's

manifestos were able regularly to report, often with detailed maps, the steady

German retreat before General Foch's counter-offensive on 18 July and the

successful Anglo-French attack west of Amiens on 8 August. The victorious

advance continued, bringing the Allies thousands of prisoners while making

the German people ever more disillusioned and pessimistic. Radical German

newspapers could be quoted to show that `an awful abyss yawns under the feet