Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds
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304 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary
clutched may have been those issued specially on the eve of offensive by Italian
Intelligence precisely in order to assure them that they could pass safely into
Italian lines.
183
Padua believed that this had happened. It seemed to be proven
by the large number of prisoners taken ± almost 22 000 from mid-June to mid-
July ± and the fact that 6000 of these were of `Yugoslav' nationality.
Thus most
of the propagandists' claims had some degree of truth, even if they
tended to make unsubstantiated links between their campaign and any sign of
national unrest in the enemy war zone. One link which did exist was in the
field of sabotage behind enemy lines. Crewe House suggested that Czechs had
been responsible for blowing up munition dumps in the rear during the offens-
ive.
184
The limited information which can be put together on this subject con-
firms that
Italian Intelligence began in early June to use Czech and Croat
deserters as agents behind enemy lines. It was a new way to employ disaffected
Slavs against the enemy, and one which Marchetti in particular would perfect
over the summer months. In early June, both Finzi and Marchetti began to train
a small number of reliable individuals for these risky ventures, but whereas
Marchetti's group got no further than training, some of Finzi's saboteurs were
sent into enemy territory before the June offensive.
185
A first attempt was made by two Czechs, Karel Mlejnek (one of Pivko's
colleagues) and Artur Z
Â
k, but it was unsuccessful because of vigilant Austrian
Ï
a
sentries.
Equipped with explosives, poison and forged documents, the two
agents were supposed to have crossed the lines in the Brenta valley and pro-
ceeded into
Val Sugana to destroy munition dumps. In their place Pivko chose a
young Croat, Florijan Babec, who on 13 June posed as an escaped prisoner and
successfully arrived in the Austrian positions at Asiago. His task was to carry out
the sabotage and then to proceed to Croatia where he would hand over to
`nationalist deserters' a coded report which was concealed in his prayer book.
Whether he succeeded is unknown.
186
It is more likely that those who suc-
ceeded and
from whom Crewe House took the credit were a third group of
Finzi's agents. Eight of them were sent over at the same time as Babec (indeed
Babec may have been part of their group) with the purpose of destroying targets
identified by Finzi. In the next ten days, Italian Intelligence recorded two
incidents of munition deposits exploding in the rear, one on 22 June at Tezze
which involved 160 000 shells. On 3 July two of the agents crept back across the
front line into British positions. They reported their adventure, how they had
made their way to the rear, challenged only once by a guard who had accepted
the validity of their documents. Once in Val Sugana they had planted their
bombs at Tezze and then proceeded westwards to Levico where they counted a
dozen aeroplanes. Some of them had then decided, as Finzi had suggested, to
stay behind and try to reach their families, while two agents returned back to
the Asiago plateau and after waiting three nights in the undergrowth managed
to pass across no-man's-land to the British trenches.
187
Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 305
This exploit had been a valuable experience which Italian Intelligence would
build upon, but it could only indirectly be described as a triumph of the Allies'
propaganda campaign. Crewe House implied erroneously that the sabotage had
been the work of Czechs who were still members of the Austrian army. It tied in
rather well with their view that the offensive had witnessed major examples of
insubordination in the Austrian forces: that a Czech company had tried to desert
en masse or that a fervently Yugoslav commander had succeeded in bringing his
whole company over to Italy.
188
What was the truth in these rumours? Cer-
tainly, as
we have seen, the offensive provided an opportunity for seemingly
reliable Austrian troops to be captured easily by the Italians. Others, if they had
not specifically refused to go into the front line, had revolted passively. One
Austrian corps command, for instance, discovered that in the first two days of
the offensive most units were reporting a startling deficit of 75±80 per cent of
their manpower due to shirkers who had rejoined their units only when the
`coast was clearer'.
189
Yet there appear to have been few cases of mass desertion
to the enemy. According to Delme
Â
-Radcliffe, writing on 21 June:
There have
been indications of the desire of bodies of troops and individuals
to come over, but hitherto the action taken by us has failed to produce
practical results on a large scale. As a whole the enemy troops on the Piave
and Montello especially, are fighting with great determination. If the Aus-
trian army
continues to fail in obtaining successes, desertions on a large scale
may be expected, perhaps also open mutinies.
190
Coming from a `Czech enthusiast' like Radcliffe, such an idea was overoptim-
istic. The
offensive showed in fact that, despite the Austro-Hungarian army's
growing material and ideological crisis, it was still welded together by its
officers and by the large number of soldiers who were ready to fulfil their duties.
Those involved in Italy's propaganda campaign exaggerated the potential for
unrest in June 1918 just as they boasted about the fruits of their labours after
only a few months of the campaign. Thus Steed was quick to point out that a
mass revolt by `Yugoslav' troops had only been prevented because of Sonnino's
anti-Yugoslav stance at Versailles in early June; but for that, `the Piave battle
would probably have ended in a complete Austro-Hungarian disaster and the
war would have been shortened by some months'.
191
With this idea, Steed, of
course, presumed that most soldiers of southern Slav nationality were `nation-
ally conscious'.
He also presumed too much of the power of Allied manifestos.
Polish prisoners who were interrogated by the Italians, for example, were found
to have little knowledge of Allied propaganda or even of the Versailles Declara-
tion in
favour of Polish independence.
192
Front propaganda therefore had so far only had a moderate impact. Its signi-
ficance lay
in what the Italian and Austrian military thought it had achieved or
306 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary
could achieve, rather than what it had actually contributed to the Piave de
Â
ba
Ã
cle.
As a final balance to some of the propagandists' own extreme claims it is worth
quoting a perceptive analysis drawn up by British military Intelligence on the
state of the enemy after the battle:
From the
large number of prisoners and deserters who have been examined,
and from the letters, diaries and army orders which have been captured
during the last offensive it is evident that except in some isolated instances
Allied propaganda is not having the immediate effect which had been hoped
for. It has not stimulated desertion to any extent; it cannot be said to have
had any great influence on the morale of the troops. The reason for this is
that a large number of Austro-Hungarian soldiers whom it is desired to
influence are ill-educated and apathetic, they do not know much about the
causes of the war and do not care much about its consequences. They are all
tired of fighting and long to have done with it, but the path of least resistance
is to take things as they find them and to obey orders. The tradition of the
army is a force not altogether spent and there is undoubtedly a feeling that,
after all, the Habsburg Empire, whatever may be thought of it, is an institu-
tion which
has lasted so long that it must have some good points; and that as
long as rations are enough to support life and conditions not too intolerable,
desertion, disgrace and loss of citizenship are hardly worthwhile.
193
Yet from the experience of June 1918 it was indeed the supposed benefits of
psychological warfare which convinced the Italian CS that their propaganda
campaign should be intensified. The opposite was true for the AOK. The Aus-
trians were
suddenly confronted with the fact that their campaign had not been
as effective as they assumed. They decided immediately to shelve their own
efforts and end the propaganda duel; only in the last month of the war would it
be revived. In the weeks before the June offensive, the duel had been at its
height. On 26 April at a meeting to discuss front propaganda, the AOK had
decided to intensify its efforts during the month before the attack.
194
This was
to mean an increase in the number of leaflets distributed by plane, rocket and
patrol. Direct fraternization with the enemy, which the Austrian military had
always viewed as the most efficient way to wield the weapon, was now to cease
in view of Italian counter-measures, in view of the need to keep Austria's plans
secret, and because such work necessitated exceptionally reliable propaganda
personnel.
195
Instead, personal traffic with the enemy was to be limited to
handing over manifestos. The work would be fully supported by troop com-
manders who
should dispel any idea that propaganda activity was `unfair' and
ensure that its personnel received the full cooperation of the Intelligence
Service and conventional forces. As for the content of manifestos, the AOK
issued new guidelines which differed little in substance from those circulated
Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 307
earlier in the year.
196
The spring in the tail was that during the offensive a mass
distribution would continue, assuring the Italians that it was an `offensive of
peace', while after the offensive's `successful conclusion' the enemy would
immediately be bombarded with proclamations which called for `peace in
1918'.
197
Thus propaganda would help to make the offensive a success, but
must then be prepared to follow up that success with powerful arguments.
In keeping
with Baden's instructions, in May the army commands signific-
antly increased
their propaganda output. KISA, for example, which had distrib-
uted 98
500 leaflets in March and 150 000 in April, sent out about 500 000 in
May.
198
Distribution continued to pose some problems. The Allies were now
masters of the air, some Austrian divisions still possessed no propaganda per-
sonnel,
199
and in the plains KISA and the 6AK continued to find the Piave an
obstacle which could only be surmounted at low-water level. But despite this,
and despite increasing signs that the Italians were no longer as responsive as
previously, the AOK appear to have believed that the fruit of its campaign was
beginning to ripen. After all, in May the number of Italian deserters increased
and some of the deposited material was still being picked up; in a few places the
local commanders even permitted some fraternization with the Italians.
200
Elsewhere it was taken as a positive sign that the enemy was more alert and
nervous and had increased his `counter-propaganda' in response to Austrian
efforts. The AOK, therefore, like its Italian counterparts, expected that its
campaign would facilitate success in the June offensive, and publicly the Aus-
trians prophesied
a second Caporetto. On 11 June Arz's deputy, Alfred von
Waldsta
È
tten, sent Conrad a propaganda map for duplication during the attack;
it showed how far Austrian troops had advanced into Italian territory.
201
The fact that Austria-Hungary's propaganda campaign was a failure only
became clear during the offensive itself. It was not just that the Italian lines
stood relatively firm. Of 26 000 Italian soldiers taken prisoner by the Isonzo
army, only three possessed Austrian manifestos.
202
Moreover, in a survey of a
sample 5000 Italians taken prisoner, it was found that while 376 had read some
Austrian propaganda and 707 had seen but not read it, 3917 had no knowledge
of it whatsoever. As in the Austrian ranks the high degree of illiteracy among
Italian soldiers had undoubtedly proved to be an obstacle; of the 5000 exam-
ined, 1546
could not read or write. But the survey also showed that the Italian
military since the spring had managed very successfully to counter Austria's
campaign, both by intervening to seize propaganda material and by presenting
effective defensive arguments to their own men. One powerful argument was
the Italian material situation which at the front had greatly improved since
Caporetto. Another was to instil a conviction that, since the Austrians were ill-
treating civilians in Venetia, it was vital to reconquer the occupied province
and destroy the Monarchy. Many of the Italians captured seemed to be confid-
ent that
with American help this could be achieved, and rather than being
308 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary
depressed or even affected by Austria's campaign they simply viewed it as a sign
of the enemy's own war-weariness.
203
The AOK reacted quickly to the knowledge that the results of the campaign in
no way corresponded to its efforts (over three million leaflets). On 5 July,
blaming its failure on Italian vigilance and counter-propaganda, Baden advised
the army commanders `in the future to continue propaganda on a more limited
scale with the aim of combatting enemy propaganda'.
204
The army commands
totally agreed. KISA replied that, in spite of distributing over a million leaflets
since January, `the effect of our propaganda on the enemy is not noticeable.
The Italian soldier is under too strict a control, while the Italian officer is
reliable and too nationally disposed for peace propaganda to be able to take
firm roots at the front.' If the campaign had had no success prior to the
offensive it would have even less now and `would on the contrary only provoke
and advance even more Italy's defensive propaganda'.
205
The 6AK, similarly,
felt that because of strict discipline and good food in the trenches, and the
absence of a strong revolutionary movement in the Italian hinterland, Austrian
propaganda could not be expected to reap any benefits.
206
The 11AK went even
further, advising that any recommencement of Austria's campaign in the fore-
seeable future
would be `completely pointless'. In analyzing why the campaign
had failed, the 11AK reasoned with hindsight that the most favourable moment
for intensive propaganda against Italy had been immediately after Caporetto,
but it had been neglected and in the 11th army sector had only been organized
in late January: `then it was already too late. The fighting spirit of the Italian
soldier had already recovered from the blows of our offensive, the units were
already organized, disciplined and firmly in the hands of their superiors.' Just
when Austria's campaign had been starting to have some success, the enemy
officers had managed to thwart it.
207
In retrospect some might argue that the Austrians had been defeatist in
effectively halting their campaign in early July.
208
At the time all were in
agreement. Henceforth there was to be only small-scale leaflet distribution, so
as to keep up some pressure on the enemy, but the main aim would be to
defend Austro-Hungarian morale against Italy's poisonous efforts. After all, the
Italian military had set a good example of how important defensive measures
could be against hostile propaganda. Thus it was that the June offensive, which
was a permanent blow to the Habsburg forces' morale, was also a significant
turning-point in the competing propaganda campaigns of 1918. After the
offensive, the Austrians placed themselves on the defensive with regard to
psychological warfare. The propaganda duel was at an end, or at least for the
AOK, any continuation had been shelved until the military situation changed
again in the Monarchy's favour.
Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 309
Notes
1. Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (London
and Toronto, 1930) p. 123.
2. The most
thorough account is Richard Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner and Arnold
Suppan, Innere Front. MilitaÈrassistenz, Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie
1918, 2 vols (Vienna, 1974) I, pp. 59ff.
3. KA, EvB
1918, Fasz.5743/2790, Arz to Na.Abt, Pers.Geh.Nr 11, 26 January 1918.
4. Ibid., Fasz.5743
/4041, Sto
È
ger-Steine
r to AOK, Pra
È
s. Nr 672, 8 February; Plaschka,
Haselsteiner, Suppan, Innere Front, I, pp. 260±1.
5. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5742/1707, Milita
È
rkanzlei im Kriegsministerium [successor to KU
È
A]
to
EvB, Nr 9922, 12 January; Fasz.5743/2792, AOK to all military commands, 13 Feb-
ruary 1918.
6. For a
collection of such material, see KA, EvB, Fasz.5745/7417.
7. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5743/2792 and 5745/6649. The Times report was sent into the AOK by
the 10th army on 20 January.
8. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5742/1935 (Copy also in HIL, Hadifelu
È
gyeleti
Bizottsa
Â
g [HFB],
Fasz.4470, Nr 777); Ronge, Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 341.
9. Ibid., p.
340. See also HIL, Honve
Â
d Miniszte
Â
rium [HM] 1918, Fasz.537(B), Nr 4102,
Arz to Szurmay, Op.Nr 49946, 15 February 1918.
10. Erich Feigl,
Kaiserin Zita. Legende und Wahrheit (Vienna and Munich, 1977) p. 336.
11. Pester Lloyd,
18 February (Abend). Cf. the Neue Freie Presse which gave news of
Northcliffe's appointment no prominence: Nr 19213, 19 February 1918 (Morgen-
blatt), p.
6.
12. Stenographische Protokolle,
III, 70.Sitzung, 7 March 1918, p. 3544: speech in response
to an interpellation by Wilhelm Miklas and others on 22 February (ibid., p. 3269).
13. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5744/4899, report and minutes by Hptm Novak, 21 February 1918.
14. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5747/9459, Ronge to various military authorities, 5 April 1918.
15. KA, Feindespropa
ganda-Abwehrstelle [FAst], Fasz.5994, Res.86, EvB to FAst, Nr
10683, 3 May 1918.
16. Andrea Torre
and G.A. Borgese were mentioned.
17. `Northcliffes bezahltes
Propagandameeting', Bosnische Post (Sarajevo), 11 April;
`Trumbic
Â
eva Jugoslavija', Hrvatska (Zagreb), broj 2021, 13 April. See also Glas Slove-
naca Hrvata
i Srba, broj 113, 10 June 1918.
18. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5751/14973, EvB to various military authorities, 25 May 1918: `Anglo-
Amerikanische Propaganda'.
19. Ibid., Fasz.
5756/22824, Protocol of meeting on 18 July (Ronge with Intelligence
officers from Bohemia and northern Hungary).
20. See, for
example, ibid., Fasz.5758/25618, MilKmdo Pozsony [Bratislava] Gstbs Abt to
EvB, Gstb Nr 974/Na, 20 August 1918.
21. Ibid., Fasz.5755/21
672, Philipp Gaiger (journalist) to EvB, 18 July 1918.
22. For the
Swiss border, see KA, Zensurstelle Feldkirch, Fasz.5952, Polizeiliche
Nachrichten 70, MJ12 144 ± Statth.Pra
È
s.3589;
Polizeiliche Nachrichten 71, MilKmdo
Innsbruck 3721 res ± Statth.Pra
È
s.15/805. Some hints of the reality can be gleaned
from E. Voska and W. Irwin, Spy and Counterspy: The Autobiography of a Master Spy
(London, 1941) pp. 223ff, although in general Voska's account is also littered with
inaccuracy. For the eastern borders, see HIL, M.V.in Ruma
È
nien: k.u.k. Sektion bei der
politischen Polizei OKR, Fasz.13, Na Nr 4275/18, `Bericht u
È
ber
Entente Agitation und
Propaganda in der Moldau und in Bessarabien', 23 August 1918; KA, EvB, Fasz.5757/
310 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary
24357, Na
Lemberg to EvB, Na Nr 4800 res, 8 August (report for July 1918); and ibid.,
Fasz.5756/23557 and Fasz.5758/25212, Beilage 4.
23. Janko Pleterski,
Prvo Opredeljenje Slovenaca za Jugoslaviju (Belgrade, 1976) p. 402.
24. Stephen Buria
Â
n
von Rajecz, Austria in Dissolution (London, 1925) pp. 451±2; Feigl,
Kaiserin Zita, p. 336.
25. Tribune de
Gene
Á
ve, quoted in KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2350: KPQ report
on `propaganda activity', July 1918, pp. 5±6.
26. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5759/28977, Military attache
Â
The Hague to Na.Abt AOK, Res 530/17,
3 September 1918.
27. KA, 11AK
Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.264, Op.Nr 1400/18, 55ID Kmdo to I KK, Na Nr 180,
22 May 1918, referring to the period 22 April±22 May. Of these, about 800 publicized
the Czechoslovak army, 900 appealed to the South Slavs not to fight for Germany,
and 1300 called on all soldiers to desert.
28. KA, 11AK,
Fasz.449, Pr.2252, 2303 (I KK).
29. KA, 11AK
Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.446, Na Nr 1106, 10AK propaganda report, June 1918.
30. The general
context of Sarkotic
Â
's views is discussed in Cornwall, `The Experience of
Yugoslav Agitation in Austria-Hungary 1917±1918'. See also particularly Sarkotic
Â
's
reports in AHZ, Sarkotic
Â
MSS, Sarkotic
Â
to AOK, Op.Nr 751, 12 February; KA, EvB,
Fasz.5751/15181/18, Sarkotic
Â
to AOK Na Abt, Op.Nr 2669, 18 May 1918. For the
leaflets sent out by the Cattaro mutineers, see above Chapter 5, p. 153.
31. Manifesto 17,
`Jugosloveni! Draga brac
Â
o Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci!' (KA, EvB, Fasz.5756/
22782 and 5752/16897/6). The word `Mitteleurope' is in the original Croat text.
32. Manifesto 16,
`Hrvati, Srbi i Slovenci!'. Jambris
Ï
ak had in fact been concerned about
having his name publicized in enemy territory: see AJA, JO 35/252, Jambris
Ï
ak to
Banjanin, 7 June 1918.
33. For the
reception, see KA, EvB, Fasz.5756/22782; AJA, JO 35/247, Jambris
Ï
ak notes;
and for copies of the photographs, PRO, AIR 1/2127/207/80, no. 7. Ojetti gives his
reaction in La Propaganda sul Nemico, p. 130.
34. Quoted in
`Die Luftpostbriefe des Dr Trumbic
Â
', Reichspost, Nr 276, 19 June 1918 (p. 4).
See also `Proglasi Dra Trumbic
Â
a', in the radical Glas Slovenaca Hrvata i Srba which
quoted extracts from the leaflets: broj 123, 21 June (p. 1).
35. Pleterski, Prvo
Opredeljenje, pp. 253±4. For the context of Koros
Ï
ec's behaviour, see
Cornwall, `The Experience of Yugoslav Agitation'.
36. The AOK
felt that Tavc
Ï
ar's own behaviour was opportunistic, carefully calculated so
that he would not forfeit his influence either with the radicals or with the govern-
ment: see
KA, AOK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.376, Nr 112303, 20 September 1918.
37. BL, Northcliffe
MSS, vol.X, Add.Mss 62162, minutes of the 6th EPD Committee
meeting, 9 July 1918. Pivko also recalls that S
Ï
us
Ï
ters
Ï
ic
Â
's moves were known to Italian
Intelligence (see Val Bella, p. 78).
38. For example
, KA, EvB, Nrs 16895, 17003, 18306, 19447, 21352, 23510, 24959, 27664,
28248, 31651, 32552, 23749 (Lublin: manifesto 55), 33024 (Bratislava: manifesto
89), 33993 (Graz: manifesto 252).
39. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5760/31223, NaSt.MilKmdo Nagyszeben to EvB, Na Nr 8478 res,
2 October 1918. The newssheet was manifestos 44/45/46/49.
40. Ibid., Fasz.5757
/24326, Arz to various military authorities, 24 August 1918. For
Bolshevik or Russian leaflets (most of which emanated from Ukraine) see EvB Nrs
17217, 17625, 18560, 18735, 22471, 23681, 24258, 24779, 26128, 26715, 28147,
31840. For manifestos of the POW (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa), see EvB Nrs 2340,
23510 (pp. 10, 41, 46), 24131, 24156, 26107.
Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 311
41. Ibid., Fasz.5759/28
207, MilKmdo Prague Gstbs Abt to EvB, Na Nr 1454, 8 September
1918.
42. Ibid., Fasz.5744
/5125/I, Protocol of Ronge's discussions with leaders of the Intelli-
gence service,
21±2 May 1918; Ronge, Kriegs- und Industriespionage, pp. 346±7.
43. KA, 11AK
Gstbs Abt, Fasz.272, 4±6/2, 11AK to corps, Op.Nr 1423, 2 March 1918; Arz,
Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges, p. 135.
44. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5742/2477; Fasz.5743/3584 (the idea of a mass search, which took
place also in military units in the hinterland on 15 March, seems to have originated
with the Hungarian Minister of the Interior); Fasz.5749/11092, Arz to various milit-
ary authorities,
27 May 1918.
45. Ronge, Kriegs-
und Industriespionage, pp. 327±31. See also KA, AOK Op.Abt 1918,
Fasz.376, Nr 112226, Beilage 3: `Heimkehrer-Standesbewegung'; and for the May
rebellions, Plaschka et al., Innere Front, I, pp. 324ff. The Padua Commission only
picked up a few details of the revolts from a Bavarian newspaper, and it could
arguably have exploited them more fully: see, for example, manifesto 74, Jugoslavia
no. 4; manifesto 114, Neamul Roma
Ã
nesc
no. 5 (KA, 11AK Fasz.451 `Flugzettel I').
46. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5743/4041, Sto
È
ger-Steine
r to AOK Na.Abt, Pra
È
s.Nr 672, 8 February 1918.
47. Richard Plaschka,
`Contradicting Ideologies: the Pressure of Ideological Conflicts in
the Austro-Hungarian Army of World War I', in R.A. Kann, B.K. Kira
Â
ly and P.S.
Fichtner (eds), The Habsburg Empire in World War I (New York, 1977) pp. 108±11.
48. KA, 11AK
1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2145, 11AK Op.Nr 1766, 25 March 1918: `Maûnahmen
gegen ital. Propaganda'.
49. Ibid., Fasz.448,
Pr.2087, AOK to 11AK, Op.Nr 140286, 23 February; Pr.2099, AOK to
11AK, Op.Nr 140566, 7 March 1918, enclosing first editions of Heimat.
50. KA, FAst
1918, Fasz.5994, Res.80, Waldsta
È
tten
to AOK Op.Abt, 8 May 1918.
51. By June
Heimat had 1020 private subscribers, U
È
zenet
480 and Domov only 340 (KA,
HGK Conrad, Fasz.66, Na 400a/395). This was somewhat offset by the large number
of copies which were sent out direct to the military commands: by late June, 30 000
copies of each edition of Heimat and U
È
zenet
were being dispatched and 15 000 copies
of Domov (KA, FAst, Fasz.5998, Res.705/2). For details of the free editions sent out
from September, see ibid., Fasz.5997, Res.569. Cf. the phenomenon of unofficial
`trench journalism' in the French army: Ste
Â
phane Audoin-Rouzeau, Men at War
1914±1918: National Sentiment and Trench Journalism in France during the First World
War (Providence and Oxford, 1992).
52. Later, Glaise-
Horstenau, who was involved with the new body, specifically men-
tioned the
German example: OULK, VII, p. 99. See Max Ronge's reports on the
Germans' organization which was subject to their KPQ and the Prussian War Min-
istry: KA,
FAst 1918, Fasz.5994, Res.40, Ronge to Waldsta
È
tten,
EvB Nr 7241, 21
March; Res.101, Ronge to KPQ, EvB Nr 11279, 29 April. In the latter report, he
extolled the virtues of cinema for propaganda purposes, but Eisner-Bubna, head of
KPQ, commented that regrettably the Monarchy did not have enough modern
equipment available to match the Germans.
53. For some
recent thoughts on Germany's failure in the field of patriotic instruction,
see Wilhelm Deist, `The German Army, the Authoritarian Nation-State and Total
War', in John Horne (ed.), State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First
World War (Cambridge, 1997) pp. 168ff.
54. KA, EvB,
Fasz.5745/6187, KPQ P.Nr 4400, January report on `propaganda activity'.
55. See, for
example, KA, KISA Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.4, Op.Nr 770, Obst Pitreich to
KISA, Op.Nr 306/1, 17 February; KA, HGK Conrad, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/59, AOK to
312 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary
Conrad, Boroevic
Â
,
etc., Op.Nr 766/34, 12 February; ibid., Na Nr 400a/82, Boroevic
Â
to
Conrad, Op.Nr 300/416, 28 February (enclosing two articles from the Corriere della
Sera).
56. KA, FAst,
Fasz.5994, Res.14a, Petrovic
Â
to `Anton', 23 January 1918 (enclosing order
of GM Viktor von Severus, and seven pages of `suggestions for patriotic instruction').
57. Ibid., Res.18,
Arz Op.Geh.Nr 1219, `Aufkla
È
rungsar
beit in der Wehrmacht', 14 March
1918.
58. Ibid., Res.13,
KPQ to FAst, Adj.Nr 11612, minutes of meeting held on 20 March 1918.
59. Ibid., Res.25,
30 and 35. Kraus's pun was actually on the words chlorreichen (`rich in
chlorine') and erfolgreich (`successful'), but my translation captures the essential wit
more accurately. See Timms, Karl Kraus, p. 355.
60. KA, FAst,
Fasz.6003, AOK zu Op.Nr 141676: `Richtlinien fu
È
ndischen Unter-
È
r
vaterla
richt und Abwehr des Feindespropaganda'.
61. Ibid., Fasz.5994,
Res.18.
62. See Edmund
von Glaise-Horstenau, Ein General im Zwielicht, ed. Peter Broucek, 3 vols
(Vienna, 1980±8) I, p. 497.
63. KA, FAst,
Fasz.5994, Res.46, Werkmann to FAst, 21 April 1918.
64. Ibid., Fasz.59
95, Res.278/I, VaterlaÈndische Bildungsarbeit, Mitteilungen der FAst,Nr1,
10 July 1918, pp. 4±6, 8±9. FAst and KPQ representatives met together on 25 May to
discuss cooperation (Fasz.5994, Res.121).
65. Ibid., Fasz.5994
, Res.267, MGG/S to FAst, Pra
È
s.Nr
22678, 6 July 1918. For details of
the mutiny of IR71, caused largely by disgruntled homecomers, see Plaschka et al.,
Innere Front, I, pp. 385±400.
66. Ibid., Res.273/8
, MilKmdo Krako
Â
w
to FAst, Pra
È
s.Nr 5942/FA, 29 July 1918.
67. Ibid., Fasz.5994,
Res.124, Hptm Franz Zeidner to FAst, 28 May and 6 June 1918.
68. Ibid., Res.8a,
HGK Conrad Na.Abt to AOK Op.Abt, Na Nr 400a/81, `Aufkla
È
rende
Propaganda', 9 March 1918. Here it was suggested that such information should
be discussed in Slav editions of Heimat.
69. Ibid., Fasz.5995,
Res.273/6, 42HID (Oberlt Juraj S
Ï
us
Ï
njak) to XIII KK, 20 June 1918.
70. Ibid., Fasz.5994,
Res.22, 59, 105; Res.212, Waldsta
È
tten to AOK Op.Abt, 25 June 1918.
For FA instructions about the railways, see Res.39/1 and 170; and for responses to
requests from Sarkotic
Â
and the 11AK: Res.170/1 and 170/2. For displeasure at the
information courses, see Res.214, where Major Franz Hoc
Ï
evar complained to the
FAst that his three-week visit to Vienna from Zagreb had cost him 124 Kronen since
only one meal was provided on the course.
71. Ibid., Fasz.5997
, Res.513. Only in October 1918 was a `translation group' established
at the KPQ to service both the AOK and FAst (Fasz.5998, Res.853).
72. Ibid., Fasz.5994,
Res.155, FAst to AOK Op.Abt, Ta
È
tigkeitsbericht, 11 June 1918.
73. Ibid., Res.187/3
, 245, 263.
74. Ibid., Res.263,
Gablenz to Waldsta
È
tten,
1 July 1918.
75. OULK, VII,
pp. 94, 99.
76. See Miklo
Â
s
Komja
Â
thy (ed.), Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der O
È
sterreichisch
-
Ungarischen Monarchie 1914±1918 (Budapest, 1966) pp. 593, 605ff: meetings of the
Council on 24 September and 28 October 1917, which illustrate well the clash of
views among the authorities. Landwehr's memoirs, Hunger. Die Erscho
È
pfungsjahre der
MittelmaÈchte 1917±18
(Zurich, Leipzig and Vienna, 1931) are essential to understand
the options available (see pp. 142±8).
77. KA, MKSM
1918, 25±1/9, AOK Q.Nr 119083, Beilage 3: `Darstellungen der materi-
ellen Lage
der Armee im Felde'; Arz, Zur Geschichte, p. 195.
Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 313
78. Requisitioning in
Hungary is well described in Plaschka et al., Innere Front,I,
pp. 209±31; Landwehr, Hunger, pp. 150ff, 176ff.
79. Ottokar Czernin,
Im Weltkriege (Berlin and Vienna, 1919) p. 345.
80. On Austrian
problems in Ukraine, see Alfred Krauss and Franz Klingenbrunner, `Die
Besetzung der Ukraine 1918', in Hugo Kerchnawe (ed.), Die MilitaÈrverwaltung in
den
von den o
È
sterreichisch-ungarischen Truppen besetzten Gebieten (Vienna, 1928); and
Wolfdieter Bihl, O
È
sse von Brest-Litovsk (Vienna,
È
sterreich-Un
garn und die Friedenschlu
Cologne and
Graz, 1970) pp. 120ff.
81. Josef Redlich,
Schicksalsjahre O
È
sterreichs
1908±1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef
Redlichs, ed. Fritz Fellner, 2 vols (Graz and Cologne, 1953±4) I, p. 263.
82. Landwehr, Hunger,
pp. 189ff.
83. See ibid.,
pp. 201, 229ff; HHStA, PA I/505, Liasse XLVII/3/24, Karl to Wilhelm II,
June 1918.
84. AHZ, Sarkot
ic
Â
MSS, Archduke Eugen to Sarkotic
Â
, 30 December 1917.
85. See Hermann
Leidl, `Die Verwaltung des besetzten Gebietes Italiens, November
1917 bis Oktober 1918', in Kerchnawe (ed.), Die MilitaÈrverwaltung,
pp. 342±5. The
grape harvest in 1918 was disappointing and over half the cultivatable land was
given over to maize which could not be harvested until October.
86. KA, KISA
Gstbs Abt 1918 Op.Akten, Fasz.6, Op.Nr 2034, KISA Q.Op.Nr 15600/V.A.,
Zusammenfassender Darstellung, 14 March 1918.
87. For conditions
for the 10ID, see the reports in: ibid., Fasz.2, Op.Nr 444 and Fasz.3,
Op.Nr 571. In March the number who reported sick in the KISA zone as a whole
rose from 9436 to 12 868, most of whom had bronchial catarrh or stomach/bowel
afflictions (Fasz.5, Op.Nr 982).
88. Ibid., Fasz.4,
Op.Nr 768, Boroevic
Â
to Arz, t.Op.Nr 379, 17 February (quoted also in
OULK, VII, pp. 184±5).
89. KA, KISA,
Fasz.4, Op.Nr 891, HGK Boroevic
Â
to AOK, Nr 5764/Mat., 28 February
1918.
90. OULK, VII,
p. 202. See also KA, 6AK 1918 Qu.Abt, Fasz.1, Nr 39, Boroevic
Â
to 6AK,
Op.Nr 1100/98, 20 May 1918.
91. KA, HGK
Conrad, Fasz.13, 10AK Qu.Abt to Conrad, t.Nr 2450, 13 January; ibid.,
Conrad to AOK Qu.Abt, t.Nr 1663, 14 January 1918.
92. KA, FAst,
Fasz.5994, Res.113, Krobatin to AOK, Op.Nr 3346, 16 April, enclosing
letter: Korporal Wasyl to Lynda Pazia, 27 March 1918. At the FAst, it was noted that
Petrovic
Â
might use this material in one of his lectures.
93. KA, HGK
Conrad, Fasz.13, 12±51/2±6, Scheuchenstuel to Conrad, t.Op.Nr 585, 16
January; ibid., 12±51/2±10, Scheuchenstuel to Conrad, t.Nr 5167, 29 January 1918.
94. Ibid., 12±51/1±4
, Conrad to AOK Qu.Abt, t.Nr 1663, 14 January 1918.
95. Peter Fiala,
Die letzte Offensive Alto
È
sterreichs. Fu
È
hrerverant-
È
hrungs
probleme und Fu
wortlichkeit bei der o
È
st.-ung. Offensive in Venetien, Juni 1918 (Boppard am Rhein, 1967)
p. 82.
96. KA, 11AK,
Fasz.269, 1±17/15±7/30, Op.Nr 2500/30, GM Vidale to VI KK, Res.2158, 13
June 1918. Of 950 horses expected by the division in late May, only 150 had arrived.
97. OULK, VII,
p. 203.
98. KA, FAst,
Fasz.5994, Res.6, Waldsta
È
tten
to Arz, 23 March 1918.
99. Ibid., Fasz.6003
, `Vaterla
È
ndischer
Unterricht Heft Nr 1 ± Einleitungsvortrag zum
1.Informationskurs, von Oberst Egon Frh. von Waldsta
È
tten',
p. 6.
100. Gustav Spann, Zensur in O
È
sterreich
waÈhrend des 1.Weltkrieges 1914±1918, Ph.Diss.
(Vienna, 1972) pp. 220±1; Ronge, Kriegs- und Industriespionage, pp. 285±6.