Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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324 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

This declaration, which had been indirectly influenced by Crewe House as well,

was the most far-reaching commitment made by an Allied country to the

Czechoslovak but also to the Yugoslav cause. For the first time, one of the Allies

had publicly mentioned a future `Yugoslav state'. In Padua, Bogoljub Kujundz

assured Granville Baker that for that reason the statement was `exceptionally

important': `besides its political importance, which is without doubt enormous,

it also has a practical side in that through it one will eliminate all those notes of

mistrust which were spread intentionally or in good faith about the Versailles

Declaration'.

It is surprising therefore that Pichon's announcement seems to

have been omitted from Padua's Yugoslav material altogether, something

which might suggest that Ojetti himself was sensitive to its implications, or at

least that Kujundz

was unable to control was what printed in the

Commission's Yugoslav propaganda.

While Pichon's statement was an isolated event, Kujundz

hoped rather

optimistically that the Entente Powers would now `give a collective declaration

in which they will precisely and simply state, Austria est delenda'. This was

Crewe House's ideal as well, but for the present they had to be content with

satisfactory statements from the British and American governments which kept

up a certain momentum; Seton-Watson had continued to badger the Foreign

Office for more. On 1 July, Balfour duly sent a public telegram to the French,

associating Britain with Poincare

's declaration and expressing pleasure that

Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs and Poles were fighting at the side of the Allies for

the cause of freedom. It was, as Steed informed the EPD Committee, `the best

[British] declaration yet made', even if it found rather limited use in Padua's

manifestos.

More impressive certainly was a second major statement by

Robert Lansing on 28 June. When the Serbian minister in Washington com-

plained to

him that the Austrian press, notably the Neue Freie Presse, was

scorning the weak Versailles Declaration, Lansing responded with a definite

American commitment to destroy Austria-Hungary: `all branches of the Slav

race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule'. As Steed again

informed Crewe House, these were words which `had the effect of taking the

leadership out of the hands of Italy, where it had been placed by the Rome

Congress, and of putting it into the hands of the United States'. Ojetti duly

realized their importance and publicized them rather more widely than Lan-

sing's limp statement of sympathy a month earlier.

By July, therefore, all the Allies except Italy had made some further public

commitment to the Czechs and Yugoslavs to offset the weakness of the Ver-

sailles Declaration.

As far as the Yugoslav Committee was concerned, Crewe

House had been anxious to reassure them. Steed had advised their officials in

London to submit to the Foreign Office a memorandum, indicating the strength

of the Yugoslav movement in the Monarchy and requesting an `open and

decisive declaration' by the Allies to benefit that movement as well as the Allied

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 325

cause. At the same time, Baker when in Paris in mid-June had assured De Giulli

that he would personally work in Italy to secure for the Yugoslavs the same kind

of benefits accruing to the Czech movement.

When the Entente Powers then

made further commitments at the turn of the month, it seemed quite likely

that the Yugoslav Committee would soon be following the trail blazed by the

Czechs. In particular, at the Paris `Congress of Oppressed Nationalities', being

organized for 26±28 July, it might be possible to proclaim an important Allied

statement on the Yugoslav question. This in turn would please Fournol and

Franklin-Bouillon, who wanted their French congress to be as great a propa-

ganda success

as that in Rome, so as to underline France's leading role as patron

of the oppressed nationalities.

In the

days before the Congress, moreover, the British and French foreign

ministers committed themselves further to the Yugoslavs. On 24 July, the

fourth anniversary of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, at a Mansion House

meeting, the British Foreign Secretary gave a significant speech which Steed

expected to have great propaganda value (although again it was never exploited

in Ojetti's manifestos).

In it, as Steed recorded later, Balfour `criticized

Austria-Hungary more frankly than any other British minister had hitherto

done, and recognized the Austrian problem as the key to European reconstruc-

tion, and

the case of Yugoslavia as a test case of Allied sincerity in regard to its

solution'. He `had said enough to make it clear that the full Yugoslav pro-

gramme had

the sympathy and support of the British Government'.

For

Trumbic

, who was already in Paris for the Congress, this was confirmation of

what the French had told him a week earlier. Trumbic

had stressed to Pichon

that the Yugoslavs wanted the same concessions as the Czechs and Poles,

whereupon Pichon had assured him that both France and Britain were `without

qualification' on the side of the Yugoslav Committee. He advised Trumbic

simply to draw up a statement of recognition, as Benes

had done for the Czechs,

which could then be agreed to by the Allies.

This sounded a simple procedure, but as usual there were fundamental

obstacles. It was highly unlikely that either Italy or the Serbian government-

in-exile would agree to any Allied recognition of the Yugoslav Committee.

While in these circumstances the Yugoslav cause could only made slow pro-

gress, the

Czechoslovak National Council had no rivals and could achieve

much more. In the wake of the Anglo-French declarations, Benes

by July

hoped especially to push the British further.

Constantly advised by Steed in

his talks with the Foreign Office, Benes

could emphasize the Czechs' military

contribution on three Allied fronts, and the `evident maturity' of the Czech

nation in Austria, revealed most recently by the creation of a national council

in Prague. With the latter allegedly just waiting to take power as Benes

argued,

British recognition of the Czechoslovaks and their army as allies could have an

`explosive effect' in Bohemia as well as `an immense and beneficent influence

326 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

on the Poles and Yugoslavs'. Benes

was anxious to gain full Allied recognition

for the Czech cause before Austria-Hungary disintegrated. For the British, the

propaganda aspect (the `explosive effect') seems to have played its small part in

breaking down Balfour's initial reservations, even if Benes

's arguments about

the Czechs' military role were the most decisive.

The upshot was Balfour's

declaration on 9 August: Great Britain recognized the `Czechoslovaks' as an

Allied people, the three Czechoslovak armies as `one allied and belligerent

army' and the Czechoslovak National Council as `the present trustee of the

future Czechoslovak government'. All the e

migre

s recognized the great value of

this statement, which for the first time recognized Czechs and Slovaks, peoples

wholly subject to the Habsburgs, as Allies of the West. Trumbic

labelled it as

Finis Austriae.

It implied that the British intended to dismember the Habsburg

Empire, even if it did not bind them to that course. The Padua Commission too

was not slow to realize the sharp edge to Balfour's statement: it seemed to be the

most useful piece of propaganda from the Allied side since the start of Padua's

campaign (see page 353).

The new

declaration further highlighted Britain's leading role in support of

the oppressed nationalities, in contrast to Italy's lack of initiative since the

Rome Congress. This was something which loyal Italian supporters of a nation-

ality policy

found hard to swallow. For example, Leonida Bissolati viewed the

declaration as a humiliation for his country which was lagging behind the other

Allies and might now even be pre-empted by Britain over the sensitive Yugoslav

question.

The propagandists, whether at Padua or Crewe House, had equally

been concerned for some time at the attitude of `official Italy'. From the early

summer they, together with those like Bissolati who were sincere adherents of a

nationality policy, were trying to push Italy along the path to which they felt it

had publicly committed itself at the Rome Congress. Ultimately this meant that

either Sonnino would have to follow what was felt by many to be the alternat-

ive `Orlando±Bissolati'

policy, or Orlando would have to remove Sonnino and

his partisans from influence.

When Steed

had learnt of Sonnino's behaviour at Versailles he had decided to

communicate personally with Orlando. In early June the EPD had taken over

responsibility for British propaganda in Italy from the Ministry of Information,

and Steed now used this as an excuse for writing direct to Orlando.

In his

letter of 15 June, Steed pointed out that the British government had asked

Northcliffe to assume responsibility for `good relations' between Britain and

Italy, that a small committee had been organized for this, but that the work

necessitated `the continual coordination between English policy with regard to

Italy and Anglo-Italian policy against Austria-Hungary'. The latter policy, as

evidenced especially in the work of the Padua Commission, had unfortunately

been obstructed of late by tendencies which were `not completely in harmony

with the spirit of the Rome Congress'; indeed, they might be connected to

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 327

`a somewhat reactionary wind blowing for some weeks in sundry Italian pol-

itical circles'.

Since nationality politics had already brought Italy great benefits

and was the only one which could give it `security, development and independ-

ence', Steed

pressed Orlando for assurances that he was still committed to the

principles of April 1918.

Orlando's reply and his general behaviour in mid-June seemed reassuring.

While informing Steed that his policy would remain that agreed upon in April

`whatever the consequences may be', he closed a debate in the Italian chamber

on 16 June with a reaffirmation of his government's commitment to oppressed

peoples.

This was seized upon by Trumbic

who, while thoroughly disillu-

sioned by

the Versailles Declaration, chose now to exploit and reaffirm Orlan-

do's commitment. On 18 June, he stated in the Italian press that the Prime

Minister had `understood the importance of the Austro-Hungarian question . . .

and he enjoys our confidence'.

Whether or not Trumbic

really believed this,

his public trust in Orlando seemed to be justified when a week later he and a

deputation of the Yugoslav Committee were granted an official audience, a

meeting which found full expression in one of Ojetti's Yugoslav newssheets for

the enemy. On this occasion Trumbic

congratulated Orlando on `the great

victory of Italian arms . . . on the shores of the bloody and sacred Piave' and

reminded him that Italy which had been `the first among the oppressed nations

to snub Habsburg rule' was now fulfilling its noble mission of destroying the

Habsburg state and opening the road to freedom for the oppressed peoples of

Austria-Hungary.

He concluded rather sycophantically that `Your Excellency

knew with a clear vision how to establish a policy of mutual trust between Italy

and the Yugoslav nation'. Orlando in his reply was no less enthusiastic, con-

firming that

Italy's role was that prophesied by Mazzini, to act on behalf of

oppressed peoples and in fraternity with the `great Slav family'.

Such language encouraged the Yugoslav e

migre

s to continue believing that

there were two currents in Italian governmental and public opinion, that of

Orlando±Bissolati representing the Mazzini tradition and that of Sonnino repres-

enting himself.

Nor were the e

migre

s by any means alone in misrepresenting

Orlando's outlook. Bissolati himself continued to believe that Orlando was

sincerely sympathetic to nationality politics while Sonnino was the real obs-

tacle to

the execution of that policy. Others like Delme

-Radcliffe, having heard

personally from Orlando of his displeasure at the Versailles Declaration, only

naturally came to the same conclusion.

In fact Orlando's commitment to the

policy was one of pure expediency, to make an Italian victory on the basis of the

Treaty of London more likely. He wished to preserve a facËade of vague support

for the oppressed, while at the same time maintaining Italy's earlier war aims.

The fact that `appearance' was all important to Orlando is clear from remarks to

his ambassador in Paris who had warned him in mid-June that Italy should not

fall behind in statements of sympathy for the nationalities since certain French

328 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

circles were trying to win the role of protector exclusively for France. Orlando

replied that the Versailles Declaration had indeed been a mistake, but not so

much because it had been too `cold', rather because it had made Italy look

guilty.

A few weeks later, he stressed to a delegation of Italian irredentists

tha the had only adopted the nationality policy because of Italy's precarious

situation after Caporetto. The policy was important simply as an instrument for

Italy and did not signify that he had renounced any of Italy's territorial

claims.

In the light of these remarks it might be expected that after the Piave battle,

with the prospect of victory over Austria more likely, Orlando would feel less

anxious about maintaining the facËade. This was to some extent the case, for as

the summer progressed he drew openly closer to Sonnino. He was nevertheless

still concerned to avoid any government crisis on the eve of victory, and this

perpetuated his desire to maintain a compromise in governmental policy, to try

to pacify Bissolati as well as Sonnino. For the role of mediator he was perhaps

ideally suited since, in Ojetti's view, he had the deformazione professionale of a

lawyer: the ability to agree with everyone.

Yet his attitude was not one which

the Allied propagandists were prepared to tolerate. Both Crewe House and Ugo

Ojetti moved to counter a tendency which they felt was weakening their

propaganda efforts.

In spite

of Orlando's `nice speeches' which had given some satisfaction to

Steed and Seton-Watson, they were still determined to bring pressure to bear

upon the man whom they considered the real villain of the piece ± Sonnino. On

20 June, Seton-Watson had attacked Sonnino in his journal The New Europe,

describing him as `the benumbing influence'.

It was an article which seemed

to hit its mark, fuelling rumours in Italy that Sonnino was about to resign or be

removed from office. But it also brought criticism upon Crewe House itself,

from the British embassy in Rome and from Gaetano Salvemini's L'Unita

, both

of which considered the attack as blatant interference in Italian politics.

Crewe House's interference however did not stop there: in late June it sent to

Italy the secretary of its `Italian Committee', Gerald O'Donovan.

O'Donovan

made a controversial tour of the country, publicly chastising the Italians for

wavering from the nationality principle, and sending back firm recommenda-

tions to

Crewe House and the Foreign Office. On his departure from Italy, for

example, he advised that `unless something is done very soon to define position

of Allies towards the subject races of Austria-Hungary, suspicions of motives of

more than one of the Allies will be intensified'.

O'Donovan therefore added

his voice to those emanating from the Italian Front or the EPD who were

increasingly alerting the Allies to the danger of Italy's ambiguous attitude,

pressing them to formulate a clear Allied policy which might, not least, prove

more useful and effective for the purposes of psychological warfare against

Austria-Hungary.

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 329

These voices naturally included Ojetti himself as well as Salvemini and

Bissolati, men who as sincere proponents of a nationality policy viewed with

alarm the way in which an ultra-nationalist and anti-Yugoslav agitation had

emerged in the Italian press after the Versailles Declaration.

Already on

6 June, La Stampa of Turin had congratulated Sonnino on his opposition to

the Yugoslavs, alleging that they had yet to prove themselves to be anti-Habsburg

or of any help to the Allies. It was an article which encouraged Bissolati to

complain to Orlando that the Consulta was supporting ultra-nationalist propa-

ganda, pushing

the Yugoslavs into the arms of Austria.

If Orlando's speeches

in the next two weeks did something to offset the impact of Versailles, the

strange ambiguity of Italy's policy was nevertheless well portrayed on 30 June

by Epoca, a newspaper which had particular connections to Orlando. It praised

his policy of Italian±Slav agreement in the spirit of 1848 or 1866, but went on to

warn its readers of a `secret organization' which was spreading poisonous

propaganda with the purpose of ruining Italian±Slav friendship. On 1 July a

much publicized specimen of such `poison' duly appeared in the Bolognese

Il Resto del Carlino. An article by Francesco Coppola contrasted the supposed

`treacherous' behaviour of Yugoslavs (against Austria) with the actual conduct

of two (allegedly) `Yugoslav' Austrian divisions, the 10ID and 12ID, whom he

asserted to have fought loyally for their Habsburg masters during the battle of

the Piave.

Coppola's article produced a strong reaction. At Salvemini's suggestion,

Ojetti replied with a public refutation of the allegations. He had already demon-

strated over

the Caburi incident in May that he did not believe that attacks on

the nationality policy should go unanswered. And in his first report on the

work of the Padua Commission, written itself on 1 July and possibly influenced

by Coppola's article, he numbered among the tasks still to be completed the

need `to reconcile propaganda against the enemy army with the political

action, so far dispersed and contradictory, of the Italian press which is read,

quoted and discussed daily not only by neutrals and allies but also by the

enemy'. Italian propaganda at home and abroad had to follow the same prin-

ciples as

front propaganda, so that the Austrians could not take advantage of

discrepancies in Italy's public pronouncements and assert that `we are talking

like this out of pure and short-sighted opportunism'.

Ojetti was naturally

sensitive to the role of the press since he himself was exploiting the radical

Austro-Hungarian press to such advantage. In his reply to Coppola, published

in Il Resto del Carlino on 5 July, he gave full rein to his exasperation. Despite the

Rome Congress and Orlando's statements, a `tiny minority' were continuing to

attack the Yugoslav e

migre

s, thereby doing the greatest service to the Austrians

to the benefit of their propaganda campaign against Italy. He challenged the

accuracy of Coppola's statements. While the 10th and 12th divisions hardly

contained any Yugoslav soldiers, he himself had recently visited Yugoslav

330 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

prisoners in the 3rd army zone and become convinced from their behaviour

that the Yugoslav Committee did indeed have the support of the `Yugoslav

people'.

This was rather a wild statement, however enthusiastic the welcome

which Ojetti and Jambris

ak had received among Serb and Croat prisoners (on

21 June); but Ojetti was only too aware that he had to oppose Coppola's

arguments with positive generalizations of his own.

Coppola replied

on 10 July, describing Ojetti's views as an `epidemic of

blindness which for three or four months has been massacring Italian political

intelligence'.

He asserted, with some justification, that the 42HID, the pre-

dominantly Slav

12ID, as well as Bosnian troops had been fighting valiantly

against Italy. He then listed some rather tendentious evidence to prove that the

Yugoslav movement was really anti-Italian and pro-Austrian; most examples

referred to the way in which Yugoslavs in Austria and Italy were publicly laying

claim to the Adriatic coastline.

At the core of Coppola's argument was the fact

that Yugoslavs were opposed to the Treaty of London; he himself felt that the

treaty embodied the sole criterion for which Italy was waging the war, namely

the `rights of Italy', and that any discussion of Mazzini's principles was `useless

and anachronistic'. He denied Ojetti's claim that those of his persuasion were a

`tiny minority'. Rather, they represented the totalita

degli italiani, out to stop the

`cheap trick' of a few foreign intriguers and many naõ

ve Italians by exposing the

real attitude of the Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary. To do so, he argued, could

not benefit the Austrians since the Yugoslavs were already in their camp!

Ojetti was

extremely irritated by this second article from Coppola, feeling

that it had been directly inspired or even drafted by the Consulta itself.

Since

Orlando seemed incapable of removing Sonnino from office, Ojetti urged

Albertini to begin another campaign in the columns of Corriere della Sera, this

time to topple Sonnino and his adherents. But such desperate tactics were not

yet acceptable to Albertini who still trusted Orlando's commitment to the

oppressed nationalities. He preferred, rather than being responsible for creating

a government crisis, to use more subtle means to twist Orlando's arm.

Ojetti

therefore reluctantly agreed to be patient and await a meeting with his two

mentors, Orlando and Albertini, in the war zone. There they would put their

cards on the table and if Orlando was found to be hesitant or frivolous over

nationality politics, Ojetti vowed that he would ask to be relieved of his post.

On his own admission, the only thing which was keeping him at Padua was

pressure from Albertini, Bissolati and Salvemini. Having been appointed by

Orlando to propagate the nationality policy from the war zone, he felt it

dishonourable to remain while the `see-saw policy' of Orlando and Sonnino

continued.

After all, as he had pointed out in his first propaganda report,

Italy's ambiguous stance was not only seriously hampering the effectiveness of

psychological warfare. It was, as he told Albertini on 14 July, causing the work

at Padua to become `disjointed and weakened'. At the CS the blatant Slavo-

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 331

phobes had retaken the upper hand, with Siciliani himself preaching that the

nationality policy had failed, while the national delegates at Padua were natur-

ally becoming

suspicious and disheartened.

Ojetti was furthermore charac-

teristically anxious

about Italy losing its position as the leading patron amongst

the Allies of the oppressed peoples. Since the British and French were already

emphasizing to their advantage the contradictions in Italian policy, Ojetti

feared that the Paris Congress, instead of being a valuable sequel to the Rome

Congress, would simply show up Italy in a poor light. He warned Albertini:

`that congress, which ought to reaffirm the need for Austria's decomposition,

will perhaps only endorse our political incapacity to smash her'.

That this might indeed be the result seemed all the more likely because of

Sonnino's attitude to the Paris Congress. Compared to Orlando, who contem-

plated Italy's

image and favoured a good number of influential Italians attend-

ing the

event, Sonnino saw everything through the prism of Italy's London

treaty. He was not only averse to any more joint Allied statements about the

subject races, but also refused to grant diplomatic passports to Salvemini,

Amendola, Torre and others so that they could attend the Congress. Although

in the end he yielded to pressure from Orlando, it was not, unfortunately,

before the Congress had been postponed to September (it never met). At the

last moment Crewe House had advised a delay. Steed reasoned that Allied

disharmony would be only too evident at the event since no Yugoslav declara-

tion was

ready to be made public. This, combined with the practical hurdles

which Sonnino had set up, sabotaged the chance of the Paris Congress repeat-

ing the

propaganda coup of its Roman predecessor. The French, with good

reason, placed the full blame for the postponement on the Italians.

Meanwhile, the passport incident had contributed to fomenting the long-

expected crisis in the Italian government. It centred entirely around the contradic-

tions in

official policy, personified by Sonnino on the one hand, and Bissolati

and Gallenga Stuart on the other. Ever since the Rome Congress, Gallenga, with

the support of Orlando, had been propagating the nationality policy in allied

and neutral countries, while Sonnino had been advancing his own views

abroad through Italian nationalist groups as well as diplomatic channels.

The two ministers and their representatives had repeatedly clashed, and finally,

on 28 July, after Sonnino had recalled two employees of Gallenga's ministry to

the Consulta, Gallenga's patience snapped and he submitted his resignation.

Like Ojetti, he hoped by such a move to clarify the ambiguity. Either it would

strengthen Orlando's hand, enabling him to take `a decision which it is known

he wished to take' of clear commitment to the Yugoslav cause, or it would set

Gallenga free to exercise pressure independently inside and outside Parliament

in favour of the Yugoslavs. In the event, Gallenga's move led to neither result.

Orlando managed to persuade him that Italy's policy towards the Yugoslavs was

still an issue which he hoped to conclude successfully, not a matter suitable to

332 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

provoke a cabinet crisis. Gallenga thereupon withdrew his resignation on con-

dition that

a Yugoslav legion be formed, and that he himself would be admitted

to meetings of the Italian War Council.

It was clear that the governmental crisis had only been deferred. When

Orlando met Ojetti and Albertini at Padua in early August and gave them

similar assurances to those made to Gallenga, Albertini warned him that there

would be a press campaign against Sonnino if the matter was not resolved very

quickly.

Orlando was also still under mounting pressure from within his own

cabinet, notably from Bissolati who was especially incensed at Sonnino's initial

refusal to grant passports to the Paris delegates. Egged on by Ojetti, he too was

threatening to resign unless the Prime Minister shook off his `timidity' and

forced Sonnino to change his stance over the Yugoslavs. Bissolati was not at

all optimistic that Orlando would manage to do this, but on 12 August he

informed Trumbic

that in a few days there was to be an important meeting

between himself, Orlando and Sonnino, followed by a ministerial conference as

a result of which the question would be resolved one way or the other.

The

impression was that Italian obstacles to `effective propaganda', which Crewe

House had failed to shift, might finally be dismantled by the Italians them-

selves.

8.2 An Italian or an Allied campaign?

Among the Italian obstacles which Steed and Seton-Watson were trying to

surmount from London, the Padua Commission itself was always perceived as

part of the problem. From the start it had failed to function harmoniously as an

Allied concern. Ojetti's methods of control had immediately alienated Gran-

ville Baker,

while progressively irritating the national delegates who, in the case

of the Yugoslavs and Poles, had expected their own delimited sphere of influ-

ence in

the campaign. Admittedly, by the time of Austria's offensive Ojetti's

relations with the Yugoslav delegates had somewhat improved. This was due

partly to Delme

-Radcliffe's intervention, but also to the CS which had decided

to allow Jambris

ak and Kujundz

to visit and agitate among `Yugoslav' prisoners

in the war zone. Nevertheless, when in mid-June Baker returned to Padua

after a visit to London, he failed to detect any change in the environment

since he was repeatedly reminded that his own role was to be strictly advisory.

On 18 June, he warned Crewe House: `everything is being done to deprive this

commission of its inter-Allied character'. Ojetti, whom Baker pictured as the

tool of Sonnino, was still insisting on a purely Italian organization; the Yugo-

slav delegates

in turn were champing at the bit since, according to Baker at

least, Ojetti insisted on the Treaty of London and prohibited any reference

to the Corfu Declaration.

It was a lurid assessment and it brought a speedy

and characteristic response. In his reply, sent to Delme

-Radcliffe, Northcliffe

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 333

strongly condemned the drift towards a purely Italian organization or any

slighting of the Yugoslavs:

I cannot

acquiesce in Baker's intercourse with the representatives of the

subject nationalities being limited in any way, as the establishment of the

Inter-Allied Commission was due to my initiative. I shall find means of

making representations to the competent Italian authorities to this effect.

Please inform Col. Siciliani and Capt. Ojetti, in the meantime, that unless the

original arrangement is adhered to, we shall have [to] reconsider the whole

position carefully as the whole work which was begun at my initiative would

evidently be wrecked if they persist in the present alleged tendencies.

At the same time, Crewe House contacted Borgese in Berne, asking him to

support the EPD's efforts to counteract `this deplorable tendency' in Padua.

Borgese found the information `extremely painful'. While sensing that Baker's

own personality and interpretation were largely to blame, he advised Albertini

to caution patience on Ojetti: `we must think how useful for the policy we

desire has been the action of Northcliffe and Steed towards the English govern-

ment and

especially towards Balfour'. A rupture with Crewe House now would

do great damage at a time when, Borgese suggested, Austria was organizing

large-scale propaganda against Italy.

Albertini, however, took a more cynical

view of British behaviour. The facts seemed to be that Italy was genuinely

committed to the oppressed nationalities, as shown for instance by Orlando's

meeting with Trumbic

(26 June), while Crewe House was constantly question-

ing Italy's

commitment. The discrepancy of viewpoint could be explained by

the British seeking to undermine Italy's leading role in the nationality cause to

benefit themselves and promote Yugoslav aspirations at the expense of Italian.

Albertini's theory seemed to tally quite well with the prevailing conflict in the

Padua Commission. There, he felt, Ojetti was doing an excellent job with the

enthusiastic backing of the national delegates, running a campaign which

was naturally going to be largely an Italian affair. In contrast, Baker's attitude

was inflexible and `rather ambiguous even if he is not a complete idiot'. It was

Baker, not Ojetti, who ought to be dismissed.

Albertini's outlook entirely chimed with that of Ojetti. Ojetti would never

accept Steed's idea that the Commission was an Allied body. As we have seen,

the two concepts of an Italian or Allied campaign had their precise origins

earlier in the year when both the Italians and British had separately come to

the conclusion that psychological warfare ought to be more tightly coordinated

against Austria-Hungary. Steed had, until April at least, erroneously worked on

the premise that little had been done by Italy; while Ojetti had always been

aware of previous Italian efforts, envisaging that his role was to work from an

established Italian base, producing front propaganda of quality which would