Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

314 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

101. On

15 August 1917, when Eisner-Bubna (head of KPQ ) had met representatives of

the KU

and the HFB to discuss censorship, he had divided news items simply into

these two

categories: Spann, Zensur, p. 219.

102. Ibid., pp. 71ff, 76ff.

103. See, for example, the comments of the military attache

in Switzerland: KA, FAst,

Fasz.5994, Res.130,

16 May 1918; and the FAst's own conclusions about the

domestic press on 11 June (ibid., Res.155, Beilage 11), that it conducted `not exactly

a beneficial activity'[!].

104. Ibid.,

Res.89, Alfred von Waldsta

tten

to FAst, Op.Nr 766/107, 10 May: section III,

`Mittel zur Beka

mpfung der fdl. Propaganda'.

105. See ibid., Res.103, AOK to FAst, Op.Nr 766/136, 16 May 1918 (eight of the daily

press extracts are enclosed).

106. Ibid.,

Res.159, Arz to FAst, AOK Op.Nr 143027/II, 11 June. See also comments by

the FAst: Res.211, FAst to Arz, 24 June, enclosing further newspaper extracts to

illustrate the deficiencies of the censor.

107. By

October 1918, for example, Hrvatska Drz

ava, Pra

vo Lidu, Illustrowany Kurjer

Codzienny, Innsbrucker Volkszeitung and others had been added to the list, while

some (Slovenec, Vila

g) had been dropped because of `loyal' behaviour: ibid.,

Fasz.5998, Res.754.

108. See,

for example, Spann, Zensur, p. 371.

109. See Cornwall, `The Experience of Yugoslav Agitation in Austria-Hungary 1917±

1918', pp. 664±6.

110. KA, FAst, Fasz.5994, Res.64, Rudolf Peerz to Waldsta

tten, 26 April; Res.228: Peerz's

proposal for a FAst in the Ministry of the Interior.

111. See ibid., Res.143, 11AK to Conrad, Op.Nr 1766/3, 4 May; Res.262, `Studie u

ber

Innenpropaganda-Organisation' by Hptm Josef Weber (11AK); Fasz.5995, Res.273/

8, MilKmdo Krako

w to FAst, Pra

s.Nr 5942, 29 July 1918.

112. Ibid.,

Res.85, EvB to FAst, Nr.12892, 7 May 1918, enclosing study by Hptm Otto

Wittmayer for an O

sterreichisch

er Vo

lkerverein.

113. A number of historians have highlighted this event. See, for example, Karel Pichlõ

`Der milita

rische Zusammenbruch der Mittelma

chte

im Jahre 1918', in R. Plaschka

and K. Mack (eds), Die Auflo

sung des Habsburgerreiches. Zusammenbruch und Neuor-

ientierung im

Donauraum (Munich, 1970) p. 260.

114. Richard

Spence, `The Yugoslav Role in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914±1918', in

B. Kira

and N. Dreisziger (eds), East Central European Society in World War I (New

York, 1985)

p. 360.

115. HIL, 42HID, Fasz.1659, Report by Hptm Rupnik, 30 January 1918.

116. KA, AOK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112745, 42HID to VI KK, Op.Nr 4520/5, 21

April 1918.

In February, for example, 24 Croats who were due at the front having

attended a machine-gun school in Poz

ega managed to escape from the transport

taking them from Poz

ega to Zagreb (HIL, 42HID, Fasz.1660, Op.Nr 4327).

117. The

usual official Austro-Hungarian terminology when describing Italy.

118. Ibid., Op.Nr 4329, GM Mihaljevic

, special divisional order no. 5 [in Croat],

9 February 1918.

119. The following discussion is largely based on the 42HID records in HIL, Fasz.1659±

67. See also

KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.270, Op.Nr 2847/2 Soretic

to 11AK, Op.Nr

4806/7, 9 July 1918.

120. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2222, Rittmeister Ernst Hackl to 11AK, 6 May,

with minutes by Mihaljevic

and Frydman; Pr.2232; Pr.2242, XIII KK to 11AK,

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 315

t.Op.Nr 450/3,

27 May 1918: 500 copies of nine different manifestos had been

deposited in May.

121. AHZ,

42 Domobranska pjes

adijska divizija (1916±1918) [42HID records], 482/Fasc.2,

Verzeichnis u

ber Deserteure.

122. Five

boxes of Belos

evic

's papers are in the Croatian State Archives (AHZ, no. 789),

but they largely discuss the Carzano plot and were used by Belos

evic

in his article,

`Uloga Ljudevita Pivka u talijanskom napadu kod Karcanca 17.Septembra 1917.

godine', Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 20 (1969), pp. 231±40.

123. Pivko,

Val Bella, pp. 23±8. In late June 1918, the radical paper Hrvatska Drz

ava

would publish a statement by Jewish university students in favour of Yugoslav

unification.

124. See

HIL, 42HID, Fasz.1659, Rupnik report, 30 January 1918. A Sturmbatallion had

been created in every division in February 1917. Details of the 42nd Sturm course in

April 1918 are to be found in AHZ, 42HID, Fasc.2.

125. Pivko,

Informatorji, p. 100; Pivko, Val Bella, p. 23; KA, AOK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.377,

Op.Nr 112745, Soretic

to XIII KK, Na Nr 172, 5 June; ibid., 42HID court, R.1068±18,

`Referat', 29 May 1918. For Yugoslav colours among military in the hinterland, see

Cornwall, `The Experience of Yugoslav Agitation', p. 668; and Franjo Barac (ed.),

Croats and Slovenes ± Friends of the Entente in the World War (Paris, 1919) pp. 69, 74.

126. Pivko,

Val Bella, p. 47.

ic127. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2242. Kostrenc

himself told the Italians that in

early 1918 he had been appointed as a propaganda officer to the 83rd Brigade

(42HID), but a table of 11th army propaganda officers of 27 March does not contain

his name, and certainly he was never one of the two divisional propaganda officers

nor one of their `interpreters' (ibid., Pr.2120, Beilage 13). The propaganda officer on

leave at the time of Kostrenc

's desertion was Rittmeister Ernst Hackl who had

only recently

been appointed as head of Nachrichtentruppen no. 1 (83rd Brigade) as

well as

propaganda leader for the whole division. Nachrichtentruppen no. 2 (84th

Brigade) in

the Val Bella sector had been led since March by Lt Ludwig Zendron.

128. See

KA, 11AK, Fasz.272, 4±6/2, 11AK to corps, Op.Nr 1423, 2 March 1918: two

Czechs or two Serbs were now forbidden to be on sentry duty together.

129. KA,

AOK Op.Abt, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112745, 42HID court report, 29 May. The deser-

ters' arrival

was announced on the Italian side: see PRO, WO 157/636, DIS no. 167,

15 May 1918.

130. KA,

AOK, Op.Nr 112745, 42HID court report, 29 May.

131. Pivko,

Val Bella, pp. 47±9; Informatorji, pp. 98±9. Kostrenc

's information was used

extensively by Mate Nikolic

for an Intelligence summary of conditions in Austria-

Hungary.

132. PRO,

FO 371/3136, WO `Notes on the situation in Austria-Hungary no. 3 ± August

1918', paragraph 34.

133. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2267, 11AK to XV KK, 5 June. Copies in Czech

also existed and were assumed by the Austrians to have been written by S

tina

(ibid., Pr.2257).

134. KA,

EvB 1918, Fasz.5753/19017/3, HGK Conrad to AOK, Na Nr 2000/4, 14 June,

enclosing purple leaflet found in the Assa gorge, signed by Belos

evic

, Kostrenc

and S

tina (dated 19 May).

135. Pivko,

Val Bella, p. 25: manifesto, `Jugoslav brothers! Croats, Serbs, Slovenes!'

(signed by the three officer-deserters). Eugen Kvaternik (1825±71) was, ironically,

a Great Croat nationalist who had led a revolt against the Habsburgs in 1871. The

316 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

later individuals

referred to were heroes from the legendary Serbian struggle against

the Turks which had ended at the battle of Kosovo in 1389. However, they were

also key figures from a common South Slav epic poetry, and therefore potentially

had a deeper cultural significance for many `Yugoslavs'. See Andrew B. Wachtel,

Making a

Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia

(Stanford, 1998)

pp. 33ff.

136. Pivko, Val Bella, pp. 26±8, 74: two leaflets, one signed by all four deserters, the other

iconly by

Kostrenc

. Pivko suggests that the latter manifesto had `sensational

success' on the front from early June.

137. KA,

AOK Op.Abt, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112745, HIR27 to 42HID, Op.Nr 314, 27 May.

Pivko mentions that Zvonarevic

in August was due to be punished, but does not

specify the crime committed: Pivko, DRUP (Maribor, 1928) p. 71.

138. KA,

AOK, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112745, 42HID court, Na Nr 143/18 (R.1242±18/16),

`Referat', 28 May; ibid., HIR27 to 42HID, Op.Nr 314, 27 May.

139. KA,

AOK, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112745, 42HID court record, 28 May; ibid., 42HID to XIII

KK, Na Nr 172, 5 June 1918. Svetec too had links to S

tina's fiance

e, Milica

Popovic

, who was subsequently arrested.

140. See

Pivko, Nas

i Dobrovoljci u Italiji, pp. 42±3; and for the arrival of the deserters in

Italy: PRO, WO 157/636, DIS no. 180, 28 May 1918. On Val Bella, the work of one

of Pivko's patrols, led by Veselko-Sedlecky

, seems to have begun just after 26 May:

Pivko, Informatorji, p. 95.

141. See

KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.268, Op.Nr 2752/3, XIII KK to 11AK, 11 July,

enclosing table of deserters during the period 1±15 June. Three were Serbs, the

rest Croats.

142. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2242, XIII KK to 11AK, t.Op.Nr 450/3, 27 May

1918.

143. Ibid.,

Fasz.272, 4±6/8±2, 35 I Brigade Kmdo to VI KK, Op.Nr 527/7 Phonogram,

27 May; HIL, 42HID, Fasz.1667, 84 HI Brigade to 42HID, t.Op.Nr 527/1±b, 27 May

1918.

144. KA,

AOK, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112745, 42HID court, Na Nr 143/18, `Referat', 28 May

1918.

145. Ibid.,

HIR27 to 42HID, Op.Nr 345, 2 June. For a vivid defence of the division's

reputation, see also the 26th regiment's report: HIR26 to XIII KK, Res.476, 1 June.

146. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.270, Op.Nr 2847/2, 42HID (Soretic

) to 11AK, Op.Nr 4806/

7, 9 July 1918.

147. See

the 36ID judicial records in KA, Feldgerichte Akten 1918, Fasz.565, 3753, 4302,

3260, 8812. The case of Martin Maljak is typical. He returned from leave in Croatia

to his regiment (IR116) two months late, giving as his reason that his wife was ill,

he had to care for their two children, but that when she recovered an epidemic had

broken out in the locality and he himself had fallen ill (Fasz.3260, K767/18).

Hungarian courts martial records from the interior present a similar picture.

Many of the records from Szeged in early 1918 deal with desertion or excessive

leave in the hinterland: see for instance HIL, Szegedi Hadbiro

g 1918, Box 268 Hb

(cases 715±765), which is almost entirely about such incidents.

148. KA,

AOK, Fasz.377, Op.Nr 112745, HIR27 to 42HID, Op.Nr 345, 2 June 1918.

149. Ibid.,

XIII KK to 11AK, Aw.Nr 481, 12 June; 42HID to XIII KK, Na Nr 153/1, 5 June;

HIR28 to 42HID, Res.500, 31 May 1918.

150. Ibid.,

German translation of Obstlt Na

dasdy's report about the state of the 42HID

(zu Gstb Nr 81) [August? 1918].

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 317

151. KA,

AOK Op.Abt, Fasz.378, Nr 113167, 42HID to XXVI KK, Op.Nr 5017/10,

20 September 1918 (and minute by Boroevic

152. Plaschk

a, Haselsteiner, Suppan, Innere Front, II, p. 78.

153. OULK,

VII, pp. 245, 301, 303.

154. HIL,

42HID, Fasz.1659, Kampfstand der 42HID, 30 January; KA, XIII KK 1918,

Fasz.182, Op.Nr 501, 1 May; HIL, Fasz.1668, Op.Nr 4811, 42HID to XVIII KK,

Op.Nr 4792/12, 28 June 1918.

155. KA,

XIII KK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.184, Op.Nrs 617, 619.

156. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.270, Op.Nr 2847/2, 42HID (Soretic

) to 11AK, Op.Nr

4806/7, 9 July 1918. (Draft of this is in HIL, 42HID, Fasz.1668.)

157. HIL,

42HID, Fasz.1668, Op.Nr 4826, 11AK to 42HID, Op.Nr 8070/15c, 24 July 1918.

The ringleader, Korporal Stjepan Likovic

, was sentenced to 20 days' solitary con-

finement by

the divisional court.

158. KA,

AOK Op.Abt, Fasz.381, Nr 114315, Boroevic

to AOK, t.Op.Nr 1471, [27?]

October 1918; OULK, VII, pp. 592, 630.

159. BL,

Northcliffe MSS, vol. X, Add.Mss.62162, minutes of 2nd Committee meeting at

Crewe House, 27 May 1918.

160. AJA,

JO 35/252, Jambris

ak to Banjanin, 7 June 1918.

161. Ojetti,

Lettere alla Moglie, pp. 534±5. See also Zanotti-Bianco, Carteggio 1906±1918,

p. 632, for

Ojetti's confidence after a month of work.

162. Steed, Through Thirty Years, II, p. 215.

163. PRO, FO 371/3136, WO `Notes on the situation in Austria-Hungary, no. III ± August

1918'.

164. Ibid.

165. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.272, 4±6/12, HGK Conrad to 11AK, Op.Nr 26300/13, 8 June

1918. The proportions are equally clear from corps records: from the Ist corps sector

there were 28 known deserters during May, of whom 11 had deserted to Italy (ibid.,

4±6/11). For the trend in desertions, see also KA, 10AK 1918, Fasz.441, R.366,

Krobatin to corps, Op.Nr 4167/2, 15 May; and PRO, FO 371/3136, WO `Notes'.

166. SWP,

Draft EPD Report, p. 38; Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, pp. 40, 168.

167. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 123, 284, 312.

168. PRO,

WO 106/852, Cavan to CIGS, 27 May 1918; Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie, p. 527;

OULK, VII,

p. 266.

169. For the case of Paprskar

, see the reports (including the captured Italian interroga-

tion of

Paprskar

) in KA, 6AK Na-Stelle, Fasz.16, Na Nr 4086; Hanzal, SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky,

p. 284. The

Austrians were more sceptical than the Italians about the quality of the

information betrayed, feeling that Paprskar

had imparted a lot of gossip.

170. Finzi,

`I.T.O.', pp. 229±40; Pivko, Val Bella, p. 70 note; Marchetti, Ventotto Anni,

pp. 355±6; Hanzal, SVy

zve

õky, p. 176, for desertions near Lake Garda; Paulova

Jugoslavenski Odbor, pp. 444±5 evaluates the perhaps crucial role of a Bosnian Serb

deserter on the evening of 14 June.

171. CCC,

Cavan MSS, 1/3, part 1, `Italy', p. 12.

SNR-S172. See

VHA, Fond C

tefa

nik, 35/3/4, S

eba to S

tefa

nik, 26 June 1918. S

eba was told

the same thing by Pecori-Giraldi, commander of the lst army.

173. Pivko,

Informatorji, p. 95.

174. Ronge,

Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 391.

175. Glaise-Ho

rstenau, Ein General im Zwielicht, I, p. 471.

176. On

this subject, see especially Peter Fiala, Die letzte Offensive Alto

sterreichs; OULK,

VII, pp. 190±207. See also Boroevic

's fiery letter to Franz von Bolgar (19 June 1918),

318 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

published in

Neue Freie Presse, Nr 20377, 23 May 1921; and in its uncensored and

damning version: Neue Freie Presse, Nr 23128, 3 February 1929.

177. See KA, FAst 1918, Fasz.5996, Res.487, Beilage zu AOK Op.Nr 146329; KA, 11AK,

Fasz.446, Nr 1100, `Verhalten der o

st-ung.

Truppen in der Ka

mpfen vom 15±30 Juni

1918'; and `Slawische Verra

tereien an der italienischen Front', in Neue Freie Presse,

Nr 19368, 28 July 1918 (Morgenblatt), p. 4.

178. Stuart,

Secrets of Crewe House, p. 168; Seton Correspondence, I, no. 221, p. 330.

179. BL, Northcliffe MSS, vol. X, Add.Mss.62162, Minutes of 8th EPD Committee meet-

ing, 6

August 1918; Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, p. 45.

180. IWM, Wilson MSS, 22/10, Delme

-Radcliffe to Wilson, 10 June 1918.

181. Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie, p. 541; Ojetti, La Propaganda sul Nemico, p. 129; and his

comments too

to Zanotti-Bianco: Carteggio 1906±1918, p. 634.

182. PRO, WO 106/825, Radcliffe to DMO, B.M.452/42, 24 June; Ojetti, Lettere, p. 541;

AJA, JO

35/103, Jambris

ak report, July 1918 (sent to the French ambassador in Rome).

183. Marchetti, Ventotto Anni, p. 338.

184. Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, p. 44; PRO, WO 106/824, Radcliffe to DMO, B.M.452/

40, 21

June 1918.

185. Hanzal, SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, p. 204.

186. Pivko, Val Bella, pp. 49±52, 55; Pivko, DRUP, pp. 21±4.

187. Finzi, `I.T.O.', pp. 235±6, 250±1.

188. SWP, Draft EPD Report, p. 37; Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, p. 44.

189. See KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.269, 1±17/15±33, Op.Nr 2745, Csana

dy (XIII KK) to

11AK, Op.Nr

628/6, 29 June; and for an example of refusal to move into the front

line: KA, XIII KK, Fasz.184, Op.Nr 618.

190. PRO,

WO 106/824, Radcliffe to DMO, B.M.452/40, 21 June 1918. Some historians

have contributed to the `propaganda myth' by misinterpreting statistics; thus

Luciano Tosi (La Propaganda Italiana, p. 188) interprets the Italian figures of prison-

ers taken

during the offensive as figures for `mass desertion'.

191. Steed,

Through Thirty Years, II, p. 215; Stuart, Secrets, pp. 40,42. Jambris

ak,

Kujundz

and Gallenga all publicized this idea as well: see DRP, File `Private letters

out', Radcliffe to Lord Stamfordham, 10 July; PRO, WO 106/817, Radcliffe to DMO,

SBM 249, 2 August 1918.

192. PRO,

CAB 23/6, W.C.436, 26 June 1918.

193. PRO,

FO 371/3136, WO `Notes on the situation in Austria-Hungary, no. III ± August

1918'. Radcliffe too recorded the general apathy of prisoners who `when ques-

tioned as

to open revolt, ask what they can do with a resigned and hopeless air'

(PRO, WO 106/824, Radcliffe to DMO, B.M.452/40, 21 June).

194. KA,

FAst 1918, Fasz.5994, Res.89, AOK to FAst, Op.Nr 766/107, 10 May: `Sitzung am

26 April 1918. Frontpropaganda'.

ic195. That

the AOK's fears were well-founded was to be clear from Kostrenc

's desertion,

and also the desertion of a propaganda patrol of IR75 (Czech) in late May (KA, HGK

Conrad, Fasz.72, Na Nr 400a/322).

196. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2218, AOK to 11AK, 10AK, 6AK, KISA, etc., Op.Nr

766/120, `Richtlinien fu

die Feindpropaganda', 10 May 1918.

197. Ibid., Pr.2242, 11AK Beilage zum Monatsbericht u

ber

den Feind pro Mai 1918. For

the 11AK `peace offensive' leaflet, see ibid., Fasz.448, Pr.2204/34, `Vi portiamo la

pace! Non vogliamo prendervi le vostre terre!'

198. KA,

11AK, Fasz.445, Na Nrs 609 (KISA Beilage 8), 756 (KISA Beilage 11); Fasz.446,

Na Nr 889.

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 319

199. For

example, in the 11AK sector: 52ID, 28ID, 39HID, 16ID, 74HID, 5ID, etc. (ibid.,

Fasz. 449, Pr.2208).

200. For

Italian desertions, see ibid., Fasz. 446, Na Nr 891. Fontana Secca (55ID) was a

spot where fraternization was actually continuing into late May (ibid., Fasz. 449,

Pr.2242) with the permission of the 11AK propaganda officer.

201. KA,

HGK Conrad, Fasz.66, Na Nr 400a/342, AOK to Conrad, Op.Nr 766/189,

11 June

1918.

202. KA, FAst, Fasz.5995, Res.403, KISA to AOK, Op.Nr 6847/1, 28 July 1918.

203. KA, HGK Erzherzog Joseph 1918, Fasz.65, F.E.G.Nr 48850/17, AOK Op.Nr 766/345,

ber

5000 wa

hrend der Ka`Untersuchungen und

statistische Daten u

mpfe vom 15

bis 30 Juni an der Piave eingebrachten Kriegsgefangenen'. A few prisoners remarked

that Austria might more effectively have concentrated their efforts upon the Italian

hinterland, especially Reggio Emilia, Ferrara and Turin.

204. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt, Fasz.449, Pr.2308.

205. KA, FAst, Fasz.5995, Res.403, KISA Gstbs Abt to AOK, Op.Nr 6847/1, 28 July 1918.

206. KA, 11AK Op.Abt, Fasz.447, Na Nr 1359, 6AK to 11AK, Op.Nr 977/Ev, 31 July,

Beilage 14.

207. Ibid., Fasz.449, Pr.2308, 11AK to AOK, 11 July 1918.

208. Ronge, Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 346.

The Climax of Italian Psychological

Warfare

8.1 The pressure of Crewe House and the Italian obstacle

In his memoirs, Tullio Marchetti employed a number of vivid metaphors to

describe the disintegrating Habsburg Empire, including that of a tree assaulted

by rotten plants. In this vein he wrote that until the battle of the Piave `the

decomposing seeds scattered with our propaganda had germinated quite well

though with irregularity', but that the events of June 1918 were `the best

manure for beginning a luxuriant and uniform vegetation'.

Marchetti and the

other Intelligence officers felt after the battle that their campaign ought to be

intensified in order to prepare the ground for the time when Italy launched a

final offensive. This could not be too early. For although Intelligence sources

suggested that cracks in the enemy structure were steadily widening, there were

equally signs, as Finzi noted in mid-July, that the tree still had `a solid bark'.

Italian Intelligence therefore tended to back the mood which prevailed at the

CS over the summer. Diaz and Badoglio were always inclined, notwithstanding

news of the enemy's low morale, to postpone any unilateral Italian offensive.

Their reasoning was usually the delicate numerical balance on the Italian Front,

but any anxiety about a new Caporetto was certainly heightened by persistent

rumours in these months that Germany was about to transfer forces to that

theatre to aid its ally. Better then to launch a full-scale attack on the Monarchy

only when the western Allies could provide extra military support.

For Italy's

allies, however, attention was fully concentrated on dramatic events in the

West, so the CS requests for more British or American troops for a `knock-out

blow' were always refused. Thus it was that the summer months witnessed a

marked lull in military operations on the Italian Front, with occasional raids by

Allied forces in the mountains, and a planned limited attack on the Asiago

plateau taking the place of that full-scale offensive which the French in par-

ticular were

urging and the Austrians were always expecting. The relative

inactivity was characterized well by the British commander, Lord Cavan. He

320

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 321

moved his headquarters to a cave nearer the front line and `slept on gentians

every night': `The views from here were superb and I spent many hours with my

stalking glasses watching the enemy across the plateau and gazing at the distant

Dolomites.'

During this period of calm, however, Italy's campaign of psychological war-

fare against

Austria-Hungary was at its height. The CS backed the enthusiasm of

both Ugo Ojetti and the Intelligence heads since it perceived that propaganda,

having played its part in the Piave de

cle,

could now form a similar prelude to a

last Italian military offensive and victory. The summer months saw the Italian

propagandists elaborating ever further the techniques which they had learnt

earlier in the year. The number of manifestos raining down on the Austrian

positions was on an unprecedented scale. The themes of the manifestos were of

an unprecedented sophistication, specially tailored by Padua to suit each nation-

ality and

(partly because of this agenda) exceeding in quality anything which was

being issued by the British EPD for the Western Front. If new targets at the front

included Magyar soldiers, who were sent social as well as nationalist arguments

to revolt, Ojetti was also eager to build on the successful propaganda flights

which had been made to Ljubljana and Zagreb. Therefore, he gave full backing

to the idea of the poet Gabriele D'Annunzio that the next adventure should be to

Vienna itself. D'Annunzio's flight over the imperial capital in August 1918 was

the most celebrated episode in Italy's whole campaign, a daring and dramatic

feat which only exacerbated the Austrian authorities' paranoia about ubiquitous

`Entente propaganda' and its secret links to traitors in the hinterland. It was at the

same time very much an integral part of Ojetti's campaign. This time it was the

Viennese who were being targeted, with arguments which were not simply

triumphalist (as Manfried Rauchensteiner has suggested

) but also liberating in

the spirit of those manifestos distributed over Zagreb and Ljubljana.

Equally dramatic,

but far less well publicized except in Czech and Slovene

literature after the war, were the continued exploits of Slav propaganda troops

on the Italian Front. They were being used ever more extensively by Italian

Intelligence, their `propaganda remit' widening to include espionage behind

enemy lines and even combat in the front line: here was new evidence for both

the Austrian and Italian armies that Czech troops in particular were reliably

committed to the Entente cause. The Austrians in response would, as we will

see, try to counter such poisonous propaganda by cleverly arousing Italian

qualms about employing such `unreliable Austrians' in sections of the Intelli-

gence network.

Although their efforts did not succeed they are significant, first

in demonstrating that the Monarchy's psychological struggle against Italy was

not completely terminated by the Piave offensive; and second, in revealing that

for many leading Italian officers their commitment to a `nationality policy' was

at worst nominal, at best simply a tool to produce the victory which had proved

so elusive with conventional weapons.

322 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

At Crewe House this Italian ambiguity over commitment to the oppressed

nationalities was seen as the major obstacle to the effectiveness of propaganda

against Austria-Hungary. Because of its perceived and actual repercussions for

front propaganda, the ambiguity is worth repeating. It was personified in the

Italian government by Orlando himself who, for the purpose of defeating

Austria and giving Italy a `moral edge' in western eyes, wished to espouse

nationality politics, but at the same time believed in upholding the `imperialist'

Treaty of London which conflicted with Yugoslav aspirations. As we have seen,

Crewe House and their Italian supporters always exaggerated the degree to

which Yugoslav propaganda could influence enemy Croats, Serbs or Slovenes:

a `Yugoslav consciousness', in the idealistic sense propagated by Ante Trumbic

was rarely to be found in the enemy trenches. But it was true that any Italian

arguments aimed at educated Croat and Slovene troops were substantially

weakened because of Italy's alternative agenda in 1918. It was also the case

that official Italy's reservation towards the Yugoslavs had damaging repercus-

sions for

their cause, however idealistic the latter may have been. It limited

progress towards a Yugoslav legion and, as had been shown at Versailles on

3 June, it prevented any joint Allied declaration of commitment to the destruc-

tion of

Austria. Thus Italy's qualms not only meant that the `Yugoslav evidence'

available to the Padua Commission for propaganda purposes was rather patchy

(in a way that Czech evidence was not). It also had a broader impact, since the

Allies could never make a common statement including the Yugoslavs which

Padua could then employ in propaganda material for all of the opposing

nationalities.

Yet if

a joint Allied statement was now a dead letter, the Allies on 3 June had

agreed that they would be free to issue separate supplements to the Versailles

Declaration `as suitable occasions arose'. In the following weeks and months it

was especially the Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe House, the official guise

for the many activities of Steed and Seton-Watson, which aided the national

migre

s in pressing for such supplementary statements. As far as the campaign

against the Monarchy was concerned, Crewe House continued to have a

broader propaganda remit than the Padua Commission, fashioning policy

rather than practice. Steed and his collaborators were trying above all to circum-

scribe Allied

policy towards Austria-Hungary, tying an Allied victory to the

Monarchy's dismemberment. While this work would increasingly benefit the

campaign on the Italian Front, Crewe House had sensed early on, not least from

Granville Baker's regular complaints, that the campaign there was not the

Allied venture which Lord Northcliffe's organization claimed to have done so

much to coordinate. Rather, Ojetti seemed to be working unilaterally and in a

way which smelt too strongly of an Italian imperialist attitude, an `obstruc-

tionist tendency'

similar to Orlando's government. From the early summer,

Steed on several occasions sought to reimpose a more active role for the British

The Climax of Italian Psychological Warfare 323

EPD in the campaign by trying to reconvert the Padua Commission into an

Allied body. At the same time, in August, Crewe House organized an inter-

Allied conference in London which, among other things, tried to weaken

Italian particularism and strengthen a common Allied position with regard to

propaganda against the Monarchy.

While much

of this effort would be in vain, Crewe House's major success in

the early summer was in altering British and French official policy towards

Austria-Hungary. On 6 June, on learning of the Versailles statement, Steed

had immediately drafted a letter for Northcliffe to send to the British Foreign

Office, deploring its weakness and emphasizing the urgent need for supplement-

ary statements

by the British and French governments. The letter continued

rather pompously: `Unless these declarations are made, I greatly fear that the

propaganda organizations I have set up in Italy may get out of hand or break

down entirely.'

Replying to Northcliffe, Balfour explained that it was Sonni-

no's scepticism which had caused the weak Versailles Declaration, but he noted

that the French were planning to make a supplementary declaration when

President Poincare

presented colours to Czechoslovak troops. Although no

such convenient opportunity seemed to exist at present for an equivalent

British statement, Balfour had asked Benes

to publish the letter in which Britain

had recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as `the supreme organ' of

the Czechoslovak movement in Allied countries.

On 11 June, as a further sign

of encouragement to the Czech and Yugoslav e

migre

s, Robert Cecil spoke in

Parliament about the abundant evidence of Czech and Yugoslav national feel-

ing and

the help which their troops were lending to the Allied cause.

These moves gave some consolation to Crewe House. Steed and Seton-Wat-

son were concerned, in the absence of an adequate joint Allied declaration, that

individual Allied statements should give equal satisfaction to all the oppressed

nationalities. Thus when Seton-Watson learnt in Paris on 11 June that Poincare

was to present colours to Czech and Polish troops and make `whole-hog

declarations' for these nationalities, but to do nothing comparable for the

Yugoslavs, he immediately stressed to Paris and London `the disastrous effects

of this omission'; it would benefit the enemy and damage the Yugoslav move-

ment in

Austria-Hungary. In the absence of Steed (who had been in a road

accident and was out of circulation for a month), Seton-Watson managed to

persuade the Foreign Office to urge upon the French the need for some refer-

ence to

the Yugoslavs.

As a result, the French postponed the presentations.

When they were made a few weeks later, Poincare

, in speaking to the Polish and

Czech forces, also mentioned the Yugoslavs. Meanwhile on 29 June, Pichon,

the Foreign Minister, in a crucial government statement to Benes

recognizing

the Czech National Council as `the first basis of the future government', further

expressed the hope that the Czechoslovak state would become `with Poland

and the Yugoslav state an insurmountable barrier to Germanic aggressions'.