Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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284 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

The clearest example of this was in the AOK's attitude to the domestic press.

As we saw in Chapter 2, the flow of information in the Monarchy had been

eased when in 1917 Emperor Karl had restored some constitutional rule in

Austria. The guidelines for censoring the press in both Austria and Hungary

might for some time remain the same, but in practice the watchful eye of the

Reichsrat in Vienna ensured a laxer or more erratic wielding of the censor's

pencil in different corners of the Empire. Due to complaints in the Reichsrat the

was dissolved in September 1917 (even if its duties were simply inherited

by a commission in the War Ministry). Similarly, parliamentary pressure in

October forced the Austrian government to agree to limit press censorship of

political matters, in theory at least, to removing items which were contrary to

pre-war penal statutes.

100

The result was to produce a level of censorship in the

press which was far more attuned to the restless political and social mood

which was sweeping the Empire from the summer of 1917. For the AOK this

was alarming. Of the two types of news which they felt affected their interests,

`strictly military' and `other' (which could undermine morale), it would still be

possible to control the former through the KPQ's official war reports. `Other'

categories of information, however, were unmanageable. They were liable to

fall outside the AOK's remit since they might be deemed a political preserve,

even if the military could justifiably argue that all items of news indirectly

concerned their conduct of the war effort.

101

In early 1918 the AOK was brought face to face with this dilemma. By

then, the phenomenon which Conrad had attacked in September 1917, of

newspapers writing too expansively about an end to the war, had grown

hydra-headed in tune with the mood of the hinterland. On 15 February, Arz

proceeded to complain to government ministers about the domestic press.

Instead of behaving in a way designed to calm troops at the front, many news-

papers were

regularly attacking Germany, writing impartially about the

Entente's `honourable' offers of peace, and commenting gloomily about the

Monarchy's food crisis and widespread social unrest. Arz demanded not simply

tighter censorship for the rest of the war, but consciously uplifting articles in

the press so as to boost military morale. Replying to this, however, Count

Toggenburg (the Austrian Minister of the Interior) set out for the AOK the

constitutional parameters within which the censor was having to operate.

With regard for instance to the often sensational speeches which were delivered

in the Reichsrat:

Because of

existing constitutional provisions it is not possible to keep these

events secret from the public. The so-called parliamentary censor, whose

legal basis is rather dubious anyway, can only act against the most blatant

cases. Consequently the newspapers have to be permitted a somewhat wider

latitude than before.

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 285

Arz's only consolation was to note that Toggenburg had issued new censor rules,

clamping down on criticisms of the war leadership or the food crisis in Austria.

Otherwise, the Ministry of the Interior advised that the best way forward would

be to put subtle (not draconian) pressure on newspaper editors, while the AOK

might consider banning unsuitable newspapers from the war zone.

102

Effectively, Arz was being told that the radical political agitation, which was

emerging fast within Austria's constitutional structure, could not be silenced by

the censor. In the following months this was something all the more galling,

since the military noted how enemy propaganda was steadily beginning to use

the domestic press in order to publicize everything negative about events in the

Monarchy. It was certainly a prime source for Padua's manifestos, with news

items secured via Borgese's bureau in Berne and transmitted to Ojetti; it was

also exploited, or so the AOK always imagined, by `English propaganda', which

was presumed to be working indirectly through the Swiss press in order to

proclaim the Monarchy's imminent dissolution.

103

When on 26 April a meet-

ing was

held at the AOK to discuss `offensive' and `defensive' propaganda at the

front, a prime consideration in the latter case was the subject of the press. The

minutes of the discussion recorded how `our newspapers, especially the Slav,

are the most effective means of propaganda supporting the enemy; there is no

Italian concoction [Machwerk] which can come anywhere near that of these

newspapers in providing such good service to the enemy'. The fact that censor-

ship in

Austria-Hungary completely lacked direction, and that the government

was `agonizingly weak' ± this all combined to make the press `the first and

foremost enemy of our fatherland'. One solution, it was suggested, would be to

ensure that the men in the trenches always received timely `official' news about

events in the hinterland before the arrival of any newspapers.

104

Another was to

badger the domestic authorities with a tirade of complaints.

From the

middle of May, the AOK began to circulate to the main political and

military centres a daily selection of extracts from the press which it deemed

treasonable. They illustrate well the character of certain newspapers in mid-

1918 as

well as revealing Baden's sensitive outlook. Most of the extracts were

from Czech, southern Slav or socialist journals, and most described or implied

either the brutality of the German-Austrian authorities or the goal of national

liberation for the oppressed peoples of the Monarchy.

105

Thus, one Slovene

paper (Straz

a) recalled German tyranny in Austria in the early years of the war,

but hinted that the persecution would not last much longer. The socialist

Arbeiter-Zeitung condemned the authorities' brutality in Prague during the

celebrations for the National Theatre, concluding that Austria, like England

with the Irish, would finally have to grant home rule. The radical Yugoslav

paper Glas Slovenaca Hrvata i Srba was unabashed in claiming that the struggle

in the south of the Monarchy would end with the victory of `democracy over

German-military rape'. And several Czech papers could be quoted, calling for

286 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Czech unification on the basis of the right to self-determination. The AOK

exclaimed, with reason, that much of the language being used ± `self-deter-

mination', `persecution', `demands of oppressed peoples' ± was synonymous

with the vocabulary of enemy propaganda. But all of the AOK protests could

only make small inroads into curbing this explosion of radical ideas. Unless the

chief culprits could be banned (like the Czech Na

rodnõ

Listy) or heavily cen-

sored, the

military were forced to fall back on defensive tactics.

Just before

the June offensive, Arz took up Toggenburg's suggestion and

announced the creation of an `index' of newspapers which henceforth would

be prohibited in the war zone. They included the socialist Arbeiter-Zeitung,

Arbeiterwille and Ne

pszava, and `extreme' nationalist organs such as Slovenec,

Glas Slovenaca Hrvata i Srba, Lidove

Noviny, Venkov and Kurjer Lwowski.

106

Increas-

ingly over

the summer months it would be clear that these were indeed some of

the chief newspapers which Italian propaganda was exploiting for its own ends.

Moreover, since the AOK index continued and was steadily updated, Padua's

manifestos gained an added importance in the final months of the war in that

they were trying to break through the artificial quarantine of the war zone.

107

Yet the index alone could never be a substitute for censoring or closing down

radical newspapers and the sources which fed them in the hinterland. There

they continued to circulate in the midst of nationalist-social agitation which

the authorities could not control and which any troops passing through to the

war zones were bound to experience.

Patriotic instruction

in the armed forces was thus consistently disrupted by

the disintegration of authority in the hinterland. The flow of radical ideas in

the press (and even the Neue Freie Presse was not above reproach from military

quarters)

108

was merely a symptom of the fact that national-social movements

in all corners of the Empire were now mobilizing with agenda which ran

counter to the basic precepts of the FAst. Either the domestic authorities had

to suppress these movements by force, or they needed to counter them posit-

ively with

their own political solutions coupled perhaps with a coordinated

`secondary mobilization' of the population on behalf of the Habsburg cause.

Neither course was feasible in the circumstances of 1918. Suppressing radical

agitation might be attempted, but was always limited by manpower resources

and by the constitutional regime in Austria. Thus, for example, Anton Koros

ec's

notorious journeys and rallies in the south of the Empire on behalf of Yugoslav

unity could not be prevented.

109

As for organizing any movement to promote Staatsgedanken throughout

Austria-Hungary, it might have been possible earlier in the war when there

was tighter central control in the Monarchy and more evidence of public

consensus behind the war effort. But even then, as we have seen, the authorities

had only made superficial efforts, or had acted in ways which often served to

undermine public morale. In 1918 it was simply too late and never attempted

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 287

anyway. In short, patriotic instruction was to be limited to the armed forces.

The FAst, while having a strictly military remit, was occasionally reminded that

similar work was vital yet absent in the hinterland. Such a suggestion came

from civilian FA lecturers like Rudolf Peerz, who in his own words had been

active in `state propaganda' for the Austrian Ministry of Interior for some years

(in what context is not clear).

110

Similar proposals were made from units at

the front and in the hinterland.

111

They included, again with an eye on North-

cliffe's `Propaganda Ministry', the idea of setting up in the Monarchy an

`Imperial Society' which would be deliberately non-official so as to attract

personalities from all nationalities and walks of life with the purpose of pro-

moting propaganda

on behalf of the Monarchy.

112

On paper it was a fine idea,

evidently first formulated before the war; in practice, in the Monarchy's rapidly

disjointed social and political environment of 1917±18, it had no future what-

soever. Indeed,

none of the proposals could be taken up. The FA instructors

therefore had to go about their business in the knowledge that outside the war

zone or the military barracks their pupils would always be prey to subversive

ideas. Well might they observe that `enemy propaganda' in its domestic

guise was far more dangerous than anything stemming direct from foreign

territory.

7.3 The case of the 42nd Honve

d Infantry Division

By a close examination of one military unit, we can better understand how

Italy's propaganda campaign began to act as a catalyst upon these other threats

to morale which originated either in the Austro-Hungarian hinterland or in the

war zone itself. Assessing troop morale is not easy. While grass-roots sources

from the Austro-Hungarian trenches are difficult to find, local commanders

rarely gave detailed reports to their superiors unless specifically ordered to do so

on the eve of battle or after some disaster had occurred in a particular unit.

Then there is the issue of the reports' reliability. Since officers had a responsib-

ility to

maintain and nurture morale, a disquieting report would inevitably

reflect badly upon their own abilities. Furthermore, the evidence of a conspir-

acy like

Ljudevit Pivko's indicates how far it was possible to conceal the real

mood or outlook among the lower ranks. As a case study, the story of the 42nd

Honve

d Division (42HID) is instructive. As a predominantly Croat unit which

was recruited in Croatia, it was usually considered by the military authorities to

be composed of loyal, reliable elements. Yet in the final weeks of the war it was

to be one of the first divisions on the Italian Front to rebel, thereby setting off a

string of mutinies in other units in the war zone.

113

Its reliability in 1918 had

been increasingly shaken by the material and ideological crisis of the hinter-

land. Partly

for this reason a number of detailed reports about the division were

composed and found their way to the AOK. And these, together with the

288 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

surviving divisional records in the Hungarian War Archives, allow us to draw

certain interesting conclusions about the ways in which threats to morale could

interact.

The 42HID

had begun the war in 1914 in the Balkans, when a striking

percentage of Serbs from its regiments had deserted.

114

Thereafter it served

chiefly on the Eastern Front, participating in the brutal Carpathian campaign

of early 1915 and witnessing, after the liberation of eastern Galicia in 1917, the

dramatic collapse of the Russian forces. In January 1918, when it had been

announced that the division was to be one of those transferred to the Italian

Front due to imminent peace in the East, its chief of staff reported that its

overall morale remained `excellent'. Fifty per cent of the unit had actually

served in the battles of 1914, while 25 per cent had been at the colours in

peacetime; their health and discipline remained good, with most individuals

`battle-tested and reliable'. The only perceived weaknesses were the division's

inexperience with gas and mass artillery fire (as practised by the Italians), and

particularly a crisis in manpower. As the only division recruited in Croatia

which had the status of Domobran or `home guard', the 42HID was unique in

being entitled to use Serbo-Croat as its language of command, thereby neces-

sitating a

steady supply of Croat-speaking officers. That had been a problem

even in peacetime, but it was all the more so after wartime losses. By 1918

the division was 50 per cent below the prescribed number of officers.

115

The

divisional commander, Brigadier Michael Mihaljevic

, rather typically blamed

the military authorities in Croatia for this situation, alleging that they were

retaining Croat officers in comfortable positions at home rather than dispatch-

ing them

to the front. At the same time, perhaps more accurately, he bemoaned

the degree to which soldiers on leave were deserting and joining notorious

deserter-bands in the countryside, in part at least because of insufficient vigil-

ance on

the part of the Croatian authorities.

116

In each case the result was to

diminish manpower in the division, something which would steadily under-

mine its

overall capability until the end of the war.

Still, Mihaljevic

expected that the troops would perform enthusiastically

when transferred to the south-western front. On the eve of their departure

from the East, he painted for them a vivid picture of the role which `His

Majesty' had asked them to perform against a new villain, Italy:

Our perfidious

ally,

117

cunning neighbour, who yearns for the regions of our

homeland, for those Croatian baptismal hills which defend our Adriatic sea

from the continent. There, where through the centuries Croatian heroic

songs have echoed; where the Croat mother has given birth to most sons

of our nation; where the scarlet sunrise, dark red dawn of all Croats has been

reflected in the blue waves of the sea; where a shining future is blossoming

and awaits: there our perfidious ally wants to propagate his own dirty seed

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 289

and deal a deadly blow to our people. This enemy, the Italian, unswervingly

waits for our avenging Croatian hatred.

The Domobrani

would have a chance to show themselves worthy sons of their

ancestors, proclaiming in their spirit: `We too with God have faithfully done

our duty to king, homeland and golden freedom!!!'

118

This `freedom', this

historic tradition which Mihaljevic

was evoking, was the alternative to that

which Padua would appeal to in its manifestos. Italy's front propaganda would

remind Croat soldiers of seventeenth-century martyrs such as Zrinjski and

Frankopan, of broken Habsburg promises, of the Hungarian `yoke', and of a

`freedom' which was yet to come. Mihaljevic

was reminding the same soldiers

of how their ancestral `frontiersmen' had fought with Marshal Radetsky in 1848

against the Italians, of their age-old loyalty to the Habsburgs, and of a `freedom'

which Italy was now threatening. Both messages had strong elements of truth,

reflecting as they did the ambiguous historic tradition in Croatia as well as the

dual loyalty which many Croat soldiers continued to possess in 1918, both to

their nationality and to their Habsburg monarch. One might suggest that,

in contrast to the Czechs or even Slovenes, such dual loyalty had a certain

resilience among Croat soldiers which Padua would find very hard to penetrate

with its message of a Yugoslav utopia.

Yet in

material terms the 42HID was as open to attack as any other unit in the

army. Its physical resilience would be worn away on the Italian Front.

119

Not

only was marching up to the Asiago plateau in February 1918 something of an

ordeal in itself, but the division was dismayed to find immediately on its arrival

how critical were the routes of supply to positions at the front and in reserve.

There were only two supply lines to the division. The first was a winding road,

34 kilometres in length and crossing three mountain ridges, which was im-

passable when

snow fell heavily in early March. The second was a light cable-

car or teleferiche, which for some time (until a second teleferiche was opened in

April) was the only means to bring food, munitions or any technical material to

the division. Although many Italian mountain divisions faced similar supply

hazards, their lines were always nearer to the plains than the Austrians, their

food resources always more plentiful. For the 42HID, the reduced food ration

could not be fully issued, and two-thirds of the division began to live on snow-

water due to a chronic water deficiency in the sector; shelters were also in-

adequate and,

in terms of basic clothing, 90 per cent of the troops were soon

wearing rags instead of underwear. Not surprisingly, the health of the division

sharply deteriorated. In March 1918, 909 men fell ill while 107 were wounded;

in April, 1003 reported sick while 73 were wounded, many having to be trans-

ported over

treacherous terrain to be treated.

In the

front line the misery was further compounded by the fact that the

enemy was blatantly superior in artillery fire and in control of the air. While

290 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

from the start the 42nd's infantry was steadily run down by an incessant

bombardment (all calls for extra munition being ignored or hindered by the

bad supply lines), the division in May began to be aware of the enemy's

propaganda offensive in the shape of a mass leaflet distribution by plane.

Already in March they had noticed some leaflets, and then become aware of

the stronger efforts which Pivko's unit was making against the neighbouring

26SchD. By May the enemy was swarming over their own sector with 39 planes

seen on one day alone. In response, the divisional Nachrichtentruppen stepped up

their own propaganda efforts, depositing material for the Italians in no-man's-

land and approaching the enemy lines to fraternize, something which had not

previously been attempted because of the distance involved. However, the Ital-

ians were

overwhelmingly hostile, and since the rest of the troops opposite

were French and not an appropriate target, the 42HID was at an immediate

disadvantage in the propaganda duel.

120

In this field, as in so many others,

the division was already on the defensive.

It was

against this disturbing background that a notorious event occurred, the

desertion of four individuals to the enemy. In the previous years, and until May

1918, desertions from the division seem to have been relatively rare; in the last

four months of 1917 on the Eastern Front, for instance, 17 individuals are known

to have deserted.

121

In the late evening of 12 May 1918, Lt Mirko Weiss-Belos

evic

and his batman Stanko Papric

, together with a propaganda officer, Luka Kos-

trenc

(all Croats from HIR26), and Vite

slav S

tina, a Czech one-year volunteer

of HIR25, crept across the lines to the French trenches near Monte Sisemol. The

desertions had been planned for weeks if not months beforehand, and much of

their background can be pieced together from Pivko's memoirs and the later

Austrian enquiry. Mirko Belos

evic

was a Jew from Zagreb whose impeccable

Yugoslav credentials seem clear from the fact that he immediately joined Ljude-

vit Pivko's

Yugoslav unit, and was chosen by Pivko as a recruiter of other

volunteers during Pivko's tour of the camps in late May.

122

According to what

Belos

evic

told Pivko, he had fraternized with Russian soldiers in 1917 and

planned to desert to them if it had not been for the Bolshevik Revolution; then

on leave in Zagreb, he had spread Yugoslav literature among Jewish students

who were beginning to incline in a radical direction.

123

When the 42HID was

moved to the Italian Front, Belos

evic

in April was sent on a four-week training

course of the 42nd Sturmbatallion, part of the division's traditional practice to

steadily drill as many troops as possible in Sturm duties.

124

There in the rear at

Castello Tesino (just to the east of Carzano) Belos

evic

had begun to think more

clearly about agitation within the division, stimulated by like-minded officers

such as S

tina, Dejan Popovic

and Boz

idar Zvonarevic

. Together, they formed a

secret club known as the `cadet party' with a certain Mile Buzadz

as its leader.

It was

a sign undoubtedly of how far `Yugoslav thinking' had progressed in

the army and hinterland in the past six months, that the cadet party, while

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 291

secretly plotting their own desertions, felt able to be far more open than the

Carzanci about their radical gospel. They issued a lithographed newspaper,

Jugoslaven, which they read out to their men during training, they collected

money for a Slovene national theatre in Ljubljana, and they even publicly

displayed red and blue Yugoslav insignia in their caps and urged others to do

so in order to distinguish Yugoslavs from other nationalities. The wearing of

these colours was an idea `exported' from the hinterland. There the authorities

were beginning to notice their adoption by some soldiers in Slovenia and

Dalmatia, and in a letter to S

tina from Zagreb (which arrived after his de-

sertion), his

Croat fiance

e had praised the plotters' efforts to `gain a following

for this new Yugoslav badge at the front as well'. While at Castello Tesino,

tina had cut up a Croat tricolour flag into strips (concealing the white

sections to make them distinctly `Yugoslav') and persuaded some men on the

Sturm course to wear them as a badge. Although some `loyal' officers noticed

them and ordered their removal, few seem to have been aware of their real

significance and no investigation was undertaken. Later, a witness would tell

the 42HID military court that Belos

evic

while at Castello Tesino had been `an

enthusiastic Yugoslav and condemned the war'. Another, who shared his quar-

ters at the

front, would testify that Belos

evic

and his batman had both returned

to their regiment wearing Yugoslav insignia. But no witnesses had felt at the

time that it was a matter to report to their superiors. As with the Carzanci,but

even more so, indifference or perhaps even a conspiracy of silence appears to

have reigned among many of the officers, enabling the plotters to plan and act

undetected.

125

For Belos

evic

and S

tina, their plot to desert was aided considerably by

involving in their scheme a like-minded propaganda officer, Luka Kostrenc

Kostrenc

had probably been assigned to the 42HID Nachrichtentruppen because

he knew German and Italian well. Born in Crikvenica on the north Adriatic

coast, he had attended naval academy, and from 1916 until early 1918 had

been employed in the HIR26 reserve at Karlovac, examining Austrians who had

been recaptured in Serbia as well as other politically suspect elements from

south-west Croatia.

126

Whether it was at that time or earlier that he became a

secret Yugoslav is unclear; his upbringing in a Croatian coastal town might

suggest Yugoslav inclinations. But neither in Karlovac nor at the front does his

reliability appear to have been questioned. The positions he held, most notably

in propaganda work against Italy, immediately implied that he was trusted.

Indeed, when in May 1918 one of the divisional propaganda officers went on

leave it was Kostrenc

who temporarily replaced him.

127

Probably only at that

time, under Belos

evic

's influence, did Kostrenc

decide to desert to the enemy

for in the previous few months he would have had a number of opportunities

to do so. On the evening of 12 May he was able to disguise himself and the

three others as a propaganda patrol, going out into no-man's-land to deposit

292 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

newspapers. By telephone he told regimental command of his intention, an

essential move since rules about entering no-man's-land had been tightened a

few months earlier to prevent desertions, and any stray individuals would be

shot on sight.

128

The four deserters gave different excuses to their comrades as

to why they would be absent from their quarters that night. They met at

Belos

evic

's quarters, dressed in front of Belos

evic

's unsuspecting room-mate,

and then proceeded outside. On the way they were noticed by a sentry, but he

let them pass having received from Kostrenc

the pass-word `ensign of hunt-

ers'. The

sentry did not (as required) demand written proof, nor did he question

why the group might be depositing propaganda in front of French rather than

Italian positions. They disappeared into the darkness, and crossed the short 150

metre stretch to the enemy.

129

The group proved to be of considerable value to Italy. They imparted detailed

information about Austrian positions so that `the 83rd Brigade [42 HID] was

fired upon immediately after their desertion, and enemy planes which pre-

viously had

not flown over Tesino did so already at 7 a.m. on 13 May'.

130

Kostrenc

in particular could betray many secrets about the organization of

Austrian propaganda, confirming that the Austrians had faith in that weapon

after its success against Russia; and he illustrated with a selection of military

orders the degree to which, after a preparatory attack on Italian morale with

propaganda, an Italian collapse in the forthcoming offensive was firmly

expected. The deserters confessed that many Slav officers also shared that

optimism, but they insisted that a younger generation was slowly rising, `ripen-

ing into

a secret revolutionary movement'.

131

Belos

evic

, `ardent in his hatred of

the Habsburgs' as a British report noted, even claimed that most of the officers

at battalion headquarters sympathized with the Yugoslav idea or `at all events

rather unwillingly concealed their sympathies and inclinations'.

132

As we

will see, evidence on the Austrian side implied as much, and the divisional

authorities came close to admitting it. Italian Intelligence in any case

was convinced, and decided to exploit the situation with the aid of the new

deserters.

All agreed

to join Pivko's unit, and Kostrenc

was soon commandeered by

Finzi because of his special experience. All proceeded to compose manifestos at

6th army Intelligence for duplication and distribution over the enemy. In the

following weeks Italian planes spread leaflets, mostly in Croat and signed by the

deserters, over the whole 11th army front.

133

These echoed the line of the

Padua Commission, assuring their `Yugoslav brothers' about the marvellous

environment in Italy: `The Italians and Yugoslavs are in complete agreement

and the Italians receive us and accept us as allies and brothers. Everyone who

comes here is sorry that he did not come before, for here hunger and misery,

fear and slavery, are unknown.'

134

Then they appealed to a heroic epic tradition

which embraced the `Yugoslav nation'. Yugoslav soldiers ought to be fighting

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 293

for liberty rather than for their sworn enemies: `Dare the nation of Petar Svac

Zrinjski, Frankopan and Kvaternik fight on the side of Krauts and Magyars?

Dare the nation of Milos

Obilic

, Marko Kraljevic

, Majka Jugovic

and Kosovo

field fight on the side of the Turks?'

135

To do so was to forge the shackles of

slavery for the Yugoslav people, to aid oppressors who were already tyrannizing

those at home, in their goal of exterminating the Slav race and establishing

themselves on the Adriatic. Rather than waiting `to become corpses or invalids'

in the approaching offensive, Yugoslavs should desert to those who were fight-

ing for

civilization, who had unlimited resources with which to crush German

militarism:

The war

will be ruthlessly continued until that magnificent moment when

the idea of freedom and justice celebrates victory over medieval barbarism

and the sun of freedom shines on the human race. On the ruins of Austria two

new Slav buildings of freedom will be reconstructed, a Yugoslav and a Czecho-

slovak state.

Brothers, it is in your hands to accelerate that great moment, to

help to create what we have been dreaming about for centuries, to end the

time of suffering for our people . . . The hinterland in Austria is undermined, it

needs only a spark and the old cracked sepulchre called Austria will explode

into the air. Make that spark! Men at the front, take up your arms, come to us,

to become free men as another final blow to Austria!

136

Despite this self-publicity from the deserters, and their obvious betrayal of

information in the crucial weeks before the offensive, the 42HID was remark-

ably negligent

about investigating the incident or tightening security. As a

result, two weeks later, four more members of the cadet party were quite easily

able to desert to Italy: ensigns Dejan Popovic

, Luka Kerekovic

and Boz

idar

Zvonarevic

, together with one-year volunteer private Franjo Svetec, all from

HIR27. Their desertion in the Val Bella sector was not only a direct sequel to the

first group's, but was stimulated by the latter's propaganda back across the

trenches. The divisional enquiry revealed that Popovic

, Zvonarevic

and Svetec

had all associated with Belos

evic

in Castello Tesino and worn Yugoslav colours.

Popovic

, whose cousin Milica was engaged to Vite

slav S

tina, was well-known,

at least among his associates in the regiment, as a rather violent `political hot-

head' who

was often to be found discussing Yugoslav, or rather Great Serb, ideas

with junior officers in the mess. According to the regimental command, he

seemed to be the ring-leader of the four deserters and had probably won over

Zvonarevic

to his cause while on the Sturm course. Zvonarevic

allegedly was a

`notorious drunkard', lazy and irresponsible (and his behaviour in Italy would

also leave something to be desired).

137

As for Kerekovic

, retained as an adjutant in the 3rd battalion although the

regiment noted in hindsight that he had lacked the necessary sense of duty, his