Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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254 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

220. PRO,

FO 371/3474, DMI to Radcliffe, t.59793, 8 June; Radcliffe to DMI, t.10440 and

10441, 9 June, t.10443, 10 June.

221. AJA,

JO 35/252, Jambris

ak to Banjanin, 7 June; JO 19/116, Jambris

ak to Trumbic

18 June 1918.

222. AJA,

JO 28/42, Kujundz

to Trumbic

, 20 May 1918; Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie,

p. 537.

223.

Pivko, Informatorji (Maribor, 1925) p. 69.

224. Useful data about the state of the Czechoslovak Legion at this time is contained in

Jan S

eba's

reports to S

tefa

nik. In early June he had numbered the Czechs involved

in Intelligence work at the front at 1200, and he then travelled to the war zone to

SNR-Ssupervise the

taking of the oath. See VHA, Fond C

tefa

nik, Karton 1.

225. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky od S

carsky

ch Ledovcu

po Mor

e Adriaticke

(Prague, 1938)

pp. 259±63; and KA, 11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2333 (captured order of

Vigevano, 4 May). For Austrian concern about the Czech patrols on Monte Pertica,

see KA, EvB, Fasz.5758/27418.

226. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 279±84. For some Austrian evidence, see KA, 11AK Gstbs

Abt, Fasz.446, Ev.Nr 841 (6AK report); and for the significance of Rudolf Paprskar

desertion, see below Chapter 7, p. 302.

227. See

Smaniotto's letter to Hlava

ek of 18 February (ANM, Hlava

ek MSS, Karton II/i);

and DRP diary: apart from attending the meeting on 30 March, Smaniotto met

Granville Baker (27th) and Delme

-Radcliffe (23rd/28th) on separate occasions.

228. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 305±9; KA, 11AK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.445, Na.Nr 756, KISA

Op.5800, monthly report, Beilage 11 (10 May).

229. Manifest

o 37 [Polish and Croat], `Polacy!' (OHM, sz.1445/1).

230. HIL,

KISA Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.77, Op.Nrs 5927 (`Propaganda activity increases

daily', 6 May); 5970, 6061 (the leaflets on this occasion were all burnt by the

rocket), 6085, 6110, 6139, 6151, 6184, 6379 (calls on 4 June).

231. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 310±12. See below pp. 301±2.

232. Manifest

o (in Czech/Polish, signed by Stinny

), `Vs

em Slovanu

rak.uherske

Arma

dy!',

in KA, EvB 1918, Fasz.5744/4538; and IWM, aerial leaflets, 3(45)/44.

See Ronge,

Kriegs- und Industriespionage, p. 364.

233. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 312±14.

234. Ibid.,

pp. 97, 305. Before the war, Kobylinskij had been a professor of psychiatry at

Genoa University and knew several east European languages.

235. KA,

EvB, Fasz.5752/18742: captured order of 3rd army command (Lt General

Fabbri), dated 14 May 1918. Fabbri noted that some Czechs had deserted to Italy,

while some had remained behind to ferment rebellion in the Austrian ranks.

236. AJA,

JO 19/118, Kujundz

to Trumbic

, 9 June 1918.

237. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, p. 311; Pivko, Zeleni Odred, p. 126.

238. Hanzal,

SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 133±4; Pivko, Informatorji, p. 68. Marchetti had felt it

necessary to secure governmental permission for publicity among the Veronese,

and it was Steed who wrote to Gallenga on his behalf: see PRO, FO 170/1145,

p. 102: Delme

-Radcliff

e to Rodd, t.10298, 15 April enclosing Steed's request.

239. Hanzal, SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, p. 132; Pivko, Informatorji, p. 68.

240. Hanzal, SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 198±9.

241. For a vivid study of warfare in this remote region, see Luciano Viazzi, I Diavoli

dell'Adamello. La

Guerra a Quota Tremila 1915±1918 (Milan, 1981).

242. For details, see Hanzal, SVy

zve

ÏÂ

õky, pp. 140±5.

243. Ibid., pp. 200±1.

Italy's Campaign against Austria-Hungary 255

244. KA,

11AK Gstbs Abt 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2205, 11AK (Frydman) to corps, 7 May 1918;

Fasz.448, Pr.2004/24: manifesto, `Ufficiali e soldati italiani!'

245. Pivko,

Informatorji, p. 74.

246. KA,

11AK 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2183, VI KK to 11AK, Na Nr 423/8, 25 April 1918. For

continued Austrian propaganda efforts until the June offensive, see Pr.2213, 2232,

2251, 2278, 2292.

247. Pivko,

Val Bella (Maribor, 1928) pp. 53±4.

248. Of

the `450' from Padula, five officers and 183 men left Verona for Tugurio on

2 May; on 21 May, Tugurio received a further four officers and 110 men as its

allotment from the II/31st regiment.

249. Pivko,

Informatorji, pp. 90, 93±4; Val Bella, pp. 6ff.

250. Pivko,

Informatorji, pp. 91±4.

251. In

some sectors, such as the Frenzella gorge (where a unit under Karel Pajger was

operating), the Austrians seem to have been overwhelmingly hostile from the

beginning (see the 26SchD report contained in HIL, 42HID 1918, Fasz.1666,

Op.t.126/4, 6 May). The 26SchD continued in June to record the efforts of Czech

propaganda patrols but always implied that the efforts had been repulsed (see

26SchD propaganda reports under note 246 above).

252. KA,

11AK 1918, Fasz.449, Pr.2278, 2292: these reports give in detail the material

which was distributed by the 26 SchD Nachrichtentruppen.

253. Pivko,

Informatorji, p. 93. One of the deserters from SchR9 on San Francesco was

Anton Barek, who might be identified as the elderly Czech corporal who had

engaged the patrol in conversation: see HIL, 42HID, Fasz.1667, 26SchD to 42HID,

t.Op.Nr 135/6, 16 May 1918.

254. See

below Chapter 7, p. 302.

255. Report

of the KPQ of 27 July 1918, as quoted in Pivko, Val Bella, p. 71.

256. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, pp. 317±18; Ojetti, Lettere alla Moglie, mentions two Polish

officers who were killed during their propaganda work: pp. 535, 556.

257. Szuber

, Walka o PrzewageÎ DuchowaÎ , pp. 158±62; Albertini, Epistolario, II, no. 867,

p. 977; Ojetti,

Lettere alla Moglie, pp. 528, 618. The AOK knew that Italy was having

problems over Polish recruitment: see KA, AOK Op.Abt 1918, Fasz.370, Nr.109614,

military attache

in Berne to AOK, Res.Nr 829/M, 17 July 1918.

258. Luciano

Tosi, La Propaganda Italiana, p. 237 note 134. The Austrians had intermit-

tent news

about Rygier's committee but thought he was a woman (see KA, EvB,

Fasz.5761/32389).

259. G.G.

Mironescu, ApercËus sur la Question Roumaine (Paris, 1919) pp. 114±17; see also

George Moroõ

anu, Les Luttes des Roumains Transylvains pour la Liberte

et l'Opinion

Europe

ene (Paris, 1933) pp. 209±11.

260. AJA,

JO 59/2(2): 2000 at Cavatzere, 1600 at Mantua.

261. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, pp. 316±17 who claims that the Austrians had to with-

draw IR50

from the line.

262. Thus

Orlando later told Delme

-Radcliffe that Transylvanian Romanians and

Ruthenes could not be trusted and often would not submit to Mõ

ndrescu's author-

ity: IWM,

Wilson MSS, 22/18, Radcliffe to Wilson, 12 September 1918. For the

creation of the legion, see Ion Ardeleanu, `Romanian Combatants in Italy during

World War I', in B. Kira

ly and N. Dreisziger (eds), East Central European Society in

World War I (New York, 1985) pp. 547±51. The evidence which reached the Aus-

trian authorities

similarly suggested that Italy faced problems with recruitment,

even if in October the Italian press naturally reported how Mõ

ndrescu and Rygier

256 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

were rapturously

received by the new Romanian legionaries before their departure

for the front (Giornale d'Italia, 9 October, contained in KA, EvB, Fasz.5761/32389).

263. See

Franc Grafenauer, `Od Gorlice do Soluna', in E.Turk, J.Jeras, and R.Paulin (eds),

Dobrovoljci Kladivarji Jugoslavije 1912±1918 (Ljubljana, 1936) pp. 689ff. For the six

camps, see AJA, JO 59/2(2), Trinajstic

to Jambris

ak, 20 May 1918.

264. AJA,

JO 35/224, Trinajstic

to JO London/Paris, 18 May 1918.

265. Pivko,

Informatorji, p. 102; AJA, JO 59/4, Trumbic

notes on talk with Pas

, 31 May;

AJA, JO 35/127(a), JO Rome office to Vigevano, 30 May 1918. The visits to Nocera

Umbra were mentioned in manifestos 18 and 33, while manifesto 16 (`Hrvati, Srbi i

Slovenci!') claimed that `our prisoners in Italy are totally separated . . . and we are

allowed to visit them if we wish' [!]. See p. 266.

266. AJA,

JO 35/252, Jambris

ak to Banjanin, 7 June 1918.

267. Pivko,

Val Bella, pp. 7±8.

268. The

two officers were Hugo Plhak, who had joined Pivko's unit earlier in the year;

and Mirko Belos

evic

, who had only just deserted on the Asiago plateau and there-

fore might

be presented as living proof of a new commitment by Croats from the

Austrian ranks.

269. For

the following see Pivko, Val Bella, pp. 28±40.

270. See

Pivko, Informatorji, pp. 102±3, for Vidmar's visit to the camp at Avezzano where

he collected the names of 305 Serb volunteers.

271. Marche

tti, Ventotto Anni, p. 318.

272. Pivko,

Informatorji, pp. 114±15; Val Bella, p. 47.

273. Pivko,

Nas

i Dobrovoljci u Italiji, p. 40.

274. AJA,

JO 28/50, `Zapovjednis

tvo 4e Armate, Ured informacija, Popis vojnika Jugo-

slavenske c

ete';

AJA, JO 35/129, Officers at Nocera Umbra to Lt Pindemonte (Vig-

evano's envoy), 31 May 1918; Janko Poljak, `Nocera Umbra in majnis

deklaracija', in Dobrovoljci Kladivarji Jugoslavije, p. 702.

275. AJA,

JO 28/52, `Jedinac

ni spisak odela Eksploratora 3e Armije'.

276. AJA,

JO 28/170, statement by Nikola de Marchi; JO 28/51, VIII Armata (table of

volunteers).

277. Ojetti,

La Propaganda sul Nemico, p. 123; Pivko, Informatorji, p. 70.

278. AJA,

JO 35/156, Trumbic

notes [undated].

279. Pivko,

Informatorji, pp. 72±3.

280. AJA,

JO 19/186, Trumbic

notes (May/June 1918); Pivko, Val Bella, p. 75.

281. Finzi,

`I.T.O.', p. 229.

282. See

statement of Nikola de Marchi in AJA, JO 28/170. De Marchi referred to his

fellow-officer Zdravko Wiegele as a `shameless soldier volunteer' since he totally

complied with Italian wishes.

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive

7.1 The perception of enemy propaganda

From the time of the Rome Congress, according to Edmund von Glaise-Hor-

stenau, `an especially dangerous and brilliantly organized campaign of propa-

ganda threatened

the morale of the Austro-Hungarian armies'.

To understand

how the Austro-Hungarian authorities came to perceive `enemy propaganda' as

a pervasive force, it is important to appreciate the context in which they were

operating. Having witnessed the collapse of Russia's army, stimulated in part by

their own effective propaganda, the Austrian military leaders by the spring of

1918 were vigilant, bracing themselves for the onslaught of Bolshevik propa-

ganda from

the East. This coincided with the most serious internal crisis to

engulf the Monarchy for the whole war. In mid-January, mass strikes due to the

food crisis and expectation of peace began in Vienna, and spread simulta-

neously to

Trieste, Krako

w, Budapest and all other major urban centres.

February the strike encompassed 34 000 miners in the coalfields of Moravia-

Silesia; mass Polish demonstrations erupted in Galicia as a result of the Mon-

archy's peace with Ukraine; and, most alarming for the AOK, the naval forces in

the gulf of Cattaro revolted. It was a time when the Emperor was pleading with

his foreign minister to make a speedy peace at Brest-Litovsk with the Bolshe-

viks, as

the alternative seemed to be an imminent revolution. He himself,

having fled out of Vienna with his family, contemplated for a while a `ministry

of generals', an effective dictatorship or Staatstreich. Even if this idea proved

abortive (not least because the military themselves now shied away from it), the

widespread unrest, which the authorities were only just able to master, was

bound to make them take stock at this eleventh hour.

When assessing

the degree of social disruption, the regime naturally tended

to make comparisons with what had just occurred in Russia. Arz von Straussen-

burg warned

that a social-revolutionary movement was visible in the Mon-

archy, stimulated

from the East, and it was vital that it did not enter the armed

257

258 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

forces and produce the kind of chaos witnessed in Russia.

Others, the Minister

of War, Sto

ger-Steiner,

and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, for example,

saw dangerous parallels in the seditious socialist leaflets which had been circu-

lating in

Budapest.

There and elsewhere, the Flugblatt (propaganda leaflet) was

increasingly accorded a special sinister mystique by the authorities. Its presence

could be tied in with what Austrian military Intelligence thought it knew

about the Bolsheviks' plans. The Bolsheviks had allegedly set aside two million

roubles for socialist propaganda, which would be smuggled into the Central

Powers from neutral states or via returning prisoners of war.

By February, the

revolutionary material which had been discovered in the Monarchy's cities

seemed indeed to be matched by an increasing amount of Bolshevik propa-

ganda which

was seeping through the Russian border.

For Austria-Hungary's

military and political leaders, therefore, the domestic crisis of early 1918 was

immediately associated in their minds with enemy subversion. `Propaganda',

moreover, was treated reverentially precisely because the Austrians had already

used it and appreciated what it could do.

While the

threat from the East seemed the most tangible, there were signs

that the western Powers were devising a strategy too. Austrian Intelligence was

aware of an article in The Times of 10 January, probably included by Wickham

Steed, according to which copies of President Wilson's `Fourteen Points' were to

be distributed over enemy lines `translated in all Austrian Slav languages and

circulated by every possible means in Austria-Hungary'. That this was no idle

threat was confirmed for Baden a few weeks later when such leaflets were

discovered on the Italian Front.

But there was also evidence of a more deep-

seated intrigue. A month before the British publicly announced Lord North-

cliffe's appointment, Baden had received some substantial news from a `reliable

Entente source' on the `Italian border'. According to this, on New Year's Eve a

special Allied propaganda committee had been constituted in Washington. Its

membership included Northcliffe (in fact in London by this time), Lord Read-

ing, Senator

Stone, and many editors of the American press; its purpose was to

organize revolution in Germany and the other enemy states. Trained agents,

who had been recruited in the West, were to be sent out from `stations' in

neutral countries into the Central Powers to foment revolutionary ideas and

spread subversive material. The whole operation would be financed by America.

It was a report which Max Ronge continued to believe, and included in his

memoirs. There is no evidence that the information was accurate, but it fitted

the AOK's concept of an Empire which in its last year was facing an ideological

onslaught from both East and West.

The standard line, in memoirs and in

Austrian military reports from the spring, was that the enemy had turned to the

use of propaganda because they had been unable to defeat the Central Powers

with conventional weapons. Although this argument might equally be applied

to Austria's own propaganda campaigns, it was consistently repeated and lent a

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 259

kind of moral authority to the `respectable' war which the Monarchy was

waging.

When Lord Northcliffe was appointed as `Director of Propaganda in Enemy

Countries', the Austrians were given a concrete western opponent to match

that of Bolshevism in the East. It was the first public admission by the western

Allies that they were organizing a propaganda campaign, and with this absolute

proof in mind, the Habsburg authorities would increasingly place subversion of

all kinds at the door of ubiquitous `Northcliffe propaganda'. In July 1918, the

editor of the Reichspost, Friedrich Funder, would tell a rally of Catholics in

Vienna: `we know that Lord Northcliffe has been entrusted with so-called

``domestic propaganda'' in enemy lands and that millions of the English treasury

have been placed at his disposal'.

Northcliffe from the start was assumed to be

the key figure in the Allies' campaign, not surprisingly in view of the absence of

any other information. The loyal Budapest daily Pester Lloyd was the first to pick

up Reuter's announcement of the appointment on 18 February, and published

the next day on its front page a vivid description of the man who came to

personify enemy propaganda for the Central Powers. It revealed how ten years

before, at an exhibition in Berlin of the Hungarian painter Philip de Laszlo

, the

German Kaiser had been fascinated by a portrait of Northcliffe. Questioning the

artist closely, the Kaiser had shown `astonishing vision': `it was obvious to him

that Harmsworth was destined to play a fatal role in contemporary history'.

And indeed, after `diabolical advancement' Northcliffe had contributed cru-

cially to

pushing Sir Edward Grey into war in August 1914. Today the peer of

the realm

has control

over the most influential and widespread newspapers of the

island empire, is more or less the dictator of public opinion of the British

people, a man at whose hint generals and ministers vanish from the scene, a

kind of mortal weather god who has it in his hand to let governments walk in

the sun-light of popularity or to unleash murderous hurricanes against them.

Pester Lloyd

presumed that Northcliffe's chief task was to divide the Monarchy

from its German ally, and assured its readers that such intrigues would never

succeed.

Nevertheless, the appointment caused some alarm in loyal political

circles. On 7 March the Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Ernst von Seidler, had to

assure Christian Social deputies in the Reichsrat that the government was not

only fully aware of the danger, but was actively combatting it: `In the interest of

success I cannot at present communicate any details. I can however say this

much, that the organization which we have set up against enemy influences is

working very earnestly and also with good results.'

If Seidler's words had any meaning, the organization to which he was refer-

ring must

have been the Intelligence Service, for no other special organization

260 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

had been created by this time. Immediately after the Reuter announcement,

Ronge had ordered the Evidenzbu

ro,

his `collecting centre' for Intelligence in

Vienna, to draw up a report. The report, a few days later, made the same kind of

comments as Pester Lloyd about `the infamous press king', and surmised that

Northcliffe's appointment signified that the press was to play a major role in

the enemy propaganda campaign. He, however, would be one of a trio, since it

was known that Lord Beaverbrook had been appointed `Propaganda Minister'

[actually Minister of Information] while the newspaper editor, Robert Donald,

was said to be `director of propaganda in neutral countries'.

With these facts

as an initial basis, Austrian Intelligence in the following months tried to piece

together a clearer picture, assuming increasingly that Britain and America were

the leaders in the psychological offensive.

On 5

April, Ronge summed up what was known so far about `Anglo-American

Propaganda'.

Since the enemy had failed to defeat the Central Powers from

without by conventional weapons (force of arms or blockade), they had taken

up the weapon of insidious propaganda from within. From small beginnings

the enemy campaign, which was organized especially through the press, had

grown into `a centralized system which encompassed the whole earth: we are

faced today with a new enemy whose dangerousness we are still unable to

assess'. The evidence now suggested that earlier in the year propaganda centres

had been established in London, Paris and Rome for the purpose of spreading

literature in central Europe. As far as Northcliffe and Austria-Hungary were

concerned, the key distribution point seemed to be Switzerland. From there

the press baron planned to send Dutch, Swedish and Spanish agents, dressed as

businessmen, to agitate in the Monarchy, encourage pacifism and thereby

indirectly force Germany to end the war as well. American agents were similarly

agitating in neutral Holland and Switzerland, and it seemed true to say that

Allied influence over the neutral press would be `the most important tool' in

the campaign. Ronge's report was not wholly inaccurate. It was indeed part of

the EPD's remit to spread material into the Monarchy via Switzerland, though

little is known about this. Ronge even tried to sketch out the structure of

Britain's new propaganda machinery. However, Austrian Intelligence was al-

ways led

astray by concentrating too much on Northcliffe and the press, and

too little upon evidence which was emerging from the Italian Front.

Admittedly, in

another report a month later, the Austrians showed that they

were soon able to guess more accurately about Allied propaganda coord-

ination.

Information was now available to show France's, and particularly

Italy's role in the offensive. Earlier, little had been known about French propa-

ganda except

that Clemenceau himself might have been responsible (Ronge

had vainly approached Berlin on the subject). But by May it was correctly

assumed that Henri Franklin-Bouillon was playing a key role, coordinating

meetings in Paris between Italians

and the Czech and Yugoslav Committees,

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 261

and participating in propaganda conferences in Paris and London in the middle

of March. Austrian Intelligence knew about these crucial meetings because they

had briefly been mentioned in the Allied press. Most significant seemed to be

the presence of the Italian Under-Secretary for Propaganda, Romeo Gallenga

Stuart. According to the Giornale d'Italia, the day after the London conference

the American `Luncheon Club' had hosted a breakfast, attended by Gallenga,

Northcliffe, Beaverbrook and Franklin-Bouillon. Gallenga had made an impas-

sioned speech,

appealing to America to discover the new Italy just as Columbus

had once discovered America, and to recognize Italy's idealistic commitment to

the war. The Austrian Intelligence report concluded that at this meeting of

minds in London, the Allies had made some important resolutions and decided

to divide up between themselves the tasks of enemy propaganda. The Italians, it

seemed, had been assigned the chief role of conducting the propaganda cam-

paign against

Austria-Hungary. They would concentrate upon strengthening

links in four directions, with Yugoslavs, Czechs, Poles and socialists of the

Monarchy: `In all these directions in Italy at the moment, there is a striking

and in many cases novel activity which has come to the fore in political

discussions in public, in the Parliament and the press, and is winning ever

more converts.' The Italians were building upon solid agreements made with

the four groupings and, the report suggested, they could find a very willing ear,

especially among socialists in the Empire. If Austrian Intelligence officers were

particularly alert to socialist subversion because of the unrest earlier in the year,

it would soon become clear to them that Italy's priority lay with fomenting

nationalist agitation. Most notably there was the evidence of the Rome Con-

gress which

was well publicized in the Monarchy by the Austro-Hungarian press

itself. In Yugoslav regions, for example, newspapers of all political persuasions

were able to reproduce accounts from the Swiss press, one describing it as `A

propaganda meeting financed by Northcliffe' while another commented that

the Italians were trying to `divide the skin of a bear which is still alive'.

If by the early summer concrete signs of enemy propaganda were only too

evident on the Italian Front, the Habsburg authorities would always treat

`enemy propaganda' as something more nebulous and ubiquitous. From the

premise that it was `an organized system encompassing the whole world',

enemy propaganda easily became a `catch-all' phrase for any poisons infecting

the Monarchy, an evil which seemed to have links to every facet of nationalist

or social unrest. Northcliffe still continued to be seen as the real mastermind or

soul behind the campaign, the man who with American support and millions

of pounds at his disposal was steadily building up centres in the neutral states

from which to infiltrate the Central Powers and unleash a revolution.

The

link to mounting unrest in the Monarchy was easily made. In July, for example,

at a meeting between Ronge and a group of Intelligence officers to discuss the

`Czechoslovak movement', those present naturally assumed some connection:

262 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

Newspaper reports about the careful preparation and large-scale execution of

the Allies' propaganda service are innumerable. The whole network of the

organization which Lord Northcliffe has called into being lies before us.

Agents report just as frequently about details of the campaign being prepared

against us and our allies. The agitation in the Monarchy is said to be

prepared in Switzerland. . .

. [While Czechs abroad are in league with this

campaign], we can see in our fatherland the effects, which we ascribe to a

large extent to enemy propaganda. But unfortunately we still do not

know about the threads which lead from the known causes to the

clear effects. The meshes of the network have for the most part not been

uncovered.

The idea that Northcliffe had spun a large web across the Monarchy called for

extreme vigilance on the part of the already hard-pressed security forces. How-

ever, they

could rarely be given specific data about the nature of enemy propa-

ganda. They

were simply informed that the Entente, in league with domestic

and foreign nationalist agitators, had created various organizations to destroy

the Monarchy by means of agents, leaflets and sabotage, but that more precise

details of the `network' were unknown.

This often resulted in Intelligence

agents or military commands indulging in wild speculation about the supposed

detection of `enemy propaganda'. A few examples will suffice. When in July

1918 wireless links were cut between Pula and neutral Spain, an Austrian agent

in Spain assumed that it was the work of `Entente propaganda'.

Meanwhile,

Entente agents were regularly reported to be entering the Monarchy from

Switzerland, although they were rarely discovered. If there was a grain of

truth in this particular idea, it was highly improbable that the same phenom-

enon could

be detected also on the Monarchy's eastern borders. There, for

instance, `Entente agitation and propaganda' was said to be especially lively

between Moldavia and Transylvania, while from a centre in Moscow Entente

agents were allegedly entering Galicia as Ukrainian `homecomers', equipped for

some reason with Spanish passports.

In these cases any underhand methods

of the enemy might be labelled as `Entente propaganda'.

Another tendency

was to blame enemy propaganda for many aspects of

the domestic unrest which was engulfing the Empire. In May, when a revolt

occurred in a Slovene regiment in Judenburg, the court martial proceedings

concluded:

It can

certainly be said with regard to the influence of national political

factors, that the Yugoslav parties and, in the broadest sense, also the revolu-

tionary campaign

of the Entente and therefore the English propaganda

ministry played some role, although there is no immediate evidence avail-

able for

this.

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 263

In the same way, when ugly rumours circulated about the Emperor and his wife

in July, there were always those who placed the blame on the `lie factory' which

the Entente was constructing in the Empire. The Foreign Minister, Count

Buria

n, publicly reminded the Austrian and Hungarian Prime Ministers that

there was `actually a Minister for Propaganda in England':

Our enemies

are endeavouring by means of the propaganda offensive to

cripple us internally and make us defenceless . . . Enemy propaganda is not

content with endeavouring to stir our peoples up against each other. It has

not even shrunk from fostering suspicion between the peoples of the Mon-

archy and

the hereditary dynasty by the dissemination of monstrous and

contemptible slanders.

Thus `enemy propaganda' by the summer at least had become a convenient

label for many anonymous evils. At times it was a term used loosely to describe

Entente machinations, the supposition being that the enemy by 1918 had

actively infiltrated the Empire and was in direct contact with nationalist agit-

ators within.

But the very vagueness of the term was also exploited by the

authorities to justify their own predicament. If some were indeed paranoid

and felt encircled, others had in `enemy propaganda' an ideal bogey which

could be blamed, both during the war and thereafter, for domestic unrest and a

whole host of errors which were to lead to the final collapse. As a Swiss news-

paper commented

scornfully:

If the

Austrian army suffers a defeat on the Piave because of the incompet-

ence of

its generals, if the peoples of the Monarchy want to emphasize their

century-old demands, if the population of Bohemia despairs because of

hunger, if the imperial couple is disliked, this is all blamed on the influence

of Northcliffe's propaganda.

Until the end of the war, Austrian Intelligence gained little new information

about the real organization of enemy propaganda. As we have seen, they had

some accurate suspicions: about Allied attempts at coordination, about Borg-

ese's office in Switzerland; and in the summer they learnt correctly that French

propaganda had been reorganized under a French diplomat, Klobukowski. But

through an indiscriminate accumulation of fact and fiction there were also

some striking errors. At one point, when asked to supply details about Eng-

land's propaganda organization, the military attache

at The Hague replied

that it was led by Lord Beaverbrook [Max Aitken] under whom were serving

Northcliffe, Robert Donald and `Sir M. Aitken (a Canadian)'.

The impression

is that Ronge's Intelligence service, though highly competent in gathering

detailed reports from all corners of the Monarchy as well as abroad, was always