Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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294 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

political leanings could only be ascertained from one fact. On the day of his

desertion he had suppressed a piece of enemy propaganda which he had found,

a leaflet telling of a parliamentary speech by Ante Tresic

-Pavic

about atrocities

against Croats. More certain proof of Kerekovic

's state of mind came from a

comment he had made to a fellow officer after finding one of the leaflets signed

by Belos

evic

: `these scum of HIR26 are now sitting comfortably in a cafe

Rome while I get myself killed here by enemy grenades and can't get any leave'.

Having not associated with the `cadet party' at its birth, it seems likely that

Kerekovic

joined the plotters chiefly because he had not been on leave for 15

months; but his was still a significant desertion as he knew a lot about the div-

isional defences.

138

Franjo Svetec, on the other hand, seemed more obviously

committed to radical politics. Among his personal effects were found fragments

of a book about the anarchist Bakunin, and he was known when on the Sturm

course to have worn Yugoslav colours and recommended them to a friend in

Zagreb on the grounds that there was not enough political agitation in the

hinterland. Like his fellow-deserters, Svetec was also probably spurred on to act

by the example set by the first group of the cadet party and by their signed

manifestos which proved that they had safely reached enemy lines. On dep-

arture, Svetec

left behind a note for his company commander saying that he

was `following in the steps of Lt Belos

evic

, ensign Kostrenc

and volunteer

tina, because my life is dearer to me than glory'.

139

The way in which the second group deserted was also remarkably similar to

the first. On the evening of 26 May, Popovic

, Zvonarevic

and Kerekovic

met for

a game of cards without arousing any suspicion. Then they went out with

Svetec, who was often on sentry duty and knew the terrain, and posed as an

`officers' patrol' in no-man's-land near Val Bella. In the darkness they were chal-

lenged by

a sentry, but were easily allowed to continue, crawled under the wires,

and escaped into Italian lines. It was around this very spot that one of Pivko's

patrols was about to begin trench propaganda, and although the deserters do

not seem to have been enticed by anything more than enemy manifestos, they

would all be destined when in Italy to join Pivko's Yugoslav unit.

140

Only after these desertions did the 42HID begin to take precautionary mea-

sures. But

their inadequacy is clear from the fact that just a fortnight later

another patrol, of seven men from HIR28, was able to go missing (and later

turned up in Pivko's unit).

141

Divisional precautions meanwhile had included

halting all propaganda against Italy in the sector, thereby curbing unnecessary

patrols, but also leaving the field wide open to the enemy propagandists.

142

Since the second group of deserters was thought to have betrayed vital details

about the sector and the imminent offensive (something immediately borne

out by the direction of enemy artillery fire after 26 May), the 42nd command

also considered radical changes in the layout of their forces, including with-

drawing HIR27

from the front altogether.

143

But above all, the divisional

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 295

picture was to be clarified at this time by a thorough investigation into the

reason for both sets of desertions. In the reports which emerged from the

enquiry, it was generally agreed that the deserters had been infected in some

way by Yugoslav agitation, but it was less clear how large a role it had played. As

the divisional court proceedings observed, the second group of deserters were

`all youths of about 20 years of age, and one cannot say that they have a serious

understanding of politics or real life in general'. Less idealistic motives seemed

`clear' from the message which Svetec had left behind, from Kerekovic

's frus-

tration about

leave, from Kostrenc

's supposed `timidity', and from the fact

that Popovic

owed his batman 300 Kronen.

144

All this supported a divisional consensus that it was cowardice which was the

leading motive, something which the regimental commanders were keen to

highlight while insisting that there were no other signs of political agitation or

unreliability in their units. The desertions were portrayed as unique incidents

which occurred even among the most reliable troops and would in no way

tarnish the glorious reputation of the 42HID. In particular, all were agreed that

among the rank and file there was no sympathy whatsoever. `The behaviour of

the men is exemplary', wrote the HIR27 commander; `they unanimously con-

demn the

deserters' treacherous conduct and threaten that if they are caught

they will be lynched.'

145

For the men, the main source of discontent remained,

as revealed in postal censorship during May, their material conditions and

particularly the food crisis. They were not likely to be receptive to Yugoslav

propaganda since, as FML Soretic

the new divisional commander explained,

`our men, mostly peasants, stick to tradition and are rooted too firmly in their

native soil to be susceptible to these ideas'. He warned, however, that if propa-

ganda was

cleverly disguised, it might well constitute a danger to the ordinary

soldier.

146

Indeed, one disguise might be for the enemy propagandists to dwell

on social unrest in the hinterland, for the men were naturally always anxious

about their families and property. In 1917±18, cases of absence without leave

were soaring from even the most reliable divisions. For example, in a `loyal'

Croat division like the 36ID, the court martial records abound with such cases,

often caused because the men on leave discovered a miserable home environ-

ment and

were persuaded to remain there by insistent family members.

147

If these basic threats to morale were only hinted at in the 42HID enquiry, the

specific danger of Yugoslav agitation among the officer corps was firmly

acknowledged. The regimental commanders might emphasize that the deser-

tions were

an exception, that the officer corps was generally reliable, but at the

same time they could not deny that younger reserve officers who were joining

the division were sympathetic to the Yugoslav message. It did not mean that

they were necessarily disloyal to the Emperor. A dual loyalty seemed to persist

for many Croats, of loyalty both to the Emperor and to southern Slav unity. But

from this duality there was a strong possibility of Habsburg patriotism being

296 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

slowly eroded by more radical nationalism reaching the army from front and

rear. The HIR27 commander presented the problem very clearly. He divided the

younger officers into two categories, those who had completed their training

before the war or in its early years, who were reliable and patriotic; and those

whose training fell after 1916, who were politically infected, listless and

untrustworthy. The blame for the latter could be set squarely at the door of

the hinterland where the authorities lacked political direction, where the pol-

itical vacuum

was filled by Yugoslav agitators, and where the press was full of

sensational and disruptive news. The result was that `infected' young officers

like Popovic

were, after training, being sent out to the division without any

record being communicated of their past misdemeanours.

148

Summarizing

these views, the divisional and corps commanders also blamed the hinterland

for most ills, particularly using the opportunity to complain once again about

the dearth of older, experienced Croat officers in the division. Such men, they

alleged, were being allowed to remain in comfortable positions in the hinter-

land instead

of taking their turn at the front. It left a bitter taste in the mouths

of officers in the front line, but it also weakened morale in the officer corps as a

whole, because older individuals would naturally act as a stabilizing influence

upon the younger ones and steer them on a straight patriotic path.

149

The front-line commanders expected that if this single issue could be

resolved, by dispatching to the 42HID a good number of older reliable officers,

most of the existing threats to morale would disappear at an instant. In fact it

was a fallacy to suggest that a surplus of Croat officers existed in Croatia. The

reserve which was available there was tightly stretched. Nor could many of the

other front-line troubles blamed on `the hinterland' be easily resolved by the

military commanders in Croatia. When in July the 42HID invited the chief of

staff of the VI Honve

d military district (Zagreb) to make a report on the whole

issue of divisional manpower and its relationship with the Croatian hinterland,

Lt-Colonel Na

dasdy's conclusions put the 42HID complaints in clear perspect-

ive.

150

dasdy readily confirmed that the number of older active officers in

the division was far too small, while younger reserve officers were fast losing

their former balance of `dual allegiance' and inclining to Yugoslavism due to

nationalist agitation in the hinterland. However, Na

dasdy then described in

detail why Croatia could no longer meet the twin divisional requirements of

supplying sufficient, but also reliable, officer reserves. The number of officers

there was steadily shrinking since, apart from acting as a reserve for Croatian

divisions, the district also had to supply Serbo-Croat-speaking officers for most

Bosnian units and for the administration of occupied Serbia and Montenegro.

The result was a dearth of officer material in Croatia itself, which had a direct

impact on the ability of the authorities to exercise an efficient administration,

not least to round up the growing number of deserters in the countryside.

According to Na

dasdy, a good 70 per cent of military administrative staff were

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 297

now women, while those officers in place (and 116 were vitally lacking) were in

crucially necessary posts rather than in `comfortable positions' as the 42HID

insinuated. The prospect therefore of meeting the 42HID demands was not

bright for a combination of reasons. Na

dasdy, estimating that a reserve of

only 8000 men was available for the division for the rest of the year, recom-

mended that

the whole system of managing manpower in the Monarchy would

need to be transformed if `patchwork measures' [Flickerei] were not to continue.

A few

months later patchwork measures were indeed continuing. Although

the 42HID benefited in September 1918 when a regiment (HIR33) was dissolved

and assigned to it, the issue of human resources remained fundamental to the

division's morale. In late September FML Soretic

continued to view a manpower

crisis as imminent since the number of those deserting when on leave (60 per

cent in one regiment) was spiralling. He could not prohibit leave altogether as

he felt it might directly cause mass desertion. He could only call for action in

Croatia itself, warning of the immense dangers now constituted by `the sinking

state of affairs at the front combined with an armed hinterland which mocks

the authorities'.

151

It was a call of despair, but it could not gain a hearing in the

recruitment ground of Croatia where perhaps 9000 deserters from the 42HID

reserves were now at large.

152

Soretic

's military superiors simply noted that

some reorganization of the 42HID might be possible at the end of the year.

What the

42nd commanders had long viewed as the most serious threat to

morale, the absence of reliable officers, persisted therefore until the end of the

war. The division could not be supplied with many new officers, and the

cohesion of the existing officer corps was steadily weakening as chaos took

hold in Croatia and the environment of the war zone deteriorated. The military

had, of course, exacerbated this state of affairs through launching a final

offensive against Italy in June 1918. Just as the 11th army lost over 1000

officers and 44 000 men in this enterprise, so the 42HID suffered proportionally

(Table 7.1). The division's material crisis, its inferior position in artillery and in

the air, its slightly crumbling hierarchical cohesion ± all these weaknesses were

exposed in June in the way that the division collapsed after an initially

impressive performance against French positions.

153

As with so many other

Austro-Hungarian units, the 42HID troops had been fired up to perform well

Table 7.1 Diminishing Strength of the 42HID (1918)

154

Unit 30 January 1 May 28 June

Officers Men Officers Men Officers Men

HIR25 53 1912 50 1461 38 1125

HIR26 56 2119 56 2070 27 860

HIR27 44 2015 54 2260 30 1137

HIR28 70 2006 80 2072 41 938

298 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

by the promise of rich booty. But after a few days they had over 4000 casualties

and were `completely exhausted'.

155

On 24 June they were withdrawn to the

rear, Soretic

specifying that failure in the long-awaited offensive was the main

reason for `the deep depression' which pervaded the whole division. It was, in

his view, no longer the physically and morally efficient instrument which had

arrived earlier in the year to fight the hereditary enemy; it had suffered from

poor supplies, from inferior weaponry and seeping Yugoslav agitation. None of

these evils would be removed in the following months, and all would contrib-

ute in

their way to sabotaging Soretic

's overall solution for curing the division's

`deep depression'. In his words: `Only a major, sensational [military] success

will be able to give the optimists among the officers the upper hand and carry

the men securely along with them.'

156

The previously untold story of the 42HID is all the more valuable because its

nickname `Devil's Division' (Vraz

ija Divizija) always symbolized a reputation

for fiery reliability. In 1918, its effectiveness as a military unit was being eroded

by the same threats which had long-undermined far less reliable Czech or

Romanian divisions. All units in the army were now subject to a range of similar

pressures. Their morale was lowered by a perpetual crisis in material and human

resources, and this was compounded for each nationality (in varying degrees)

by the ideological struggle which was being waged in the hinterland. Develop-

ments in

the 42HID illustrate how educated soldiers in particular might be

affected by nationalist agitation from their home-region, and how Italy's

front propaganda might then act as a small catalyst upon nationalist phenom-

ena in

the war zone which the Austrian military were desperate to eliminate.

While the

division's FA officer could portray his pupils' outlook in glowing

colours, a different picture of the division had emerged from the May desertions

and the troops' rapid exhaustion during the June offensive. It was a picture

which made any productive FA work among the troops highly questionable. If

in the summer months the division lapsed into what Soretic

termed a `critical

passivity', there were also alarming hints of what was beneath the surface (and

these must remain hints in the absence of any detailed reports). In late July, for

example, about a dozen men who were on a training course in the rear refused,

due to their poor rations, to obey orders which were given by a commanding

officer who could not speak Croatian.

157

It was a minor incident, but it is

probably significant in view of the division's later history. On 22 October,

two days before the final Italian offensive began, regiments of the 42HID (HIR

25/26) in the rear were some of the first Austro-Hungarian units to revolt

against their commanders. Most of the mutineers were rounded up by a reliable

Sturmbatallion without bloodshed, but they had still set a public example for

others. Soretic

judged a few days later that the rest of his division in the front

line was now unreliable as well. More importantly, the 42nd's challenge to

Habsburg authority had been enough to set off a string of mutinies in the war

158

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 299

zone. In this way, the collapse of the 42HID's dual allegiance was finally

complete.

7.4 Austria loses the propaganda duel

Both the Allies and the Austrians had expected that the Monarchy's summer

offensive would be decisive in revealing the effectiveness of their respective

propaganda campaigns. This was indeed the case, and it was Austria-Hungary

whose illusions were shattered. As with the experience of the 42HID, the June

offensive had the effect of clarifying the reality behind the Austrian comman-

ders' assumptions.

The AOK was forced to accept that its campaign was already

inferior and had been largely unsuccessful when compared to the Italians'.

While the Austrians had single-handedly had an opportunity to wield the

propaganda weapon with some vigour in the spring, the subsequent propa-

ganda duel,

especially from April 1918 onwards, had been weighted more and

more heavily in Italy's favour.

The Allied

propagandists were the first to claim success for their own efforts

in the months before the June offensive. Steadily from April, Henry Wickham

Steed had been using a myth, that propaganda had already forced the enemy to

postpone his offensive, as a bargaining chip in Allied circles. He proceeded in

late May to tell the EPD committee in London that the campaign of leaflets and

trench propaganda had influenced the morale of `a considerable proportion of

the Austro-Hungarian forces'.

159

It was a vague claim, yet one which those at

Padua undoubtedly supported on the basis of more specific `evidence'. Jambri-

sak, for example, professed to be able to see visible effects of the Rome Con-

gress: `deserters

come in greater numbers, and all are motivated by having

heard that an [Italo-Yugoslav] agreement has been reached'.

160

Ojetti enthusi-

astically concurred,

writing to his wife on 9 June that `all deserters are arriving

with leaflets in their hands . . . [saying] that our manifestos have a great effect

because they tell the truth and tally with the few newspapers which come from

the interior to the lines'.

161

In assessing such evidence and the real impact of Italy's campaign in these

months, certain facts cannot be denied. As we have seen, the bogey of enemy

propaganda was certainly alarming the Austrian authorities and forcing them

to take counter-measures. The threat was perceived as something vague and

ubiquitous, but it also had a specific Italian shape in manifestos and trench

propaganda which seemed ever more cleverly attuned to each nationality's

outlook. At the front, there was indeed clear evidence that Czech propaganda

patrols, especially on the river Piave, were making a mark, securing some

desertions from their efforts or at least winning over disgruntled soldiers who

then remained in the Austrian trenches to act as `yeast' for future fermentation.

The case of the 42HID also indicates how by May 1918 Italy's efforts were

300 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

playing a subtle role in contributing to the material and ideological crisis

which was undermining troop morale in all quarters. One can suggest that

Italy's campaign was acting most effectively as a catalyst upon the thinking of

educated reserve officers, men like Belos

evic

and Kostrenc

who were follow-

ing in

the steps of Hlava

ek and Pivko from earlier in the war. But less effect-

ively could

the campaign influence the less-educated rank and file. After all, in

terms of the impact of Padua's manifestos, a crucial basic obstacle (and one

which never seems to have occurred to the Allied propagandists) was the issue

of literacy. Literacy figures from British military sources (Table 7.2), even if not

wholly accurate, raise a question-mark over how many soldiers could actually

read Padua's leaflets, all the more so as the language of the leaflet would have to

match its recipient's own language proficiency. Nor did the manifestos contain

the number of pictorial images which Ojetti had first envisaged, and which

might have done something to offset the literacy problem. From this premise it

seems difficult to believe that large numbers of men deserted to Italy in direct

response to Padua's often rather subtle arguments. In contrast, the work of

propaganda patrols in the front line might be considered far more dangerous.

The Austrian commanders always viewed it as such, since the very presence of

the patrols introduced new confusion into the purpose of the war which the

Empire was fighting.

A question

too must hang over the Allied propagandists' claims that their

early successes were directly reflected in an increase in the rate of enemy

desertions. Steed wrote in his memoirs that in May 1918 `hundreds' of Czechs

and Yugoslavs had sought refuge in Italy, bringing Allied leaflets with them as a

passport to a better future.

162

The reality was undoubtedly more modest. It is

true that, as before any offensive, desertions to the enemy were increasing and

Table 7.2 Percentage of literate males, aged 16±50,

in Austria, Hungary and Bosnia-Hercegovina

163

Nationality Austria Hungary Bosnia

Ruthene 28 25 ±

Polish 60 ± ±

Czech 97 ± ±

Slovak ± 75 ±

Romanian ± 45 ±

Italian 88 ± ±

Slovene 84 ± ±

Serb 35 45 18

Croat 50 50 25

German 97 75 ±

Magyar ± 78 ±

Moslem ± ± 12

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 301

Table 7.3

Desertions to the Italian 4th Army, 15 May±14 June 1918

164

Reason for Desertion Nationality* Total

Cz I B

S-C R U P G M

Nationalism 4 4

Join Cz.

Legion



1 1

Join Serb

Legion 1 1 2

Propaganda



1 1

War-weariness 1 1 2

Fear 1 2 3

Ill-treatment 1 1 2

Hatred of

Austrians 1 2 1 4

Hunger 1 15 1 1 1 1 3 1 24

TOTAL 3 4 19 4 2 4 1 3 3 43

Notes:

* Cz (Czec

h), I (Italian), B (Bosnians: it is unclear whether Moslems are specifically meant), S-C (Serbs

and Croats together), R (Romanian), U (Ukrainian; Ruthene), P (Polish), G (German), M (Magyar).



On the 7th army front during the same period it is known that six Czechs gave joining the Legion as

their reason for desertion, while two Czechs specified `enemy manifestos'.

occurring in the Czech case with a certain regularity. Yet, of 25 officers and 990

men who went missing from the Heeresgruppe Conrad during May, only five

officers and 145 men were definitely known to have deserted to Italy.

165

these, it seems reasonable to suppose that the number who deserted in direct

response to Allied propaganda was relatively small; `baser' motives were in the

forefront of most soldiers' minds. It was also in the deserters' interest to tell the

Italians that they had acted due to some high-minded ideal. But we know from

Italian 4th army records (Table 7.3) that most deserters in that sector gave

`hunger' as their chief motivation, not `enemy propaganda' or a desire to join

the Czechoslovak Legion. The tendency seems clear, even if for any individual

desertion there could be a mixture of reasons, among which the appeal made by

an enemy manifesto might be an added stimulus and a guarantee of safe-

conduct across the lines.

For the

British propagandists at Crewe House, the success of `their' campaign

at this stage was measurable in another form as well. Allegedly, the deserters

who were stimulated by Allied propaganda had betrayed vital information to

the Italians on the eve of the Austrian offensive.

166

This claim too requires

qualification. And it enables us to take up Vojte

ch Hanzal's challenge to future

historians of assessing how far these desertions were crucial for Italian Intelli-

gence in

June 1918.

167

In the days and weeks before the Austrian attack, the

work of the Czech propaganda patrols was certainly helping to clarify the

picture for the Intelligence network; they gained precise details about the trend

and timing of the offensive. The desertion of Karel Stinny

on the 3rd army front

302 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

in late May appears to have been a real prize, for he knew convincing facts

about the attack across the Piave which made the Italians decide not to proceed

with a local offensive on the Asiago plateau.

168

Stinny

's disclosures were sup-

ported a

few days later by Rudolf Paprskar

who was enticed to desert by 8th

army patrols and spoke openly about an imminent offensive across the river to

the Montello hill.

169

Pivko's units also played their part in honing the accuracy

of Intelligence data. From listening devices and a stream of desertions, Finzi

could feel the `nimbus of the offensive' gathering on the mountain front as

well. On 9 June he knew that the enemy had delivered reserve rations to the

troops. On 13 June the 6th army bulletin duly announced that attack was

imminent. On 14 June Pivko's scouts learnt at three separate points that it

would begin at 3 a.m. the next morning, a fact confirmed by deserters in other

170

sectors. As a result of such precise Intelligence the Italians were not at all

surprised by the offensive, and could pre-empt it in the mountains with a heavy

bombardment from midnight; Lord Cavan noted, `the Austrian attack on our

positions began to the expected minute'.

171

Thus there is reliable evidence to

suggest that Italian Intelligence was substantially enhanced by the work of

Czech propaganda troops prior to the offensive. Italian commanders like Giar-

dino (4th

army) sincerely believed this, concluding that such precise data had

done much to sabotage the Austrian attack.

172

It should be emphasized, however, how far the Italians since the spring had

suspected the main trend of Austrian plans. They were not solely reliant upon

enemy desertions for such clues. Just before the offensive, Finzi could boast to

Pivko that he knew everything happening in the Austrian war zone thanks to

the Intelligence network's finely tuned efficiency.

173

It had gathered informa-

tion from

agents like Mansueto Zanon at Innsbruck, from reconnaissance

flights over enemy territory, from eavesdropping on Austrian wireless activity,

and from the very large number of prisoners taken prior to the offensive (870

for example during Austria's diversionary Tonale attack on 13 June). Alongside

these sources, which included the valuable work of Czech propaganda troops,

the role of individual deserters could be a useful check but was unlikely to be

decisive. It is a point, surprisingly, with which Max Ronge after the war agreed.

Rather than blame Slav deserters for the de

cle

in June 1918, he wrote dispas-

sionately: `Failures

should not always be linked together with treachery even

though one likes to make treason responsible.' He himself was more inclined to

point to Austrian errors in the front line, including the failure to conceal their

wireless chatter from the Italians.

174

Yet Ronge too therefore was implying that the outcome of the June offensive

was decisively affected by the fact that Italy knew exact data about its timing

and orientation. A more fundamental reason for the failure would seem to be

that the operation was `a rather bungled affair even before it started'.

175

Mem-

oirs and

the official Austrian inquiry of December 1918 confirm that the

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 303

Austrian forces were undernourished and insufficiently equipped for a major

onslaught, Boroevic

and others pleading only a few days before the attack that

it ought to be postponed. Peter Fiala's work has revealed also the degree to

which the AOK and leading Austrian commanders were themselves completely

at odds over the exact character of the operation. The result was that Austrian

forces were spread evenly along the whole front, with no overwhelming point

of concentration which might have aided a break-through. These deficiencies

in planning were fully acknowledged by Rudolf Kiszling in the Austrian official

history (volume seven, published in 1938).

176

But in 1918, in the wake of the offensive, such an interpretation was naturally

not forthcoming. Conrad von Ho

tzendorf

served as a scapegoat for the failure

and was dismissed as commander of the Tyrolian front by the Emperor. Other-

wise the

AOK proclaimed that the offensive had been vital in forestalling an

Italian move, and had been most excellently prepared. It put the blame for

defeat on Slav deserters, singling out for publicity in the Austrian press the cases

177

of Stinny

and Paprskar

. While this deflected from the AOK the storm of

abuse which had arisen in the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, it also

attracted the attention of the Allied propagandists. They could seize upon it

as further proof of their own success.

178

In this way, the two sides became

unlikely allies in exaggerating the power of the propaganda weapon.

For the

Padua Commission, events which occurred during the offensive had

further contributed to the growing myth of their success in Italy. After the

battle General Diaz himself received members of the Commission and thanked

them for their efforts to which, he allegedly remarked, the victory `was in

considerable measure attributable'.

179

Even if such language may actually be

that of Wickham Steed, it seems clear that the CS was truly impressed by the

large number of deserters and prisoners secured during the offensive. Just

before the attack, Badoglio had been anxious to see the real effects of the propa-

ganda campaign,

since he already presumed it to have gained some useful

Intelligence and even to have forced the enemy to postpone their operation

from April to June.

180

After some days of the battle there were indeed signs that

Padua's leaflets had got through to the enemy. Ojetti asserted that almost all

prisoners had read them and exclaimed to his wife, `my thirty million mani-

festos have

achieved miracles!'

181

The reality as usual was more modest: we

know that 200 Romanians who were captured on the Montello hill had never

heard of Allied propaganda. But there seems no reason to doubt Ojetti's claim

that on one day 800 leaflets had been found upon 350 prisoners. Jambris

ak had

a similar experience when he visited Yugoslav prisoners and discovered that

most of them possessed leaflets, including some which had been distributed a

few weeks earlier over Ljubljana.

182

The most that can be inferred from this is

that Italy's manifestos may have helped some soldiers to feel that surrender

during the offensive was a viable option. Some of the leaflets which they