Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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SEA-POLICY
AND
NORTH
AMERICAN
CIVIL
WAR
55
which
formed
not
only
a
definite
stage
in the
evolution
of
British
Foreign
Policy
in
relation to the
Law of
the
Sea,
but
also
a
turning-
place
in the
history
of that
Law. The
policy
of
the
dominant
Sea-
Power
was,
and
is,
something
more than the
policy
of a
single
nation.
Despite
the
accidents
of events and the
errors
of
individual
statesmen,
that
policy
presents
an
organic growth
of
principles
rather
than the
selfish
policy
of an
individual Power.
Those
principles,
in
ever-growing
measure,
have
represented
what
has
been
accepted
as
the
inevitable
relationship
of neutrals with
belligerents,
of neutrals
with neutrals
and
(in
time
of
peace)
of all
nations
with
one
another.
Sooner
or
later,
a
complete
doctrine
of
Neutrality
was destined to
emerge,
and
the
rapid
transformation
of
the
character
of
Sea-Power,
as
the result
of
new methods
of
propulsion
introduced
about the
middle of
the
nineteenth
century,
made
it certain
that it
could not
be
long
delayed.
The North
American
Civil
War,
which
began
in
April,
1861,
as
the
consequence
of
the
Secession
from
the
Union in
November,
i860,
of
seven States
—
South
Carolina,
Florida,
Mississippi,
Alabama,
Georgia,
Louisiana
and Texas
—
under
the
designation
of
"The Confederate
States
of
North
America,'*
created
conditions
which could
not but
result
in war at sea.
The
Seceding
States
in
the
spring
of
1861 were
joined by
the States
of
Virginia,
North
Carolina,
Tennessee
and
Arkansas.
The United States
of
America,
after
a
century
of
extension
and
consolidation,
were
reft
asunder.
A
vast
unbroken
region
in
central
and
southern
North
America from Mexico northward to the
Potomac
River asserted
with
ample
arms and a solid
political organisa-
tion the
right
of
self-determination
and
independence.
It
was
neither
a
revolt
nor a revolution.
It
was
a
deliberate
setting-up
of a new
Rational
hearth.
The
northern
region
of
the
great
republic
—
"the
North,"
as
it
was
called
—
decided
at
all
costs to
maintain
the
Union;
and in this
country
there
was a
political
and social
repercussion
of
the terrible
struggle
which was
raging
in the
vast
areas of North
America.
Great
Britain,
on
the
question
of
principle,
was
split
in
twain,
and
the
cleavage
became
clearly apparent
in the
light
of
the
early
successes
of
the secessionists.
Each of
the
antagonists
strove
to
lean
upon
Great
Britain,
their
mother-country.
The North
looked
for
moral
support
not
only
in
respect
to
the doctrine
of
National
Unity
and
all
that it meant
to
civilisation,
but
also in
respect
to
the
great
policy (of
which
Great Britain was the
protagonist)
of
the
extirpation
of
Slavery
1
.
The
South
looked
for
the
"material
support
of
Great
1
See
J.
L.
Motley's
letter to the
Duke
of
Argyll
of
June,
1861, Autobiography
and
Memoirs
of
the
Eighth
Duke
of Argyll,
11.
173.
56
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
Britain
and
relied
on
the economic
difficulties and disasters caused
by
the
interruption
of
the
supplies
of
cotton to the manufacturers
of
the
Northern
counties. The
cleavage
of
English
opinion
took
un-
expected
lines. The
starving
operatives
of
the north of
England,
whose
material
interests
lay
with
the success of
the
apparently
triumphant
Secessionists,
repudiated
the ''Slave
States" and
gave
the
North their
moral
support.
Disraeli held
the
same view and
gave
no
support
to
the
South. On the
other
hand,
Gladstone
was so
impressed
with the
doctrine
of
self-determination
in
the
form which
it
had
then assumed
as
to
declare,
in
the
autumn
of
1862,
that
Mr
Jefferson
Davis
"
had made
an
army
and had made a
navy,
and,
what
was
more,
had made
a
Nation."
So
late
as
the
summer
of
1863,
Gladstone
affirmed that the
maintenance
of the
Union was
impossible.
A
steady foreign
policy
in these
circumstances was difficult
to
maintain
and liable
to
strange
deflexions.
It
was
destined to turn
ultimately
on Gladstone's state-
ment that the
south
"had
made
a
Navy."
For British
statesmen,
the
problem,
when
stripped
of
all its
passions
and
conflicting sympathies,
was a
problem
of
sea-policy.
If
this
had not been
plain
from
the first
—
and
it
cannot be
denied
today
that
Lord
John
Russell
was ill-advised and obstinate
in
his
early
dealings
with
the
question
—
Liverpool
soon
made
it
plain.
The
coming
of the
War
found this western
seaport teeming
with the
rich and
un-
scrupulous
agents
of the Confederate States. Into
Liverpool
there
had
drifted,
as
by
the
influence
of
some economic
magnet,
hundreds
of
British
and
American
sea-adventurers
of
every
kind, but,
for
the
most
part,
of the
old
piratical
type.
The
quays
of
Liverpool
hummed with
rumours
of sea-adventure
;
and
the
things
that the
British
Government
did not
know,
that
the Custom-House
officials
and
their
London chiefs
did
not
choose to
know,
were
the
common
talk
of
every
marine-store
dealer
in the
famous
seaport.
The
naval
side of
the
War
developed
with
great
rapidity.
In
April,
1861,
the
Confederates
secured
Fort
Sumter
(at
the north
of
Charleston
Harbour),
the
military
arsenal
of
Harper's
Ferry
on
the
Potomac,
and
the
naval arsenal at
Norfolk.
On
April
15th,
the
President
of
the
United
States
called out the
militia,
and,
on
April
17th,
Jefferson
Davis
(who
had been
elected
President
of
the
Confederate
States in
February)
issued
a
counter-proclamation
inviting
applications
for
letters
of
marque
and
reprisals
against
the
United
States.
Lincoln's
inevitable
answer,
two
days
later,
was to
declare
a
blockade
of
the
Seceding
States.
Confederate
vessels
were
captured
and
condemned,
and
the
Supreme
Court held that
"a state
THE
BLOCKADE OF
THE SECEDING
STATES
57
of
war"
existed.
In
these
circumstances,
the
British
Government
had
no alternative.
On
May
14th,
1861,
a Proclamation
of
Neutrality
was
issued with the
necessary
reference
to
the
Foreign
Enlistment
Act,
1819.
Great offence was
given
to
the
North
by
this action
;
but,
in
fact,
a similar
course had been
followed
by
the United States
in
the
Canadian
Rebellion of
1837,
and,
moreover,
a
recognition
of a
state
of
war did
not
involve
any recognition
of
Independence
1
. On
June
1st,
the
British
Government forbade
any belligerent
warships
to
carry
prizes
into
any
harbour of
the
empire,
and,
on
January
31st,
1
862,
excluded
all
ships
of
war from
the Bahama Islands and
forbade
any
ship
of war
to
stay
more
than
twenty-four
hours in
any
other
imperial port.
The
Government,
moreover,
in
its
anxiety
to
avoid
any charge
of
favouring
the
Con-
federate
States,
recognised
from
the
first
the
blockade
of a coast
line
of
3000
miles declared
by
Lincoln,
though
in truth it
was,
for a con-
siderable
time,
by
no means
effective.
It
was
at this
stage
that
Liverpool
became
the
storm-centre
of
British
policy.
It
was
the interest
of
the cotton trade to
make the
blockade
of
the Southern
ports
ineffective. It
was
the
business
of
the
blockading
forces
to
make
this
blockade
effective.
In
the
case
pre-
sented
on
the
part
of
the British
Government
to the
Tribunal
of
Arbitration,
constituted under Article
I
of
the
Treaty
of
Washington,
it
was
contended
that
the
right
of blockade is
a
belligerent right,
and the enforcement
of it
belongs
to
the
belligerent
and not to neutral
powers.
That
blockades
to
be
binding
must be made effective
by
the
blockading power,
is
a settled
and
salutary
rule
;
and
this indeed is the sole
protection
of
neutrals
against
an
undue and
extravagant
extension of the
right
of
blockade.
It
follows,
of
necessity,
that
to the exertions
of the
blockading
Power,
and to those
alone
the task
of
making
them
effective
must be left.
It
will
be desirable
to examine
this
declaration
of
policy
in
the
light
of
Anglo-American
relations
; but,
first,
it is
necessary
to
refer
in
bare outline
to the
facts
which
gave
rise
to
the
Alabama
Claims
and
to
the
subsequent
tendencies
of
British and American
policy.
In
June,
1862,
it became
clear
that
Liverpool
had
determined
to
break the
blockade
not
only by running cargoes
but
by
strengthening
the
Confederate fleet.
In a
strong
letter to
Lord
Russell,
dated
June
23rd
2
,
C.
F.
Adams,
the
United
States
Minister
in
London,
referred
to
the
case
of
the
gunboat
Oreto
(which
became the
Florida)
in
the
Confederate
1
See The Education
of Henry
Adams,
an
Autobiography, p.
153.
(Constable,
1919.)
2
Papers presented
to
Parliament,
1872.
58
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
service,
which
had
been built at
Liverpool,
and
sailed thence
in
March,
1862;
and to
a
sister
ship
—
"a
new and
still more
powerful
war
steamer
"
—
then
within
nine or
ten
days
of
completion.
This was
the
290th
ship
laid down
in
the
building-yards
of
Messrs
Laird
at
Birkenhead.
It was
admittedly
"a
ship
of
war."
When
completed
and
armed,
"she will be a
most
formidable and
dangerous
craft, and,
if
not
prevented
going
to
sea,
will do much
mischief
to
our
commerce.
The
persons engaged
in
her
construction
say
that
no
better
vessel of
her
class was ever built."
No
one
in
Liverpool
doubted the destination
of
"No.
290,"
and
the
password among
the
crew,
who were
enlisted
from
July,
1862,
was
"290";
but
Adams
merely
asked
the British
Government
for "such
action
as
may
tend,
either to
stop
the
projected
expedition,
or
to
establish the fact
that its
purpose
is
not
inimical
to the
people
of the
United States."
On
June
25th,
Lord
Russell
replied,
"I
have lost
no
time
in
referring
the
matter to
the
proper Department."
Delays,
due
to
bad
fortune
or
carelessness
and
to
the
amazing
view
of
the
Commissioners of
Customs,
that
"at
present
there
is
not
sufficient
ground
to warrant the detention
of
the
vessel,"
were tolerated
by
Lord
Russell.
However,
all
the
necessary
evidence
was
submitted
to
him
by
Adams on
July
24th, including
an
opinion
from one of the
most
eminent
of
English
lawyers,
R. P.
Collier, K.C.,
who stated that
"it
appears
difficult to make
out
a
stronger
case of
infringement
of
the
Foreign
Enlistment
Act,
which,
if
not enforced
on this
occasion,
is little better than
a
dead
letter
1
."
There can be
no
doubt that Lord
Russell
ought
to
have
acted
at
once
on such
evidence
and on
such an
opinion.
His
vacillation,
perhaps,
reflected the
cleavage
of
national
opinion
and the view held
by
a
section
of the
nation
that it was
perfectly
legitimate
to ride
through
the
policy
of the
Foreign
Enlistment Act
of 18
19
on
purely
technical
grounds.
In
June,
Lord
Russell
ought
to have taken
im-
mediate action.
On
July
24th
he
had
his last
opportunity,
but
did
nothing
for four
days.
He
then
wrote,
on
July
28th,
to
Adams
that
the
papers
had been
referred
to
the Law Officers
of
the
Crown. There
were
delays
in
securing
this
opinion,
due
to
the
illness of
one
of
the
Law
Officers;
but the
opinion,
when
it
came,
entirely
confirmed the
opinion
of Collier. The
delay,
however,
hardly
mattered
;
for No.
290,
1
Sir Robert Collier
was
Solicitor-
General
from
October,
1
863
,
and
was
appointed
Attorney-
General
in
1868.
In
1885
he
was created Lord Monkswell.
(Lord
John
Russell
was created Earl
Russell on
July
30th,
1861.)
THE
OPERATIONS OF THE
ALABAMA
59
on the fatal
July
28th,
went
for a
trial
trip
out
of
the
Mersey,
from
which
she
never returned.
She was
joined
by
most
of
her
crew
in a
bay
on
the Welsh
coast,
sailed
round
the
north
coast
of
Ireland and
arrived
at the island of
Terceira
(among
the
Azores)
on
August
20th.
There she was
met
by
a
British
barque
loaded
with
guns
and war
material,
and
later
by
the
S.S.
Bahama,
bringing Captain
Semmes,
more
guns
and
the
rest
of
the crew. Here The
Alabama
was
equipped
outside
the three-mile
limit, and,
on
Sunday,
August
24th,
1862,
she
was
commissioned
by
the
authority
of
the
Confederate
States
Govern-
ment and
began
the
devastating
cruise
of
twenty-
two
months,
which
ended
in
her
destruction on
Sunday,
June
19th,
1864,
off
Cherbourg,
by
the U.S.S.
Kearsage.
It
is not
necessary
here
to retell
the
story
of
the
Alabama,
or
to estimate
in
detail the
great
losses that
she
inflicted
on
the
loyal
subjects
of
the
United States
Government.
These were
the
fruit
of Lord
Russell's
vacillation.
An
acute
observer
declared
that his four
days
of
indecision
cost
England
a million
sterling
a
day
1
.
Lord
Russell,
in his
Recollections,
accepted
full
blame. He
wrote:
"
I
assent
entirely
to the
opinion
of
the
Lord
Chief
Justice
of
England
that the
Alabama
ought
to have been detained
during
the four
days
I was
waiting
for
the
opinion
of
the
Law
officers.
But I
think
that the
fault was
not that of
the Commissioners
of
Customs,
it was
my
fault as
Secretary
of
State for
Foreign
Affairs
2
."
It
is
unnecessary,
as
it would be
painful,
further
to recall
Lord
Russell's
explanations
of
his error and his
account of his
belated
efforts
to
stop
the
Alabama
at
Liverpool,
Queenstown
and
Nassau.
Adams's
moderation
of
tone
in
the face of
great provocation
offers
a model for
Ambassadors.
He
contented
himself with
writing,
on
September
30th
:
"
The
extent to
which Her
Majesty's Flag
and some
of her
ports
have
been used
to the end
of
carrying
on
hostile
operations
is so
universally
understood
that I deem
it
unnecessary
further to
dwell
upon
it.
But,
in
the
spirit
of
friendliness with
which I
have ever been
animated
towards
Her
Majesty's
Government,
I
feel
it
my duty
to omit no
opportunity
of
urging
the
manifestation of
its well
known
energy
in
upholding
those
laws
of
neutrality
upon
which alone
the
reciprocal
confidence
of nations can
find
a
permanent
base."
1
Lord
Houghton (in
Fitzmaurice's
Granville),
n. 81. See also
Mr
Sidney
Low
and
Mr
L.
C. Sanders'
History of England
during
the
Reign
of
Victoria,
p. 264.
There
are
many
records
of the cruise
of
the
Alabama.
Very
vivid accounts
by
eyewitnesses
were
published
in The
Century
magazine
for
March,
1886. The account
of
life
on board
by
one of
the
hands is
a
horrible
picture
of
a
pirate
crew of earlier
centuries,
a
gang
of
murderous ruffians. On the
other
hand,
the account
given
by
the
First
Officer of
the
ship
is
much
more
favourable.
Probably,
the tiuth
lies
between
these
two
accounts.
2
See
also The
Education
of Henry
Adam'.,
p. 150.
60
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
Adams,
in this
sentence,
removed
the whole
subject
of
sea-
policy
from the
arena
of
local
politics
and
passion
to
the
region
of
history,
tradition
and
reasonableness.
He
knew,
as
possibly
Lord
Russell's
legal
advisers
at
that time
did
not
know,
that
there
was a
continuity
of
British
and
American
policy
in
relation to
neutrality
which
could
or
should be
the
only
test
of
the troubles involved
in
the
losses that British carelessness
had
imposed
on
his
sorely
tried
republic.
It
is in
this
connexion
noteworthy
that,
in answer
to his
further
letter
of November
20th, 1862,
dealing
with the relations
of
the two
countries
on
the
subject
of
neutrality
from
the
latter
part
of
the
eighteenth
century,
Lord
Russell
offered
to
amend the
Foreign
Enlistment
Act,
1
8
19
:
an
offer that was carried
into effect
in
1870.
The
difficulties
of
policy
that have
for
more than
a
century
beset
the
accepted
doctrine
of
Neutrality
have been almost
entirely
due to
the tardiness in
the
emergence
of
that doctrine. It
was
first enunciated
in
1793
by
the United
States
of America in
Jefferson's
famous
procla-
mation
;
but it was
limited
by
the
fact
that,
at that
date,
the international
rules
relating
to
Contraband and Blockade in
restraint
of
belligerent
trade
had
reached a
definite
form,
and
the doctrine
of
Neutrality
was
so
framed as
not to
interfere with these
rules.
Jefferson
declared
in
1793
that
a neutral
nation
must,
in
all
things
relating
to the
War,
observe
and
enact
impartiality
towards the
parties
;
that favours
to one to
the
prejudice
of the other would
import
a
fraudulent
neutrality,
of which
no
nation
would
be the
dupe
;
that no
succour should be
given
to either
unless
stipulated
by
treaty,
in
money,
arms,
or
anything
else
directly
bestowing
favour.
This
development
of
the views
of
Gentilis
in
the
seventeenth
century,
and of
Vattel and
Rousseau
in
the
eighteenth,
carried
with it
two
implications.
It is
the neutral
Sovereign
and
not the
Sovereign's
subjects
whom
the rule
or
doctrine
binds,
and,
therefore,
while enlist-
ment
in
neutral
territory,
and
the
arming
of vessels
in neutral waters
are
alike
unlawful,
yet
the
neutral
Sovereign
has
no
duty
to restrain
his
subjects
from
trade with
any
belligerent
or
any
fellow neutral.
These
implications
follow
at once from
Rousseau's
doctrine
that
nations,
not
nationals,
are
at
war. In
policy
these
implications
have
survived,
though
Rousseau's
doctrine
finally
disappeared
in
the
Five Years'
War
that
ended
in
November,
19
18.
Jefferson
laid
special
stress,
in
ominous
words,
on
this
right
of
nationals
to trade:
"
American
citizens
have
always
been free
to
make,
vend
and
export
arms. It is the constant
occupation
and
livelihood
of some
of
them.
To
ANGLO-AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF CONTRABAND
61
suppress
their
calling,
the
only
means,
perhaps,
of
their
subsistence,
because
a war
exists
in
foreign
and
distant
countries,
in which
they
have
no
concern,
would
scarcely
be
expected.
It
would be
hard
in
principle
and
impossible
in
practice."
This
doctrine
or
policy
and
its
implications
were
never
overlooked
in
England
or in
America. The
duty
of the
neutral
Sovereign
was
conscientiously
enshrined in
the
American
Neutrality
Acts
of
1794
and
1
8
18,
and
the British
Foreign
Enlistment
Acts
of 18
19
and
1870,
the
latter
being
the
direct
fruit
and a
step
towards the
peaceful
settle-
ment
of
the Alabama Claims.
The
rights
of
the
neutral
nationals were
already
enshrined
in
the rules
of
law
which,
from
the
days
of Lord
Stowell to our
own,
have
been
steadily
evolved with the
intention
of
giving
reality
to those
very
rules
relating
to
Contraband and
Blockade,
which
have made
anything
in
the nature
of
absolute
or
true
Neutrality
impossible.
Had
the
doctrine
of
Neutrality emerged
before the doc-
trines
of
Contraband
and
Blockade,
the
duty
of
a neutral
Sovereign
to restrain his
subjects
in
the
pursuit
of
trade
in
goods
that are
essential
to the
maintenance
of
a war
might
have been
enunciated
;
but
the
policy
of
successive neutrals
during
successive Wars
made
this
impossible.
Hugo
Grotius,
in
1625,
laid
down the
complete
doctrine
of
Contraband,
including
the doctrine
of
Pre-emption
that
played
so
great
a
part
in
the
War of
19 14.
Grotius,
in
effect,
declared
that no
person
belonging
to a
non-belligerent
State has
the
right
to
play
the
part
of a
belligerent.
If
he does so he must share
the fate
of
a
belligerent
in
respect
to
goods
useful
in
war. Such
goods
included
goods ancipitis
usus
y
goods capable
of
a double
purpose
and in
fact
useful in
war.
The
belligerent
who
might
suffer
injury
has full
rights
of
self-protection;
and,
even
if
the
shipper
is
innocent
and has no
noxious
purpose,
yet
the
goods may
be
seized,
subject,
in
certain
circumstances,
to restitution.
The
Treaty
of
Whitehall between
England
and
Sweden in
1661
practically adopted
the
doctrine
of
Grotius,
and the
English
Courts crowned the list
of
Contraband
contained in
that
Treaty by
a
recognition
of
this
practice
of
Pre-
emption.
So
the
Anglo-American
doctrine of
Contraband
arose,
whereby
Absolute
and
Conditional
Contraband
were
recognised
and
special
cases of
necessary
seizure were met
by
the
recognition
of
the
equitable
practice
of
Compensation
or
Pre-emption.
The Continental
Powers
for
the
most
part
rejected
this
conception
of
Conditional
Contraband.
Yet
the
practice
by
which
the
capture
of
goods
ancipitis
usus involves
62
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
compensation
where
a
guilty
mind
cannot be
brought
home
to the
shipper
was a
fair
answer to Continental
objections,
while it
brought
in for
trial
all
real cases
of
Contraband. This
doctrine
was
fully
at work
before
Jefferson
enunciated his
theory
of
Neutrality
;
but
the
policy
of
the
Washington
Government
in
1793 gave
permanence
to the
practice
that the
neutrality
of
a Power
is
consistent with the
assiduous
belligerency,
at
their
own
risk,
of
its
subjects.
If
the
doctrine
of Wolff
rather than that
of
Vattel
had been
adopted
in
1793,
the
United States
and
Great
Britain
would
have decided
to
police
their
own
subjects
and have thus
ended
many temptations
to
war.
The
question
of
Blockade is
not
less
important.
Blockade
springs
from
the idea of
Siege.
No
neutral
could cross
the
lines
of a
besieged
city,
even
if
the
lines of
investment
were on
the
sea
;
and
this
led
to
what
Grotius called the Closure of
Ports.
In
1584,
and
again
in
1630,
the
Dutch had declared
certain
ports
closed, and,
though
an effort
was
made to limit
in
practice
such
closure to
Contraband,
yet
after
1700
it was well
recognised
that
all commerce could
be
legitimately
ex-
cluded
from
a
port
definitely
invested
by
sea.
The
principle
is that
a
non-belligerent
shall
not be allowed
to
supply
any
goods
that
will
tend
to
prolong
the
resistance
in
any
defined area. The
Blockade must
be
recognised,
must be
effective
and
one
that
does not
distinguish
between
neutrals.
In
these
circumstances,
a
belligerent
has a
right
to
condemn
the
ship,
and
probably
the
cargo,
of
any
non-belligerent
who seeks to
succour
a
blockaded
enemy.
Blockade
and Contraband
are
penal
measures
against
the
subjects
of
neutral
Powers
who,
for their
own
profit,
decide to
intervene in a war. The
Washington
Administration
in
1793
adopted
for
the
benefit
of
their own
subjects
a
policy
of
Neutrality
which
included a law of
Contraband
and
Blockade invented
to
penalise
subjects
of
neutral Powers
intervening
in
a war. The United
States
might
have
forbidden
its
subjects
to traffic
in
Contraband,
or
to run
cargoes
through
blockaded
areas.
This would
have been
a
step
forward; but,
so
soon as
the
policy
of
1793
had been
adopted by
England
as
well as
by
America,
the
doctrine
had to
be carried to
its
logical
conclusion.
This
conclusion
was
foreseen
by
Lord
Stowell
and
Sir
William
Grant
during
the
Napoleonic
Wars. The
doctrine
of
Continuous
Voyage,
which
sprang
from
what
is
known
as
the
Rule
of
the
War
of
1756,
extended the
rule as
to
Contraband
to
cases
where the
goods
were
colourably
consigned
to a
neutral
port,
this
being
merely
a
stage
on
the
journey
to
the
belligerent
forces.
Lord Stowell
held that
the
THE DOCTRINE
OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE
63
real destination
was
the test. No
doubt there
was a
question
as
to
whether the
test
was
the
real
destination
of
the
ship
or of
the
goods.
But
Dr
Westlake
has
rightly pointed
out
1
that
Lord
Stowell never
committed
himself to the view
that the
real
destination
was that
of
the
ship.
Such a conclusion
would
have been a
logical absurdity,
since
the
question
of
guilt
lies
with
the
shippers.
The
American
judges
during
the
War of
Secession were not
likely
to be
misled on
this
point,
and,
in
the case
of
the
Peterhof
2
,
the
Supreme
Court
boldly
and
without hesitation
applied
the doctrine
of
Continuous
Voyage
to the
transport
of
goods.
The Court
gave
the doctrine
its
legal
extension
to
a
doctrine
of
Continuous
Transport,
whether
by
sea or
land,
when
the
goods
were
shipped
with
the
guilty
intention
of
supplying
the
enemy
with Contraband.
The
British
Courts
during
the War of
Secession
expressly recognised
this
developed
doctrine
of
Contraband and
applied
it
during
the
War of
io^with
further
logical
extensions.
The
devices
of
non-neutral
shippers
were
endless,
and
the
range
of
Contraband
became
practically
endless.
In
order
to make
the doctrine of
Non-
access
complete,
the
British Government claimed
so
to
apply
the
doctrine of
Continuous
Transport
as
to allow
the
capture
of
cargoes
consigned
to neutral
ports
"to order" or
to
an
unknown
consignee,
while
the
doctrine was carried
to the
length
that
all
Contraband
goods
were
shut out
from
a neutral
country,
which was
proved
to be
sending
supplies
to the
belligerent.
All
this was
the
logical
and
inevitable
extension
of
the
policy
adopted
by
Jefferson
in
1793
;
and all
this would
have been
avoided,
had
the doctrine
that
a
neutral
nation
must
police
its
own
nationals
been
adopted
at
that date.
At the
time
when
the
Alabama
Claims
were
accruing
this
growth
of
policy
was
in
active
process,
and
North and
South alike were
watching
the
development
of
that
policy
with
eager eyes.
It was
unfortunate
that,
at such a
time,
British
statesmanship
should
not
have
perceived
the
line
that
lay
between the
duty
of
neutral
Governments not to
intervene
in a war and
the
right
of
neutral
nationals,
at their own
risk,
so
to
intervene,
and
should have
confused the
notions
of
a
ship
as
a
Contraband
article
and of a
ship
as an
illegal expedition.
The
line
of
distinction
was
clear
enough,
had
British
statesmen known the
history
of
the
policy
and of
the
doctrine
which
it was
their
duty
to
apply
in
the
case
before
them.
The
reaffirmation of
the
principle
of
the
Union in
North
America,
1
International
Law,
part
n.
p. 296.
2
5
Wallace
28
[1866J.
64
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
at vast
cost
in
lives
and
treasure,
created
on
the other side
of
the
Atlantic
a
Power
that
had
been
integrated
and
become
strong
in
the
furnaces
of fratricidal
war.
In a
sense,
modern
America dates
from
the
successful
emergence
of
the
re-united
States
from a
struggle
that
threatened
its
life. It
emerged
triumphant,
but
through
the nation
there
thrilled
a
deep
dislike
and
distrust
of
Great
Britain,
of
the
mother-country
who was believed to have failed
them
in
their
distress.
Such
a
belief
was
ill-founded,
for errors
of
judgment
are not
errors
of
heart
;
but the belief
grew
and was
grafted
into earlier
griefs
and
became
a kind
of national
tradition, fostered,
as
it
is
even still to
some
extent
fostered,
by
school histories which
all true American
historians
condemn.
Lord Russell's
vacillation
and
defective
knowledge
of
history
bore
bitter fruit that
was
still
ripening
so
late as
the
year
19
14;
but
some
part
of
the harvest came to
sudden
maturity immediately
after
the conclusion
of
the
War of
Secession
in
1869.
American
states-
men
and
journalists
alike were
determined to
make the case
of
the
Alabama and her sister
ships
a
test
of
the future relations
between
the
two
countries
;
and a
growing party,
flushed with
victory,
were
not
only
tempted
but
anxious
to
try
conclusions
by
war
with the mother-
country.
Such
a
feeling
was
by
no
means universal
;
yet
the
peace
party
would
not have
been
strong enough
to
preserve peace,
had
statesmanship proved incapable
of
finding
a
via media.
Mr Lucien
Wolf,
in his
Life
of
the First
Marquess of
Ripon
y
goes
so
far
as to
say
that,
towards the
end of
1870,
"war
with America
had
become almost
a
question
of
opportunity
and
the
opportunity
was
ominously nigh
1
."
The wiser
and
greater
minds on
both
sides of
the Atlantic
were,
however,
in no mood
for a
repetition
of
1812.
In
1869,
John
Lothrop
Motley,
despite
President
Grant's instinctive
dislike of him
—
a
dislike
that extended
to
anyone
that
Grant
could
not understand
2
—
had been
sent
as
Minister to the
Court
of
St
James ;
and
he was no
war-maker.
Henry
Adams was
then
in
London,
seeking
an
opportunity
to
discuss
the
Alabama
Claims with
the
British
Ministers. The
younger
Adams
looked
on
the
Claims,
so
he
says,
as his own
special
creation,
"dis-
cussed
between him and
his
father
long
before
they
had
been discussed
by
Government."
He, too,
was
no
more
of a
war-maker than
his
father.
The crash
of
the
War of
1870
gave
time
for
the wiser
minds
to
think. President
Grant,
so
long
as
there
was
peace,
wanted
peace.
He
would have been
very dangerous
if war
had
actually
begun,
or
if
1
Life of
the First Lord
Ripon, by
Lucien
Wolf,
1921,
1.
237.
2
The
Education
of
Henry
Adams,
p.
276.