Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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BISMARCK'S
OBJECTIONS
25
in
German
affairs,
and that
all her
energies
are
now directed
eastwards,
with
a view of
extending
her
territory
and her commerce
in Asia. Whatever
sentiments
may
be
suggested
in
other
quarters by
a
rapid
development
of
the
present
feeling
of
Russia,
which has the entire
support
of
public
opinion
in that
country,
it
appears
certain that
Germany
can have
no
danger
to
guard
against
from
Russia,
whatever
may
be the
personal
feelings
or
opinions
of
the
reigning Sovereign."
In
this
assumption,
Clarendon
was
hardly expressing
his
real
feelings,
since
he
had
already
told
Lord
Lyons
that
he
believed
it to be true
that
the
Tsarevitch
and the
Slav
races were
very
hostile to
Germany.
T
Ie
proceeded
to
emphasise
the
importance
of
the reduction
in
the
French
Army
to which
the
Emperor
had
assented,
and
added: "I
venture to
think
that the
present
state
of
opinion
in
France,
founded
as it
is
upon
a
true estimate
of
French
interests,
is a
more solid
guarantee
than
any
that the
respective
Governments
of
France and
Germany
could effect
for
their
own
security."
His
practical
proposal,
derived from a
suggestion by
Daru,
was in favour of a
general
disarmament.
"The
military
forces
of the
great
Continental Powers have
a
certain
proportion
to each
other
;
in order to maintain that
proportion, very heavy
burdens are
imposed
upon
each
country;
but
if,
by
common
agreement,
each
reduces its
army by
a certain number of
men,
the same
proportions
will
be
maintained,
while the
burdens,
which
are
fast
becoming
intolerable,
will be alleviated."
In
reply,
Bismarck
naturally
controverted
the
extravagant
expecta-
tions which Clarendon based
on
the
present disposition
of
the French
people.
In
conversation with Lord
A.
Loftus
(March
12th)
he said
that,
"
although
the
nation
was
now
pacific,
you
know
as
well
as I
do
that
a war
cry
can be raised
in
France,
on
any emergency,
and
at
the
shortest
notice.
If. . .the
present
Constitutional
government
had
been
three
years
instead of three months in
existence,
then
there
would
be
some
chance
for
its duration
and
for
the maintenance of
peace.'
'
At
the
present
moment,
he
observed,
there
was a
party
anxious
to restore
the
previous
state
of
things,
a
personal
government.
That
party
in-
cluded
the
Empress
Eugenie,
and
they
would
not
be
sorry
to divert
the
public
attention from home affairs
by raising
some
questions
of
foreign
policy.
Bismarck,
however,
on
this occasion did
not
refuse
to
bring
the
matter to
the
notice
of
the
King,
and
appeared
to
be
less
decidedly
opposed
to
any
disarmament. But
any hope
that
King
William
might
view the
project
with
a
favourable
eye
was
quickly
dashed.
He
stated his
objections
with a
conclusive
simplicity
which
26
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
made it
impossible
to
continue
the
negotiations.
The
German
Army
could
only
be
reduced
in
two
ways
:
either
by changing
its
legislative
basis,
and
thereby
its
whole
character,
or
by
reducing
the
period
of
military
service
to two
and
a half
years.
The former
method was
impossible
;
the latter
had
been the
subject
of a five
years'
struggle
between
the
King
and his
Parliament,
and
he would rather
give
up
his
Throne than
yield
on
it.
Moreover,
as
Bismarck had
foretold,
the
King regarded
the
proposal
as
put
forward
in
the interests
of
France,
and
as
showing
no
regard
for
the
safety
of
Prussia.
It is
not
surprising
that this
attempt
should have failed. The
whole
interchange
of
views rested
on a
basis of
unreality.
The one
supreme
difficulty
which
barred the
way
to mutual confidence
between France
and
Germany
was never mentioned. Yet it
was
perfectly
clear
—
to
French
and
German
as
well as
to
disinterested
observers
—
that
the
tension
between
the two
countries
must
continue,
until
either
France
was
satisfied that
Prussia had
no
design
of
uniting
Germany,
or until
Prussia was
satisfied that France
would
not
oppose
such
a
Union
by
force.
The
character
of an
intrigue
was thus
inevitably
thrust
upon
the
negotiations
themselves.
The
French Government
was
desperately
anxious
that Bismarck should not know that
they
had
anything
to
do
with the
proposal,
since such
knowledge might
lead to
immediate
war;
while
Bismarck,
in
return,
professed
great eagerness
that the
French
Government
should
not
be
acquainted
with
it.
The
preparations
for a
plebiscite
which was to
ratify
the
recent
Constitutional
changes
in
France
provoked
the uneasiness of
Lyons,
who
feared that
a
failure
or
a
small
majority might
turn the
minds of
the Ministers to war.
Writing
to Clarendon on
May
6th,
he said:
"With
reference to
Loftus's
despatch,
I
sincerely
hope
that
his most
confidential informant is
not
so
well informed as he
represents
himself to
be,
and that
no
change
is
really
contemplated
in
the
status
quo
of
Hesse
and
Baden.
It
would be
quite
a
mistake
to
suppose
that this is a
moment
at which it would be safe
to
defy
France.
On
the
contrary,
a
war unmis-
takably provoked by
Prussia
would
be
hailed
by
many
as a
welcome
diversion
from internal
difficulties.
So
far
as I can
judge,
Ollivier is not
the man to shrink
from
one."
The
overwhelming
majority,
however,
which
Ollivier's
"devouring
activity
"
secured two
days
later
seemed a
pledge
of
renewed
confidence,
and the
last
month of
Clarendon's life
offered
no
premonitions
of
the
coming
storn. He died
suddenly
on
June
27th,
only
ten
days
before
the
Hohenzollern
candidature
became
publicly
known.
Lord
Clarendon
owed his
great reputation
at
home and abroad less
LORD CLARENDON
27
to
his
achievements
than to
his
character.
Passionately
attached
to
peace
—
the
French
called
him "le commis
voyageur
de
la
paix"
—
he
was
constantly
to
see
wars
gathering
before
his
eyes,
which
his best
efforts
failed
to
prevent
;
of all
his
public
utterances
none
is so
firmly
enshrined
in the
popular
mind
as
his
statement
in
1854:
"We
are
drifting
into
war."
His
personal reputation
reached
its
height
at the
conclusion
of
the
Congress
of
Paris,
in which he
had
become the
most
prominent
and
popular
figure.
The
Queen
expressed
a
general
feeling
when
she wrote: "We
congratulate
him on
the
success
of his
efforts
in
obtaining
the
peace,
for
to
him alone
it
is due
;
and also
to
him
alone
is due the
dignified
position
which the
Queen's
beloved
country
holds,
and which
she
owes to
a
straightforward,
steady
and unselfish
policy
throughout."
His
European position
was
established,
and was never
afterwards
shaken.
Lord
Augustus
Loftus
has
described
him
as
possessing
all those
qualities
which
mark the ideal
diplomatist:
"
Courteous
and
dignified,
with
charming
manners,
he won
the
regard
and confidence
of all
with
whom he came
in
contact.
Firm
and
courageous,
with
consummate
judgment,
he was neither
open
to
flattery
nor
to
the influence
of
fear." Gladstone
dwelt
on "his un-
swerving
loyalty,
his
genial
temper,
his kindness ever
overflowing
in
acts
yet
more than
in
words,
his liberal and
indulgent
appreciation
of
others";
and estimated
him
to
have been the
"very
easiest
and most
attractive
"
of
all his
colleagues
in
the Cabinet.
His broad
sympathies,
and
his
effortless
power
of
being
happily
at home
in
any
society
invested
him
with that
personal
attractiveness
which
helps
in so
important
a measure to
smooth
the
path
of
diplomacy.
It
is
perhaps
true that
he was
a
better
judge
of men
than
of
events,
and
that
while
he
"
understood
how
to dash
offin
a few
daring
if
slightly
contemptuous
phrases
the
main
features of a
political
situation
and the
leading
traits
of
the
European
statesmen whom he had
known,"
he was less successful
and
possibly
less
interested
in
forecasting
the future
developments
of
Europe.
His
influence
was
increased
by
his
rare
personal
detachment
:
he was so far from
desiring
office
that
he
accepted
its
burdens
only
with
increasing
reluctance,
and
has been
well described
as
having
been
a
member
of
successive
Cabinets
simply
because
he had
proved
himself
indispensable.
One of
the
highest
compliments
ever
paid
him was
that
posthumously
bestowed
by
Bismarck,
who
told
Lord
Clarendon's
daughter
in
1871
that
he
was
never in his
life more
glad
to
hear of
anything
than
of
her father's
death,
because
if he had
lived he
would
have
prevented
the
War.
Lord
Granville,
whose
very
first
duty
in
taking
office
was to
28
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
attempt
this
task,
had
many
of
the
personal
qualities
of his
predecessor.
He,
too,
was
noted
for
his
tactful,
courteous
and
conciliatory
address,
which
made
him
for
more than
thirty
years
so successful
a leader
of
the
Liberal
minority
in the House
of
Lords. He even
surpassed
Clarendon
in the
unusual command which
both
possessed
of
the
French
language.
His
previous
direct
experience
of
the
Foreign
Office
amounted
to
less than
three
months;
succeeding
Palmerston,
after the
dismissal
of the latter
in
December,
185
1
,
he won the
complete
approval
of
Lord
John
Russell,
who,
on his
retirement,
expressed
the somewhat
extravagant
belief that
"the
country
will
lose
one of the
best
Foreign
Secretaries
it ever
had."
During
the
eighteen
years
which
elapsed
before his
resumption
of
the
office,
Lord Granville
had, however,
exerted
at intervals
a remarkable influence over the
course
of
British
Foreign Policy.
In
1856,
he
had
been
sent
to Russia
immediately
after
the
conclusion
of the Crimean
War,
as head of a
Special
Mission to
attend
the
Coronation of the
Tsar.
The
Queen,
who
placed
entire
confidence
in
his
sagacity
and
moderation,
twice
employed
him,
when
President
of
the
Council,
as her
mouthpiece
in
the Cabinet
to combat
the views
of
Palmerston
and
Russell.
In
1859,
she
urged
upon
him,
in a
private
communication,
the
duty
of
controlling
the Italian
sympathies
of
his
colleagues
;
and
in
1864,
in
a
still
more
urgent
appeal,
she
begged
him
to
prevent
the
country's becoming
involved
in
the
Schleswig-Holstein
War. In
September,
1862,
he
had,
on his own
initiative,
taken
the
leading part
in
defeating
the
proposal
made
by
Palmerston
for a
joint
intervention
with
France
in
the
American
Civil
War.
He
was,
therefore,
regarded
in
1870
as
the natural
and inevitable
successor to Clarendon. But his
achievements were not
equal
to
the
expectations
of his friends.
Faced
as he was
throughout
his
two
sub-
sequent
periods
of
office
(1870-74,
1880-85)
by
a
constant
series of
difficult
problems
directly
affecting
British
interests,
the
responsibilities
of office bore
very heavily upon
him.
He was
constantly
(though
often
unjustly)
accused
of
indifference or
of
imperfect
sympathies;
and,
in
the
long
run,
his lack of
decision
contributed
to
involve
the
country
in
misunderstandings
with several
of
the
Great Continental Powers.
On
the
afternoon
of
July
5th,
Granville,
who
was
to receive the
Seals
next
day,
had a
conversation
at the
Foreign
Office
with Ham-
mond,
the
Permanent
Under-Secretary.
The latter assured him
that
he had
never
during
his
long
experience
known so
great
a lull in
foreign
affairs. This
unforgotten
false
prophecy
cannot
be
held to convict
British
diplomacy
of
any peculiar
ignorance
;
for it was
only
on
the
3rd
that
Paris
knew
definitely
of
the
acceptance
by
Prince
Leopold
of
THE
HOHENZOLLERN
CANDIDATURE
29
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen
of
the offer
of
the
Spanish
Crown.
It
rather
proves
the
extraordinary
success
with
which
Bismarck
had
matured
his
plan
in
secret. It
is
not
necessary
or indeed relevant
to
enter
into
a full
discussion of
the methods
by
which the
Prince's
reluctance
to
grant
his
consent was overcome. The
full extent
of
Bismarck's
responsibility
for
the
decision,
which could
only
be
sus-
pected
in
1870,
has
gradually
become
known
through
a series
of
subsequent
revelations.
The
British
Government could
only
base
its
policy
on
such
information
as was obtainable at the time. The
deposi-
tion
of
Queen
Isabella
on
September
30th,
1868,
had
created
a de
facto
republic
in
Spain,
from which Marshal
Prim,
who had
induced
the
Cortes to
pass
a monarchical
Constitution,
wished to rescue
his
distracted
country
as soon as
possible.
He had not been
actuated
by
hostility
towards
France
in
the invitation
to Prince
Leopold,
who was
related
to the
Emperor Napoleon
both
by
birth
and
marriage,
and
whose elder
brother,
Charles,
had
ascended
the
Roumanian
throne
in
1866 with the
Emperor's goodwill.
But
Leopold proved very
cautious.
Although
Lord A.
Loftus
reported
that the Prince
was
being
mentioned
in
diplomatic
circles
as a
possible
candidate
so
early
as
October,
1868,
he
was
not
finally
persuaded
to
accept
until
June
21st,
1870,
when
the
King
of Prussia
gave
his
reluctant assent.
The
Spanish
Cortes
had
been
kept
sitting
in
order to
proceed
with the election
; but,
owing
to
a
telegraphic
error
in
the date announced
for
the return to
Madrid
of the
Envoy,
Salazar,
who was
bringing
the
acceptance
with
him,
they
were
adjourned
without
proceeding
to
a
vote.
This small mistake
of
a
clerk
had
very important consequences.
Bismarck had
hoped
to
keep
the
entire
question
secret
until
France
could
be confronted
with
a
fait accompli.
In
that
case,
only
two
practical
alternatives
would
have been
open
to her: either
to
accept
Prince
Leopold
of Hohen-
zollern as
King
of
Spain
—
a
humiliation
and a
prospective
menace
which
the condition of
French
feeling
at
the moment
would
hardly
have
endured
—
or
to make
war
on
both
Germany
and
Spain together,
it
being
exceedingly improbable
that
a
people
proverbially proud
like
the
Spanish
would
have
consented to
drop
their elected
King
at
the
bidding
of a
foreign
Power.
But,
as a
matter
of
fact,
the
secret
began
to leak
out
in
Madrid.
The
Emperor
Napoleon
had
expressed
his
suspicions
to
the
Due
de
Gramont,
the French
Foreign
Minister,
so
early
as
June
17th;
but
had
been
reassured
by
Mercier,
the French Ambassador at
Madrid,
on
June
25th,
who
wrote that
if
the
candidature
was
really
a
subject
for
negotiation,
it was
kept
very
secret and
suspected by
no
one, and,
30
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
on
July
1
st,
that
he
had
still not heard a
word of
it. Next
day,
Prim
somewhat
shamefacedly
informed
him
of
Leopold's
acceptance;
it
would
not,
he
knew,
be
agreeable
to
the
Emperor,
but then
he had
no
other
alternative.
Spain
could
not
be
left
a
prey
to
revolution,
and
Leopold
would make
an
ideal
King.
Mercier
warned
him
with
great
vigour
and
gravity
that
the
news
would
produce
an
"extraordinary
effect
"
in
France,
and
that
public opinion
would
view
it
as
a
"real
provocation."
Ollivier and
Gramont,
acquainted
with
the news of
the
3rd,
were
stiffened
in
their
resolution
next
day
by
the
almost
unanimous
voice
of
the
Press,
and
by
the
affectation of
complete
ignorance,
which
they
disbelieved,
at Berlin.
When
Lyons
saw
Gramont and
Ollivier
on
the
5th,
their
language
was
perfectly
definite and firm.
Gramont
exclaimed:
"To
this
France
will
not
resign
herself,
and
when
I
say
that we
shall
not
resign
ourselves to
it,
I
mean
that
we shall
not
permit
it;
and
we shall
use our
whole
strength
to
prevent
it." The
proposal
was not
only
an
insult,
but a
positive
danger
to France.
It
would
paralyse
200,000
French
troops
in
case
of
a war
with
Prussia.
Leopold
was a
member of a
family
which had
shown
peculiar
devotion
to
the head of
the House of
Hohenzollern. His
brother Charles had
acted
under
the
direction
of Bismarck
when
he
accepted
the
Throne
of
Roumania
;
he had
begun
to build
up
a
military
State
there,
and
would
use
his
army
for
any
purpose
which
Prussia
might require
1
. Such
were
the
arguments
which
were
presented
as
the French
justification.
Prim,
when
conversing
with
Mercier
(July 2nd)
had
ridiculed the
importance
of
the
dynastic
danger;
a
King
of
Spain,
he
said,
will
always
be a
Spaniard;
but
subsequent
events have
shown
that
Gramont
was
justified
in
believing
that
family
relationships
between
rulers
may
still
play
a
considerable
part
in
determining
the
policy
of
European
States in
both
peace
and war. On
the
6th,
Gramont read
in
the
Chamber a
Declaration,
the terms of which had been
concerted
by
the
Council of
Ministers. It
stated
that
respect
for
the
sovereignty
of
Spain
did
not
oblige
France
to allow
a
foreign
Power,
by
placing
one
of
its
princes
on
the throne of
Charles
V,
to shift the
existing
Balance of
Power
in
Europe
to
the detriment
of
France and
to
endanger
her
interest and
honour. The Government
hoped
that the
wisdom of
the German and
the
friendship
of the
Spanish
people
would
prevent
this
project
from
being
carried
into execution
; but,
if
this should
be
the
case,
they
would do their
duty
without hesitation
or
weakness.
1
From Lord
Lyons,
No.
685,
July
5th, 1870;
Nos.
697-8,
July
7th, 1870.
VIEWS
OF THE
BRITISH
GOVERNMENT
31
The
Emperor
and
Ollivier,
at
least,
seem to have
used this
strong
language
with the
object
not of
precipitating,
but
of
preventing,
war
;
for,
on the same
evening,
the French Ambassador
asked
Lord
Granville
if the British Government
would
advise the abandonment
of
the
candidature at Berlin and
Madrid. When
Gladstone
had first heard
the
news,
he
had,
while
expressing
his
disapproval,
said
that
he was
not
disposed
to interfere with the
liberty
of
the
Spanish
people
to
choose
their
own
Sovereign.
But
both
he and
Granville
readily
assented to the
request
made
for
their
good
offices.
They
deprecated
the
language
which Gramont
had
used;
they
did
not
admit that
Leopold's
nomination
to the
Spanish
Throne was
"a
matter of such
importance
to a
great
and
powerful
nation like
France as
to
warrant
carrying
to extremes
a natural
feeling
of
resentment
1
";
but
they
perceived
that the strict
secrecy
in which
the affair had
been
matured
made
the issue
exceedingly dangerous.
A
telegram
was at
once
despatched
to
Layard
at
Madrid,
ordering
him
to "use
every
pressure
which will
not offend the
Spanish
Government,
but
will in
your
judgement
promote
the
abandonment
of
the
project."
But
no
repre-
sentations
appear
to
have
been sent to Berlin
until the
9th,
as Lord
Granville's
despatch,
though
written
on
the
6th,
was
delayed
for
the
approval
of
a Cabinet
meeting
held on
the
former
date.
Lord A.
Loftus
was
instructed to
avoid
any
appearance
of
dictating
either to
Spain
or
to
Prussia
;
to assume
that the
King
of
Prussia
had
not sanctioned
the
project,
the
secrecy
of which
was,
so far
as
it
went,
a
just
cause
of
offence
to France
;
and to
point
out the
dangers
which
it
would
involve
to
Spain,
Prussia and
Prince
Leopold
himself.
Meanwhile,
in
spite
of
the
commencement of French
military
preparations,
there
seemed
good
reasons for
believing
that war
would
be
averted.
On
July
8th,
Gramont
told
Lyons
that
"a
voluntary
renunciation on the
part
of
the Prince would
be
a most fortunate
solution
of
a
difficult and
intricate
question,
and
he
begged
Her
Majesty's
Government
to
use all
their
influence in
bringing
it about
2
."
The
Emperor Napoleon,
on
the same
day,
sent
a
secret
message
to
the
King
of
the
Belgians
urging
him
to
put pressure upon
Prince
Leopold
to withdraw
;
and
in
equal
secrecy gave
his
personal approval
to
Strat,
the Roumanian
Agent,
who had
been
induced
by
the
Spanish
Ambassador
at
Paris
to
go
to
Sigmaringen
on the
same errand.
Thus,
1
To
Lord
Lyons,
No.
13,
July
6th,
1870;
No.
19,
July
9th, 1870;
and to Lord
A.
Loftus,
July 6th,
1870.
2
From
Lord
Lyons,
No.
708,
July
8th, 1870.
32
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
from all
quarters,
both official and
unofficial,
a
converging pressure
was
being
employed
to obtain the
result
suggested by
Gramont. Nor
was
it
ineffectual,
for on
July
12th,
Prince
Anthony telegraphed
to
Madrid
withdrawing
the
candidature
of
his son.
But
by
this
time
the
French Government
had
changed
its
position,
or
rather had
reverted to that
which
it
had
adopted
in
instructing (July
7th)
Bene-
detti to
negotiate
at
Ems
directly
with
the
King
of Prussia.
Gramont
had,
in
a
confidential
letter,
instructed Benedetti to obtain a
declaration
from
the
King
that
his
Government
disapproved
of
Prince
Leopold's
acceptance
and
ordered
him
to revoke his unauthorised
decision;
by
this
means alone could
France be satisfied and war
avoided. But
on
the
8th,
in
conversation with
Lyons,
this was
put
forward as
only
the
one of
two
alternatives
:
the
other
being
pressed upon
the
attention
of
the British
Government
as a
"most fortunate
solution." On
July
9th,
however,
Benedetti
extracted
from
King
William
the
information that
he
had
known of
Leopold's
candidature,
and had
not withheld his
assent,
though
he
maintained that
he had
acted
simply
in
his
capacity
as
head of
the
Hohenzollern
family.
The news seemed
to Ollivier
most
ominous
1
;
after
a
Council of
Ministers Gramont
told
Lyons,
on
July
10th,
that
"
the affair is
now,
beyond
all
controversy,
one
between
France and
the
King";
that, therefore,
it was
necessary
for
its
satis-
factory
conclusion for
Prince
Leopold
to
withdraw
"on
the
advice of
the
King
of
Prussia."
Granville does
not
appear
to have
perceived
the
importance
of
this
enlarged
demand,
and
to have
confidently expected
that the news of
Leopold's
renunciation on
the
12th
would
satisfy
France. But
Gramont was far from
being
satisfied. He
acknowledged,
indeed,
to
Lyons (July
12th)
that
Spain
was now
out
of
the
dispute;
but
said
that
the answer of
the
King
was
neither courteous
nor
satis-
factory.
The
Government
was
placed
in
a
very
embarrassing
position
;
for
public
opinion
was so
much
excited that the
Ministry
would
probably
be
overthrown,
if
they
announced next
day
in
the
Chamber
that the affair
was
settled,
without
having
obtained
some more
complete
satisfaction
from
Prussia.
Gramont was
peculiarly
irritated
by
his
knowledge
that
King
William
had
privately
advised
Leopold
to retire
2
,
though
he
had
refused
when
conversing
with Benedetti to
give
such
advice. Such an
attitude
really
shows,
as
Lyons
pointed
out,
that
the
King's
intentions were
pacific,
and he warned
Gramont that
if
war
1
See his note to
Gramont on
the
night
July 9-1
oth:
"La
depiche
Benedetti est
fort claire;
elle
confvrme
tous
mes
pres
sentiments et des
maintenant la
guerre
me
parait
imposee;
il
n'y
a
plus qu'd s'y
resoudre
intrepidement
et
virilement."
2
In a
letter sent
to Prince
Anthony by
Colonel Strantz on
July
nth.
THE
EMS INTERVIEW
33
broke
out
now "all
Europe
would
say
that
it was the fault
of
France;
that
France rushed into
it without
any
substantial
cause
—
merely
from
pride
and
resentment,
"
and
that Prussia
might
well
expect
to
rally
all
Germany
in
defence
against
such an
attack
1
.
So soon as
Lord
Granville
learnt
this,
he
telegraphed
at
midnight, July I2th-i3th,
to
instruct
Lyons
to
renew his
representations
before
the
Council
of
Ministers
was
held,
and
to remind Gramont
that the
British
Govern-
ment
had
intervened
at
the
request
of
France,
and that
their efforts
could not
have
been more
promptly
and
energetically
employed,
and
to
impress upon
him the immense
responsibility
which would
rest
on
France,
if
she should
seek to
enlarge
the
grounds
of
the
quarrel.
As the
Ministers
were in
session
when
Lyons
received
the
telegram,
he embodied
the
substance
in a
letter
which was handed
to
Gramont
at the
Council
table
(July 13th).
But France was
already
committed.
Ollivier,
on
hearing
of
the
renunciation,
considered that
peace
was
now
assured,
and
the
Emperor
at first
agreed
with
him;
but the
Empress
and various
Deputies
of
the
Right
so worked
upon
his
vacillating
mind,
during
the afternoon
of
the
12th,
that
Gramont
was
authorised
at
7
p.m.
to
send to
Benedetti
a
telegram
containing
the
words
:
"
In
order
that
this
renunciation
by
Prince
Anthony
may
pro-
duce its
full
effect,
it seems
necessary
that
the
King
of Prussia should
be
associated with
it,
and should
give
us
the assurance
that
he will
not
authorise this
candidature
in
future." Ollivier
had,
in
fact,
been
simply ignored by
the
Emperor;
and his
attempt,
in
a second
despatch
to
Benedetti,
to narrow
the
scope
of
the
guarantees
demanded
arrived
too late.
Benedetti
had
acted
with
great promptitude,
and had seen
the
King
early
in
the
morning
of
the
13th.
The
latter
categorically
refused to
give
the
required promise,
and
declined
the
request
of
the
Ambassador
for
a
second
audience,
at which he
intended
to
act
on his
modified
instructions
;
but sent
word
later
by
his
aide-de-camp,
Prince
Radziwill,
that
he
gave
his full
and
unreserved
approval
to the
re-
nunciation
made
by Leopold.
Meanwhile,
Lyons
still
hoped during
the
13th
that
peace
might
be
preserved.
The
Council
of Ministers
had
neither
called out the
reserves nor
issued an
ultimatum to
Prussia,
and
Gramont
had
merely
announced
to
the Chamber
that the
negotia-
tions
with Prussia
were
not
yet
concluded.
Gramont,
it
is
true,
maintained
a
very
stiff
attitude. He
told Lord
Lyons
that
from
Prussia
France had
obtained
nothing,
absolutely nothing
Surely,
it
is
but
reasonable
that France should
take
some
precautions
against
1
From Lord
Lyons,
No.
738,
July
12th,
1870.
w.&g. in
3
34
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
a
repetition
of
what
had
occurred
when
Prince
Leopold's
brother went off
to Bucharest.
It
was
not to
be
supposed
that France
would
run
the risk
of
Prince
Leopold
suddenly presenting
himself
in
Spain
and
appealing
to
the
chivalry
of
the
Spanish
people.
Still,
France
did not
call
upon
Prussia
to
prevent
the Prince's
going
to
Spain:
all
she desired
was
that
the
King
should
forbid
him to
change
his
present
resolution
to withdraw
his candidature.
If His
Majesty
would
do
this,
the
whole affair
would
be
absolutely
and
entirely
at
an
end.
He
then
asked whether
France could count
on
the
good
offices of the
British Government
in
obtaining
this
prohibition
from
the
King.
Thus
Gramont
made his
third
volte-face
to
the
Ambassador
within
five
days
;
each time he
had added
something
to
his
original
demand,
and
each
time
he
had
protested
that
he had
nothing
else to ask.
Lyons,
without
committing
himself,
forwarded
this
new
suggestion
to
the
Foreign
Office;
and
it
was
considered
next
day
at a
Cabinet
Meeting.
It
was decided
that Gramont's
new demand was inadmissible
;
but another
attempt
was made to
preserve
peace
by
a
communication
handed to Bernstorff
which
ran as
follows
:
"
We
recommend to Prussia that as the
King
consented to
the
acceptance
and
thereby
in a certain sense became
a
party
to the
arrangements,
so
he
might
with
perfect dignity
communicate to the French
Government his
consent in like
manner
to
the
withdrawal of the
acceptance,
if France
should
waive her demand
for
an
engagement covering
the
future.
Such
a
communication
at the
suggestion
of a
friendly
Power
would
be a further
and the
strongest proof
of
the
King's
desire
for the
maintenance of
the
peace
of
Europe."
The
proposal
was
at the same
time sent to Paris. But
it arrived
too
late to
have a
chance
of
acceptance
in
either
country.
For,
on
the
previous
evening,
Bismarck,
who
strongly disapproved
of
the
King's
negotiation
with
Benedetti,
and had
threatened to
resign
if
he
received
the
Ambassador
again,
took
advantage
of
the
discretionary
power
allowed
him
by
the
King
and
published
the Ems
telegram.
He so
rearranged
the
wording
as to make
it
appear
that,
in
consequence
of
Benedetti's
offensive
importunity,
the
King
had
been
compelled
to
repel
him
by
a
public
slight.
This version of
the
telegram
was
not
only
published
in
the
newspapers,
but
sent
officially
to the Prussian
Diplo-
matic
Agents
abroad.
The
French
Council
of
Ministers
met
on
the
afternoon
of
the
14th
and
called out the reserves.
But,
momentarily
shrinking
from a war
which
now
stared them
in
the
face,
they
assented
to
the
proposal
of
the
Government,
that
France should
appeal
to
a
European
Congress
to
give
a
formal
recognition
to the
principle
of
international
law, which,
it was
stated,
forbade
princes
connected
with