Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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BRITISH
OBLIGATIONS
15
aware
of
the difference between
the
two
engagements
when
she
signed
the
Treaty
of London. This
interpretation
of the
practical
difference
between the two
Treaties seems to
have been
accepted
as
a
matter
of
course
by
British statesmen.
Viscount
Grey,
at the
outbreak
of
War
in
1
9 14,
treated
it
as a
matter
of
common
knowledge
that
Great
Britain
was
bound
to
engage
in
a
single-handed
defence of
Belgium,
but
was
not so bound in
the
case
of
Luxemburg.
A
comparison,
however,
of the
text
of
the
two
Treaties,
of
1839
ana
*
I
^°7>
by
no
means bears
out this clear
distinction,
from
which such
vitally important
results
have flowed.
Article
II
of
the
Treaty
of
London
of
1839 speaks
simply
of
"the
guarantee"
of
the
Signatory
Powers
—
omitting
the word
"
collective
"
but not
inserting
the word
"joint
and several."
But this
latter is a
technical
diplomatic
term,
which was
actually
inserted
in
the
Treaty signed by
Great
Britain,
Austria
and France
on
April
14th,
1856, by
which
"the
high contracting
parties
guarantee, jointly
and
severally,
the
independence
and
the
integrity
of the
Ottoman
Empire."
Such
an
omission,
therefore,
makes
it
appear
that
legally
the
value of
the
guarantee
of
1867
was
precisely
that
of
the
guarantee
of
1839;
that Prussia was
justified
in
supposing
that
she had
actually
obtained
the
result
that
had
been
implied
in her
demands;
and
finally
that,
if
the
guarantee
to
Luxemburg
meant
only
what
Lord
Derby
asserted,
then
that to
Belgium
had no
higher
legal
value. The
practical
difference
between
the
two
may
be
considered
to amount to this
:
Great Britain
would
always regard
the
violation
of
Belgium
neutrality
as
a casus
belli,
because
she would
always
view
the
integrity
and
independence
of
Belgium
as
a
vital
interest
1
,
and could
always
render
that
country
direct
assistance
by
sea
;
whereas
neither
of
these considerations
applied
to
Luxemburg.
The
Queen
pointed
out
with truth to Disraeli
that,
while
the
British action in
preventing
war
had
restored to the
country
much of
its
lost
prestige, yet
the
most
likely
method of
provoking
the violation
of
a
neutral
State was
to
use
language
which
suggested
that Great
Britain
regarded
her
guarantees
as a
dead
letter.
In
point
of
fact,
a
vigorous
British
protest
was
lodged
when,
in
December,
1870,
Bismarck
declared
that Prussia
no
longer
felt
bound
to
respect
the
neutrality
of
Luxemburg,
in
view of
the use which
the
French
had
been
permitted
to
make of
the
grand-duchy
for
military purposes.
1
Compare
the
language
used
by
Gladstone
in the
House of
Commons,
August,
1870:
"We
have
an
interest in
the
independence
of
Belgium
which is wider than
that
which
we
may
have in
the
literal
operation
of
the
guarantee."
16
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
As Bismarck
in
reply
stated
that he had
no
intention of
denouncing
the
Treaty
of
London,
nor entertained
any
design
of
annexing
Luxem-
burg,
the
matter
was
allowed to
drop.
II.
The
Abyssinian
Expedition,
1868
Although
the
Conservative
Government
during
the
remainder of
its tenure
of office were not
faced with
any
further
complications
in
Europe,
it
won,
deservedly, great
credit
for
its successful
handling
of
the
Abyssinian
Expedition,
of
which
the
object
was
to release
the
British
captives
whom
Theodore,
the
Negus,
or
supreme
King,
of
the
country,
had
detained
in
his
hands since
November,
1863.
Theodore,
who maintained
with
difficulty
and
great
cruelty
the
position
which
he
had
usurped
in
1855,
had been
in
the habit
of
seeking
the
society
of
British
Consuls at
Massowah,
who had
been
appointed
since
1848
for the
protection
of British
trade
with
Abyssinia
and
the countries
adjacent
thereto.
They
had
no official status
in
the
country,
since Theo-
dore
had
always
refused
to
ratify
a
Treaty
which Consul
Plowden had
negotiated
with
his
predecessor,
providing
for
mutual
representation.
But
Consul
Plowden,
who had become
one of
the
King's
most
in-
timate
friends,
was
killed while
assisting
him
against
a
rebellion in
Abyssinia;
and his
successor,
Cameron,
in
spite
of
warnings
from
Lord
John
Russell as to
his
not
holding
the
position
of a
diplomatic
Representative,
also
spent
much of his time at Theodore's
Court. In
the
spring
of
1863,
Cameron
forwarded
to
the
Foreign
Office a letter
from the
King
to
Queen
Victoria
proposing
an
Embassy
and an
alliance
against
the
Turks,
although
he had been
expressly
warned
that
no
Embassy
would be received
from him
until
he
had
given up
his
hostile
designs against
Turkey
and
Egypt.
This
letter remained un-
answered,
and Theodore retaliated
by
throwing
Cameron
into
prison.
Apart
from
the
slight
to
his
vanity,
the
King
seems to have feared
that
Great Britain
would
join Egypt
in an
attack
on
his
independence,
and
discovered a further
grievance
in
the fact that
Abyssinian pilgrims
to
Jerusalem
were
being
treated
by
the
Turkish
authorities as
Turkish
subjects,
whereas
he
considered
that
Lord
Malmesbury
had
promised
them
in
1852
the
protection
of
the British
Consul
1
. He
was
confirmed
1
Lord
Malmesbury's
actual Instructions
had been
that,
while
the British
Government
could
not undertake
officially
to
protect
Abyssinians
residing
in
Turkish
territory,
yet
the British
Consul
was,
in case
of
need,
to
use his
good
offices
on
their
behalf
"as members of a Christian Church
in
spiritual
communion
with the
Established Church in
this
Country."
THE
RASSAM
MISSION
17
in
his
suspicions
by
an
intercepted despatch
to
Cameron,
which
ordered the latter to return
at once
to
Massowah
and to cease
from
interfering
in
Abyssinian
affairs.
Ten
European
missionaries,
ofwhom
two
were
women,
were
joined
with Cameron
in
captivity,
and
were
treated
intermittently
with
extreme
cruelty
:
they
believed
themselves
to
have
excited the
King's displeasure by commenting
unfavourably
on his
wholesale
massacre
of
rebels.
In
1865,
the
captives
still
re-
mained in
Theodore's
hands,
and
public
opinion
began
to demand
that effectual
steps
should
be
taken
to secure their release.
An abortive
attempt
had
been made in
February
to
use the
Abouna,
or Christian
Bishop,
of
the
country
as an
intermediary
for
the
purpose.
Lord
Russell
rejected
the notion
of
force,
writing
on
June
8th:
"I
cannot
think
that it would be wise
to
send a
military expedition
to attack the
King
of
Abyssinia.
I
know
not
how we could
reach
him
in
that
way
"
;
and
decided to send an official
British
Mission.
Accordingly,
Rassam,
an
Armenian
by
birth
who had
received
an
English
education,
and
held
the
post
of
First Assistant to the Resident at
Aden,
was sent to
Massowah,
with
a
letter from
Queen
Victoria to
Theodore,
affecting
not
to
know
of
Cameron's
imprisonment
and
promising
that the
King
should
be
permitted
to send an
Embassy
when the
Consul
had re-
turned to
England.
In
September, 1865,
Rassam received
an invitation
from
Theodore
to
proceed
to
Abyssinia,
and after
many
delays
was
received,
on
February
7th,
1868,
by
the
King,
who
immediately
released
Cameron and all
the other
prisoners.
Rassam was
delighted
;
"Nothing
"
he
wrote,
"could
exceed
King
Theodore's courteous
and
polite
behaviour";
and
the whole
matter seemed
to
be
successfully
concluded. On
April
13th,
however,
the
King
suddenly
ordered
the
rearrest
of
the
liberated
prisoners,
and
placed
Rassam
and the
re-
mainder of
his Mission
under
confinement.
Theodore,
whose diseased
mind
was
influenced
by
an
intense
suspiciousness
bordering
on
in-
sanity,
apparently
believed
that,
if
he
allowed
his
captives
to
leave the
country,
the
British
Government would
on
their safe
return
send
an
expedition
to
attack him.
He,
therefore,
determined
to retain
them
as
hostages
until
he
had a
satisfactory
reply
to
his
original
offer
of
an
alliance with
the
Queen,
and
to
take
advantage
of
the
opportunity
for
procuring
from
England
a
number
of
skilled
artisans,
desired
by
him
for
the
development
of
his
country.
The
Government,
with
extra-
ordinary
forbearance,
acting
on the
advice
of
the
Resident
at
Aden,
Colonel
Merewether,
who
was then
in
London,
advised
the
Queen
to
give
an
audience to
the German
missionary
who
brought
Theodore's
W.&G.III
2
18
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
demand to
England,
and
sent
presents
of
machinery
for
Theodore to
Aden,
together
with
a
number
of
artisans,
who
had been
induced
to
go
to
Abyssinia
by
a
guarantee
against
financial loss
given by
the
Government.
Theodore,
however,
returned no
answer to
the intima-
tion that
they
would
be
placed
at
his
disposal
when the
captives
reached
Aden;
but
merely
removed
these to the
inaccessible and rockbound
fortress
of
Magdala.
In
October,
1866,
Lord
Stanley
asked
the
War
Office to
consider the
possibilities
of a
military
expedition;
though
expressing
his real
feelings
in a
letter
to Disraeli:
"I
sincerely hope
the W.O. will
find
the
country
inaccessible.
I
think
they
will."
No
further action
was taken until
April,
1867,
in
the belief that
Theodore,
who
was
surrounded
with
rebels,
might
be overthrown
and
the
captives
in
consequence
released.
On
April
16th,
Lord
Stanley
for-
warded
through
Aden
an
ultimatum
to
Theodore,
warning
him
that,
if
the
prisoners
were not restored
within three months
from
the
despatch
of
the
letter,
all
friendship
between
him
and the
Queen
must
cease. No answer was returned
by
him to this communication. On
August 19th,
it was decided
that
an
Expedition
should be
immediately
despatched
from
Bombay,
the
Governor of that
province
having
already
drawn
up plans
under the Instructions
of Sir
Stafford North-
cote,
Secretary
of
State
for India. The
Instructions
given
to
Sir
Robert
Napier,
who was
placed
in command
of
this
force,
show
ex-
tremely clearly
the
objects
which the Government
had
in
view. His
primary object
was to be to secure the release
of
Cameron,
Rassam
and all the
other
official
persons
detained
by
Theodore,
and
he
was,
also,
to use
his
best endeavours to secure the
release of all
other
Europeans
in
captivity,
whether British citizens or
not,
though
he was
not to
prolong
the
Expedition
for
that
purpose.
Theodore
was
not
to
be
deprived
of
any
portion
of his
territory,
nor to
be forced
to make
any
concession,
pecuniary
or other.
While
Napier
might
take advan-
tage
of
the existence of
any
hostility
to
the
King
in
Abyssinia,
he was
not to
wage
war in
order
to set
up
a
pretender
in
a
country
where
there
were
really
no
British
interests to
promote.
If
Theodore
fell
into
the
hands of the
Expeditionary
Force,
he was to
be
sent to
Bombay.
Lord
Stanley
concluded
by
remarking
that,
"
Her
Majesty's
Govern-
ment have
no
concern
with
what
might
befall
Abyssinia by
the
removal of
Theodore
from
the
country.
The lesson to be
taught
to
rulers of his character and
their
peoples
is
that wanton
outrages
to
British
Subjects
will sooner or
later
bring
down
upon
the
perpetrators
of
them
signal
retribution."
It
is
not
within the
scope
of the
present
EFFECT OF
ABYSSINIAN
EXPEDITION
19
work to
describe the
Expedition,
which was
handled
throughout
with
the
greatest
ability
and
met with
a
complete
and
almost
bloodless
success.
Theodore,
who had
taken no
notice of a
last
warning
letter
sent
him
by
the Khedive
of
Egypt
after
the
Expedition
had
actually
started,
recognising
the
impossibility
of
resistance,
killed
himself
in
Magdala,
on
the
day
before
the British
troops
entered and found the
prisoners
all
unharmed
(April 13th, 1868).
Within a
week
they
were
beginning
their
withdrawal
from
Abyssinian
territory.
Great Britain had
acted
in
this
protracted
affair
with a
combination
of
extreme
patience
and
rapid
energy.
Four
years
had
elapsed
between
the
imprisonment
of
Cameron and
the
entrance of
British soldiers
on
Abyssinian
soil;
but
within
five
months
they
had
overcome all
the
geographical
and
climatic
difficulties,
and
were masters of
a
fortress,
which all who
were
acquainted
with
it
had
described as
impregnable.
It
is
certain that the
impression
of
irresistible
power
produced
in
India,
where the
Expedition
had
been
organised,
powerfully
enhanced
British
prestige,
which Sir
Henry
Rawlinson so
aptly
described as
"the
power
which
enables us
to
achieve
very great
results with
very
small
means at
our
immediate
disposal."
Disraeli
was
fully justified
in
calling
the
attention
of
Parliament
to the
disinterestedness
which
had
throughout
characterised our
action. When
the
Expedition
was
starting,
he had
stated that its
object
was
"not to obtain
territory,
not
to
secure commercial
advantages,
but
for
high
moral
causes and
for
high
moral
causes
alone." On
its
completion,
he
repeated
that,
"
when
it was first
announced
that
England
was about
to embark
on a
most
costly
and
perilous
expedition,
merely
to
vindicate the honour
of
our
Sovereign,
and
to rescue
from an
unjust
but
remote
captivity
a
few
of our
fellow-subjects,
the
announcement
was
received in more
than one
country
with
something
like
mocking
incredulity.
But
we
have asserted the
purity
of
our
purpose.
In an
age
accused,
and
perhaps
not
unjustly,
of
selfishness,
and
a
too
great
regard
for
material
interests,
it is
something,
in so
striking
and
significant
a
manner,
for a
great
nation to
have
vindicated the
higher
principles
of
humanity.
It is a
privilege
to
belong
to
a
country
which has
done
such
deeds."
The mass of
papers
preserved
among
the
records
of
the
Expedition,
which
emphasise
the
importance
of
developing
British trade
in
Abyssinia
and
describe
the
richness of
the
mineral
deposits,
prove
that
Ministers did
not
adhere
to their
disinterested
policy
from
lack
of
inducements
to
depart
from
it.
20
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
III.
The
Franco-German
War,
1870
The
Abyssinian
success, however,
did
not
prevent
the Liberals
from
obtaining
a
large majority
in
the
new
electorate at the General
Election
held
in the
autumn
of
that
year
(1868).
Gladstone became
head
of a
powerful
and active
Government,
and
Lord
Clarendon
returned
once more to
his old
post.
But the
latter
appointment
was
not
made until
objections
from
a most
unexpected
quarter
had
been
overcome.
In
1866,
the
Queen
had
been
so
unwilling
to
part
with
Clarendon
as
Foreign Secretary
as
to write
that she
"cannot
express
too
strongly
her
hope
and
earnest
wish
that
Lord
Clarendon
may
find
himself enabled to
accede to
the
proposal,
which
the
Queen
knows
Lord
Derby
will make
to
him,
of
remaining
in
his
present
office
"
(June
28th,
1866).
But,
two
years
later,
we find
from Lord
Halifax's
Journal
1
that
she
desired to
place
an
absolute
veto
on
his
name
for
that
post.
An
entry
there,
for
November
26th,
states
that
"The essential
part
of
the
Queen's
message
was her
objection
to
Clarendon
as
Foreign Secretary.
She
told Charles
2
that he was
the
only
one
of her
Ministers who had ever
been
impertinent
to
her,
and
that she
could
not submit to him in
the
position
of
Foreign
Secretary
which
brought
him
into such
constant communication with
herself;
that he
was too
intimate
with the
Queen
of Holland
and was
influenced
by
her,
and that his
opinions
against
the German
unity
and
views of
Russia,
which she considered
so
right
and
necessary,
rendered him unfit
for that
post
on
public
grounds.
She
said that both Clarendon
and
Lowe
were
very
sarcastic,
and she did
not like such
people
in intimate
communication
with
her."
It was fortunate that
the
Queen's
opposition,
which
appears
at
bottom
to
have
rested
on some
personal
pique,
was
overcome. Lord
Clarendon
was the
only
British
diplomatist
who
possessed
a
European
reputation
;
and so far was he from
desiring
to
break the
continuity
of
our
Foreign
Policy
that he
tells
us
himself
that on
taking
office he had
"a
long
official talk with
Stanley,
who
was
most
friendly
and
communicative.
I did not
detect
a
shade of
difference of
opinion
between
us
3
."
In
fact,
the Memorandum
which
was
presented
by
Gladstone to
General
Grey
for
the
information of
the
Queen
(April 17th,
1869)
furnishes an
exposition
of
the
principles
which
should
govern
the
relations of
Great
1
Quoted
in Sir
H.
Maxwell's
Life of
Lord
Clarendon,
11.
353.
2
General the Hon.
Charles
Grey,
her Private
Secretary.
3
Sir H. Maxwell's
Life of
Lord
Clarendon,
11.
355.
GLADSTONE'S
MEMORANDUM
21
Britain to
Europe
very
similar
to that
laid down
by
Disraeli
in
his
speech quoted
above
1
.
He
writes
:
"
I do not believe that
England
ever will or can be
unfaithful
to
her
great
tradition,
or
can forswear
her interest in
the common
transactions
and
the
general
interests
of
Europe.
But
her
credit and her
power
form a
fund
which,
in
order
that
they may
be made
the
most
of,
should
be
thriftily
used...."
And he adds:
"
As I
understand Lord
Clarendon's
ideas,
they
are
fairly
represented
by
his
very important diplomatic
communications
since
he has
taken
office.
They proceed
upon
such
grounds
as
these: That
England
should
keep
entire in her own
hands
the means of
estimating
her own
obligations
upon
the various states of facts
as
they
arise
;
that
she should not
foreclose
and
narrow her
own
liberty
of choice
by
declarations made to the
Powers,
in
their real or
supposed
interests,
of which
they
would claim
to be
at
least
joint
interpreters;
that it is
dangerous
for
her to
assume
alone an
advanced,
and
therefore
an
isolated
position,
in
regard
to
European
controversies;
that,
come
what
may,
it
is
better
for
her to
promise
too
little
than too
much;
that she should not
encourage
the
weak
by
giving expectations
of
aid to
resist the
strong,
but should rather seek
to deter
the
strong
by
firm
but
moderate
language
from
aggression
on the
weak;
that she
should
seek
to
develop
and mature
the action of
a
common,
or
public
or
European
opinion,
as the best
standing
bulwark
against wrong,
but
should beware
of
seeming
to
lay
down the
law of that
opinion by
her own
authority,
anJLlms
running
the risk
of
setting against
her,
and
against
right
and
justice,
tlkt
general
sentiment
which
ought
to
be,
and
generally
would
be,
arrayed
in
their
favour.
I
am
persuaded
that at this
juncture opinions
of this
colour
being
true and
sound,
are also the
only
opinions
which
the
country
is
disposed
to
approve.
But
I
do not believe
that on
that account it
io
one
whit less
disposed
than
it
has
been at
any
time,
to cast in its
lot
upon any
fitting
occasion with the cause
it believes to
be
right."
Meanwhile,
the relations
between France and
Prussia
remained
inevitably
the
central
problem
of
European
diplomacy.
The
publica-
tion
by
Bismarck
(March,
1867)
of
the
Treaties of
Alliance with
the
southern
States,
and
the wave
of
national
excitement which
swept
all
over
Germany
at the
time
of
the
Luxemburg
incident,
proved
how
shadowy
were
the
guarantees
of
the
Treaty
of
Prague
for
the
inde-
pendent
existence of
the
south,
and
suggested
that
the
surest
method
of
cementing
a German
Unity,
which
to
all
impartial
observers
now
seemed
inevitable,
would
be a war
against
France for an
object
common
1
See
for this
letter or
memorandum
Lord
Morley's Life of
Gladstone,
11.
316-
318,
where
it is
described as
"in
truth
a
sort of
charter of the
leading principles
of
Mr
Gladstone's
foreign
policy
at the
moment when
he first
incurred
supreme
responsibility
for
our
foreign
affairs."
22
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
to
all Germans.
Many
reasons
combined
to
draw closer
the
relations
between
Great
Britain
and
France. Lord
Clarendon
was
a
personal
friend
of
the
Emperor
Napoleon,
who
regarded
him with
complete
confidence
1
;
while
Lord
Lyons
proved
an
extremely
able
successor
to
Lord
Cowley,
who
had
shown
himself
during
his fifteen
years
of
office
(1852-67)
to
be
the
most effective
of
contemporary
British
Ambassadors.
The
Emperor,
throughout
all
the
windings
of
his
policy,
attached
the
highest
importance
to
preserving
British
friendship.
Clarendon
regarded
the
continuance
of
the
Napoleonic
empire
as the
only
guarantee
against
the
evil
of
high
tariff
walls between
the two
countries,
and
was
suspicious
of
the transformation
into
a
Parlia-
mentary
system
which
was
gradually
taking
place
in
the
government
of
France
2
.
Further,
he
hoped
to
prevent
the
Emperor
from
either
tampering
with
the
independence
of
Belgium,
or
making
war on
Prussia
to
secure
popular
opinion
for the
support
of his
tottering
dynasty.
In
its
continuance
he had
little
confidence,
and
he
expressed
his
opinion,
in
August,
1869,
that the French
"
will
drift into
a
Republic
before
another
year
is
over." As
to
the
unification
of
Germany,
he
did
not
believe it to
be
imminent,
but
expected
that it
would
prove
a
gradual
and
inevitable
process.
'U
agree
with
you
(he
wrote to
Lyons,
March
3rd,
1870)
that Prussia
w?H
never
declare
that
she will
not
complete
the
unity
of
Germany,
because
she looks
on it
as
inevitable.
Nothing,
as
the
King
himself
said
to
me,
can
prevent
the
gravitation
of
the weak towards
the
strong,
but that it would
not take
place
in
his
life,
possibly
not in that
of his
son.
France if not
grov
;
,
wiser
by
that
time
will
probably
consider it as a
casus belli. .
.and
she
!
/ould
weld
all
Germany together
as
one man
if she
attempted by
force
to
prevent
Bavaria,
Wurttemberg
and
Baden
from
joining
the
North,
when
they
had determined
that it was
for
their
own interest to
do
so."
There
was
little
interchange
of real confidence between Berlin
and
London
;
although
Clarendon
did
not believe that Prussia
meant
war,
he
felt the
deepest
distrust
of
Bismarck,
whom he had
described
in
1864
as "a
man
without faith or
law."
He saw
clearly
that,
while
1
Cf.
Lord
Lyons
to Lord
Stanley,
October
20th,
1868. The
Emperor
told
Clarendon
in
strict confidence of a
proposal
which he
had
not,
he
said,
mentioned
even
to
his
Ministers.
Men
of
weight
(des
hommes
serieux)
had
proposed
a
Con-
federation
between
the
south-German
States
and
Switzerland.
(See
Ix>rd
Newton,
Lord
Lyons,
1.
204.)
2
See
Lyons's
letter to
Clarendon,
December
3rd, 1869:
"I
am
afraid we
shall
never
again,
either
in
political
or
commercial
affairs,
have as
good
times
as
we had
under
the
personal
power
of the
Emperor
—
by
we of
course
I
mean the
English";
to
which
Lord
Clarendon
replied
:
"
I
quite agree
with
you
that we shall
never
have
uch
good
times
again
under
a
Parliamentary
instead of a
personal
regime."
(Lord
Newton,
Lord
Lyons,
I.
240-1.)
LIMITATION
OF
ARMAMENTS
23
France
and
Prussia
persisted
in
their
competition
of
armaments,
peace
must
remain
at the
mercy
of an
incident,
so soon
as
one or other
party
believed
itself
to
be
momentarily
possessed
of a
clear
superiority.
The
King
of
Prussia
had
always,
in
spite
of his real desire
for
peace,
shown
himself
no less
unapproachable
than
Bismarck on this
subject;
but
the
Emperor
Napoleon,
with
whom the
Foreign Secretary
had a con-
versation
in
September,
1869,
proved
more
sympathetic.
The
rural
population,
the
solid
prop
of the
French
empire,
was
growing
more
and
more restive
under
the
burden
of
taxation
and
conscription;
and,
so
early
as
April,
1868,
the
Emperor's
Government
had
informally
suggested
to
Lord
Stanley
that
Great Britain
might "give
advice" to
Prussia
on the
subject
of
disarmament,
which he
had
refused
to
do.
The
newly
formed
Ministry,
which
under Ollivier
was
to
reconcile
responsible
government
with
the
empire,
made another
essay
in the
same
direction
through
La
Valette,
the
French
Ambassador at
London
(January
26th,
1870).
Clarendon
agreed
to
enter
into the
design,
though
it
was clear
that its
handling
required
the most
delicate tact.
For,
as
Ollivier told
Lord
Lyons (January
30th)
it
was
essential that
the
French
Government
should not
be
in
any way
compromised;
since,
"under
present
circumstances
a
public
rebuff from
Prussia would
be
fatal."
"
Un echec"
he
said,
"
c'est la
guerre."
He
hoped,
therefore,
that
Prussia
might
be led to
agree
with France
on a simultaneous
disarmament,
or at least
to receive a
proposal
from her
in a
friendly
spirit.
After
obtaining
the
approval
of
the
Queen
and
the Prime-
Minister,
but
without
communicating
the matter to
the
Cabine
Clarendon
sent
a Memorandum
(February
2nd)
which Lord
A. Loftus
was
instructed
to
lay
before
Bismarck in
strict
confidence.
This
document,
after
pointing
out the destructive
and
anachronistic
burden
which the
enormous
standing
armies of
Europe imposed
on
civilisation,
suggested
that
Prussia,
better
than
any
other
Power,
might
undertake
to
modify
this
system.
Clarendon, therefore,
hoped
that,
in
spite
of
the
King's
"parental
feeling
and
affection
for
his
army,"
Bismarck
would recommend
to
him a
partial
disarmament.
The moment
seemed
highly
propitious,
as
France
had
"
never been more
peacefully
inclined
than
at the
present
time,
under
a
responsible
government
which
cannot
make war for an
idea,
because it
represents
a nation
that
is determined
to
maintain
peace
so
long
as
there
is no
just
cause
for
war,
and
because
the
Emperor entirely
shares the
feelings
of
his
people."
He
concluded
by
expressing
his conviction
that the French Government
would
raise
no
opposition
to a reduction
of the
Army
pari
passu
with
Prussia.
24
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
In
point
of
fact,
the
moment
was
very unpropitious
for
opening
this
question
with
Bismarck,
who was
becoming increasingly
anxious
as to whether
the
Treaties
with
the
south-
German
States,
his
principal
pledge
of
security,
would be renewed when
they
expired
in
1871.
The
fall
of the
Hohenlohe Cabinet
in Bavaria
(February 14th)
and the
unconcealed
hostility
of
the
King
of
Wurtemberg,
showed how sub-
stantial
were
his reasons
for uneasiness.
Moreover,
as he
pointed
out
with
force
in a conversation with
Lord A.
Loftus
(February
5th)
Prussia's
geographical
position
made
the
taking
of
any
initiative
in
the
reduction of armaments
far
less feasible
for
her than for
Great
Britain.
"Our
position,"
he
said,
"is
an
exceptional
one.
We are
surrounded
by
three
great
empires
with Armies
as
large
as our
own,
any
two
of whom
might
combine
against
us." He
further remarked
that
Prussia's
military strength
was
an
advantage
to
Great
Britain,
as
the events
of
1869
had
shown,
when an
occupation
of
Belgium
would
have taken
place,
had
it
not
been
known at Paris
that
Prussia would
join
in
the defence
of that
country.
He declared that he did
not
dare
even to name the
subject
of
Clarendon's
letter to
the
King,
"
much
less
show it to
His
Majesty.
He would
get
into
a
fury
and
immediately
think
that
England
was
trying
to
weaken Prussia
in
the
interests
of
France."
Daru,
the French
Foreign
Minister,
on
hearing
the
substance
of
Bismarck's
objections,
expressed
his
determination to
disarm,
whether
Prussia
did so or
not,
and
to
propose
to the
Emperor
a
reduction
of
the
yearly contingent
from
100,000
to
90,000
men,
which
reduction
he
would have
suggested
to
be even
larger,
if
the
accounts of Prussian
intentions were
more
satisfactory (February
10th).
This
step
would,
he
thought,
furnish Clarendon with a
powerful
argument
for
per-
severing
in his
endeavours to work on
Prussia. Clarendon
was
not
discouraged,
and
renewed
his
attempt
in a
letter
to Lord A.
Loftus
on March
9th.
He tried to convince
Bismarck that Prussia had
nothing
to fear
from
any
of
the three
empires
which surrounded
her.
Austria
"
could
not,
even
on
the
most
pressing emergency,
bring
200,000
men
into
the
field.
Her finances
are
dilapidated
and her
internal dis-
organisation
affords
just
cause
for
alarm." Bismarck had
dwelt
on
the
"hostility
of the
Muscovite
party
towards
Germany
and on
the
dislike
of the Tsarevitch to
everything
German
"
which
must cause
a
great change
in
the
relations
between Prussia and
Russia
after
the
death
of Alexander. Clarendon
replied
that
"
Count Bismarck must
know better than
myself
that
Russia has
long
since,
and
wisely,
ceased to aim at
influence in
Germany
or
intervention