Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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CLARENDON
AND
MEDIATION
5
tion
(of
the
Duchies)
as
a
vital
question,
whether
regarded
in
its
military
or
political
aspect
1
"
;
and that the
proposal
of
convoking
the
Estates
of
the
Duchies
in
order
to
decide
on their
future
destiny
was,
in
consequence,
inadmissible as
they
would
probably
adhere
to
the Duke of
Augustenburg.
Clarendon
replied
by
directly
traversing
these
statements,
and
declaring
that
Austria neither wanted
war
nor
was
preparing
for
it.
In
a conversation
with Count Bernstorff
on
April
4th
2
,
he showed
how
completely
he understood Bismarck's
position.
"
Count
Bismarck,"
he told the
Prussian
Ambassador,
"
was
not
an
ordinary
Minister
;
he
exercised
supreme
power,
he dictated the
policy
of
Prussia which was territorial
aggrandisement,
he was
a man
of
purpose
and
that
which he
announced he was
likely
to execute.
War
with
Austria
had become
necessary
for his
position
and his
designs,
and
Austria
was
right
in
preparing
to
repel
the
blow
that
might
at
any
moment be
aimed at
her
by
Prussia.
"
He told Bernstorff
with
passion
that Bismarck
was
engaging
his
country
in
the
greatest
of all
wrongs,
unjustifiable
war,
which he
was
certain
would
not
have
been contem-
plated
by
the
King,
a sincere Christian
and
a
man of
the
highest
honour,
if
the whole
truth
had been
made
known to him.
Such
an
appeal
was
not, however,
likely
to
influence
Bismarck,
who
was
then
presented
with a
suggestion
that both
Prussia and
Austria should disarm.
Bismarck,
at
first,
promised
that disarmament
should
proceedparipassu
in
both countries
;
but,
finally (on April 26th),
he declared
that Prussian
action must
be
contingent
on the
complete
disarmament of
Austria
against Italy
also :
with
the
result that
within
a
week
general
mobilisation was in
progress
in all
three countries.
Since General
de
La
Marmora
had,
with
singular
frankness,
repeatedly
told
the British Minister at
Florence that
"
as soon as war was declared
between Austria and Prussia he would
declare
it
against
Austria
3
,"
this
condition,
which
Bismarck
had
sought
to
impose,
offered the
clearest
proof
both of
the
identity
of
interest between
Prussia and
Italy
and
of
the
determination
of
the former
to
push
the
dispute
to
extremes
without
further loss of
time.
The
chance
that
war
might
be
avoided
by any
agreement
or
compromise
was
now
exceedingly slight
;
for,
as
the
history
of
the
nineteenth
century
has
shown,
the almost
inevitable
sequel
of
mobilisation
is
war. The
Emperor
Napoleon,
however,
whose
efforts had
hitherto been
mainly
confined
to
clearing
the
way
to
war
1
Clarendon
to
Loftus,
No.
33,
March
24th,
1866.
2
Clarendon to
Loftus,
No.
42, April
4th,
1866.
3
Clarendon
to
Loftus,
No.
81,
April
29th,
1866.
6
NEUTRALITY,
1 866-1
874
for
two
of the
prospective
combatants,
pressed
forward a
proposal
for a
European
congress.
It
is
doubtful
whether the
Emperor
ex-
pected,
either
that
a
congress
would be
held,
or
that,
if
held,
it
would
be successful
in
averting
war;
but
it could
not
do
France
any
harm,
and would
give
the
French
Representative
an
opportunity
of
ex-
plaining
more
precisely
what
the
Emperor
had
meant
by
his
pointed
reference at
Auxerre,
on
May
6th,
to the detestation
with which
he
and
the
majority
of
French
people regarded
the Treaties of 18
15,
"dont
on voudrait
faire aujourd'hui
l'
unique
base
de notre
politique
exterieure."
Clarendon
doubted,
from the
outset,
whether
a
congress
offered
a
reasonable
prospect
of
effecting
the
purpose
for
which
it
would be
convoked. He
objected
that it
would be
powerless
to enforce
its
decisions,
and
again
suggested
the
employment
of
the
means
recom-
mended
by
the
Paris Protocol
of
1856.
Great
Britain,
France and
Russia should
appeal jointly
to the
prospective
combatants
to
resume
the
status
quo.
The French
thought
that better results
would be
achieved
by presenting
a
programme
which had been
settled
in
advance
by
the three
Powers,
and was
accompanied
by
a
joint
declaration of
their
"firm
intention"
to solve the international
difficulties
in
the
direction
of
peace.
Clarendon considered that the words
"firm in-
tention
"
might suggest
a course of action which
his
Government
did
not
intend
to
pursue,
while
the French
argued,
with some
force,
that
to make it clear
from
the outset that
no armed
intervention
was con-
templated
under
any
circumstances
would
ensure the
futility
of
any
offer
of
mediation.
The
proposal
for a
congress
was
finally accepted
by
Great Britain
and
Russia,
and
invitations
were
sent out
on
May
24th. They
were
addressed
to
the Germanic
Confederation
as well as
to
the
three
principal
parties
to the
dispute,
and
the
object
to be attained was thus
defined.
"It
is
proposed
in
the interests of
peace
to settle
by
means
of
diplomacy
the
question
of
the
Elbe
Duchies,
that
of
the
Italian
dispute
and,
thirdly,
that
of
the
reforms to be introduced
into the
Federal
Pact,
as far as
they
may
affect the balance
of
power
in
Europe."
The
vague phrase,
"the
Italian
dispute,"
was understood to
include
the Venetian
question,
but
expressly
to exclude
all
discussion re-
specting
the
guarantee
of
the
Temporal
Power of
the
Pope.
No
preliminary
condition
of
demobilisation
was
insisted
upon,
but
a
hope
was
expressed
that
military preparations
would
be
suspended
while
the
congress
was
sitting.
Prussia and
Italy accepted
without
con-
ditions.
Bismarck,
as
always,
was careful to act
with formal correctness
THE
AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN
WAR
7
towards
Europe
;
and the event
proved
that
he
was
right
in
taking
the
apparent
risk of
seeing
his
plans
overthrown.
For Austria
accepted
only
with a
proviso
which was
regarded
by
the
inviting
Powers
as a
refusal.
She demanded
that
the
congress
should exclude
from
its
deliberations
any arrangement
which
would
give
to
any
one
of the
States
invited
any
accession
of
territory
or
any
increase
of
power.
This
condition
excluded
any arrangement
such
as
the
proposal
—
privately
favoured
by
Clarendon
—
by
which Austria
would
cede
Venetia
to
Italy,
and
would renounce
any
claims to
the Elbe
Duchies
in
favour
of
Prussia,
while
receiving
Silesia
in
exchange
from
the
latter Power.
Austria
had
definitely
determined
not
to
cede Venetia
without
war;
though
the
Secret
Treaty
concluded
with the
Emperor Napoleon
on
June
1
2th showed
that,
at the
moment,
she considered her
interests
in
Germany
more
vital
than those
in
Italy,
as
she undertook
to cede
Venetia,
if
successful
in
conquering
Silesia. Clarendon
had
strongly
warned
Austria
against
refusal;
since,
in
contrast with the
acceptance
of the
two other
Powers,
it would throw
upon
her the technical
respon-
sibility
for
the
ensuing rupture,
and
divert
public opinion
abroad from
the Prussian
designs.
British
opinion
had,
in
fact,
been
deeply
ex-
asperated
against
Prussia,
and BernstorfT
had
constantly,
during
the
spring,
warned
his
Sovereign
of the
general
hostility
which he en-
countered
in London.
The last
steps
to
war
were
now
speedily
taken.
On
June
7th
Prussian
troops
entered Holstein
in answer
to the
proclamation
by
which
Gablenz,
the Austrian
Commander,
had convoked
the Estates
of
the
Duchy.
On
June
10th,
Bismarck
proclaimed
his
far-reaching
aims
by
publishing
the draft of a new
Federal
Constitution
for
Germany,
from which
Austria
was
to be excluded.
The
neutrality
of Great
Britain
in
the
ensuing struggle
had
been
generally accepted
as
a
matter
of
course both at home
and
abroad. It
is
true
that
the
Queen
had
expressed
her
opinion,
in
a Memorandum
written at her desire on March
30th,
that Austria should be
given
armed
support
;
while
Lord
Russell
had
also inclined
to the same
view,
if
Austria had
been
prepared
to sacrifice Venetia.
But
no
Cabinet,
of
whatever
party
complexion,
would
have
advised
participation
in
a war
in which no
British interests
were
directly
affected
—
and least
of
all
the
discredited
and moribund
Liberal
Administration,
which,
on
June
19th, actually
resigned
office,
in
consequence
of a defeat
in
the
House
of
Commons in
Committee
on
the Reform
Bill. This
resig-
nation
aroused the
indignation
of
the
Queen,
whose intense interest
8
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
in
the
struggle,
due to
both
political
and
personal
reasons,
made her
consider the
crisis
at
home
as
inconsiderable,
especially
when viewed
in
the
light
of the
general
apathy
in
the
country
towards
Reform.
Lord
Russell,
however,
declined
to
accept
her
view
that
he
was
acting
in-
consistently
with the
duty
which
he owed
herself and the
country,
and refused
to
reconsider
his
resignation.
She then
endeavoured,
but without
success,
to
induce
Clarendon
to
remain
at the
Foreign
Office as
a member
of
the
Conservative
Government
which
Lord
Derby
finally
succeeded
in
forming
on
July
6th. It
was, indeed,
unfortunate
that
a
change
of
Government
should have taken
place
at
this moment.
The
new
Ministry,
faced
by
a
minority
of
70
in
the
House of
Commons,
could not
expect
to
speak
with
authority
abroad.
But the
accession
of Lord
Stanley
to
the
Foreign
Office
brought
no
change
to British
policy.
He
was,
it
is
true,
comparatively
inexperienced, exceedingly
cautious
and un-
willing
to
commit
himself
or
the
country
;
and the
Queen
had
suggested
the
fear,
on his
appointment,
that
he
might
be inclined to
go
too
far
in
the line of non-intervention.
Nor can his
temperament,
as
sketched
by
Disraeli a
year
later,
be said to
suggest
the
qualities
requisite
in
a
successful
diplomatist.
He
wrote to
the
Queen
(August
16th,
1867)
that
"although
Lord
Stanley
is
of a reserved
and
rather
morose
temper,
and
will
not
go
out
of his
way
to confess
that
he has been
in
error,
he
is
really
au
fond
truthful and
impartial,
and,
if
convinced
that he
has
erred
or
miscalculated,
is never
blind
to
the
result,
and
often
unavowedly,
to
a
certain
degree
perhaps
unconsciously,
will
assuredly
modify
his
conduct/' Yet it is
impossible
to see
how
Clarendon could
have
enabled the
country
to
play
a
more active
and
influential
part
in the
settlement
which
followed.
For the
rapidity
and
completeness
of
the
Prussian
triumph
made
any attempt
at
mediation
between the victor
and
the
vanquished
completely
futile,
unless backed
by
a
determination
to
employ
force,
as the
Emperor Napoleon
found
to
his
cost.
Moreover,
no
British
statesman
of
either
party
seems to have had
any
clear idea as
to what
resettlement
of
Germany
would
be
compatible
or
incompatible
with
British
or
European
interests.
It was
generally
assumed
that Prussia
was
simply
following
her
traditional
method
of
territorial
aggrandise-
ment
and
that,
if
successful,
she would swallow
up
some more
pieces
of
Germany;
but,
until the
terms of
peace
were
presented
to
Austria,
no
one,
with the
exception
of Sir
Robert Morier
1
,
seems
to
have
1
See Memoirs and Letters
of
Sir
R.
Morier,
vol. n.
ch.
xix.
DISRAELI ON FOREIGN POLICY
9
perceived
clearly
that the
aim
of
Bismarck was to
create
a united
Germany,
or
to
have
considered
how
the
new creation
would
affect
the
Balance
of
Power
in
Europe.
It was indeed
recognised
that
the
Germanic
Confederation,
as
part
of
the Vienna
Settlement,
was
legally
under
the
guarantee
of
the
Signatory
Powers,
and that
any
alteration
might
be
held
to
require
their
preliminary
assent.
Curiously
enough,
Russia,
without whose
consent,
given
or
implied,
Bismarck
could
never
have embarked on
the
War,
proposed
a
joint
declaration
by
Great
Britain,
France
and
Russia,
to
the
effect that Prussia
could
neither
dissolve
the Germanic
Confederation
nor
form
another
with-
out the
consent
of all
the
Great
Powers
1
. Russia
cannot
have
wished
to
preserve
the
existing
Germanic
Confederation,
and was
probably
anxious
to discover what would
be the
attitude
of
the British
Govern-
ment.
Lord
Stanley,
while
declining
the
Russian
proposal,
stated
that
armed
intervention would
be
in
any
case
impossible.
The
policy
of
the
Government,
in
short,
was
to
wait
on
events
—
and,
indeed,
no
other
policy
was
at the
moment
possible
—
but
no
attempt
was made
to think
out
what
changes
would
be
desirable for British interests
in
Central
Europe,
and
what would be
the
position,
in
the
new
European
system
of an
Austria
deprived
of
influence both
in
Italy
and
Germany,
and of
a
united
Germany
controlled
by
Prussia.
Disraeli
was,
indeed,
beginning
to
point
out
to
his
countrymen
that
British
Foreign
Policy
was
growing
to be
imperial
rather than
European.
In his
speech
on
reelection
he said
:
"
The
abstention
of
England
from
any
unnecessary
interference in the
affairs
of
Europe
is
the
consequence,
not of her
decline of
power
but of
her
increased
strength.
England
is no
longer
a
mere
European
Power;
she
is
the
metropolis
of a
great
maritime
empire,
extending
to the boundaries
of the
furthest
ocean.
It is
not
because
England
has taken
refuge
in a
state
of
apathy
that
she
now
almost
systematically
declines to interfere
in
the
affairs
of the
Continent of
Europe.
England
is as
ready
and as
willing
to
interfere
as in
old
days
when
the
necessity
of her
position requires
it.
There is
no
Power,
indeed,
that
interferes
more than
England.
She inter-
feres
in
Asia,
because
she is
really
more
an
Asiatic Power
than
a
European.
She
interferes
in
Australia,
in
Africa,
and
New
Zealand,
where she carries
on
war
often
on
a
great
scale.
Therefore,
it
is not
because
England
does
not
recognise
her
duty
to
interfere in
the
affairs
of the
Continent
of
Europe
that
persons
are
justified
in
declaring
that she
has
relinquished
her
imperial
position,
and
has
taken
refuge
in the
otium
cum
dignitate
which
agrees
with
the
decline
of
life,
of
power,
and
of
prosperity.
On the
contrary,
she has
a
greater
sphere
of
action
than
any
European
Power,
and
she
has duties
1
From
Buchanan,
unnumbered,
July
7th,
1866.
io
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
devolving upon
her
on a much
larger
scale.
Not that
we
can ever
look
with
indifference
upon
what takes
place
on the
Continent.
We
are
interested
in the
peace
and
prosperity
of
Europe,
and
I
do
not
say
that
there
may
not
be
occasions
on which it
may
be
the
duty
of
England
to
interfere
in
European
wars."
The
emphasis
in
this
passage
is
obviously
laid
rather
on
the
point
that the
interests
of
the
empire
are not
primarily
European,
than
on
the
prior
truth that its
security
rests
on the existence
of a
favourable
Balance
of
Power
in
Europe.
The
Government
found no
difficulty
in
meeting
the terms
of the
Treaty
of
Prague
with
a
ready acquiescence.
The
Queen had, indeed,
shown
much
concern at the
plight
of
the
fugitive
King
of
Hanover,
but
was
persuaded
by
Disraeli and the
King
of Prussia that it
would
be
unwise
to
permit
him
to
find a
refuge
in
England.
When
Russia
proposed
to Prussia
that
a
European congress
should be
held to
discuss
the
post-
War
settlement,
Lord
Stanley
declined
to
support
the
Russian
demand,
and
it
was
not
seriously pressed.
He
had
already
stated
in
the
House
of Commons
(July
20th)
that he
could not
see
how
the
establishment
of,
a
strong
compact
Power
in
northern
Germany
would
be either a
detriment
or a menace
to
Great
Britain,
whatever
it
might
be
deemed to
be
by
other
Powers. From these last
words it
is
clear
that
British anxieties were
beginning
to
be
diverted
from
Prussia towards
the
probable
attitude of
France.
When
Thiers exclaimed in
the
French
Chamber,
"It
is
France
that has
been defeated
at
Sadowa,"
he
was
emphasising
two
points
whose
overwhelming importance appealed instinctively
to
French
public opinion.
That
duality
in
Germany,
whose existence
the
French
had
always
regarded
as a
pledge
of their
security
or an
opportunity
for
their
advantage,
was
gravely
threatened. It
is
true
that the
Treaty
of
Prague permitted
to
any
future Confederation
of
the
southern
States
"an
international
independent
existence";
but
how
were
they
to be
prevented
from
falling
under
the
exclusive
influence if
not the
direct
control
of
Prussia ?
Moreover,
Prussia
herself,
the
triumphant
head of
the
new
centralised
North-German
Confederation,
had added
to her
dominions
4,000,000
inhabitants.
The
Emperor Napoleon,
after
the
failure
of
the
Benedetti
negotiations,
made
it
clear
by
parting
with
Drouyn
de
Lhuys (September
1st,
1866),
that he
intended,
at
least
for
the
present,
to
accept
the
Treaty
of
Prague,
and
that,
if
territorial
compensation
was
to
be
sought
for
France,
it
would
not be
looked
for
in
German
territory.
The
alarm which Disraeli
expressed
in a letter
FRANCE
AND LUXEMBURG
n
to
Lord
Stanley
(December 30th,
1866)
as to
the
existence
of secret
French
designs
against
the
independence
of
Belgium
was,
indeed,
well
justified,
as was
proved by
the
subsequent
publication
by
Bismarck
of the
draft
Treaty,
in
Benedetti's
handwriting,
which
provided
for
the
French annexation
of
that
country.
(The
vigilant
anxiety
of
British Ministers
for the
integrity
of
Belgium
during
the
next
four
critical
years
will be considered
later,
in connexion
with the
steps
taken
to secure it
during
the
Franco-Prussian
War.)
The
Emperor Napoleon,
however,
in order to
satisfy
public
opinion,
and
in
particular
the
indignation
of
the
Army,
which
was
intense,
required
some
immediate
and
tangible
territorial
advantage.
In
February,
1867,
he entered
into
negotiations
with
Bismarck
and the
King
of the Netherlands
for the transfer
to
France
of
the
grand-duchy
of
Luxemburg.
This
territory, although
quite
small
in
both
extent
and
population,
offered
considerable
advantages.
Its
strategic
value
was
high:
in
French
hands
it
would
render
extremely
difficult
any
hostile
advance
through
Belgium,
while
facilitating
a
French
advance
down the
valley
of
the
Moselle
towards
Coblenz.
The
Emperor
declared to
Lord
Cowley
that he
required
it
solely
for the
security
of
France,
and not
from
any prompting
of amour
propre.
Further,
the
position
of
the
grand-duchy
after
the
War
was
extremely
anomalous.
Previously
a member
of
the then
dissolved
Germanic
Confederation,
it formed
no
part
of that
Confederation's
North-German
successor;
but its fortress
was still
garrisoned
by
Prussian
troops
under
Treaties
concluded between
Prussia
and Holland
in i8i6and
1856.
Its
Sovereign
was
the
King
of
the
Netherlands;
but
the
grand-duchy
enjoyed
a
separate
existence;
its inhabitants
were believed to
have
French
sympathies,
and
the
King,
who needed
money,
was
supposed
to
be
ready
to
part
with
it
1
. Bismarck
appeared
to entertain
no
objection
to
the
transfer,
provided
that the
bargain
was
kept
secret
until
its
completion.
Lord
Stanley,
when consulted
on the
subject
by
the
French
Ambassador,
replied
that the French
acquisition
seemed
to
him
a
cheap price
for
ensuring
the
Peace
of
Europe
;
and there
seemed
no
reason to
suppose
that
any objections
would be
made
by
Austria
or
Russia,
the
other
guarantors
of
the Treaties
of
1839,
by
which
the
grand-duchy
was
assigned
to the
King
of the Netherlands.
To
the
dismay
of
the British
Government,
the
proposed
transfer,
which
had
1
The
French Ambassador told
Lord
Stanley
that
it was
only
at
the
request
of
the
King
of the
Netherlands that
France had entered into
the
negotiations.
(To
Cowley,
No.
109,
April
ioth,
1867.)
12
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
seemed
a
promising
means
for
preserving peace
between
France
and
Germany,
suddenly
developed
into
an
imminent threat
of war. The
question
was raised
in
the
Reichstag
on
April
1st,
probably
without
the
connivance
of
Bismarck,
who
had
consistently
warned
Benedetti
of
the
dangers
of
premature publicity.
Bismarck
immediately
gave
expression
to
the outburst
of national
feeling
in
Germany,
and
declared
that
the
Emperor
Napoleon's
attitude
had
caused "the
question
to
become one
of
German national
honour;
the
position
of Prussia
in
Germany
is
involved,
and that
is
well
worth
fighting
for
1
."
In
point
of
fact,
neither Bismarck
nor
the
Emperor
desired a war
at this
moment,
and the
acquisition
of
the
grand-duchy
was
no
longer
left
open
to
France,
since the
King
of
the Netherlands
refused
his consent
so soon as he became aware
of
the
state
of German
feeling
on the
subject.
But,
considering
the
relations
between
the two
Governments
and the
feelings
of the two
nations,
it was
exceedingly
difficult to
avoid
war
without
calling
in
the offices
of
a third
party.
Thus, Bismarck,
when
writing
to Bernstorff
and
using
the words
quoted
above,
threw
out a hint that he would
not
object
to see the
question
discussed
by
a
European
congress;
and
the French
Ambassador,
on
April
12th,
appealed
to the
good
offices of
Great
Britain,
while
giving
Lord
Stanley
to understand that the
danger
to France
lay
in
the
occupation
of
the
fortress
by
the Prussian
garrison,
whose withdrawal
might
make
a
friendly arrangement possible
2
.
The
question
was thus reduced
to
the narrow
limit
as
to
whether Prussia
should
or should not maintain
in
the
fortress
a
garrison,
whose
presence,
as Bismarck afterwards
admitted,
was
not,
in
his
opinion,
legally justified, though
it
suited
him
at the
moment
to
maintain that the
Treaty
of 1816 between
Prussia
and
Holland
was a
complete
justification
of
it.
On
April
19th,
Lord
Stanley
telegraphed
to Lord A.
Loftus
:
14
If
the
question
is
really
reduced
to these
limits,
it
is
deserving
the
consideration of
Prussia
whether she
should
not make
so
small a sacrifice
•
since her
hesitation to do so
would
seem to countenance
the
notion
that
she wishes to
keep
Luxemburg
for
aggressive purposes against
France and
so to
justify
the
urgency
of
the
French Government
to obtain
security
in
that
quarter.
France is
understood
only
to seek such
security
without
insisting
on
any
other
point
in
regard
to
Luxemburg
than
that
it
should
not be
used for
hostile
purposes
against
herself.
Speak
in this sense to
Count Bismarck and
ascertain
his
views.
Her
Majesty's
Government
would
1
To
Cowley,
No.
92,
April 5th,
1867,
giving
the
substance communicated
to
Stanley
by
Bernstorff
of a
despatch
from
Bismarck.
2
To
Cowley,
No.
in,
April 12th,
1867.
"Most confidential."
THE
LUXEMBURG
GUARANTEE
13
see with
deep regret
the
breaking
out of
a war
for
an occasion
apparently
so
trifling,
which could
not
but retard the
consolidation
of
Germany."
After another week
of
negotiation, during
which Austria
actively
used her
influence to
preserve
the
peace,
the hesitations
of
Bismarck
were
overcome. He declared
that
Prussia
accepted
a
conference,
at
which
she
could
make concessions to
Europe
and Holland
on behalf
of
peace,
which
she could
not
make to
France,
and on
this
account
could
not
accept any preconcerted
basis
for
the conference.
Lord A.
Loftus,
however,
confidently
stated that
Prussia would
accept
the
neutralisation of
the
grand-duchy
and withdraw her
garrison,
if
the
fortress
were
placed
under
a
European guarantee
1
. On
the
same
day,
he
confirmed
and
expanded
this
acceptance
in
a
telegram
to Bernstorff
in which
he stated that
Prussia was
"prepared
to concede
the
evacua-
tion and
rasing
of
the
fortress,
if
the
Conference
expresses
the wish
that she should do
so,
and at the same time
gives
a
European guarantee
for
the
neutrality
of
Luxemburg,
such as now exists
in
the
case of
Belgium."
Such a
declaration
removed
all serious obstacles to the
meeting
of
a conference. But
Lord
Stanley
was
extremely uneasy
at
the
thought
of
"
giving
any
fresh
guarantee
in the actual state
of
public
opinion
which
prevails
in
this
country
2
." The
existing
responsibilities
of
Great
Britain with
regard
to
Belgium
had
already
aroused his
apprehension,
and he
had
written to
Disraeli :
"I am
ready
to
go
as far as
may
be
necessary
in
support
of
Belgium,
short
of
giving
an
absolute
pledge
to
fight
for its
independence.
Suppose
we
gave
such
a
pledge,
that France
and Prussia
came to
an
understanding,
Russia
and
Austria
standing
aloof,
where should we
be?
3
"
He,
accordingly, suggested
as a basis
for
the
proposed
treaty
that,
as
Luxemburg
was
already guaranteed
to the
King
of
the
Netherlands
by
the
Treaties
of
1839,
ne should
engage
not to alienate
it without
the
consent
of
all
the
Powers
4
. When this
proposal proved generally
unacceptable,
he
suggested
that
Luxemburg
might
be declared
neutral,
without
being
the
subject
of a
special guarantee.
It
was,
however,
evident that Bismarck would
not consent
to a
conference,
unless
the
neutrality
of
Luxemburg
w
r
ere
guaranteed
by
all the Powers.
Lord
Stanley
was
therefore
compelled
to abandon
his
objections.
The
Conference
met
on
May
7th
in
London,
and
was
attended
by
Pleni-
potentiaries
from all
the Powers
who
had
signed
the Treaties
of
1839,
1
From
Loftus,
No.
181,
April 27th, 1867.
2
To
Cowley,
No.
189,
April
27th,
1867.
3
Buckle,
Life of
B.
Disraeli,
Earl
of
Beacons
field,
iv.
471.
4
To
Cowley,
No.
227, May 3rd,
1867.
i
4
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
and
from
Italy,
who thus
received
that formal
recognition
of her status
as
one of
the
Great
Powers
to
which
Cavour
had looked
forward as
the
logical
sequel
to
the
appearance
of
the
Piedmontese
Representa-
tives
in
Paris
in
1856.
It
was
agreed
that the
Prussian
garrison
should
be withdrawn
from
the fortress
of
Luxemburg,
which
was
to be
demolished.
The
grand-duchy
itself
was
declared to be
a
perpetually
neutral
State,
and
its
neutrality
was
placed
"under
the sanction
of
the
collective
guarantee
of
the
Powers
signing
the
present
Treaty,
with
the
exception
of
Belgium,
which is itself
a
neutral
State"
(Article
II,
Treaty
of
London).
Moreover,
Luxemburg,
unlike
Belgium,
was
placed
under
no
obligation
to
defend
her
neutrality,
and
was indeed
prevented
from
doing
so,
since
by
Article
III
the
King
of
the
Nether-
lands as
Grand-duke
undertook to maintain
no
fortresses within the
territory,
and
only
so
many
troops
as
were
necessary
for the
preserva-
tion
of order.
In
view
of
the
demand made
by
Bismarck
that the
conference
should
give
"a
European
guarantee
for
the
neutrality
of
Luxemburg
such
as
now
exists
in
the case
of
Belgium,"
it
is
important
to
ascertain
what
obligations
British
statesmen,
then
and
subsequently,
considered
themselves to
be
assuming.
Lord
Stanley
told
the
House
of Commons that
he had assented
to this
provision
with
more
doubt
and
anxiety
than
he
had ever
felt
on
any
public
question,
but asserted
that
the
guarantee
involved
only
a
"
limited
liability";
while Lord
Derby amplified
his
son's
language
in
the House
of Lords
(July 4th,
1867) by emphasising
the difference between a
collective
and a
separate
and several
guarantee
:
U
A several
guarantee
binds
each
of the
parties
to
do
its utmost in-
dividually
to enforce
the
observance
of the
guarantee.
A
collective
guarantee
is one which
is
binding
on
all
the
parties collectively;
but
which,
if
any
difference of
opinion
should
arise,
no
one
of them
can
be
called
upon
to
take
upon
itself
the task
of
vindicating
by
force of
arms."
A collective
guarantee,
thus
interpreted, implies
no
more
than
an
engagement by
each
of
the
Signatory
Powers to
respect
the
neutrality
of a State
so
guaranteed,
with
the
liberty,
but
not
the
obligation,
to
regard
any
violation
as a casus
belli;
the
British
Government had
therefore,
in
reality, pledged
itself no further than it would
have
done
by
Lord
Stanley's
first
suggestion,
which
not
only
Prussia
but the
other
Powers
represented
at the
Conference
had
declared
insufficient.
Lord
Derby
proceeded
to
point
out that
the Treaties of
1839,
on
the
other
hand,
provided
Belgium
with a
separate
guarantee
from
each
of
the
five
Signatory
Powers,
and
that
Prussia
must
have
been well