Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE OUTBREAK
OF WAR
35
any
of the
reigning
Houses
of
the Great Powers
from
accepting
a
foreign
Throne,
without the
preliminary
assent
of
all. The
two
further
Councils
held
on
the
evening
of
the
14th
and
morning
of
the
15th,
influenced
partly by
the
furious
excitement shown in
the Press
and
in
the
streets,
partly
by
a
despatch
from
Vienna,
which
suggested
that
Bavaria would remain
neutral,
hesitated
no
longer,
but decided to
demand
from
the Chamber
a
vote
of
credit for
50,000,000
francs,
which was
justified by
a
statement
amounting
—
as
Ollivier
admits
—
to
a
declaration
of war.
After
recounting
the
course of
Benedetti's
negotiations,
it asserted that the
King's
refusal
to
give
the
required
guarantees,
although
regrettable,
had
not led
to
a
rupture
of
negotia-
tions;
but
that his refusal
to
see
the
Ambassador,
which had
been
officially
communicated to
foreign
Governments,
rendered
further
attempts
at
conciliation
undignified
and
imprudent.
Granville
made a
last
desperate appeal
to
the two
Governments,
in
accordance
with the
Paris
Protocol
of
1856,
to
have
recourse
to the
good
offices of
some
friendly
Power
acceptable
to
both
before
proceeding
to
extremities;
but
it met with
no
more success than
Lord
Clarendon's
similar
effort
in
1866.
War was
formally
declared
by
the French
on
July
19th.
Great
Britain
entered into
a
difficult
and much
resented
neutrality.
It has been
maintained
by
both Bismarck
and
Ollivier
that
Great
Britain
might
have
prevented
the War.
The
former
said to
Lord A.
Loftus :
"
Great Britain
should have
forbidden
France
to enter on war.
She
was in
a
position
to do
so,
and
her
interests and
those of
Europe
demanded
it."
No
importance
can
be
attached
to this
charge,
when
it is
remembered
that Bismarck has
himself
admitted in his
Recollec-
tions
his
intense desire for
the War
;
besides
indicating
in a
moment
of
frankness
that
Clarendon was
the
only
man
whose
influence over
the
Emperor
Napoleon
could
have
averted
it. Ollivier
based
his
belief
on
different
grounds.
He
wrote
that
The
English
Cabinet
did not realise
the
decisive
influence
which it
could
exert;
in
short,
it
could,
if it had so
desired,
have
prevented
the
War. It
had
only
to
say:
'An
international rule
which
we
created in
the
case
of
Belgium
and
bowed to
in the case
of
Greece,
forbids
every
Great Power
to
place
one
of its
members on a
foreign
throne,
without
the
consent of
Europe.
We
consider
that under the
present
circumstances
which
threaten
the
peace
of
the
world,
a
Conference
should
assemble to
examine the
validity
of
this
rule and
to decide in
what
way
it is to
be
applied
to the
case
of
the
candidature to
the
Spanish
Crown
1
.'
Such
a
proposal,
he
believed, which,
coming
from
France,
would
have
1
U
Empire Liberal,
xv.
156.
3—2
36
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
met with the refusal
of
Prussia,
would
have
met
with
success
if
made
by
Great
Britain.
Ollivier,
however,
assumes the
very point
at
issue.
If
the
British
Government
had
recognised
the
existence
of such a
rule,
the
procedure
which he recommended
might
have been
appropriate
;
but
both
Gladstone and
Lord Granville
made
it
perfectly
clear
through-
out
the
negotiations
that
they
did
not claim
to interfere
in
any
way
with the free exercise
of
the
right
of
national
self-determination
by
either
Spain
or
Prussia
;
if
they
recommended the
withdrawal
of Prince
Leopold's
candidature,
it
was
simply
because such a
candidature
was
at the
moment
injudicious,
not because it offended
against
international
law.
The cases
of
Belgium
and
Greece,
which Ollivier cites as
pre-
cedents,
are
hardly
even
analogies.
Each
of
these countries
had
been
erected
into
an
independent
State
by
the Great
Powers;
each
was
subjected
to
a
special
regime,
Belgium being
neutralised
under
the
guarantee
of
the
five
Great
Powers,
and Greece
being guaranteed
as
a
Constitutional
monarchy by
Great
Britain,
France and Russia.
It
is
no
doubt
true that
every
Power has
always
held
itself
absolutely
free
to
object
to
any
dynastic
change
in
the
case of
another,
and
if
necessary
to
push
this
objection
to the
point
of war
;
but
such an
action
would
be taken
in
the
interests
of
the Power
concerned, or,
if in
the
interests
of
Europe,
in
order
to
secure
the
Balance of
Power,
not in order
to
preserve
international
law from
violation.
Further,
the
candidature
was not itself
the cause of
war,
for
the candidature
had been
with-
drawn.
If,
at the
suggested congress,
France
had
put
forward
the
further demand
for
guarantees,
it
would
certainly
have been
refused
by
Prussia,
and
the
negotiations
would have
been
left
at
precisely
the
same
stage
as
they
had
actually
reached
on
July
12th.
Nor,
finally,
is
there
any justification
for
the
allegation
afterwards
made
by
Disraeli
that the
British
remonstrances
had
been
lacking
in
energy.
If
Ollivier
had been
in real
instead
of
nominal
control,
war would
not have
broken
out;
but
the
Emperor
and
Gramont
changed
their
policy
without
Ollivier
's
knowledge,
and
they
obstinately
persisted
in
their
provocative
action
in
spite
of
Granville's
most
urgent
warning,
delivered
at the
Council
Table
in
the middle
of
their deliberations. It is
useless
to
speculate
whether Clarendon
would have been more
successful,
for
his
personal
influence over
the
Emperor
had
died with him.
The
Cabinet could
not have
exerted
stronger
pressure
on
France
except
by uniting
with the
other
Powers in a collective
protest;
but
such a
united action
was
as
impossible
in
the
existing diplomatic
grouping
of
Europe
as was
any
collective
mediation to enforce
peace
during
BELGIAN
NEUTRALITY
37
the
course
of
the
War
itself.
The
only
other
alternative
—
that
of
declaring
that,
if
France
engaged
in
an
unjustifiable
war,
Great
Britain
would
range
herself
as
a
belligerent
on the
side of
Prussia
—would
not
have met
with the
support
of
any
section
of
public
opinion.
The first and
most
important
problem
which confronted
the
British
Cabinet
was that
of
the
neutrality
of
Belgium.
The
independence
and
integrity
of
that
country
had been
an almost
uninterrupted
source
of
anxiety
during
the
four
preceding
years.
At the time
of
the
Austro-
Prussian
War
the
Belgian
Minister
had
expressed
his
anxiety
to
Lord
Stanley
1
.
He
said that
the
country
was
prosperous
and contented
under a
popular
King,
and that
no French
party
existed
;
but that
his
Government
had been
urged
more than
once to
obtain
some confirma-
tion or fresh
sanction
for
the
guarantees
of
1839.
This
was not
his
own
opinion,
since
he
thought
that
no fresh
Treaty
could
strengthen
the
obligation
under
which the
Powers
already
lay
;
but he admitted
that
Belgium
had been
alarmed
by
a statement
made
by
a
personage
of
importance
—
not
connected
with the
British
Government
—
that
Great Britain
would stand
aloof,
if
Belgium
was attacked.
Lord
Stanley
agreed
that the
existing guarantees
could not
be
strengthened by
a
new
Treaty,
and
said
that
the
greatest
danger
to
Belgium
would
be
the
existence
of
a
strong party
hostile
to its
independent
nationality
within the
country
itself;
inasmuch
as there
would
always
be
in
England
a
strong feeling
against
a
rupture
with
France,
any
such
division
of
opinion
in
Belgium
might
plausibly
be adduced
as an
argument
that
the
existing guarantees
should
not
be
held
applicable.
The
Belgian
Minister
asked
if
the
British
Government
would let
Napoleon
know
that
an
attack
on
Belgium
would
eventually
bring
about a
rupture
with
France
;
to
which
Lord
Stanley
replied
that
he
believed that
Lord
Clarendon
had
already given
such an assurance
and
that
"
the
views of
the
present
and late Government
were
on
that
point
the same."
Lord
Cowley
took the
opportunity
on
August
10th
of
emphasising
these
views
to
Drouyn
de
Lhuys,
who,
in a conversation
about
French
"compensations"
had
cynically
remarked that
"as
far
as
he was aware
no
sacrifice
would be asked
from
Belgium."
On the
14th, Drouyn
de
Lhuys
enclosed
a
letter,
written
by
the
Emperor's
order,
in
which he
disavowed all
intention
of
demanding
from
Belgium
the
frontiers
of
1814
2
.
Only
two
days
later,
Rouher sent
Instructions
1
To Lord
Cowley, p.
57, July
20th,
1866.
2
From Lord
Cowley,
No.
166, August
14th,
1866:
"
Mon cher
Ambassadeur,
L'Empereur
me
charge
de vous icrire
que,
si
vous
venez a
Paris il vous
verra
avec
plaisir,
que
cependant
il croit inutile
que
vous
vous
derangiez
si voire
visite
n'a
pour
but
que
38
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
to
Benedetti
to
obtain
Bismarck's
consent
to the
annexation
of
Belgium
;
and
he
fulfilled these
Instructions
by
drawing
up
and
leaving
with
Bismarck
the
draft
of a
Treaty
by
which
France
was to
assent to a
federal
union between
north-
and
south-
Germany
in
return
for
Prussian
military
assistance
"in case
His
Majesty
the
Emperor
of the
French should
be
obliged by
circumstances
to cause his
troops
to
enter
Belgium
and
to
conquer
it."
This
transaction remained unknown to
the British
Government,
though
Disraeli
suspected
its existence.
In
April, 1867,
Beust
had
proposed
as a solution
of
the
Luxemburg
Question
that
Belgium
should
receive the
grand-duchy
and
cede
to
France
the frontiers
of 18
14
—
a
proposal
which
Belgium
had,
with
British
support,
resisted.
These continual
suggestions among
the
Great
Powers
for
trafficking
in
Belgian
territory
caused
keen alarm
to
Queen
Victoria;
especially
as Lord
Stanley
was inclined to minimise the
extent
of
British
respon-
sibilities.
She
impressed upon
Disraeli
that
:
"
Prussia isn't
likely
to
violate
either the
neutrality
of
Luxemburg
or the
independence
of
Belgium
—
indeed,
she has
no
interest
to do so
—
unless
she sees
reason to believe that
England
means her
guarantee
of both these
objects
to remain a dead
letter;
in
which case she
might
think
it
to
her
interest to come to
an
agreement
with
France,
fatal to the
independence
of
the rest of
Europe."
It
was
hardly possible
even
for
the
Emperor Napoleon
to
renew
negotiations
with Bismarck for
compensations
after the
humiliating
failure to obtain
Luxemburg
1
. Lord
Stanley
had
shrewdly
penetrated
the
intentions
of
the
Emperor,
when he
spoke
of
the
danger
of
the
formation
of
a
French
party
within the
country
itself;
for
the
imperial
policy
was
now
one
of
peaceful penetration,
politically
and above
all
economically.
The
inspired
French
Press
had,
in
1868,
again
raised
the often discussed
problem
of a
Franco-Belgian
customs
union,
but
at the end
of
the
year
a serious
practical
question
arose
between the
two countries. The French
Eastern
Railway Company
had
already
made
an
arrangement
which
gave
it the
right
of
exploiting
the
de
lui
demander
s'il
compte revendiquer
la
partie
des
frontier
es de
1814 qui appartient
aujourd'hui
a la
Belgique; que
je
puis
vous rassurer
completement
a cet
egard que
les
forteresses
de
Philippeville
et de
Marienbourg,
appartenant
a un etat
neutre,
ne menacent
plus
nos
frontieres,
et
que, quant
aux
autres
parties
de territoire
qui
ne sont
pas
a la
Belgique,
ce
n'est ni
par
intimidation ni
par
violence
qu'il
desire
une
ratification
(sic)
de
frontieres,
mais
par
une entente
amicale avec les
parties
interessees. Voild
textuelement
ce
que fai
pour
instructions de vous
dire..
.
.Drouyn
de
Lhuys."
1
There
is no
doubt that Bismarck was
intentionally
inaccurate in
giving
the
summer
of
1867
as the date of
the
Draft
Treaty
in his
telegram
to Bernstorff of
July
28th,
1870.
THE
BELGIAN RAILWAYS
QUESTION
39
Guillaume-Luxemburg
line,
which
served
the
grand-duchy.
The
Eastern
Company
further entered
into secret
negotiations
for
acquiring
the
two
adjacent Belgian railways.
Such an
amalgamation
was
highly
objectionable
to
Belgium,
as
the
Eastern
Company
had behind
it
a
French
State
guarantee,
and would be able
to
control the
most
im-
portant
industrial
region
in
Belgium
round
Liege.
The
Belgian
Government
therefore
passed (February
23rd, 1869)
a law
forbidding
the
transfer
of
any
Belgian railway
without the authorisation
of the
Government.
The
Emperor
chose to
regard
this action
as a
proof
of
hostility
towards
France,
concerted with
Prussia,
and
entertained
serious
thoughts
of war
1
. He
had
hoped
that this
project
of
railway
amalgamation
would lead
to a close
union between
the
two countries
;
hinting through
his
agent,
La
Guerroniere,
who had
been
appointed
French Minister at
Brussels,
that since
1866 former Treaties
had no
more
than
an "ideal
value,"
and
that
Belgium
must henceforward
"lean towards France."
Gladstone and
Bright
were believed to be
firm
partisans
of
non-intervention,
while the
Alabama
question
seemed
likely
to embroil Great
Britain with the United States.
The use
of
such
language naturally
confirmed the
Belgian
Government
in
the
conviction
that,
under the
guise
of
a commercial
transaction,
an attack
was
being
made on the
neutrality
of
the
country.
Queen
Victoria,
always
in-
tensely preoccupied
with
Belgium,
had
urged
Clarendon
(January
14th)
to make it
known
that
any
proceedings
which
seemed to
threaten
Belgian
independence
or
neutrality
"would
bring England
at once into
the
field."
Gladstone
agreed
that
"
the
independence
of
Belgium
was
an
object
of the
first interest to the
mind of
the British
people,"
and
hoped
that it
would be
made clear
to
France that
"
the
suspicion
even
of an
intention on the
part
of
France
to
pay
less
respect
to the
inde-
pendence
of
Belgium
than
to the
independence
of
England
would at
once
produce
a
temper
in
the
country
which
would
put
an
end to the
good
understanding
and useful and
harmonious
cooperation
of
the
two
governments."
But
Clarendon was
able
by friendly pressure
to
induce
the
parties
to
agree
(March
21st)
on
examining
the whole
economic
relations
between
the
two countries
by
a Franco-
Belgian
Commission.
Frere-Orban,
the
Belgian
Prime-Minister,
repaired
to
Paris
to
carry through
these
negotiations,
which
proved very
thorny,
as
the
Emperor
seemed determined to
press
his
original
demands.
Clarendon,
throughout,
urged Belgium
to come to
an
agreement
with
1
See his
letter to Marshal
Niel,
February
19th,
1869, quoted
in
Ollivier,
V
Empire
Liberal,
xi.
375.
4
o
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
France,
provided
that this
did
not involve
the
transfer
of
the
railways,
which would
prevent
Belgium
from
remaining
its
own
master
1
. He
deprecated
the
Belgian proposal
to
call
upon
the
guarantors
of
1839
to
decide the
question,
except
as
a
last
extremity,
in
the
event
of a
definite
rupture
of
negotiations.
On the
other
hand,
he warned
the
French
Ambassador
in
unmistakable terms
(April
22nd)
that,
if
Frere-
Orban
quitted
Paris without an
arrangement
having
been
reached,
the
results
might prove
more
serious to
the
Emperor
than
to
Belgium.
The
incident
finally
terminated
in
a Protocol
signed
on
April 27th,
which
provided
for
the
appointment
of
the
Commission
agreed
upon,
and
definitely rejected
the
projects
of
the Eastern
Company.
Bismarck
afterwards claimed
to
Lord A.
Loftus
that,
"
although
there had
been
no
direct
understanding
with
England,
it
was
felt
and
known
at
Paris
that
Prussia
would have
supported
England,
if
action
had
been
taken.
It
was this
knowledge
that warded
off
action,
and
Belgium
was
saved."
This
statement was
misleading,
since
Napoleon
was
prepared
to
face
Prussian
hostility
in
the
matter,
under
the
impression
that
such a
casus belli
would
not unite German sentiment. It
is true
that
Bismarck
had made
it
clear
that
Prussia would
join
with
Great Britain
;
but it
was
British,
not
Prussian,
action
which exercised the decisive influence
over
the
Emperor.
IV,
The Franco-German War and the
Conference
of
London,
1871
At the
outbreak of war in
1870,
both
France and
Germany
ex-
pressed
their
intention
of
respecting
Belgian neutrality.
But the
publication by
Bismarck,
on
July 25th,
of
the
Benedetti
Treaty
considerably
diminished
the
value
of
their
assurances,
and
produced
a
strong feeling
that
Great
Britain
should
take immediate
steps
to
secure the
enforcement
of
the
guarantee.
Since each
of
the
belligerents
hastened to
lay
on
the other the blame
for a
document
which,
as each
declared,
embodied the
policy
of his
adversary,
it
was
easy
to obtain
from both
a
further
pledge
for
Belgium's security.
Gladstone differed
from the view
expressed
by
Lord
Stanley
in
1867,
that
no
new
Treaty
could
strengthen
the
existing guarantees.
"
The sole or
single-handed
defence
of
Belgium,"
he
wrote on
August
4th
to
Bright,
"
would be
1
The
result
of the Eastern
Company's
control
of the
Luxemburg
lines was
clearly
shown
in
1870,
when the
Luxemburg
Government
excused
unneutral
pro-
ceedings
which
had taken
place
on their
territory
by disclaiming
all
responsibility
for
a
railway
directed
solely by
a
foreign
Company,
whose
employes
were
also
foreigners.
(Despatch
of
Servais,
Ministre
d'fitat
of
the
grand-duchy,
to
Bismarck,
December
14th, 1870.)
THE
"LEAGUE
OF
NEUTRALS"
41
an
enterprise
which we
incline
to think
Quixotic
;
if these two
great
military
Powers
combined
against
it
—
that
combination
is the
only
serious
danger
;
and
this
it
is which
by
our
proposed
engagements
we
should
I
hope
render
improbable
to the
very
last
degree."
Accordingly,
Treaties were
signed (August
9th)
with
both
belligerents,
each
ofwhom
undertook
to
join
Great
Britain
in
defence
of
Belgian neutrality
against
the
other;
Great Britain
not
engaging
to take
part
in
any general
operations
of
the
War
beyond
the
limits
of
Belgium.
These
Treaties
were
to
remain
in
force
for one
year
after the
conclusion of
peace.
During August,
the
British
Government
took the
leading part
in
forming
what
the
French
incorrectly
called the
League
of
Neutrals.
Its
genesis
and
scope
can
be
best
described
in
the
language
used
by
Granville
to
Lyons
1
:
"
M.
de Lavalette informed
me
to-day
that
the
French
Government
had
reason to
suppose
that
Prince GortchakofF
had
informed the
Russian
Charge
d'affaires in Paris that
England
had
agreed
with
Italy
that neither
party
should abandon its
neutrality
without
announcing
its
determination
to the
other,
and
that the
British Government
proposed
similar
arrange-
ments
should be
made
between the
Great
neutral
Powers
and those of the
second
order."
The
Emperor
of
Russia,
the
telegram
went
on to
say,
had
given
his
complete
adhesion
to the
proposal.
"
M.
de
Lavalette
asked mewhether
the fact
stated
by
Prince
GortchakofT
was
true
—
what was the nature of the
engagement
referred
to,
whether
it
was
made and
whether it was
proposed
afterwards
to
make it
general.
I
replied
that the statement was
substantially
true
—
that the nature
of
the
engagement
was what it
purported
to be
—
that there
was
to
be
no
treaty
nor
protocol,
but
merely
an
interchange
of
despatches,
which
however had
not
yet
taken
place,
and it was
under consideration
to make
such an
arrangement
general.
The
proposal
arose
as
follows.
Several
Powers,
I
said,
since the
beginning
of the
war,
have
proposed
that
a
com-
bined
neutrality
should be
made
of
all the neutral Powers.
His
Majesty's
Government have
always
objected
to
any
formal
compact,
although pro-
fessing
their
desire to
exchange
freely
ideas which
would
tend to circum-
scribe
the war
or
which would lead
to
any prospect
of
peace.
The Italian
Government last week informed
me that it was still
desirous
of
maintaining neutrality,
but
that
pressure
was
applied
to
it from
more
quarters
than
one,
which made it difficult for it to
do
so;
and it
applied
to
Her
Majesty's
Government to
give
it some
assistance.
I
replied
that
I
still
objected
to
any
formal
engagement
;
but
that,
if it
would
be of
any
use
to
the
Italian
Government to
interchange
an assurance that
Great
Britain
and
Italy
would
not
depart
from their
neutrality
without
announcing
to
each
other
their
intention,
I
was
ready
to do
so.
1
To
Lord
Lyons,
No.
242,
August
18th,
1870.
42
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
I told
M.
de
Lavalette
further that I
have informed
the
Russian
Government
of
what
had
passed
. .
. and
have asked it whether
some
such
arrangements
between
neutral Governments
might
not be
useful
to
the
lesser
Governments
who
desired to maintain
their
neutrality,
and that
the
Russian
Government
had
assented.
..."
Such a
proposal
was
in
fact
addressed
to
all
the
European
States,
and met
with
general
assent.
Austria, indeed,
wished to
widen the
scope
of the
understanding by
an
agreement
between neutrals
not to
take
isolated
steps
towards
mediation;
as
she was
determined
not to
move on her own
single
initiative,
owing
to
the belief that
Prussia
would
not
accept
her
mediation
as
impartial,
and
to
her fear
of
Russia.
She
finally,
however,
agreed
to
the British
proposal
on
September 9th.
Granville himself was
firm
in his
intention
to take
part
in
no
mediation
either collective
or
individual,
unless it seemed to offer
a
solid
hope
of
success.
He
refused,
on
August
17th,
an
appeal
by
Italy,
who,
alarmed
at
the
rapid
successions
of German
victories,
offered to
agree
beforehand to
any
conditions
which
Great Britain
might
propose
to
maintain the
integrity
of
France.
Nor was he
shaken,
when the
Provisional
Government,
which
had
risen to
power
on
the
ruins
of
the
empire
(September
4th)
sent over
Thiers,
who
visited
all
the
neutral
Great
Courts
in
succession,
to
implore
mediation
with
all
the
impetuous
eloquence
for
which
he was
famed. He
urged,
in three successive
interviews
(September I3th-i6th),every argument
which
might
induce
Great
Britain
to
help
a
country
which had
overthrown the
responsible
authors
of
its defeat.
"
It was
not,"
he
said,
"
for the interest
of
England
that
a dishonourable
peace
should
be
patched up
which would leave
France
weak
and
irritable,
unable
to assist
England,
but
ready
for
every
occasion
for
recovering
her lost
prestige
"
;
while
again
he
urged
the
warning
that
"there was
nothing
that North
Germany,
with
a
population
of
60
millions,
could
not
do,
acting
as a machine
and led
by
such a man as
Count
Bismarck."
Granville
replied,
very
coldly,
that
We
had done all in our
power
to obtain
peace;
we went
beyond
what
we
had
a
right
to
do in
urging
Spain
to abandon a candidate
whom she
had a
right fully
to
choose. We succeeded in
removing
the
ground
of
quarrel.
But the French
Government
had not been
satisfied, and,
leaving
us
on one
side,
had hastened to
declare hostilities.
From the
first,
we told
all who
pressed
us that it was
not our intention
to offer
ourselves
as
mediators,
unless
we
had
reason
to
believe that mediation would
be
acceptable
to both
parties,
and
that
there
seemed to be a basis on which
both
belligerents
would
agree
to
negotiate;
but that
by
all we could
learn
such
a
state of
things
had not
arisen.
ALSACE-LORRAINE
43
He told
Thiers,
further,
that he believed
it
would
be
much
easier
for the
King
and Bismarck
to
agree
to conditions
which
the
army
and
Germany
might
not consider
to be
ample,
if
the
concession
was
made
spontaneously
and not
upon
the advice
of a
neutral,
who
had taken
no
part
in the
difficulties
of the
war.
Granville
was, moreover,
of
opinion,
as he
afterwards told
the
Pro-
visional
Government,
that their
refusal to
cede "an inch of their
soil
or
a
stone
of
their fortresses
"
was an obstacle
in
the
way
of
peace.
Acting
on this
belief
he,
after
a
protracted struggle
in
the
Cabinet,
defeated
Gladstone's
"effort to
speak
with the
other
neutral
Powers
against
the transfer
of
Alsace
and
Lorraine
without
reference to
the
populations
1
."
Gladstone
continued
to
press
his views with
the
greatest
persistency;
the
matter,
he
contended,
"involves
considera-
tions
of
legitimate
interest to
all
the
Powers
of
Europe.
It
appears
to
bear
on
the
Belgian
question
in
particular.
It
is also a
principle
likely
to
be
of
great
consequence
in the eventual settlement
of
the
Eastern
question."
In
any
case,
whether mediation
were
practicable
or
not,
he
declared
that,
if
no voice were
previously
raised
against
an enforced
transfer,
"it
will in
my
opinion
be a
standing
reproach
to
England,"
and
finally prophesied
to
Lord
Granville
(December
20th,
1870)
that
he
feared
"this
violent laceration
and
transfer
is
to
lead us
from
bad
to
worse,
and
to
be
the
beginning
of
a
new series
of
European
com-
plications."
But
no
British
protest
was made
against
the
cession,
notwithstanding
the
unanimous and
touching
declaration
of
the
Deputies
from
Alsace-Lorraine
in
the National
Assembly
at Bordeaux
(February
1
6th,
1
871).
Gladstone's
forebodings
have been
fulfilled to the
letter,
for,
in the words
of
President
Wilson
2
: "The
wrong
done to
France
by
Prussia
in
1
871,
in
the matter
of Alsace-Lorraine. . .unsettled
the
peace
of
the
world for
nearly fifty years."
It was not
because
the
remainder
of
the Cabinet
approved
of Bismarck's
intentions that
they
prevented
the
action
desired
by
Gladstone
;
but because
they
believed
that
any
protest
would
by
its
futility
simply
exacerbate
the conflict.
Armed
mediation,
in
which Russia would
not
have
joined,
they
believed
—
and
probably
with
justice
—
would have
created
great
danger
of
a
universal
European
conflagration.
It
is
possible,
however,
that
British
remonstrances
might
have had
some effect
on
Prussia
after
the
denunciation of
the Black Sea Clauses
by
Russia;
as Odo
Russell's
negotiations
with Bismarck
showed
him
to
be at
that time
desperately
1
Entry
in
Gladstone's
Diary, September 30th, 1870,
quoted
by
Morley, Life
of
Gladstone,
n.
346.
2
Point
viii.
44
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
anxious
to
prevent
the extension
of the
War.
The French themselves
were
to
blame
for
losing
the
last
opportunity
of
putting
their
case
before
the
representatives
of
Europe
by omitting
to
send
a
Plenipo-
tentiary
to
the
London
Conference,
until after the
Preliminaries
of
Peace
had
been
signed.
For Granville
had
let it be
known,
in
spite
of
Bismarck's
opposition,
that,
when he
presided
over
the
Conference,
"
if at the end
of the Conference
or even after one of its
sittings
the
French
Plenipotentiaries
should wish to
take
advantage
of the
presence
of
the
Plenipotentiaries
to
bring
any
subject
before
them,
in that case
it would
not be
my duty
to
interfere.. . .1
cannot concur
in
Prince
Bismarck's
view,
if
it be his
view,
that the
Conference
remains a Conference
after it
has been
adjourned
or
closed.
No
special
character
attaches
to the
place
where
it
may
be
held.
The
Conference ceases
as soon as it is
formally adjourned
or
closed.
Every Plenipotentiary
is
freed
from
any
restriction
which
may
have
been
imposed
. . .
and is at
liberty
to address
any
one
or more of those
who
may
still remain or are
willing
to listen
1
.'
'
The aim of
Granville was
simply
to remain
impartial throughout
the
struggle
;
and,
as
is
inevitable when
the most violent
passions
are
aroused,
he was
exposed
to the
continual
reproaches
of
both
parties.
His
reply
to BernstorfFs remonstrance
against
the
unrestricted
export
of coal and
warlike
stores to France
explains
his
attitude
in a few words.
"It seems
hardly
to admit
of
doubt
that
neutrality,
when it
once
departs
from
strict
impartiality,
runs
the
risk of
altering
its
essence,
and
that,
the
moment a neutral allows
his
proceedings
to be biassed
by predilection
for
one
of
the
two
belligerents,
he ceases
to
be a
neutral."
In
pursuance
of
this
view,
he was
always ready
to
facilitate
meetings
between
Representatives
of
the two
belligerents
to
discuss
an
armistice;
but,
except
in
one
instance,
he
resolutely
refused to
express
any
opinion
on
the
conditions
of
peace.
The reduction
of
the
indemnity
demanded
from
France
from six
to
five
milliards of francs
was,
partly
at
least,
due
to the
representations
of
the British
Govern-
ment.
The
neutrality
to
which
Russia
had committed
herself had a
very
different
object
in
view
from
that
sought
by
Granville.
Germany
had
been
able
to embark on
the War
in
the
confident
expectation
that
Austria
would
be
mobilised
because of her fear
of
a
Russian
attack,
if
she threw
in
her
lot with
France.
Lord A. Loftus
had
been
fully
justified
when
he
expressed
his
confidence
that
Bismarck had no fear
of
the
Russian
policy
towards
Prussia,
so
long
as
the
Tsar lived and
Gortchakoff
remained
Minister
(March
12th,
1870).
But
Russia's
1
To
Odo
Russell,
No.
iii,
February
25th, 1871.