Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE
GORTCHAKOFF CIRCULAR
45
friendly
attitude
was
not
inspired
by
a
disinterested
desire to
promote
the
Union of
Germany.
The
Tsar had
felt
bitterly
the humiliation
imposed
on
his
country
by
the clauses of
the
Treaty
of
Paris which
provided
for
the neutralisation of
the
Black
Sea,
and he
constantly
expressed
the
view
that their
existence
"was a
blot
on
his
reign."
Indeed,
such a
limitation
of
the free exercise
of
sovereignty by
a
Great
Power
did
not
carry
with it the
promise
of
permanence.
Lord Pal-
merston,
its
principal
author,
used,
with
extraordinary levity,
to
tell
Russian
statesmen when
they objected
that the
provisions
could
not
last,
that
they
would
"last ten
years
1
."
Whenever
any
question
arose
in the Near
East
which
required
the collective action of
the
Powers,
the
Foreign
Office was
preoccupied
with the
fear
that
Russia
would
demand the
revision
of
the
Treaty
of Paris. It was
certain that Prussia
attached no
importance
to the Black
Sea
Clauses which Bismarck
afterwards described
as
"politically
absurd,
and
therefore
in
the
long
run
impossible."
So
early
as
August,
1866,
Lord
Cowley
reported
that the
French Ambassador at
Petrograd
appeared
to think
that Prince
Gortchakoff
has
profited by
the
opportunity
to
express
the
expectation
of the Russian Government that
if
they
are
silent in
the
subject
of the territorial
acquisitions
now
made
by
Prussia,
they may
count on
the
goodwill
of Prussia in
obtaining
a modification
of
the
Treaty
of
1856,
whenever
a
favourable
occasion
may present
itself.
Baron
Talleyrand
even hints that
a
secret
treaty
may
have been
signed
to
that
effect
2
.
It
is
improbable
that,
either
then or
subsequently,
any
such formal
compact
was
made between
the two
Powers
;
but
Bismarck has
himself
stated
that he took
the initiative
in
1870
in
sounding
Gortchakoff and
promising
him
the
support
of Prussia
3
.
The Russian
action, however,
did
not
take
the
form,
which
respect
for
international law would
have
dictated,
of
demanding
from
the
co-
signatories
of
the
Treaty
of Paris the desired
modification. Certain
1
See
Granville's
speech
in
the
House
of
Lords,
February 14th, 1871
:
"
General
Ignatieff
told
me
that he remarked
to Lord
Palmerston,
'These are
stipulations
which
you
cannot
expect
will
last
long,'
and
Lord Palmerston
replied,
'They
will
last
ten
years' ;
and his
despatch
to Sir A.
Buchanan,
British Ambassador at Petro-
grad,
No.
303,
November
13th, 1870.
Confidential." Baron
Brunnow
said in
conversation:
"He had warned Lord Palmerston
that it
could
not
last,
and Lord
Palmerston
said
it
would
last ten
years."
For
what
follows
cf.
Correspondence respecting
the
Repudiation
by
Russia
of
the
Obligations
of
the
Treaty
of
March
30th,
1856.
Private. Printed
for
the
use
of
the
Foreign
Office.
(A
copy
of these is
preserved
among
the
papers
of Sir A.
Buchanan.)
2
Lord
Cowley,
No.
191,
Confidential,
August
21st,
1866.
3
Bismarck's
Reflections
and
Reminiscences
(English
Translation),
11.
114.
46
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
Russian
military
preparations
which had
been
noticed
during
October,
1870,
made the
Turks
fear that some
violent
coup
might
be
imminent;
they
were
inclined,
however,
to believe
that the Russian
intention was
to
occupy
that
portion
of
Bessarabia,
the cession of
which
in
1856
had
deprived
Russia
of
control over the
mouth
of
the Danube.
But,
on
October
29th,
immediately
after
the
fall of
Metz had rendered
it
absolutely
impossible
for France
to throw
in
her
lot with Great
Britain,
and
made it
probable
that Peace
would be
speedily
concluded,
Gort-
chakoff
despatched
to the
Russian
Representatives
abroad a
Circular,
in
which he
distinctly
denounced Clauses
XI,
XIII
and XIV of
the
Treaty
of Paris. The
Tsar,
he
declared,
could "no
longer
hold
himself
bound
by
the
stipulations
of
the
Treaty
of
March,
1856,
as far as
they
restrict
his
sovereign
rights
in
the
Black Sea." This
repudiation
he
endeavoured
to
justify
by
two
arguments.
The
Tsar
could
not
"
admit,
de
jure,
that treaties
violated
in
several of
their
essential
and
general
clauses
should remain
binding
in
other clauses
directly
affecting
the
interests
of his
Empire."
He
referred,
in
particular,
to the
union of
Moldavia
and Wallachia in 1866 under
Prince Charles
of Hohen-
zollern,
which,
accomplished
through
revolution,
had
received
the
implied
sanction
of
the
Powers.
Neither could he
admit,
"
de
facto,
that the
security
of Russia should
depend
on a
fiction
which had
not
stood
the
test
of
time." Great
Britain
and
France,
he
pointed
out,
had
concentrated
naval
forces
in
the
Mediterranean,
Turkey
was
at
liberty
to
maintain a
navy
in
the
Straits;
and
the introduction
of
ironclads
"
unknown and unforeseen" in
1856
still
further
imperilled
the
Russian
position
in
the
Black
Sea. When Sir A. Buchanan
at
Petrograd
heard
of
the
Circular,
he
immediately,
without
waiting
for
Instructions
from his
Government,
wrote to GortchakofT
that he would
expect
to
receive orders
to
ask
for
his
passports
and to
leave
immedi-
ately.
But the Cabinet was
by
no
means inclined
to
take
any
action
which
would
precipitate
a
rupture,
and would
either involve
Europe
in
a
general
war
or
leave
Great Britain
to
fight
Russia
single-handed.
The
reply
to
Russia,
therefore,
took
the
form ofa
despatch
to
Buchanan,
which,
though
firm
in
its
language,
contained
nothing
in the
nature
of
an ultimatum.
Granville
refrained
from
discussing
whether the
Russian
desire
to
be
freed
from
the
restrictions
of
the
Treaty
was in
itself
reasonable
or
not.
He
confined
himself
to
elaborating
the
single
point,
that
no
single
Power can
free
itself
from
any
of
the
stipulations
of
a
treaty
except
by
obtaining
the
previous
consent
of
the
co-
signatories.
The
effect
of
unilateral
denunciation,
such as
Gortchakoff
GRANVILLE AND
BRUNNOW
47
claimed
the
power
of
exercising,
"is
to
bring
the
entire
authority
and
efficacy
of
treaties
under
the
discretionary
control
of
each one of
the
Powers who
may
have
signed
them;
the
result
of
which
would
be
the
entire
destruction
of
treaties
in
their
essence."
Gortchakoff
had
declared
that
Russia
fully
adhered
to the
general
principles
of
the
Treaty
of
Paris;
but,
"however
satisfactory
this
may
be in
itself,
it
is
obviously
an
expression
of
the
free will of
that
Power
which it
might
at
any
time alter
or
withdraw."
It
was,
therefore,
"impossible
for
Her
Majesty's
Government
to
give any
sanction,
on
their
part,
to
the course
announced
by
Prince
Gortchakoff."
The
final
paragraph,
however,
suggested
a
more
conciliatory
attitude
by
the
remark
that,
if
Russia
had
requested
the
Signatories
of
the Peace of
Paris
to
examine
"whether
anything
has occurred
which
could
be
held to
amount
to an
infraction
of the
Treaty,
or
whether there is
anything
in
the
terms
which,
from altered
circumstances,
presses
with undue
severity
upon
Russia,
or
which,
in the
course
of
events,
had
become
unnecessary
for
the due
pro-
tection
of
Turkey,
Her
Majesty's
Government would
not
have
refused
to
examine the
question
in concert
with the
co-
Signatories
to
the
Treaty."
Granville was less reserved in
an
interview
with
Brunnow
on
the
following day.
The Russian
Ambassador
had
known
nothing
of
the
Circular
beforehand
1
,
and
regarded
the
British
reply
as
both
"
sudden
"
and
"unexpected."
He
complained
that it had
not
opened
with an
acknowledgement
of
the
Tsar's
assurance
that
he
meant to
observe
the
principal
stipulations
of
the
Treaty.
"Was
it
possible,"
Granville
replied,
"that the
Government
of
a
great
country
should
express
satis-
faction with
an assurance
from the
head of
another
State
because,
when
denouncing
a
portion
of
his
treaty
obligations,
he
said
that he did
not
denounce
them
all?"
Brunnow
could
only
observe
that
"
the
value
of
treaties,
particularly
in late
times,
depended
much on
their
longevity
"
—
a side-allusion
to the
recent
Treaties for
the
protection
of
Belgium,
which
the Russians
chose to
regard
as
a
tacit admission
that the
obliga-
tions
assumed
by
the
Powers in
1839
could
no
longer
be
considered
binding.
Brunnow,
who "was much
perturbed
and
sometimes
angry
"
during
this
interview,
asked
whether he
should
prepare
for
departure,
but was
told
by
Lord
Granville
that
"the
imperial
Government
had
1
To
Buchanan,
No.
303,
Confidential,
November
13th,
1870.
"I
told Baron
Brunnow
that,
although
of
course he
would
not and
could not
admit
it,
I was
sure
he
disapproved
the
Circular
as
much
as
I
did. Baron
Brunnow confessed
that it
had
taken
him as
much
by surprise
as
it had
done me
;
that,
if
he
had
had
the mis-
fortune of
being
Foreign Secretary,
he
should have
first
negotiated
with
Turkey
and
then
with
the
other
parties
to the
Treaty."
(This
passage
is
omitted in the
final
draft
of
the
despatch.)
48
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
taken
one
step
and
we
another,
and I
did
not wish to
anticipate any
event."
The British
attitude
for
the
moment was
deliberately
calculated
to leave
Russia
in
uncertainty
as to
our
intentions.
"Promising
peace
is as unwise
as
to threaten
war,"
was
the
expression
used
by
Lord
Granville to the Prime-Minister. The
practical
question
to
be decided
was this
:
if the
country
went
to
war
with
Russia,
who would be
its
allies
and who
its
opponents?
The resentment
in
Turkey,
the
country
most
directly
affected
by
the
Circular,
was
great,
and
was increased
by
the offensive
cynicism
of
Gortchakoff's
explanatory
Despatch,
in
which
he assumed that
he
was
doing
the Porte a service
by removing
the
main
cause of
friction between it
and
Russia. Sir H.
Elliot,
the
British
Ambassador,
had
indeed
prophesied,
a
few
days
before the
news
became
public,
that
Turkey
would
undoubtedly fight
1
.
He
wrote,
without
qualifications,
that
"the neutralisation
of the
Black Sea is
a
bulwark
as
strong
and
more
reliable than the
signed
guarantees
of all the
Great
Powers of
Europe.
If
it were not
for
it,
Turkey
would be almost
helpless
at the
mercy
of
Russia.
. . . The
Turkish statesmen are so
fully
convinced of this
and
feel
so
keenly
that if there should
once be
a
powerful
Russian fleet on that
sea,
after
the
completion
of the
railway
system
has rendered
easy
the
rapid
concentration
of the
enormous
military
forces of the
Empire,
it will be in the
power
of
the Russian
Government
to
strike
a fatal blow at the
independence
of the
Sultan,
at
any
moment when the Allies of the
latter are unable
to
come
forward
to
his
assistance.
They
would rather
fight
now for that
neutralisa-
tion,
which
they
regard
as their
best
ally,
than
passively
await the
greater
danger,
which
will
threaten
them when
they
have it no
longer
to trust
to."
But
when
Turkey
was
actually
faced
with the
event,
the
problem
did
not
solve
itself with
the same
simplicity.
The Russian move had
placed
her in
the
necessity
of
declaring
and
waging
an offensive
war,
which
would suit
neither her
disordered
finances nor
her
military
capacity.
She
would
probably
have been
willing
to
proceed
to
extremities,
if
Great
Britain
and
Austria
would have
given
their
simultaneous
support.
As
it
was,
the Turkish
Ambassador in
Vienna
remarked
plaintively
to
Beust: "The
Porte
derives little
comfort
from
alternate assurances
that each of
her
Allies is
willing
to
help
her,
if
the other
will
only
set
the
example,
whilst the
peril
of her
position
is
daily
increasing
2
."
Feeling
within the
Austro-Hungarian
empire
was
in
fact
bitterly
1
From
Elliot,
No.
254,
October
30th,
1870.
2
From
Bloomfield,
No.
203,
Confidential,
November
24th,
1870.
ATTITUDE OF THE GREAT
POWERS
49
divided.
The
hatred
which
the
Hungarians
felt towards
Russia,
their
ruthless
conqueror
in
1849,
was
still
unabated.
Andrassy,
the
Foreign
Minister,
told
Bloomfield in
great
excitement
that,
"so far as
Hungary
was
concerned,
he
should
be
ready
for
action at
once,
the
sooner
the
better,
for
Russia was
not so well
prepared
for war as
was
generally
supposed.
.
.
l
." But
the
Slav races and
the
Czechs
in
par-
ticular
were no
less
violently
in favour of
Russia,
while
the German
element,
with its
representative,
the
Imperial
Chancellor
Beust,
was
eager
for a
conciliation. Such
fundamental divisions
necessarily
limited
Austrian
policy.
Moreover,
Beust
himself had
never
concealed
his
view that
the restrictive clauses had
"placed
Russia in
the Black
Sea,
in a
situation
unworthy
of
a Great
Power,"
and had
actually proposed
in
January,
1867,
the convocation of
a
congress,
which would
agree
to
free her
from
those
disabilities.
His
reply
to the
Circular,
therefore
(November
10th),
though vigorous
in
wording,
contained
no
express
refusal to
sanction
the course
adopted
by
Russia.
GortchakofF,
Buchanan
wrote to
Granville,
would find
this
reply
"easy
to answer."
Italy,
which
frankly
subordinated
its
policy
to that followed
by
Great
Britain
and
Austria,
could
be
relied
on
to
cooperate
in
any
steps
which would
prevent
the
general peace
from
being
disturbed.
France,
entirely powerless
in
a
military
sense,
had
received the
news
with
general
satisfaction,
"as
likely
to
lead
to
European
com-
plications
which
will
stop
Prussia
2
."
Thiers
at once
urged
on
Lyons
that
"England,
Austria,
Italy,
Turkey
and
Spain
should
now unite
with
France
to
check
the
aggression
of
Prussia
and
Russia,"
and
thought
"that
without war
this
would
lead
to
a
Congress
in which all
Europe
would
settle the
terms of
peace."
This
view,
although
perfectly
natural
to French
statesmen in
their
present
extremity,
was
not
very
helpful
to
Granville,
as
its
motive was
plainly
to
bring
about that
collective
mediation to
which
he had
repeatedly
refused
his
sanction.
It
was,
in
fact,
clear,
as
Granville had
seen
from
the commence-
ment of
the
crisis,
that
the
attitude
of
Prussia
would
play
the decisive
part
in
determining
that
of
Austria and
Italy,
and
that Prussia's
in-
tentions
could
be
extracted from
Bismarck
alone,
since
both
Thile
at
Berlin
and
Bernstorfl
at London
confined
themselves to colourless
expressions
of
surprise
at the Russian
action.
Accordingly,
Odo
Russell
was
at
once
(November
nth) despatched
to
Prussian
headquarters
at
Versailles as
a
Special
Envoy
to Bismarck.
His
Instructions were
L
From
Lord
Bloomfield,
No.
200,
Confidential,
November
23rd,
1870.
2
From
Lord
Lyons,
No.
1803,
Confidential,
November
14th, 1870.
w.&g. Ill
,,
5
o
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
very
general,
as
the
first
object
of
the
Cabinet
was
to
gain
such infor-
mation
as would
enable
them to
decide on
their next
move.
The
Chancellor
had
maintained
complete
silence,
doubtless
in
the
belief
that
the
Circular
would,
after
a
preliminary protest,
be
tacitly accepted.
His
only
concern was to circumscribe
the
War,
and
to
prevent
any
European
interference
between France and
Germany.
Moreover,
the
military
situation
was,
at the
moment,
causing
the German Staff
some
anxiety;
for
Orleans,
reoccupied
by
the
French
on
November
10th,
still remained in
their
hands,
and
seriously
menaced
the investment
of
Paris.
The
Cabinet
had made
an
excellent
choice in
their
Envoy.
The
combination of frankness
and
subtlety
in Odo Russell's
character
appealed
to
Bismarck,
who
afterwards treated
him,
during
his
tenure
of
the
Embassy
at Berlin
(1871-84),
with
an
esteem
and
intimacy
accorded to
no
other British
diplomatist.
Two
interviews took
place
between
them,
on November
21st.
In
the
former,
Bismarck
simulated
surprise
at
the
Russian
Circular
and
entire
disapproval
of the
method
and
the time chosen
by
the Russian
Government
;
but
expressed
him-
self as
unable
to
interfere
or
even
answer the
Circular for
the
present.
He
strongly
recommended that a conference
should
be held at
Con-
stantinople
before resort to hostilities.
But,
in
the
evening,
Russell,
who had
convinced himself
that the
Chancellor
respected strength
above
everything
else,
boldly out-stepped
his
Instructions
and
told
him
bluntly
that
the
question
"
was
of
a nature
in
its
present
state to
compel
us,
with
or
without
allies,
to
go
to
war
with
Russia." The
conversation
was
prolonged
till
midnight
;
but before it closed Bismarck
"came
round
to the British
point
of
view,
and felt that
in our
place
he could
not recede
V
He now
offered to
take the
initiative of
pro-
posing
a
conference at
Petrograd,
at which
the
question
might
be
peacefully
settled. The
way
of
peace
was soon
afterwards made easier
for
the
Cabinet
by
a
despatch
from
Gortchakoff,
which
was com-
municated
to
Lord
Granville
on
November
25th.
It
was
effusive
in
its
protestation
of
friendship,
and
while not
explicitly
withdrawing
in
any way
from
the
attitude
of
the
Circular,
attenuated the
effects
of
the
denunciation
of
the
Treaty
into
"the
abrogation
of a
theoretical
principle
without immediate
application.
,,
It
was
now time
to
decide between three alternative
courses
of
action
:
either to
go
to
war
against
Russia with
the
possible
support
of
Turkey,
which
was
becoming
the
more doubtful
in
consequence
of
Bismarck's
efforts to
induce
that Power to
come
to
a
separate
under-
1
Letter
to
Lord
Granville,
November
30th, 1870.
A
CONFERENCE
ACCEPTED
51
standing
with
Russia
;
or
to
accept
the
Circular,
which
Lord Granville's
despatch
of
the 10th
had
categorically
refused
to
do;
or,
finally,
to
enter
into
a Conference.
Bismarck's
proposal,
as
it
stood,
was
in-
admissible; for,
as Granville
caustically
told
BernstorfF,
it
"only
stated
that
if
we would ask
the Prussian
Government
they
would
ask Russia
to
agree
to
a conference
to
be held
at
St
Petersburg,
whence
the
Circular,
which had
caused so
painful
an
impression
had
emanated,
with
a view
apparently
to
giving,
with the
support
of
Prussia,
to Russia
all that she
desired
1
."
But
Bismarck made
no
difficulty
in
agreeing
to
the
required
modifications. Invitations
to the
conference were
to
be
sent
"on
the
express
understanding
that
it should
be in no
way
prejudiced
by any previous assumption
as
to the result
of
its
delibera-
tions";
but the British
Government
"would feel
bound,
in
concert
with
the other
Powers,
to
weigh
with
fairness and
without
bias
any
claims which
Russia
might
advance
and
any proposals
which
she
might
make
2
." A
very conciliatory despatch
to
Buchanan
(November 28th)
stated
that
if
GortchakofT's
refinements on
the
Russian
Circular,
quoted
above,
"are
to
be
construed into
an
announcement
that
Russia
has
formed
and
stated her own
opinion
of
her
rights,
but
has
no
intention of
acting
in
conformity
with
it
without due
concert with
the
other
Powers,
they go
far
to
close
the
controversy
in which
the
two
Governments
have
been
engaged."
Austria
and
Italy
readily
agreed
;
Turkey
was
anxious
to receive an
assurance
that the delibera-
tions of
the
conference would
be
confined
to the
Black Sea
Question.
Granville
pointed
out
that
the
terms of
the
invitation
made
it
impossible
to
come
to
any
definite
agreement
beforehand
as
to what matters should
be
discussed,
but
agreed
that
it
would
be
most inadvisable to
extend
the
scope
of
the
deliberations.
France,
at
first,
refused on
the
ground
that
the
proposal
emanated from
Prussia
;
then
endeavoured to make
her
acceptance
contingent
on
the
prior
enforcement
of an
armistice
on
Prussia
by
the
neutral
Powers,
and
the inclusion in
the
deliberations
of
the
Conference of
the
conditions
of
peace
between
the
two
belligerents,
and
finally,
after
accepting
the
conference,
was
not
represented
at it
till
its
penultimate
meeting (March
13th,
1871)
—
owing
to
lengthy
disputes
between
Bismarck
and
Favre,
as
to the
method
by
which
the
latter
should
obtain the
necessary
safe-conduct
from Paris.
The
Conference,
which
met on
January 17th, 1871,
prolonged
its
six
sessions
over
a
period
of
two
months.
Its labours
produced
three
1
To
Loftus,
No.
324,
November
24th,
1870.
2
To
Russell,
November
25th,
1870.
4—2
52
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
positive
results.
At the
first
formal
meeting
all the
Plenipotentiaries
agreed
to
a Protocol
by
which
they
recognised
"that
it
is an essential
principle
of
the
law
of
nations that no
Power can
liberate itself
from
the
engagements
of a
Treaty,
nor
modify
the
stipulations
thereof,
unless
with
the consent
of
the
Contracting
Powers
by
means
of an
amicable
arrangement.''
This
Declaration
amounted
to
a withdrawal
by
Russia from
the claim
put
forward
in
the
Circular,
and was
indeed
a
logical corollary
of
the British
proviso
that the
Conference
should
meet
without
any
previous
assumptions
as
to its
results.
It also
removed the
obligation,
which
legally
bound
Great
Britain
to
go
to
war to
prevent
any infringement
of
the
Treaty
of
Paris,
by
making
it
appear
that
no
infringement
of
the
Treaty
had
taken
place.
But
the
subsequent history
of
Europe
fails
to
justify
the assertion that
the
Declaration
has
added
any
additional
security
to the
sanctity
of
Treaties.
"
In
diplomacy,"
as Bismarck
was
fond of
saying,
"
one
hand
must
wash
the other." After
signing
Granville's
Protocol,
the
Plenipoten-
tiaries
proceeded
to
abrogate,
in
accordance with
Russian
demands,
the three Clauses
of
the
Treaty
of
Paris
which
provided
for the
neutralisation
of
the Black
Sea.
Finally, Turkey
was
granted
a corre-
sponding advantage.
While
the
principle
of
closing
the Straits to
warships
was
maintained,
the Sultan was allowed the
power
to
open
them
"in
time
of
peace
to the vessels
of
war
of
friendly
and
allied
Powers,
in
case the
Sublime Porte should
judge
it
necessary
in
order
to
secure the
execution of the
stipulations
of
the
Treaty
of
Paris."
This
liberty
would
have
proved
of
service to
Turkey,
had
she
wished
at
any
time to
engage
her
Allies in
a war
with
Russia,
as it
would have
enabled
her
to
reinforce
the
Turkish Black
Sea Fleet
before war
had
been declared.
If,
however,
her
object
was,
not
war,
but
negotiations
backed
by
force,
the
entry
of
a
foreign
fleet
into the
Bosphorus
would
be
calculated to
precipitate
the
very
crisis
which
she desired
to
avoid.
To
assert
that
Granville's
diplomacy
had
resulted
in
giving
the
command
of the Black
Sea to
Turkey
seems
a
great exaggeration
of
language
1
.
So
long
as
the
entrance into
the Black
Sea
in
the event
of
war between
Turkey
and
Russia
remained in
Turkish
hands,
a British fleet
could
always
pass
into and
control
that sea
as it
did in
1854;
the revision
of
the
clause
merely
rendered
it less
probable
that the
Turkish
fleet
would
suffer
defeat
or
destruction
before
the arrival
of
allied reinforcements.
The removal
of
the
neutralisation
had,
in
fact,
little
influence
on
the
relations
between
Russia and
Turkey.
It
failed,
on
the
one
hand,
1
See
Lord
Fitzmaurice,
Life of
Lord
Granville,
n.
76.
EFFECT
OF REVISION
OF
PARIS
TREATY
53
to
produce
that
improvement
of
relations which
Gortchakoff
professed
to
anticipate.
The neutralisation had
been
itself
an
effect,
not
a
cause,
of
their
mutual
hostility.
While the
Christian
populations
under
the
Porte
could still
complain
with
justice
of
misgovernment
and
oppres-
sion,
and were
steadily
progressing, through
the
self-consciousness
of
nationality,
towards
fitness for an
independent
existence,
over which
Russia
expected
to
exercise an
exclusive
influence,
the
relations between
her
and
Turkey
inevitably
grew
worse
instead
of
better.
Both
Lord
Stanley
and
Lord Granville
were
oppressed
by
the
immense
respon-
sibility
devolving upon
Great Britain
as a
guarantor
of
the
integrity
of
Turkey
by
the
Tripartite
Treaty
of
1856,
and
perceived
its
provisions
to
be
obsolete,
since
their
enforcement
would,
in
practice,
be
im-
possible
1
.
But,
on
the
other
hand,
the Russian freedom of action in
the
Black
Sea
did
not,
as
Elliot
gloomily
prophesied,
leave
Turkey
almost
help-
less.
On the
contrary,
the
War
of
1877-78
was
not decided or
even
appreciably
affected
by
naval
operations,
but
by
the
final
success of
the
Russians
in
capturing
Plevna
and
forcing
the barrier of
the
Balkans
2
.
Great
Britain
emerged
from this
dangerous
crisis as
satisfactorily
as could
be
expected,
and
probably
with less discredit abroad
than
at
home.
Here,
public opinion,
which
is seldom
impressed
by
the
niceties
of
diplomatic
formulae,
was convinced that
the
country
had
surrendered
to
the threats
of
Russia;
for
it
was
impossible
to
deny
that,
what
Russia had
demanded,
she
had
obtained.
Thus,
the hatred
and fear
of
Russia,
which
had
begun
to
die down
after the
Crimean
War,
received
a
strong
stimulus,
and manifested itself in
1878
with
a violence
and
intensity
which have
become
proverbial.
The attention
of
the
country
was
diverted from
the
significant
part
played by
1
Lord
Stanley
said
in
1867
to the
French Ambassador: "It was
dangerous
to
seem
to
negotiate
with the Porte
on a
reciprocal
basis of
good government
by
it
and obedience
by
the
subjects,
as we
could
not
possibly guarantee
the latter half of
the
bargain.
Maladministration
was
not the
primary
cause of the
discontent which
had
its
root in
feelings
of
nationality
and
religion,
which
the best Government
could
not
wholly
remove and which indeed
with
increasing
prosperity
was
likely
to
grow
stronger." (To Cowley,
March
nth,
1867.)
Granville
wrote to Elliot
(No.
208, Confidential,
October
6th,
1870)
:
"
I
have
already
told
the
Turkish
Ambassador
that I
could
not
give
assurances
as to
future
contingencies.
Would
it not
be
more
friendly
to
say
more and
to
point
out
that there
are
contingencies
in which
Turkey
must
feel,
now
that
she
could
not
rely
on
our
aid,
and to
impress
upon
her that
her
real
safety
will
depend upon
the
aspirations
and
feelings
of
the
populations
over
which she
rules?".
. .
2
See,
as
to Russia's
tentative
efforts,
down
to
1908,
to
secure
complete
freedom
of
navigation
in the
Black
Sea,
A.
Stern,
"Zur
Geschichte
der
Meerengenfrage,"
in
Wissen und
Leben,
xvi. 6
(Zurich,
1923).
54
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
Bismarck.
He
had
throughout
dominated and
directed
the
policy
of
Europe;
he
had
successfully
maintained
the
diplomatic
isolation
of
France,
and
had created
the
German
empire,
at the
very
time when
the
Conference
was
engaged
in
its
deliberations.
Up
to
1870,
his
policy
had aimed
with
extraordinary
success
at
obtaining
from
Europe
the
necessary liberty
of
action
by
which Prussia
made Ger-
many;
henceforward,
he was
so
to
direct
and
manipulate
diplomatic
conditions
in
Europe
as
to
maintain
intact
the
supremacy
in
Europe
which
Germany
had
already
won. The
position
of
the
Chancellor
was
not,
indeed,
to
remain
for
long
so unassailable as
to
justify
Odo
Russell's
estimate,
in
1872,
that
"Napoleon
was not
more
powerful
than
Bismarck
is at this moment."
But
the
centre
of
power
and
diplomacy
had,
without
dispute,
been
transferred to Berlin. British
statesmen,
like
all
others,
had
to
shape
their
policy
in
accordance
with
their
views
of
the
future
position
and intentions of
Germany.
Bismarck
had
already
told
Odo
Russell
confidentially
at
Versailles,
"that his
ambition
for
Germany
was
an
alliance
with
England
and
Austria
in
preference
to
a Russian
alliance
;
but
he did
not see
his
way
to
it
yet
1
"
;
and he
multiplied
his
expressions
of
goodwill,
when the
Special
Envoy
had become
the
Ambassador at Berlin. It was
easy
to believe
that
Bismarck was
expressing
his real
feelings
;
for
the
prospective
advan-
tages
to
Germany
were obvious.
She would
hope
to
guarantee
all
that
she
had
won,
and
to
perpetuate
the
isolation,
and
therefore the
help-
lessness,
of France. But Great Britain could
expect
no
corresponding
reciprocity.
It was
certain,
as Bismarck himself
admitted,
that
Germany
would
never,
by
acceding
to
the
Tripartite
Treaty,
become a
guarantor
of the
integrity
of
Turkey
;
it
was
most
unlikely
that she would even
agree
on
any
joint policy
in
the Near
East,
which
might
bring
her
into
antagonism
with
Russia.
In
fact,
the Liberal
Government
during
its
last
three
years
of
office,
occupied
with the Alabama
Arbitration abroad
and with
its
comprehensive
legislative programme
at
home,
stood
entirely
aloof
from
a
Europe
which was
beginning
to feel
its
way
towards
an inevitable
new
grouping
of
its
Powers.
B.
Sea
Policy and the
Alabama
Claims,
1 861
-1907
The
"Alabama
Claims,"
the
Treaty
of
Washington
concluded
between
Her
Britannic
Majesty
and the
United
States
of
America
on
May
8th,
1871,
and the
International Arbitration
which,
in
pursuance
of
that
Treaty,
decided
those
claims,
constituted
a
group
of
events
1
From
Russell,
No.
16,
Secret,
December
ist,
1870.