Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE NEUTRAL
ZONE
PRINCIPLE
ACCEPTED
75
difficult
to
understand. The Home Government
had themselves
begun
to
perceive
the
importance
of
coming
to
a clearer
understanding
with
Russia.
Just
before
the
Amballa
meeting,
Lord Clarendon
had
dis-
cussed
the Central Asian
Question
with
Baron Brunnow
and
suggested
"the
recognition
of
some
territory
as neutral
between
the
possessions
of
England
and
Russia,
which should
be the limit of those
possessions
and should
be
scrupulously
respected
by
both
Powers.
"
Brunnow
communicated
with Prince
GortchakofT,
who
replied
that
the idea of
maintaining
between the two
empires
in Asia
"a
zone to
preserve
them from
contact" had
always
been favoured
by
the Tsar.
He
also
gave
the
assurance
that the Tsar
regarded Afghanistan
as
"
completely
outside the
sphere
within
which
Russia
may
be called
upon
to
exercise
her
influence."
The
assurance
was deemed
satisfactory,
but in-
sufficient. In the
past,
there had never been
any
reluctance on
Russia's
part
to disclaim
the
intention of further
advance
in Central
Asia,
or
even
to
disown the inconvenient action
of
zealous
soldiers
on the
spot,
eager
to
make
reputations
for themselves.
Nevertheless,
in
spite
of all assurances and
disclaimers,
Russia
had,
in
fact,
continued
to
go
forward;
and
where she went she
invariably
remained.
It
will
always
be a
point
of
dispute
how
far
the
suspicion
of
Russian
designs,
which
was
diligently
fostered
by
a
powerful
party
in
England
throughout
the
'seventies,
accentuated
the
very danger against
which
it was
directed. Russia
had,
of
course,
just
the same
right
to
approach
Afghanistan
from
the one
side
as
Great Britain had from
the other.
If
the
interests of the Indian
empire
called for a
policy
of annexations
and
protectorates,
so
did
those of the Russo-Asiatic
empire;
and the
reasons which
operated
in the
one case
applied equally
in the other.
When this
has been
said,
however,
it
must be allowed
that Russian
diplomacy
was not as
straightforward
as it
might
have
been
;
and the
habit of
the Tsar's
advisers
of
carrying
on
two
policies,
the one
at
Petrograd,
official and
conciliatory,
and
the other
in
Central
Asia,
unofficial
and at
times
aggressive, yet open
to
repudiation
at
discretion,
inevitably
increased distrust.
The
principle
of a
neutral zone
having
been
accepted,
the
boundary
of
Afghanistan
had to
be fixed. The
Oxus
was taken as the
general
northern
line,
a
final
Agreement
to
that
effect
being
reached
in
January, 1873,
at
which
time Russia
gave
positive
assurances,
not
only
that
the
Emperor
did
not intend
to
take
Khiva,
but
that
orders
had
been
issued
to
prevent
such
a
step.
Lord
Northbrook
was now
Viceroy, having
succeeded
Lord
Mayo,
76
FORWARD
POLICY AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
who
was assassinated
in
February,
1872.
Like
his
predecessor,
North-
brook was a
safe
man,
in whose
character
the
English qualities
of
slow-going
caution
and
sterling
commonsense
were shown
at their
best.
Above
all,
he
had
a
passion
for
justice
and
fair-dealing.
It was
his conviction
that,
in
political
relations,
Eastern ideas and
practices
should be met with
Western,
and
that,
if
the
European
could not
compete
with the Oriental in
duplicity
and
intrigue,
he
could meet
him
successfully
with the more
generous
weapons
of frankness and
honesty.
His
successful administration
in
India, however,
synchro-
nised
with a
relapse
in
external relations.
Ground
was
lost in
Afghanistan,
and,
while the
British
blamed the
Ameer,
the
Ameer
blamed
the British. The Seistan
boundary
settlement
of
1873 sorely
displeased
Shere
Ali,
who felt
—
as
many
Anglo-Indians
felt with
him
—
that in that transaction
his interests
had
been sacrificed
to the cause
of
Anglo-Persian
amity.
He, also,
harped
continually
upon
the
question
of
a
guarantee
and resented
its not
being
offered to
him in
the form
which could alone remove his
legitimate
anxiety.
In
1870,
General
Kaufmann,
Governor-
General of Russian
Turkestan,
had
addressed a
letter
of
courtesy
to the
Ameer,
who had
replied
to
it
in terms
approved
by
the
Viceroy.
Two
years
later,
Kaufmann
pro-
posed
a
regular exchange
of
correspondence
between himself
and
Kabul,
and
thereby
alarmed the
Ameer,
who
was not relieved
by
the
Indian
Government's assurance that Russia
had
promised
to
regard
his
country
as outside
the
sphere
of
her influence.
For Russia was still
pressing
on. Not
only
did
she retain
Samar-
kand,
after
occupying
it
avowedly
as a
temporary
measure, but,
in
August, 1873,
she obtained the cession of Khiva
by treaty.
This
proceeding
led Lord Granville to send
to
the British
Ambassador at
Petrograd
a
despatch
in
which,
while
deprecating
a too close
enquiry
into
how
far
the
Treaty
was in
accord with
Russia's
past
assurances,
and
disclaiming
the
exaggerated
apprehensions
current
in
England,
he stated it to
be
increasingly
desirable that
a clear and frank under-
standing
as
to
their relative
spheres
of interest
should "continue"
to
exist
between the
two
countries.
In his
alarm,
the
Ameer
now
not
only
asked
for
a
larger
subsidy,
more arms and
ammunition,
help
in
building
forts on the Northern
Frontier,
and for the
recognition
of
his favourite
son
as
successor,
but
demanded an
assurance that
he
would
be able to
count
on
British
help
in the event of
his
territory
being
invaded.
In
October,
the
Viceroy
conferred with the
Afghan Foreign
Minister
at
Simla,
but
LORD NORTHBROOK'S POLICY
77
failed
to
satisfy
him.
He
was
authorised
to
give
the assurance
that
the
British
Government
would
afford
the Ameer
assistance
in
the event
of
unprovoked
aggression,
so
long
as
he
followed
their advice
in
foreign
affairs
;
but it was
made clear that
they
reserved
the
right
to
judge
whether
and when
help
should be
given.
Any
unconditional
guarantee
of
protection
was
positively
refused.
To
the
last,
Lord
Northbrook
declined
to
share
the fears
of
Russian
designs
which
periodically
perturbed
a
section
of the
public
at
home.
"We
are
quite
comfortable
in
India,
but
England
is all
in a
flutter,"
he wrote home
in
1873
1
on tne
occasion of one
of these alarms.
He was
of
Lawrence's
opinion,
however,
that the weakness
of Great Britain's
position
con-
sisted in
the
fact that she
had not
made
sufficiently
clear
to
the
Russian Government
the
paramount
importance
for
her of intimate
relations
with
Afghanistan
and the
danger
of
any
disturbance
of
the
frontier of
that State.
"
I
go
heartily
with
Lord
Lawrence
and
against
fuss
and
interference,"
he wrote
so late as
January,
1875
5
"
Dut
there
is a
point upon
which
I
would
fight,
and
I
should let the Russians
understand
this
very clearly."
The Gladstone
Administration
resigned
in
February, 1874,
ana
*
m
the
succeeding
Cabinet
of Disraeli
Lord
Derby
was
for
four
years
Foreign
Secretary,
and
Lord
Salisbury,
for
the same
time,
Secretary
for India.
Gladstone's defeat
led to
his
abandonment
of the leader-
ship
of his
party
and
practically
—
though
he continued to
repre-
sent
his old
constituency
—
to
his
temporary
retirement
from
political
life.
Not
all his
colleagues
lamented
this
self-effacement;
yet
the
absence
of
his
steadying
influence,
his
instinctive
regard
for the
moralities of
national
life,
his warm humanitarian
sympathies,
and
his
lynx-eyed
scrutiny
of the
blunders and foibles of his
opponents
was
a
great
loss
to the
House of
Commons,
and
in
Foreign
Affairs it
meant
the withdrawal
of
a
wholesome
check
upon
the actions of
a
statesman
who
was
irresistibly
attracted
to ambitious
designs.
In his
appeal
to the
nation
in
the
general
election,
Disraeli
had
blamed the
outgoing
Government
for
showing
too
little
energy
in
Foreign
Affairs,
and
too much
in
domestic
legislation.
That order
of
things
it was
his intention
to reverse.
For
twenty
years
Disraeli,
both
as statesman
and
writer,
had been
educating
his
party
to
the
recogni-
tion
of Great
Britain's wider
imperial
destiny. Having
now
behind
him a
compliant
House of Commons
and a
consistently sympathetic
House of
Lords,
he
lost no
time
in
putting
his ideas
into
practice.
It
was
his ambition to revive
the
spacious
days
of
Elizabeth
;
Great
78
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1
874-1 885
Britain's
influence
should
again
be felt
to
furthest
Thule.
Without
her
word
nothing
should
be
done in
Europe,
for he was determined
to win
for
his
country
the
place
in
Continental
politics
which
Germany
under
Bismarck
was
usurping.
Still
more
distinctly,
he
aspired
to
make
his
country,
instead
of
Russia,
the
imperial
mistress
of the
East.
Long ago,
indeed,
he
had
conceived
of
her as
less
a
European
than
an
Asiatic
Power
1
. The
accomplishment
of
designs
so bold
in-
volved
a reorientation
of Great Britain's
Foreign Policy
and
a
change
of
emphasis
in her
relations
with several of
the
Powers.
It
was
a
tribute to
his
remarkable
will-power
and
concentration
of
purpose
that he succeeded
so
easily
in
winning
his
party
for a transformation
so
fundamental and
so
contrary
to
long
tradition.
There was
no immediate
change
of
policy
in
India,
though strong
influences at once became active
to that
end
at home. In
particular,
Sir Bartle
Frere,
ex-Governor
of
Bombay,
and
now
a
member
of
the
Indian
Council,
falling
back
upon
a minute of
Sir
Henry
Raw-
linson's
of
1868,
succeeded in
convincing
the
Secretary
of
State
of
Russia's sinister
designs
and in
winning
his
acceptance
of Rawlinson's
specific
for
frustrating
them. This was
the
appointment
of
a British
Resident,
in
addition to the
existing
native
Agent
in
Afghanistan,
to
be
stationed,
first
at
Herat,
but
later at Kabul.
Lord
Salisbury
formally
made himself the
mouthpiece
of the
"forward"
school
by
a
despatch
addressed to the
Viceroy
on
January
22nd,
1875,
which
he
reinforced
by
private
letters.
In this
document,
fateful because
it led
to the abandonment
of
the
old
prudent policy,
and
the
opening
of a
new era
of
rash
experiment
and
daring
adventure,
it was
stated
that
the
Government
had
anxiously
followed
the
course of events
in
Central
Asia,
and
particularly
on the frontiers of
Persia
and
Afghanistan,
and
were
impressed by
the need for
precautionary
action.
It
was
felt that
the
information which
reached the Indian Government
as to
what
passed
in
Afghanistan
and
on its
frontiers
was neither
sufficient
nor
trustworthy,
and that
there
was
reason
to
suspect
that the Ameer
controlled
that
information at
will. In order
to
remedy
this
evil,
the
Viceroy
was
directed
to
"take
measures,
with as
much
expedition
as
the circumstances
of
the case
permit,
for
procuring
the assent of the
Ameer
to the
establishment
of
a British
Agency
at Herat"
;
and it was
added
that,
when this had
been
done,
a similar
step
might
be
desirable
in
regard
to Kandahar
—
but
not
to
Kabul,
on account of
"the
diffi-
culties
which
are
interposed
by
the fanatic violence
of
the
people."
1
Speech
at
Aylesbury, July
13th,
1866.
LORD
SALISBURY AND
THE KABUL
MISSION
79
Neither
then
nor
later,
however,
did
Lord
Salisbury
take
seriously
the
alleged
menace
of a Russian
advance
upon
India;
what
he
chiefly
feared
was
that
Russia
might
seek
to
foment
Afghan hostility against
Great
Britain,
with the
object
of
supplanting
British
influence
at the
Ameer's Court.
Lord Northbrook lost no time in
telegraphing
(February
18th)
that
in
the
opinion
of his
Government
"the
time and
circumstances
appeared
unsuitable for
taking
the initiative in the
matter,"
and
that
the Ameer
might
be
unwilling
to
allow a
British
Agent
to
reside
at
Herat without
harbouring disloyal
intentions
to
the British
Government.
He, therefore,
asked for
discretion
as to
the time
and
opportunity
of
giving
effect to his
Instructions.
Lord
Salisbury
sanctioned a
delay
of
three or
four month's. In
the
following
month,
and
again
in
June,
the
Viceroy
reported
that
the
opinion
of the
officers
of
the
Punjab
was averse to
any pressure
being applied
to
the
Ameer
in
the
way
and for the
purpose
proposed.
The
attitude of the
Indian
Government
was
not,
however,
absolutely
negative,
for,
in
view of
the situation which
would arise if
Russia
occupied
Merv,
it
was
suggested
that
such
a
step
would
make it
necessary
to
give
to
the
Ameer additional
assistance
and
more
specific
assurances that
Great
Britain
would
help
him
to
defend
Afghanistan
against
attack
from
without;
and
that
then
would
be
the
proper
time to
establish a
British Resident
at
Herat,
as
part
of
a
new
treaty
arrangement,.
In his
reply (November 19)
Lord
Salisbury
confessed
to serious
apprehension
of Russian
aggression.
A
short
time
before,
in
fact,
a
Russian
Agent
had
been
received at
Kabul
for
the first
time,
and
thenceforward there
was a
more
or less
regular
exchange
of
courtesies
between the emissaries
of
the
Government
of
Turkestan
and the
Ameer.
By
the
end of
1875,
Russia
was,
also,
completing
the
subdual
and
annexation
of Khiva
and
Khokand,
and
the
early appropriation
of
Merv
seemed
certain.
Adhering
as
firmly
as
before to
the
proposal
of
a
British
Agency,
the Indian
Secretary,
on
behalf
of
the
Govern-
ment,
now instructed
Lord
Northbrook to
find
without
avoidable
delay
"
some occasion for
sending
a
mission
to
Kabul
and
to
press
the
reception
of this
mission
very
earnestly
upon
the
Ameer." It
was to
be
the
object
of
the
Mission
to
arrange
for
the
stationing
of
British
officers in
his
kingdom.
In
their
reply
(January
28th,
1876)
the
Viceroy
and
Council
still
resisted the
proposal
by
an
argument
which
went to
the
extreme
limits of
official
prudence,
ending
with
the
grave
warning:
"We
deprecate,
as
involving
serious
danger
to
the
peace
of
8o
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1
874-1
885
Afghanistan
and to
the interests
of
the
British
Empire
in
India,
the
execution
under
present
circumstances
of the
Instructions
conveyed
in
your
Lordship's despatch."
Several months
before
this,
Lord
Northbrook
had written to
Lord
Salisbury,
in a
private
letter
(Sep-
tember
30th,
1875)
:
"
My
firm
opinion
is that
to do
anything
to force
him
(the
Ameer)
to
receive
agents
of
ours in his
country against
his
will
is
likely
to
subject
us
to
the risk of
another
unnecessary
and
costly
war
in
Afghanistan
before
many years
are
over."
It
was now
too
late for
any
counsels of
prudence
to have effect.
At
home,
the
"forward"
party
was in
full
hue and
cry.
A
"
spirited
Foreign Policy
"
was the
parole
of the
day.
A
beginning
had
been
made
in
Europe,
and
the continuation was
to
be
in
Asia. Convinced
that his
work
in India
was done and his influence with the Home Government
undermined,
Lord Northbrook
resigned
in
November;
and
he
re-
turned
to
England
in the
following spring.
Some time before
this,
the Prime-Minister
had
given
two fresh
proofs
of his wish to
strengthen
British
prestige
in India. In the
autumn of
1875,
the Prince
of
Wales,
at his
suggestion,
paid
a visit
of several months
to India
and there met
the chief
native rulers.
Early
in
the
following
year,
he
sprang
on the Houses
of
Parliament
a
proposal
to confer
upon
the
Queen
a distinct
title
in virtue
of
her
Indian dominion. The
proposal
was not
popular
in the
country
; but,
since the
Queen
was
known to favour
it,
the
necessary
Bill
met with
little
opposition,
though
the
undertaking
was
given
that the
new title
should not be
used
in the United
Kingdom.
On the first
day
of
1877,
the
Queen
was
accordingly
proclaimed
at
Delhi
and other Indian
cities
as
"Empress
of India"
(Kaisar-i-Hind).
The new
Viceroy
appointed
was Lord
Lytton,
then
British
Minister
at Lisbon
1
. If the
offer of the
position
was
a
great
surprise
to
him,
as he has
recorded,
it was no less
such to
the
public.
Lord
Lytton's
distinction
had
been rather
literary
than
political.
Although
he had
many
qualities
of
statesmanship,
and
in
particular
the
rare
gift
of
imagination,
he
had
never touched
questions
of
high
politics,
he had
had little or no
experience
of
parliamentary
life,
and to this
particular
office,
as he admitted to
Disraeli,
he came
with
"inexperience
of all ad-
ministrative
business and
ignorance
at
the
outset
of Indian affairs
2
."
1
Disraeli offered the
Viceroyalty
to
Lord
Lytton
in a letter of November
23rd,
1875,
and he left
England
on
March 1st
following.
2
Letter
to Disraeli
of
December
1st,
1875.
Lord
Lytton's
Indian
Administration,
p. 3.
(In
the
following August
Disraeli
was
raised to
the
peerage
as Earl of
Beaconsfield.)
THE
APPOINTMENT OF LORD
LYTTON
81
Lord
Lytton,
however,
was not
required
to
have
an
Indian
policy
;
one had been
prepared
for
him in
advance,
and
he
was
merely
selected
as the likeliest instrument for
executing
it. Sir A. C.
Lyall,
his first
Foreign Secretary, spoke
of him as
having
come to
India "more
as
a Government
official
than as an
Oriental
ruler."
He was to
inaugurate
the
"
forward"
movement which Lord
Northbrook
had
for
a
time
delayed,
and he carried
his Instructions with him in
the form
of an
elaborate
Memorandum. While these Instructions
were
perfectly
explicit
as
to the
object
in
view,
they
left
him
a
wide
discretion
as
to
the
methods
by
which this
object
was to be attained.
Briefly,
he
was
to
concede the demands
made
by
the Ameer
in
1869
and
1873,
and,
in
particular,
to
insist
upon
the
reception
of
a
British
Mission
in
return.
For a
short time
longer,
events
in
Europe
held back
active
measures.
There,
the attention of the British and Russian
Govern-
ments
was concentrated
upon
an
Eastern
problem
nearer
home, and,
throughout
the whole of
the
year
1876,
because
approaching
this
problem
from different
angles
and
with
different
motives,
the two
Governments had
barely
succeeded in
maintaining
the
appearance
of
harmony.
In a
great
empire
like that of
Great
Britain,
Indian and
Colonial
Policy
has
perforce
to march
together
in close
step
with
general Foreign
Policy;
and while
difficulties were
increasing
in
Europe
the time
was
inopportune
for
precipitating complications
in
Asia.
Meanwhile,
his
knowledge
of the
preoccupations
of the
British
Government and of
the
delicate relations in which Great
Britain
stood to
Russia
encouraged
in
the
Ameer an attitude of
greater independence.
Reports
of
his
growing
disaffection
began
to
alarm
the Indian
Government,
and
when,
early
in
1877,
he
was
alleged
to
have
preached
a
jihad against
British
rule
in
India and to
have
opened
direct
communications with
the Russian
authorities,
contrary
to his
bond,
formal
complaint
was
made to his
advisers.
An
open
breach
with Russia
occurred
when,
after
the abortive
Constantinople
Conference,
she
declared war
on
Turkey
(April 24th,
1877),
claiming
a
justification
which
the
British
Government denied.
In
that
War,
as
in
the
succeeding
Peace
settlement
1
,
Great
Britain's
influence
was
thrown
wholly
on
Turkey's
side.
Russia,
therefore,
only
followed the
rules of
fair
fighting
when she
decided
that,
as
her
opponent
had
struck
her
in
one
place,
she
would
strike
back
in
another.
The
later
developments
of
the
Eastern
controversy
thus
1
Cf.
infra,
pp.
140-2.
w.&g.iii
6
82 FORWARD
POLICY AND
REACTION,
1
874-1 885
produced
violent
repercussions
in
Central
Asia,
and
their
gravity
was
not lessened
by
the
fact that
Russia's
action
there was
tactical
rather
than
part
of
a
deeply
laid
scheme of
territorial
aggression
1
.
Twelve
days
after
his first
meeting
with
the
Indian
Council,
then
far from
sympathetic,
Lord
Lytton
took
the first
step
in
the
pursuance
of the
policy
entrusted to
him,
when,
through
the
Commissioner
at
Peshawur,
he
informed the
Ameer of
the
intention to
depute
a
Special
Envoy
to wait
upon
him at
an
early
date,
with a
view
to
notifying
the
Queen's
Imperial
title and his
own
assumption
of
office.
In
his
reply
(May 22nd),
the
Ameer declined a
conference,
on
the
ground
that it
could
serve no
purpose,
unless
the Indian
Govern-
ment had
something
new to
say,
which went
beyond
the
conversations
at
Simla.
Answering
a
further
letter,
the Ameer so far
relented as
to
propose
that the British
native Vakeel at Kabul
should
be called
to
Simla,
to
report
upon
affairs at that
Court,
and should
thereafter
communicate to
him
the views and
wishes of the British
Government.
This
meeting
took
place
on
October
6th,
and
the result was to
show
the
Ameer to be
in
a bad
humour
and
dissatisfied with
many
things
which
the British
Government had done or
omitted
to
do. He still
brooded
over the refusal
of
the more definite
alliance for which
he
asked in
1873,
ann< ne nac
*
come
to
the conclusion that the
British
Government cared
for
him
only
in
so far as
they
were enabled
by
his
help
to serve
their own
interests.
He
objected
to
the
despatch
of a
mis-
sion to Kabul on
the threefold
ground
: that he
expected
no
practical
result from
it,
that
it
would inflame
native
feeling,
and that
Russian
counteraction would be the
inevitable
consequence.
It
was,
never-
theless,
clear that the
Ameer was
willing
to receive
any
amount of
subsidy,
and
that,
if an
alliance could but
be
shaped
to
his
liking,
he
would rather
admit
British
officers than forfeit
it,
provided
the
British
Government
would
recognise
his
younger
son,
Abdulla
Jan,
as
his
successor,
and
not otherwise
interfere
in the internal
affairs
of
Afghanistan.
Lord
Lytton
offered
to meet
the Ameer on both
points,
and
practically
to
accept
his
1873
demands,
the details to be
arranged
at a conference.
By
this
time,
he
had broken
down
opposition
in
the
1
Describing
in a
letter
to the
Queen
(July
22nd,
1877)
the
measures
which
were
to
be taken
if war broke
out with
Russia
because
of her
apprehended occupation
of
Constantinople,
the
Prime-Minister wrote:
"It is
Lord
Beaconsfield's
present
opinion
that
in such
a case
Russia
must
be
attacked
from
Asia,
that
troops
should
be
sent to the
Persian
Gulf,
and
that the
Empress
of
India
should order her armies
to
clear Central
Asia
of
the
Muscovites,
and drive them into the
Caspian.
We
have
a
good
instrument
for this
purpose
in
Lord
Lytton,
and
indeed he was
placed
there
with
that
view."
(Life
of
Benjamin
Disraeli,
Earl
of
Beacons
field,
vi.
155.)
THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
83
Council,
and
was
able to
report
to Lord
Salisbury
that he
anticipated
"no further
opposition
in
carrying
out
my
views."
The
Conference
was
held
at Peshawur
in
January,
1877,
the
Indian
Government
being
represented by
Sir Lewis
Pelly
and
the
Ameer
by
his Minister
Syud
Noor Mohammad
and the
Mir Akhor
Ahmed
Khan,
whose
powers
were ad
referendum.
The
discussions
dragged
on for
a
long
time. There
was
agreement
on
many
points;
but,
when
the
question
of
despatching
Missions
was
raised,
the
negotiators
at
once found
themselves in front
of a
dead wall.
Then,
the
Viceroy
addressed to the British
Envoy
a
long
letter
(March
3rd)
of which
the
object
was to stimulate the Ameer's
wish for an
alliance
by
convincing
him that
at
present
the
British Government
were
under
no
obligations
to him.
It
cannot be
said that
this
reasoning
was
altogether
free from
sophistry,
and its effect was
necessarily
unfavour-
able.
Lord
Lytton
contended
that,
under the
Treaty
of
1855,
the
Government
had
"contracted no liabilities whatever
on behalf
of
the
Ameer,"
not
even
reciprocating
his
pledge
to
be
"the friend of its
friends
and the
enemy
of
its enemies."
Nevertheless,
the
Treaty
certainly
bound
the Government
to
respect
the
territories
then in
the Ameer's
possession
and to
maintain
"
perpetual peace
and friend-
ship"
with
Afghanistan
—
commitments
capable
of a
very
restricted,
but also of a
very
wide,
interpretation.
Lord
Mayo's
undertaking
of
1869
had
gone
further,
while the
Simla
Agreement
of
1873, though
it
gave only
a conditional
promise
of
help
in the event
of
foreign
aggression,
in
reality
involved a
moral
and
even
a
political obligation
which the
British
Government would have
ignored
at their
peril.
It
was,
of
course,
competent
for Great
Britain at
any
time to
denounce her Treaties
altogether
in due
form,
as a
preliminary
either
to the conclusion of a
new
agreement
or to the
entire abandonment
of conventional
relations with
Afghanistan.
But confidence
in
her
good
faith
was certain to be weakened
by
an
attempt
to
prove
that
the
engagements
which had
existed
for
twenty years,
though
meaning
much to the
Ameer,
meant
nothing
at
all to his
supposed
friend
and
ally.
It
was an
inauspicious
fact that
Lord
Lytton
showed
so
little
readiness
to
view
the
question
from
the
standpoint
of
a
ruler
as
proud,
suspicious,
self-willed,
and
masterful as himself.
If
obliga-
tions
which the
Ameer
had
held
to
be,
though
insufficient,
at
least
genuine
so far as
they
went,
were
to be robbed of all
value,
it
was
hardly
reasonable to
expect
him to
enter with fervour
into
a
new
agreement
which
might
be diluted
at a
future date
in a
similar
manner.
6—2
84
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
A
white
light
is thrown
upon
the
frame of mind
in which
Lord
Lytton
proceeded
with his task
by
a
passage
in a
letter
which
he
addressed
a
little later to
Captain
Cavagnari,
the new
British
Agent
at Peshawur
(May
19th, 1877):
Mejudice,
the radical defect in the
conduct of our
past
relations
with
Shere
Ali
is
that the tone of it has never been in
wholesome
accordance
with the
realities
of our relative
positions
—
the
weakness of
his
position
and
the
strength
of
our
own We can
get
on
without
Shere Ali
;
he
cannot
get
on
without
us.
Ere
long
he
must
either
go
to
shipwreck
alto-
gether,
or
else return to the old
moorings
on the Peshawur
side
in a
temper
chastened
by
sharp
experience
1
.
The fact is
that,
from the
beginning,
Lord
Lytton
was
determined
to
drive
the
Ameer;
never
once
did
he
seriously try
to lead
him.
The Government
at
home
had,
so
far,
cordially
approved
all the
Viceroy
had done. "We must
completely
and
unflinchingly
support
Lytton,"
Lord
Beaconsfield
wrote
to the
Foreign Secretary (April
1st,
1877)
;
"we chose
him for
this
very
kind
of business."
The
support
which the
Viceroy
received
from
home
at this
juncture
was,
indeed,
so unreserved as
to
encourage
him to
greater
independence
of action
than he
had
yet
dared
to assert.
While
large
events were
shaping
themselves
in
Afghanistan,
a
smaller "forward
movement" was
carried out with
complete
success
in another
part
of the same frontier.
Energetic
soldiers
like Colonel
Sandeman
and Colonel Roberts
had
long
been
reconnoitring
on
the
borders
of Baluchistan.
Lord Northbrook
had sanctioned
overtures
to the
friendly
ruler
of that
State,
with a view
to
bringing
him
formally
under British influence
;
and Sandeman was
engaged
on
this
business when
Lord
Lytton
arrived.
Eventually, by
the
Treaty
of
Jacobabad,
concluded with
the Khan of Khelat
(December
8th,
1876)
Baluchistan
passed
under
British
protection,
and the
right
was
obtained
to station British
troops
at
Quetta.
British
influence was
also
strengthened
in
Chitral and
Gilgit
in the
north at the
same time.
The
incident
did not
improve
the
Ameer's
humour
or facilitate
the
proceedings
at
Peshawur.
In
the
midst
of the
Conference,
too,
his
Minister
Syud
Noor
Mohammad,
who
had
arrived there
sick,
died
(March
26th).
The
consequence
was
the
suspension
of
the
negotiations,
and
Sir
Lewis
Pelly
left
Peshawur
on
April
12th
without
1
Lord
Lytton'
s Indian
Administration,
p.
162.
In the same
work is
quoted
a
letter
of
August
27th,
1876,
in
which Lord
Lytton says
of the
Ameer:
"A
tool
in
the
hands of Russia
I
will never allow him
to
become. Such
a
tool
it
would
be
my
duty
to break
before
it
could
be
used."