Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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GREAT
BRITAIN
AND
THE ALABAMA
CLAIMS
65
he
had
thought
that
it
must
begin
;
but
war
was
not
his
goal.
He
had
no
goal
except
to
let
things
drift.
"
Grant
had
no
objects,
wanted
no
help,
wished
for no
champions.
The Executive
asked
only
to
be
let
alone.
This
was his
meaning
when he
said: 'Let
us have
peace
1
."'
The
only
danger
was,
lest the
policy
of
drifting
should lead to the
cataracts.
It
was the
business
of
Hamilton
Fish,
the
Secretary
of
State,
to watch
the
drifting;
and
he was
as
little of a war-maker
as
Adams
or
Motley.
Yet the
position
was
dangerous
and
the
danger
was intensified
by
the
very
simplicity
of General
Grant,
whose
message
to
Congress
on
December
5th,
1870,
on the
relations between the two
countries
was
by
no
means
friendly.
Fortunately,
the
British Govern-
ment
had
already
perceived
the
dangers
of
the
position.
The
Foreign
Enlistment
Act
of
1870
had been
passed
and on November
19th,
the
Cabinet
had considered
a
Memorandum,
drawn
up
by
Lord
Tenterden
of
the
Foreign
Office,
in which
it
was
asserted that "as
a
matter
of
national
exigency
there
must
be a
friendly
adjustment
of American
claims
2
." The American
Senate seemed
inclined to determine the
President's
policy
of
drift into
a
very
unfriendly
direction.
Lord
Clarendon
had
accepted
an Arbitration
Treaty
proposed by
the
American
Government.
This
the
Senate
had
thrown
out,
and it was
therefore
useless
to
suggest
that the
Alabama Claims
should
be sub-
mitted
to arbitration.
The
mystery
which
has
hitherto
wrapped
the
almost
unexpected
rapprochement
reached
by
the
two
Governments
has
been cleared
up by
Mr Lucien
Wolf
from
the confidential
docu-
ments to
which he
had
access
for
the
purposes
of his
Life
of
Lord
Ripon
s
. Lord
Tenterden
proposed
to
the
Cabinet
a
way
out
of
the
impasse.
He
suggested
that the two
Governments should
appoint
High
Commissioners to
consider
outstanding
matters
relating
to
Canadian Fisheries
and allied
subjects,
and
that the
proposal
should
emanate
from the British
Government
in such
a form
as to
lead the
United
States
Government to
accept
it
on condition that the
Alabama
Claims should
be included.
Sir
John
Rose,
a Canadian
lawyer
and
statesman,
who
had settled
in
England,
but
had
large
business
interests
in
America,
was
sent
to
Washington
to
sound
the
Government
and
to discuss
the
question
with
Hamilton Fish. The latter had
no
desire
for
war
and, indeed,
earnestly
wished for
reconciliation;
but it
was
necessary
that
he should
satisfy
the
potential
War
Party.
He
was,
therefore,
inclined
to insist on
expressions
of
regret
and
compensation
;
1
The Education
of Henry
Adams,
p. 267.
2
Life
of
the
First Lord
Ripon,
1.
238.
8
Ibid. I.
240.
W.&G. Ill
S
66
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
but
he
did not
press
this.
He,
no
doubt,
felt
that the British
Govern-
ment
would
go
as
far
as
possible
in
their
desire
for
peace,
and
that
a
hint
in the
right
direction
was,
as
it
proved
to
be,
sufficient. The
business
was
rapidly
carried
through.
On
January
26th,
1871,
a
Note
was
addressed
to
the United States
Government
proposing
a
High
Joint
Commission
on Canadian
Fisheries and similar
questions.
On
January
30th,
Fish asked that the
Alabama
Claims
should be included
in the
reference.
This was conceded
by
the
British
Government
on
February
1st,
and
on
February 3rd
the
American
acceptance
of
the
British
proposal
was
officially
notified.
Any
American
was
plainly
at
liberty
to
affirm the
simple
truth that
the British Government
had
yielded
to the
demand of
the
United
States Government
and had
referred
the
Alabama
Claims,
without
a
moment's
delay,
to
the
Joint
High
Commission. It
is
not often that
secret
diplomacy
has so
successfully
applied
methods
resembling
those of the
nursery
to the
pride
of nations.
The British
Commissioners
were
skilfully
chosen.
They
were Lord
de
Grey
and
Ripon,
representing
the
Government,
Sir
Stafford North-
cote,
representing
the
Opposition,
Sir Edward
Thornton,
the British
Minister at
Washington,
Sir
John
Macdonald,
Prime-Minister of
Canada,
and Professor
Montague
Bernard
who,
as
Chichele
Professor
of
International
Law at
Oxford,
knew
something
of
the
history
of
the
Anglo-American
doctrines
of
Neutrality,
Blockade and
Contraband.
Lord
Tenterden,
who invented
the
fair
and
simple
device,
was
the
appropriate
Secretary.
The
understood
process
was
followed,
when,
at
the third
sitting
of the
Joint
Commission,
the Alabama
Claims
came
up
for discussion.
On
April
8th,
Lord
de
Grey
expressed
"
the
regret
felt
by
Her
Majesty's
Government for
the
escape
of
the Alabama and
other vessels from British
ports
and
for
the
depredations
committed
by
these
vessels."
It
was the
truth,
and
Fish
accepted
it
from his
heart "as a
token
of kindness
1
." Then the bomb
fell.
The
American
Government
laid
its
cards
on
the table
and
proposed
that Great
Britain should
pay
as
compensation
an
agreed
gross
sum, or,
alternatively,
that
the
question
of
liability
should be referred
to a
competent
tribunal
;
but
that,
in
any
event,
the
following
principles
should be
applied
to
the decision
as to
the
Claims
:
"
1.
Any
Great
Maritime
Power
with
a
strong
Government
possessed
of the material
resources
requisite
to
enable
it to
perform
its
duties,
is
1
Despatches
from
the
High
Commissioners,
April
8th
and
ioth,
1871.
THE
AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS
67
bound
to
use
active
diligence
in
order to
prevent
the construction
or
getting
out,
arming,
equipping
or
augmenting
the
force,
within its
jurisdiction,
of
any
vessel
whereby
war
is intended to be
carried
on
upon
the ocean
against
a
Power
with which
it
is at
peace,
during
hostilities between
that Power
and its
insurgent
citizens
who
have
been
recognised
as
belligerents by
such
Great
Maritime
Power.
2.
When
such
vessel shall have
escaped,
such
Power
is
bound
to use
like
diligence
to correct
and detain
her
when she comes
again
within its
jurisdiction.
3.
Such
Power
is
further bound
to instruct its
naval forces in
all
parts
of the
globe
to arrest
and detain vessels
so
escaping,
whenever found
upon
the
High
Seas.
4.
Any
Power
failing
to observe either of the rules of
international
law
above
described,
is
justly
to be held
responsible
for
the
injuries
and
depre-
dations
committed
and
damages
occasioned
by
such vessels."
The British
Commissioners were
placed
in a
difficult
position.
The
American
proposals,
as
they
stood,
clearly
could
not
be
accepted;
and
yet
to
break
off the
labours of
the Commission
by
a definite
refusal
was an
impossible
alternative.
In
these
circumstances,
the Commis-
sioners,
led
by
Lord de
Grey,
advised
the
Cabinet
by telegram
on
March
15th
1
to
accept
the best that
could
be
wrung
from
the American
Representatives
:
namely,
that the American
proposals
as
amended
by
agreement
should
be
an
Instruction to an
Agreed
Tribunal.
The
Cabinet
had
assumed that
all
would
go
well
and
that the
British
Com-
missioners
would secure with ease a
solution that
would
reestablish
cordial
relations.
Everything
had been
done
to secure this. The
Foreign
Enlistment
Act,
1870,
though
of
course
it was not
international
law,
had carried
English
Municipal
Law
into an
equality
with the American
Law,
and
beyond
that
no
agreement
could
go.
The
American
proposals,
as
they
stood,
were
totally
inadmissible,
and
the
question
before a
distraught
Cabinet was
how far
the
principle
of
amendment could
be
trusted.
Lowe,
Cardwell
and
Goschen
were
opposed
to
any agree-
ment. Forster
and Sir Roundell
Palmer
were
firmly
in favour of
the
proposed
compromise.
Gladstone,
Lord
Kimberley
and Lord
Halifax
were
doubtful but were in favour
of
an
agreement.
Lord
Hartington
was
silent
and
doubtful
2
.
Commonsense
carried
the
day
—
common-
sense
and
trust
in the
carefully-chosen
Commissioners. The
Govern-
ment
agreed
to the
principles
as
amended,
while
insisting
that
no
1
Life of
Lord
Ripon>
i.
245.
2
See
Letters of Lord Granville and
W.
E.
Forster
to Lord de
Grey,
Life of
Lord
Ripon,
1.
246-7.
5—2
68
NEUTRALITY,
1866-1874
such
principles
were
in force when
the Alabama
Claims
arose
1
.
Thus,
the fateful
agreement
was made and
the
reliance
upon
Lord
de
Grey
and
his
colleagues
was well
justified.
The
Americans had
asked
more
than
they
expected
to
secure,
and so
obvious
was
this
that
they
abandoned
three-quarters
of
their
original
demands,
and
the
rules
of
guidance
for
the
Tribunal
of
Reference
went little
beyond
the rules of
the
British
Foreign
Enlistment Act
of
1819
2
.
Had
the American
Commissioners
asked
for
less,
they
would
have
secured more.
The
Treaty
of
Washington
was
signed
on
May
8th,
and
approved
by
the
Senate
on
May
22nd,
1871.
It
must have
created
considerable
satis-
faction
in America
to know that
Lord
Russell
declared
this a
British
surrender,
though,
on
June
12th
he withdrew
his
hostile
motion
in
the
House
of
Lords.
Indeed,
the whole
transaction was
designed
to save
the
feelings
of
everyone.
Lord
de
Grey,
writing
at the
beginning
of
June
to
Lord
Granville,
stated that
it
was
necessary
"to reconcile
by
some
compromise
more
ingenious
than
elegant
the
conflicting
desires
of
the
Senators,
President
and
Canadians,
without
letting go
the
substantial
objects
we had in view."
Those
objects
were
legitimate
and
desirable
:
the
preservation
of
peaceful
relations
and also
of a sound
policy
of
neutrality.
It
was
no
easy
task,
and
furnished
a notable illustration of
Ovid's maxim
—
obsta
principiis.
In
this
case,
the
remedy
seemed
likely
to come
too late.
Commonsense
had to
work
in an
atmosphere
laden
with
fire-damp.
No
protocols
of
the
daily proceedings
were
taken,
and
the
agreed
summaries
throw
little
light
on
the
struggle;
and
therefore,
as Sir
Stafford
Northcote
wrote to
Lord
Granville,
"
the
history
ofour
exploit
will never
be
written
as it
deserves
to
be,
and de
Grey
will
never
get
all the
credit
he deserves
for his
strategy.
...
I
have told
you
already
how
much de
Grey
has
impressed
us all
by
his
judgment,
tact
and
temper,
and
by
the
high
tone
he has maintained all
through
the affair
3
." Lord de
Grey
carried
the
Davy
lamp
which in a
very
dangerous
atmosphere
made
progress
possible
and
creditable to Americans and
English
alike.
The
Three
Rules contained
in
the
Treaty
of
Washington
ran
as
follows
:
"A Neutral
Government
is
bound:
First,
to
use
due
diligence
to
prevent
the
getting
out,
arming
or
equipping
within
its
jurisdiction
of
any
vessel
which it
has reasonable
grounds
to
believe
is
intended to
cruise,
or to
carry
on
war
against
a Power
with
which
it
is at
peace;
and
also to use
like
diligence
to
prevent
the
1
Despatch
from
the
High
Commissioners,
April 5th,
1871.
See
Life of
Lord
Ripon,
1.
24Q.
2
Letter
from Lord Tenterden of
March
6th, 1871.
3
Life
of
Lord
Ripon,
1.
251.
Fitzmaurice,
Granville,
II.
87,
89.
THE
TREATY
OF
WASHINGTON
69
departure
from
its
jurisdiction
of
any
vessel
intended
to cruise
or
carry
on
war
as
above,
such
vessel
having
been
specially
adapted,
in
whole
or in
part
within
such
jurisdiction,
to warlike
vise.
Secondly,
Not to
permit
or
suffer either
belligerent
to
make
use
of
its
ports
or
waters
as the base of naval
operations
against
the
other,
or
for
the
purposes
of the renewal
or
augmentation
of
military supplies
or
arms,
or
the recruitment of
men.
Thirdly,
to exercise due
diligence
in its own
ports
or
waters,
and
as to
all
persons
within its
jurisdiction,
to
prevent
any
violation
of the
foregoing
obligations
and
duties."
These Rules
were,
in
the
words of
the
Washington
Treaty,
adopted
by
the
British
Government
"
in
order
to
evince
its desire
of
strengthen-
ing
the
friendly
relations between
the two
countries
and
of
making
satisfactory
provision
for
the
future.
"
The
High Contracting
Parties,
therefore,
agreed
"to
observe these
rules as
between themselves
in
the
future
and
to
bring
them
to the
knowledge
of
other maritime
powers,
and to invite them
to
accede
to them."
The
First
Rule
hardly
went
beyond
the
Foreign
Enlistment
Act,
1819;
but
Dr
Westlake considers that
the
Second and
Third Rules
in
effect extended
to
territory
and
were not
limited to
"
ports
and waters
1
."
The
British
Government were
not,
however,
out
of
the troubled
waters.
In
1869,
Charles
Sumner,
in
the debates
on the
Reverdy-
Johnson
Convention,
had
put
forward
as
part
of the
Alabama
Claims,
claims
in
respect
of the
remote
consequences
of the
depredations
committed
by
the
Alabama,
the
Florida,
the
Georgia
and the
Shenan-
doah.
The
Commissioners
had
assumed
that
these
Indirect
Claims
had
been
abandoned,
and,
on
June
12th,
1871,
Lord Granville stated
that
they
had
disappeared
under the limited
reference
to the
Arbitrators. Lord
Cairns, however,
held
that
the
Treaty justified
the
American
demands
2
.
The
point
was a
very
fine one.
In
a
despatch
from
the
British
Commissioners of
March
8th,
1871,
it was
stated
that
the
United States
Government
did
not
put
forward the
Indirect
Claims,
and
that
this was
an
important
concession.
In
the
signed
Protocol,
it was
stated
that the
Indirect
Claims
might
be
revived
in
the
event
of
a
non-settlement.
Language,
indeed,
could
hardly
have
made
it
plainer
that
these
far-reaching
Claims were excluded
from the
Arbitration
;
but
they
were in
fact
put
forward in
the
American
Case
of
December
15th, 1871.
The
Cabinet
and
the
country
were
deeply
moved.
Russell,
Lowe,
Card
well,
Goschen and Gladstone
insisted
on
1
International
Law,
vol.
It.
War,
p.
222.
2
Wolfe,
p. 252.
Buckle,
Beacons
field,
v.
178.
70
NEUTRALITY,
1
866-1
874
our withdrawal
from the
Arbitration,
and
even Granville
rightly
became
doubtful
of American
goodfaith.
On
the other
side,
Hamilton
Fish
attempted
to
justify
the Claims on
the
ground
that
the
amicable
settlement
in
question
referred to the
first
alternative
in
the
original
American
proposal,
and
not to the case
of
an
arbitration.
His
position
was
arguable,
but
really
untenable,
and
the
outburst
of
public opinion
in
England
made
it
clear
to
American
statesmen
that
to
press
these
Claims was
to
ruin all.
General
Schenck,
the American Minister
in
London,
tried
once
again
to revert
to the first
alternative and secure
a
direct
settlement without
an
arbitration.
Sir
Stafford
Northcote,
in
an
interview,
made
it
clear
that this
was
impossible,
and on
April
24th,
1872,
General Schenck was
given
to
understand that
a
way
out must
be
found,
or
the
Treaty
was
at
an
end
1
.
Fish
found
the
way
out. He
decided to
"
ride
off
upon
an adverse decision
of
the Arbitrators
"
;
and,
once
again,
the
essential commonsense of
pacific
Ministers
found
a
method
of
saving
national
pride
and of
preserving
the
Treaty.
It
was
definitely
understood
that the Arbitrators
would rule
out these
In-
direct
Claims,
and
it
is
not
surprising
to
find
that the
records of
the
Arbitration
register
this
interesting
fact.
Secret
diplomacy
has
been
much condemned
;
but
it
is
only
fair
to
say
that it
was
secret
diplomacy,
and
secret
diplomacy
of
almost
childlike
simplicity,
that
placed
finally
the
relations
of
Great
Britain
and the
United States
of
America on a
basis which
not
even
the shock
of
the
War of
19 14
could
unsettle.
The
Arbitrators
were
duly
appointed
by
Great
Britain,
the United States
of
America, Brazil,
Italy
and Switzerland
in
accordance
with the
Treaty
of
Washington,
and
the
Tribunal of
the Arbitration
duly
met
at
Geneva.
After
no
less than
thirty-
two
sessions,
their decision
was
formulated,
on
September
14th,
1872.
Great Britain
had
to
pay,
in
respect
to
the
devastations
of
the three
ships
(the
Alabama,
the
Florida
and
the
Shenandoah), damages amounting
to
15,500,000
dollars.
It
is
not
necessary
here to deal
with the
proceedings
or
the
legal
arguments
2
.
Policy
ends,
or
should
end,
when
the
Court takes
seisin of
a case.
It
is
only necessary
to notice
two
points.
The
first
needs no
further
comment: the
Tribunal
ruled
out the
Indirect
Claims. The
second
concerned
the
construction
that the
Tribunal
put upon
the
words
"due
diligence
"
in
the first Rule
of reference.
Though
the
question
of
construction
could
not
affect the
agreement
to submit the Alabama
1
Fitzmaurice,
Granville,
n.
64.
2
See
Westlake,
u.s.,
also
Cambridge
Modern
History,
XII.
16-22,
and
legal
authorities
collected
by
L.
Oppenheim,
International
Law,
§335.
See also
J.
B.
Moore,
Arbitrations
(1.
653-9)
an
d
Phillimore,
International
Latv
(111. § 151
a)
for
the text
of
this record.
THE
SEA-POLICY
OF
NEUTRALITY
ESTABLISHED
71
Claims to
the
Tribunal,
the British Government
declined,
and
in-
evitably
declined,
to
be
bound in
future
by
this
construction.
The
Tribunal
held that the due
diligence
of
a nation
must be
in
proportion
to
the
risks to which either
belligerent
may
be
exposed
from
failure
to
fulfil the
obligations
of
neutrality
on
his
part.
Professor
Oppenheim
points
out
that,
had this been
generally
accepted,
"
the most
oppressive
obligations
would have become
incumbent
upon
neutrals.'
'
He
adds
that
no such
general
acceptance
has
taken
place
and
that
"
due
diligence"
must
have
its
regular
meaning
in
municipal
law,
namely
such
diligence
as can
reasonably
be
expected
when
all
the circumstances
and con-
ditions
of the
case are
taken
into
consideration
1
. With this
exception,
the
First
Rule was
adopted
by
the Second
Hague
Conference
of
1907
:
the
words,
"to
employ
the
means at its
disposal," being
substituted
for "to
use due
diligence."
Hence,
the
sole
difficulty arising
out
of
the Arbitration
has
disappeared.
"
These
Alabama
Rules,"
says
Dr
Westlake,
"
will
always
be memorable
in
the
history
of international
law,
not
only
as
having
been the means of
settling
a threatened
dispute,
but
as a first and not
unsuccessful
attempt
to
supply
some of the axiomata
media which
Bacon
taught
the
necessity
of
interposing
between
the first
principles
and the detailed
results
of
any
science,
and the
want
ofwhich
is
conspicuous
in
the
theory
of neutral duties."
The
Rules,
the
Treaty
of
Washington
and
the
subsequent
Arbitra-
tion
at
Geneva
represent
also the
climax of a
Sea-policy
of
Neutrality
which,
even
if
it
is
not consistent with the
highest peace
policy, brought
finally together
the two
greatest
maritime nations
in
the
world.
After
Geneva,
the
common
elements
of
this
policy
were
so
fully
understood,
that
in
the most
crucial
moments
of
stress
between
belligerent
Great
Britain
and
neutral United States
in
1915,
Mr
Bryan,
the
Secretary
of
State,
in
writing
to the
Chairman of
the
Senate Committee
on
Foreign
Relations,
frankly
declared
that
some
of the
doctrines,
which
appear
to bear
hardly upon
neutrals at
the
present
time,
are
analogous
to,
or
outgrowths
from,
policies
adopted
by
the
United States of America
when it
was
belligerent.
The
Government,
therefore,
cannot
consistently protest
against
the
application
of rules which
it
has
followed
in the
past,
unless
they
have
not
been
practised
as
heretofore
2
.
Such a
communication
between
two
great Departments
of
American
Government
was
the
direct
fruit
of
the
wisdom
with
which
Lord
Granville,
Lord
Selborne,
Lord
Ripon
and Sir
Stafford
Northcote
repaired
the
shortcomings
of
Lord
Russell and
brought
back
Sea-
policy
into the
lines
of reasonableness and
tradition.
1
International
Law,
§ 363.
2
State
Department Publication,
January
24th,
191 5.
CHAPTER II
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
I.
Forward Policy
in Central
Asia,
1
874-1
880
STATESMEN
in
India,
though differing
on
some
fundamental
questions
of
foreign
policy,
were
at
all times
agreed
in
regarding
the North-west
Frontier as the
Empire's greatest
source
of
anxiety,
and
Afghanistan,
lying
as it
did
between two
great
rival
Powers,
as
the weakest
link in an
imperfect
chain of
defence.
A
succession
of
Viceroys,
from
Canning
onwards,
taught by
the bitter lesson
of
1838-42,
had
adhered
to the
conservative
policy
of
letting Afghanistan
alone,
deeming
active intervention so hazardous as to
be
justified
only
by
the avoidance
of
still
greater
risks.
Opposed
to this school of
thought
was
the "forward"
party,
represented
particularly
in
military
circles,
which
wished
to
anticipate
a
development
of events
already
assumed
to be
inevitable,
and at
once
bind
all the frontier
rulers
and chiefs
to
the
British Government
by
means
of
alliances,
missions
and,
where
necessary,
subsidies
in
the
form of
money
and material of war.
The
problem
of the North-west Frontier
became serious
only
after
the annexation
of
Sind
(1843)
and
the
Punjab
(1849)
had
brought
the
Indian
empire
to the
belt
of
territory beyond
which
lay Afghani-
stan.
Although
not
forming
part
of
Afghanistan,
this
territory
was
inhabited
by
tribes,
more
or
less
lawless,
who
accepted
its ruler as
suzerain
and rendered
to
him
some sort
of
feudatory
service.
There
were
two
obvious
methods of
regulating
British relations
with
the
Ameer
and his
dependencies.
One
was to assert
political
influence
by
force,
and the alternative
was to trust
to the
moral
effect of
a
friendly
understanding,
formally
defined. The former of these lines
of
policy
had
been
tried
in
1838
with
disastrous
results;
and its failure
ensured
the
adoption
of
the
second,
which
was
consistently
followed for
over
thirty
years.
British
garrisons
were
stationed
at
strategical points
as
near to
Afghanistan
as was
prudent
;
but to
respect
the
independence
of
the
Ameer's
dominion and
refrain from interference
in
its internal
affairs was
still
regarded
as
an axiomatic
principle
of British
Policy.
The
accepted
bases
of the
political
relations
of
Great
Britain with
Afghanistan
were
contained
in
Treaties
and
Agreements
of
1855,
1857,
1869,
and
1873. By
a
Treaty
of
March
3rd,
1855,
concluded
THE
FRONTIER
QUESTION
AND
AFGHANISTAN
73
with
Dost
Mohammad
Khan
during
the
governor-generalship
of
Lord
Dalhousie
by
Sir
John
Lawrence,
as
Chief Commissioner
of
the
Punjab,
the
East India
Company
undertook
to
respect
the inde-
pendence
of
the territories
then in
the
Ameer's
possession
"
and never
to
interfere therein
"
;
while the Ameer
gave
a
pledge
that he would
be the
friend of the
Company's
friends
and the
enemy
of its
enemies.
By
a
Treaty
of
1857, arising
out of the
Anglo-Persian
War,
a
subsidy
was
promised
to Dost Mohammad
for
the
period
of the
War,
and he
agreed
to the residence at
Kabul,
Kandahar,
Balkh and
elsewhere of
British
officers for
controlling
its
employment,
as well
as
to the
maintenance
of
a Vakeel
at
Peshawur.
The officers
were to
be with-
drawn on the
cessation
of the
subsidy
;
but the Ameer was
to
receive
henceforth
at
Kabul a
permanent
Vakeel,
appointed by
the British
Government,
but not a British
officer,
and
he was still
to
be
represented
by
a
Vakeel
at
Peshawur. Both
Agents
were
duly
appointed
;
but the
Ameer's
was withdrawn
in
1858
and not
replaced.
Dost Mohammad
died in
1863, leaving
a
large
legacy
of
trouble
for his
kingdom
in
the
shape
of
sixteen
sons,
many
of whom
were,
at
one time
or
another,
mixed
up
in the internecine
disputes
of the
succeeding
two decades
—
some
as
active
claimants to the
Throne.
He had
named
his
third
son,
Shere
Ali,
as
his
successor,
and the
elder
brothers
gave
a
grudging
assent.
Although
in continual
conflict
with
his
own
kin,
Shere Ali
maintained his
position
for fifteen
years
with
but
one
break,
and
during
the
whole
of that
time was able to
count on
British
support.
While
Great
Britain
had
been
advancing
towards
Afghanistan
from
the
south,
Russia had
been
approaching
ever nearer
from the
north
;
and,
to
make the
resulting
situation the more
perplexing,
there
were
no exact
frontiers,
for
these had
changed
continually
with
the
fortunes of
war.
Already
in
1867,
Sir
John
Lawrence,
who followed
Lord
Elgin,
suggested
to the
Home
Government that it
would be
wise
to
make some
communication
on
the
Frontier
question
to
Petrograd
in
order to
obviate
possible
misunderstanding
in
the
future.
The
Government
replied
that
they
entertained no
anxiety regarding
Russia's
movements,
and
that the
establishment under her
auspices
of
order
and
civilisation in
backward
regions
was to be
preferred
to
the
continuance
of
the
existing
state of
unsettlement and
anarchy.
These
were
likewise
Lawrence's
views,
though
his
foresight
went
further. It is
customary
to
identify
him
in a
special
manner
with
the
policy
described
by
himself
as one of
"
masterly inactivity." Beyond
74
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1
874-1
885
doubt,
he was
hostile
to
any
measure
that
suggested aggression
or
encroachment,
or threatened
to
weaken the
confidence of the
Afghans
—
and herein
he was
maintaining
an old
tradition of
proved
wisdom.
While,
however,
he
was
far from
regarding
the
Russian advance
as
a
necessary
menace,
and
while
he
recognised
it
as no
less
inevitable
and
natural than the
corresponding
advance of British
authority
on
the other side
of
Afghanistan,
he also
saw
that it
contained the
possi-
bility
of
danger.
For that
reason,
he
was
eager
to come to
an under-
standing
with
Russia as to the
limits
within which the
spheres
of
influence of
the two countries
should
extend,
and the
transgression
of
which
by
Russia
should,
in his
view,
involve
her
in
"war
with
England
in
every part
of the
world." He
thought
the
time had
come
for this
understanding,
when,
after
absorbing successively
Tashkand
and
Khokand,
Russia
in
1868
occupied
Samarkand. As
regards
Afghanistan,
however,
he favoured to the end a
policy
of non-
intervention,
commended
by
a
money
subsidy
and
the
provision
of
arms to the Ameer
as
before,
with
an
undertaking
that Great
Britain
would
support
his
independence
so
long
as she could count
on his
fidelity.
The
policy
of Lawrence was
in
the
main
followed
by
the
Earl of
Mayo (1868-72),
though
with
a
concurrent
slackening
of the Ameer's
attachment and
cordiality. Having
been
given money,
Shere
Ali
demanded
more
and more of
it,
and
complained
when
it
was
not
forthcoming.
It
was
hoped
that a
meeting
between
the
Viceroy
and
the
Ameer,
which took
place
at Amballa
(March
27th-29th, 1869),
would
restore
the earlier
confidence.
Shere
Ali,
professing
fear of
Russia,
formally
asked for a
guarantee
of his
independence
and
security,
the
recognition
of his
younger
son,
Abdulla
Jan,
as
his
successor,
assistance
in the form of
arms
and
ammunition as
might
be
needed,
and a fixed
yearly
subsidy.
The
Indian
Government
opposed,
and
the Home
Government
rejected,
the demand
for
an
unconditional
guarantee,
and their
attitude
was
approved by
both
political
parties
at
the
time;
but the
Viceroy
was
authorised
to
promise
the Ameer
money,
arms,
and ammunition
at the full
discretion
of
his
advisers.
Interpreting
his Instructions
narrowly,
as he
was
bound
to
do,
all Lord
Mayo
could
promise
was
that the Ameer's
applications
for assistance would be received
always
"with considera-
tion and
respect."
The
question
of
the
Succession was evaded.
The
caution
and
reserve shown
by
his
Ally
disappointed
the
Ameer,
whose
alarm,
though
it
may
have
been
exaggerated,
was not