Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE
MISSION TO
KABUL
85
a
treaty.
Hereupon,
the
British
native
agent
at Kabul was
withdrawn,
and
for some months
there was
a
complete
break in
political
rela-
tions between
the
Governments of
India and
Afghanistan,
though
news
from Kabul
continued
to trickle
through
the
receiving
office
at
Peshawur.
The
negotiations
which had ended
so
unsatisfactorily
left both
sides
with
full
liberty
to
go
their
own
way,
and
both
claimed and
exercised
this
liberty.
For
a
time,
Lord
Lytton
applied
himself to
the task
of
working
out an alternative solution of
the
Afghan
Question
—
the method
of
disintegration.
Fearing
that
Shere Ali
had
irre-
trievably
slipped
out of his
hands,
he
contemplated
the
division of
his
kingdom,
thus
rendering
him
impotent
for
harm.
Soon events
in
Europe
made their
influence felt.
Smarting
under
the
humiliations which she had
there sustained at
Great
Britain's
hands,
Russia did not hesitate to
make
the most
of
her
advantages
in
Central
Asia. In the
summer
of
1878,
news was
received of
active
Russian
plottings
in
Kabul. In
July,
General
Stoletoff,
bearing
letters
from General
Kaufmann,
made his
way
to
the
Ameer's
capital,
where he
was
cordially
received.
If,
as is
maintained,
he took
back
with
him a formal
Treaty
of
Alliance,
it
was a
paper
arrangement,
for it
did not
help
Afghanistan
in
its later
difficulties. Convinced
that
the
time for resolute
action
had
now
come,
Lord
Lytton,
by urgent
entreaty,
obtained
the
Government's
permission
to insist on
the
immediate
reception
of a British
Mission.
Hitherto,
the door into
Afghanistan
had
been closed
by prejudice,
and
bolted and barred
by
suspicion
and
fanaticism. Now
he was
resolved to force
it,
though
he well knew the
dangers
which
lurked
behind,
for some of
his most
experienced
advisers
had
repeatedly
warned him of
them.
The
Envoy
chosen was Sir
Neville
Chamberlain,
who was to
be
accompanied
by Major
Cavagnari
1
;
Major
St
John,
Captain
Ham-
mick,
and
a medical
officer,
with
Kazi
Syud
Ahmed,
and
a
sufficient
escort.
It
was
necessary
that
the
Ameer
should be
informed
in
advance
by
a
native
emissary,
in
order
to
prepare
the
way
and to
allow of the
necessary
arrangements
being
made
for the
quiet
passage
of the Mission
through
Afghan
territory.
The
departure
of
this
advance
agent
was
delayed
owing
to
the death
of the
heir-appa-
rent,
Abdulla
Jan
(August 17th),
and
he
reached Kabul
only
on
1
The
testimony
of this
gallant
officer was
quoted
by
the
Indian
Government,
in
a
despatch
of
June
7th,
1875,
in
support
of
its
contention that the
Ameer
would
be
"most
unwilling
to receive a
British
agent
at
Herat."
86
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
September
10th.
The
Ameer
received
him
ungraciously
and
firmly
declined
the
proffered
overtures.
In the
meantime,
the Mission had
set
out.
Travelling by
the
Khyber
Pass
route,
it had
no sooner
reached
the
outpost
of
Ali
Masjid,
at
the entrance to the
defile,
than it
came to
a standstill.
There,
the
commander
of the fort
refused
permission
to
pass
his
lines.
In
reply
to
protest,
he
said that
he had no
authority
from the Ameer
to allow the
Mission to
go
forward,
and that
in its
absence
further
progress
would
if
necessary
be resisted
by
force. When
parley,
ex-
postulation
and threat
proved
unavailing,
the Mission returned
to
Peshawur
(September 23rd).
The news
of the
rebuff
offered to the
Mission met with a
mixed
reception
from the
British
Cabinet. The action of the Russian
Agent
and
of
the
Ameer
was,
of
course,
irregular
and
aggravating;
but
the
Viceroy's
impulsive
method of
countering
it
was felt to be indiscreet
and
inopportune.
For,
at this
time,
the
two Governments
in
Europe,
their
dispute
over
the Eastern
Question
having
been
adjusted,
seemed
at last
in
a
fair
way
of
coming
to a
complete
understanding
on the
Question
of
Central Asia.
Accordingly,
Lord Beaconsfield
and Lord
Salisbury (Foreign Secretary
since
March),
who
managed
the
more
important Foreign
Affairs in
partnership,
were both
opposed
to
the
idea of
rash
reprisals.
The
former was
certainly
in no
mood for a
second
rupture
with
Russia,
after
the first had
been healed so satis-
factorily.
He
did
not
forget
that
the
Treaty
of
Berlin,
quite
recently
concluded
(July
13th),
had
been
represented
by
him
as
an all-round
settlement
with
Russia in
Asia as
well as in
Europe.
The
country
had
responded
enthusiastically
to his Ave
"
Peace with honour
!"
when
he returned
from Berlin
;
"
but if
they
find
there
is
no
peace
they
will
soon
be
apt
to
conclude
there is also no
honour
1
."
He
was, therefore,
disposed
at
first to
condemn
the
Viceroy's
impetuous
action as
spoiling
the
good
work which
he and
his lieutenant
had
accomplished
in Berlin.
Headstrong
counsels
abounded
at that time.
"
Jingo"
voices in
India
and at
home
were
calling
in
chorus
for the
immediate chastise-
ment
of a
half-savage
ruler
who
had
proved
truculent
as
well
as
treacherous.
Without
any
concession
to
passion,
however,
there
were
grave
political
considerations
which
made
it
difficult to
overlook the
affront.
Western
authority
in
Oriental
countries is
based on
the
principle
that
prestige
is
power.
Many
moderate
men,
free from
1
Letter of
September 17th,
1878.
WAR
AND
PEACE
CONDITIONS
87
any
feeling
of
vindictiveness,
believed
that,
if
it were
to
go
forth
in
the
East
that
a border-chief
could
with
impunity
set
at
defiance
Great
Britain
and
the
Envoy
of the
Empress-Queen,
the
British
tenure
of
India
might
not
be worth
a
year's
purchase.
Rejecting
the
Viceroy's
request
for
permission
to
adopt
forcible
measures,
however,
the
Cabinet
decided
to continue
the
military
preparations;
but,
in the
meantime,
to
try
the effect
upon
the
Ameer
of another
message,
the
text
of
which,
for
caution's
sake,
was to
receive
its
explicit approval
before
despatch.
This
letter,
as authorised
by
the
Secretary
of State
on
October
31st,
and
delivered
to the
Afghan
commander at
Ali
Masjid
on
November
2nd,
demanded
from
the Ameer
an
apology
and
an
undertaking
to receive
a
permanent
British
Mission within
his
territory,
failing
which
his intentions
were
to be
regarded
as
hostile
and
he
was to
be treated
as a declared
enemy
of Great
Britain.
No
reply
to
the
British ultimatum
having
been received
within
the
time
limit
fixed
(November
20th),
three
British forces
of invasion
were
set in
motion
simultaneously.
The
northern
force,
under
General
Browne,
moved
on
the
Khyber
Pass,
taking
the
obstructive
fort
of
Ali
Masjid
and
then
Jellalabad,
so
clearing
the
way
to
Kabul;
the
centre
column,
under
Sir Frederick
Roberts,
followed
the
Kurum
Valley,
capturing
the Peiwar
Khotel
after
a
sharp engagement;
while,
in the
south,
Generals
Biddulph
and Stewart
operated,
the
former
advancing
from
Quetta
to
Pishin,
which
he
occupied
without
re-
sistance,
while the
latter took
command there
of the
Kandahar
expe-
ditionary
force,
which
he
brought
to its destination
on
January
9th,
1879.
Shere
Ali
had,
in the
meantime,
fled
from
Kabul into
Afghan
Turkestan
(where
he died
in
February), leaving
in command
his
son
Yakoob
Khan,
whom
he
had
liberated
after
long
imprisonment.
On
the
last
day
of
the
month,
his belated
reply
to
the
ultimatum was
received
:
no
apology
was
tendered,
but
he
agreed
to
a British Mission.
No
attempt
was
made
by
the Russians to increase the invaders'
difficulties.
On the outbreak
of
hostilities
the Kabul Mission
with-
drew into
its own
territory,
and,
when the Ameer
appealed
for
assistance,
he
received
only
the
good
advice
to
make
peace.
Authority having
been
thus
asserted,
peace
was
offered
to
Afghanistan
on terms which
practically
realised the
Salisbury-Lytton
programme. Unfortunately,
it
had
to be
concluded
with the
make-
shift
ruler,
Yakoob
Khan,
in default of
anyone
holding
authority
by
the known will of the
Afghan
people.
It
was
signed
on behalf
of the
Queen
by
Cavagnari,
who was
associated
with
the "forward"
88 FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1
874-1 885
policy
from
the
beginning
to its
tragic
denouement.
By
the
Treaty
of
Gandamak
(May
26th),
the
Ameer
agreed
to conduct his
foreign
relations
in
accordance
with
the
advice
and
wishes of
the British
Government,
to
enter into no
engagements
with
foreign
States,
and
not
to take
up
arms
against
any
such
States
except
with British con-
currence.
Kandahar and
Jellalabad
were
to be returned
to the
Ameer
so soon
as his
Government was reestablished
;
but
Great
Britain was
to
acquire
certain
frontier
districts and to retain
control
of
the
Khyber
Pass and
the
Pishin,
Sibi
and
Kurum districts.
On
the other
hand,
the
British Government
were to have a
Resident
in the
country,
with
the
right
of
stationing
British
Agents
to such
parts
of the
Afghan
frontier as occasion
might
require,
so as to
guarantee
Afghanistan
against
unprovoked
foreign aggression,
and to
pay
a
regular
and
increased
subsidy.
No time
was lost in
accrediting
a British
Envoy
to the new Ameer.
Yakoob Khan had
suggested
Kabul as
the
place
of
residence,
and Sir
Lewis
Cavagnari, having
been chosen for the
post,
arrived there with
his suite on
July
24th.
The
reception
of the
Mission was
"
everything
that could be desired
1
";
and
Cavagnari's
first
month
in the
Afghan
capital
confirmed
the first favourable
impressions.
A
letter
from
him
of
August 30th
to the
Viceroy,
though
not
making
light
of
a difficult
and still obscure
position,
seemed confident
and
betrayed
no
anxiety.
At
the
end of
the letter
he
regretted
that the
entry
of the Mission
into
Kabul
had
been
ignored by
the Press
at
home,
and added
his fear
that "the
British
public require
a
blunder and
a
huge
disaster to
excite
their
interest." The fear
was to
be
justified.
Three
days
later,
the
Residency
was
attacked
by
a
body
of mutinous
Afghan
troops
from the Herat
garrison,
and the members of
the
Embassy
were
brutally
massacred.
The
effect of the crime in India
was
stupefying,
while
a
cry
of
horror
went
through England.
Stunned
though
he
was
by
a disaster
which seemed
to turn
the
proud
boast of
"
Peace
with honour"
into
a cruel
jest,
Beaconsfield in that
trying
crisis
exercised
statesmanlike
restraint.
Not
once
did
he lose head or
nerve,
or
palter
to the bar-
barous
cry
for
crude
revenge.
It
was
clear
that
the
Treaty
of Gandamak
must be
regarded
as null
and
void,
and new
arrangements
devised
in
its
place.
If Yakoob
remained faithful
and the
Sirdars rallied to
him,
Beaconsfield
thought
Great Britain
ought
not
to abandon
him;
if,
1
Letter of
Cavagnari
to Lord
Lytton,
July
24th,
1879.
{Lord Lytton's
Indian
Administration,
p. 342.)
THE
POLICY
OF DISINTEGRATION
89
however,
the Ameer
was
dead or had
fled,
the
right
course
would
be
to
consolidate
the
military
frontier,
and
retain
Kandahar;
though,
for
the
rest,
Afghanistan might
be left to fall
into
pieces,
if it
must,
and
be
partitioned amongst
feudatory
chiefs.
This
was,
in
effect,
the
policy
of
"disintegration" upon
which
Lord
Lytton
had
long
before
been
prepared
to
fall
back,
if all methods of
conciliating
the Ameer
and
converting
him into
a
trustworthy
ally
failed.
A
long
and
toilsome road had
still to
be
trodden,
before the
situation in
Afghanistan
became
sufficiently
clear to make
possible
the
adoption
of
any
kind of
policy
for
the
regulation
of the
country's
future relations with
India and Great
Britain.
Of
the
ensuing
War
the most
notable
incident
was
General Roberts's
brilliant
march
to
Kabul,
which he entered
on October
12th.
Yakoob
Khan
had
already
surrendered himself
to the
British
camp
with his
Ministers. As
the
result of a strict
legal investigation,
he
was
acquitted
of
complicity
in
the
massacre,
but was held to be
culpable
in
that he had not
interposed
effectively
for the
protection
of the Mission as
he
might
have done.
Such of
the
ringleaders
in
the massacre
as
could
be
brought
to
justice
were
put
to
death.
Yakoob
was
not loth to
abdicate,
and
he was
sent into
India for
safety.
His
departure
was the
signal
for a
revolt
throughout
the
Kabul
region
which was not
suppressed
until
the end of
December.
Through-
out
1880, however,
there was
intermittent
fighting
in the frontier
districts.
Word had
gone
forth from
the India
Office in
London,
which
now allowed itself to
be
entirely
led
by
the
Viceroy,
that
Afghanistan
was no
longer
to exist as a
united
dominion.
Lytton's
idea was the
formation of a
new
western
kingdom,
with
Kandahar
as its
capital,
covered
by
a
British
cantonment
at
Pishin,
and
constituting
a
tributary
State
of the Indian
empire;
and,
in
April,
Shere
Ali,
a cousin of the
late
Ameer,
was
experimentally appointed
Governor of this
territory.
Before
further
progress
with
the
settlement of
the
country
could
be made on
these
lines,
political
events at
home
created a
new situa-
tion.
Encouraged
by
the success of the
Ministerial
candidates in two
bye-elections,
Lord
Beaconsfield
dissolved
Parliament in
April.
The
election
was
fought
over
the clear issue of
Foreign
and
Colonial
Policy,
and
the
result
showed
that
swing
of
the
pendulum
which
is so
characteristic of
British
political
opinion.
Once
more,
the
nation
pro-
claimed
its
distrust
of
any
extreme
course of
policy
and its
instinctive
preference
for
the
line of
caution
and
safety.
In all
the three
kingdoms,
in
counties
and
boroughs
alike,
the
Government
suffered
a
crushing
90
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
defeat.
For
the
Prime-Minister
the
result
was
a
final
fall,
and it
says
much for
the
chivalry
of
English
party
life
that the
sympathies
of not
a
few
of his
political
opponents
accompanied
the old
master
of
state-
craft,
enfeebled,
disillusioned,
and
broken,
into
his
lonely
retirement
at
Hughenden,
where he died a
year
later
(April
19th,
1881).
The
work
of settlement and
reorganisation
was
completed
under
the
viceroyalty
of the
Marquis
of
Ripon.
For,
with
right
feeling
and
great
good
sense,
Lord
Lytton
decided not
to
outstay
in
office the
renunciation
and
reversal
of his
policy,
and
he
resigned
with the
Government
to
whose
confidence he owed a
dramatic,
if
trying,
ex-
perience.
It was
impossible
to restore without modification
the
status
quo
ante helium.
The
idea
of
annexation was
abandoned,
and
it
was
decided
to
evacuate
Afghan
territory
and leave the
Afghans
as much
as
possible
to themselves
—
which was all
they
asked.
A
timely
auxiliary appeared
in the
person
of Abdur
Rahman
(son
of Shere
Ali's half-brother
Mahommad Afzul
Khan),
who
had
just
returned
from exile
in Russian
territory.
On
July
22nd,
1880,
he was installed
Ameer
in
Kabul,
after his
acceptance
of
the
arrangements
made
by
the
Treaty
of
Gandamak,
with two
exceptions
: Kandahar was
to be
under
a
separate
ruler,
and the
admission
of a British Resident was
not
to be
pressed, though
it
was
suggested
that
by
mutual
agreement
a Mohammadan
Agent
of the
British
Government
might
be
stationed
at
Kabul for
convenience
of
intercourse.
Subject
to
his
compliance
with
these
conditions,
the Ameer was to receive a
guarantee
against
external
aggression.
The retention of
Kandahar
was not of
long
duration. While
the
negotiations
with Abdur Rahman were in
progress, Ayoob
Khan,
a
younger
son of the late
Ameer,
who had asserted himself
at
Herat,
began
an advance on the
town. General Burrows
set out
thence to
oppose
him,
but suffered
a
disastrous
reverse
at Maiwand
(July
27th).
Kandahar
being
hard
pressed,
General
Roberts,
with
10,000
picked
men,
carried
out between
August
nth
and
31st
his famous
march
of
313
miles
from Kabul to
the
beleaguered
city,
before
the walls
of
which
he
engaged
and
routed
the
aggressor
(September
1st).
The
subsequent
withdrawal
of
the British
garrison
from
Kandahar
again
encouraged
Ayoob
Khan,
who had reestablished
himself
at
Herat,
to
attempt
its
capture,
and
in
the
following July
he succeeded.
In
September,
however,
Abdur
Rahman,
having
consolidated
his
position,
defeated
the
pretender
and
chased
him across the
frontier,
thus
making
himself master of
the whole of
Afghanistan.
REVOLT
IN HERZEGOVINA
91
II.
The Reopening of
the
Eastern
Question,
1
875-1
877
A.
The
Revolt in
Herzegovina
and
Bosnia,
1
875-1
876
At the
beginning
of
the
'seventies,
almost the
entire
Balkan
penin-
sula,
from
the
Mediterranean to the southern
and south-eastern
frontiers of
Austria-Hungary,
with
the
exception
of
Greece,
still
continued
under
either the direct
sovereignty
or
the
suzerainty
of
Turkey.
Roumania,
formed
out of the
provinces
of
Moldavia
and
Wallachia in
1861, Servia,
a
principality
since
1830,
and
Montenegro
had
alike
obtained
virtual
autonomy, though
they
were still
tributary
States. Hellas was
a
kingdom,
but
only
in
parts
;
for a
large
irredenta,
including Thessaly
and
Epirus,
remained outside the
limits of
the
monarchy,
as determined
in
1830.
The
European
empire
directly
subject
to the Sultan
comprised
Bulgaria,
Roumelia,
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina,
Albania,
Thessaly, Epirus,
Thrace,
and
Macedonia.
Within these still
centrally governed
provinces
there existed
great
diversity
both
of race and
religion,
and
the broad rule
everywhere
applied
that,
while the adherents of the
Moslem faith
practically
escaped oppression,
they
systematically
oppressed
their
neighbours.
The
Christian
populations
were
deprived
of the
commonest liberties
and
rights
of
citizenship,
as
understood in Western
countries;
they
enjoyed very
inadequate
protection
before the
law
;
the
small
peasantry
laboured under bad
land-laws;
taxation
was
everywhere arbitrary,
exorbitant,
and
ruthlessly
enforced.
Inter-racial
rivalry
strengthened
the
hands
of the Turkish
rulers,
who
played
off one
people
and
one
faith
against
another,
having
learned
by
long
experience
that,
in
proportion
as
the
subject
populations
were
divided,
it
became easier
to
misgovern
them with
impunity.
Lord
Aberdeen had
predicted
that
the
Crimean War
would
secure
the Peace of
Europe
for a
quarter
of a
century.
It
was
hoped
that
Turkey
would take to heart the
need for
internal
reform,
the
duty
of
which had
so
often
been
impressed
upon
her.
She
did
little
or
nothing;
and,
where bad
political
conditions
do not become
better,
they
usually
become
very
much worse.
The harshness
of
Turkish
rule
underwent
no
alleviation
in the
Balkans, and,
in
the
absence
of
Constitutional
government,
revolt was
the
only
vent
for
pent-up
discontents.
In
July,
1875,
news
reached the
Governments
of
Europe
that
the
Christian
population
of
Herzegovina,
exasperated
by
the extortions
92
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1
874-1
885
of
the
tax-gatherers,
had risen in
revolt.
For a
time,
the news
attracted
little
attention,
and
it was
assumed
that
the
outbreak would
exhaust
itself
in the
usual
way.
Instead of
this,
the
movement
spread
to
Bosnia,
and
it was soon seen that
the
Porte
had to deal with
an
insurrection
of
a
dangerous type.
In
one
of
their
proclamations,
the
insurgents
declared their determination
"to
win
liberty
or
to die to
the
last
man." From the
first,
Servia and
Montenegro
were
profuse
of
sympathy
with
their
kinsfolk,
and
much
surreptitious
support
found
its
way
to the seat
of
disturbance
;
but
strong
hands
restrained
them from
joining
in
the
quarrel.
Russia
and A
ustria-Hungary
were
particularly
interested in the
w
elfare
of the
Balkan
populations
—
the
former as
the head
of the
Slavic fami
l
y
of nations
and the
self-constituted
protector
of the
Christian
races
living
under
Ottoman
rule,
the
latter
as a
semi-Slavic
State sensitive
to
every
outside
movement
directed
towards
the ex-
tension
of the
Panslavic idea. Russia
was not
inclined
to
interpose
in the
insurrection,
so
long
as
it
seemed to
be
prospering,
since
it
was
her
policy
to
encourage
the
autonomy
of
the
Slavic
provinces
of
the Ottoman
empire
in
the
hope
that
they
would look to
her for
more
di
rect
protection.
To Austria
the
insurrection was
unwelcome for
two
reasons.
Not
only
was
it
a
menace to her
own
tranquillity
and
security,
but Count
Andrassy,
who
had
succeeded
Count Beust in
the control
of
Foreign
Affairs in
1871,
had
long
cherished the
hope
of
seeing
the revolted
provinces
pass
one
day
under
Habsburg
rule.
Without
Bismarck's
quick sagacity,
Andrassy
was not
less clear
and deliberate
in his aims
than
the
German Chancellor had
been,
and,
when
it
seemed
necessary
,
as
unscrupulous
as he in his
choice of means.
IIisL42aram.Qunt
concern
was
Austria's
self-preservation,
and,
if
the
annexation
of
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
was
part
of
his
Balkan
policy,
he
sought
aggrandisement,
not for its
own
sake,
but
as
a
safeguard
against
disintegration.
To
make
Austria
more
Slavic
seemed
to him
the
only
alternative
to her
becoming
less
so.
Nevertheless,
he had no
wish
to
see the
Ottoman
empire
violently
dissolved.
It
was
no
part
of
his
plan
that
Austria should
even
play
the
part
of a
gendarme
in
Turkey,
and
for
the
present
he
was
unwilling
either to
take
or
to
sanction
any
step
that
would
weaken
her.
His
line of action
as
regarded
the
coveted
provinces
in
particular
was,
instead of
driving
out
the
Turks,
to
support
them in
possession
so
long
as
they
showed
themselves
amenable
to
reasonable
influence,
but
to
supplant
them
so
soon
as,
owing
to their own
folly
or
weakness,
their
position
became
THE CONSTANTINOPLE EMBASSIES
93
untenable
1
.
In no event was he prepared
to tolerate the
creation
on
Austria's frontiers of
a
strong
Slavic
State,
whether
in the
form of a
Greater
Servia or in that of
a Greater
Montenegro.
Germany's
attitude
towards
the Balkan
Question,
on
the other
hand,
was one of
entire detachment and
freedom
from sentiment.
Bismarck would
rather
have seen
the Christian
subjects
of the
Sultan
governed
well
than
ill,
and he
preferred peace
to
war,
almost as much
in
other
countries as in his
own
;
but
the
only question
that was vital
to
him
was
the interest of
Germany,
and that
interest
required
the
maintenance of
good
relations between all
three
Eastern
Powers.
The relation of
Great
Britain to
Turkey
was still that
of a
more or
less
candid
friend,
deeply
concerned to
preserve
the
Ottoman
empire
from
dissolution,
yet
conscious
that
this
purpose
could
only
be
attained in so far as
Turkey
showed the
will
and the
power
to
reform
herself. The
positive
side
of this
policy
had
not of
late been
urged
with
undue
emphasis.
The
British
Representative
at
Constantinople
at that
time was Sir
Henry
Elliot,
who since
1867
had
wielded
an
influence
recalling
in
some
respects
that of Stratford
Canning,
that
earlier
"voice of
England
in
the East." His
position
was
unique.
In
that
home of
intrigue
and
insincerity,
where
suspicion,
jealousy,
backbiting,
and
calumny
then made
up
a
large part
of
the substance
of
political
life,
only
a man of
strong
character
and
unsullied
probity
could
hold
his
own with
dignity,
and this
Elliot
succeeded
in accom-
plishing
2
.
Keeping
aloof
from
all
scheming,
he as a
consequence
enjoyed
the
confidence of all
the
schemers,
and
even
of
the chief
of
them,
his
Russian
rival,
IgnatiefF,
who was
distrusted as much
by
the
Porte as
by
his
diplomatic
colleagues,
now
habituated
to
their
doyen's
vanity,
unveracity,
and
deceit.
After
Elliot and
IgnatiefF
hardly
any
other
diplomat seriously
counted at
Constantinople.
The
German and
Austro-Hungarian
Am-
bassadors
cooperated
more
or
less
closely
with
their
Russian
colleague
;
such
weight
as
France
carried
at
the
time
usually
went
to
the
British
side,
for
Elliot
had
done his best to
encourage
cordial
relations between
that
Power
and
the
Porte,
thus
securing support
for his efforts
to
1
See
Wertheimer,
Graf
Julius Andrdssy,
sein
Leben und seine
Zeit,
II.
260-1.
2
A
letter
written
early
in
1878
to
Lord
Derby
by
Sir
Austen
Henry
Layard,
Elliot's
successor,
soon
after
his
arrival
at
Constantinople,
is
interesting
as con-
taining
an
experienced
English
diplomatist's
clear-cut
first
impressions
of
political
life
there.
"One
lives
here,"
he
said,
"in
an
atmosphere
of
intrigue,
corruption,
and
rascality
that
only
those who have
personal
experience
of
the
place
can
appre-
ciate.
It is
Byzantium
over
again.
The
threatened fall
of the Turkish
empire
can
be
sufficiently
accounted
for
by
this state of
things" (February
20th, 1878).
94
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1
874-1
885
counteract
anti -Turkish influence. The Italian Ambassador
was
also
a
safe
auxiliary.
No
foreign
Representative
enjoyed
so
largely,
and
none
deserved
so
well,
the
confidence which was
reposed
in Elliot
by
Sultan,
Grand-
Vizier,
and Ministers
alike.
No
important
foreign,
and few
domestic,
decisions were
taken
without consultation with
him,
and it is
creditable
to
his
candour and
judgment
that
he
could
be relied on to
give
—
if not
always
with
sufficient decision
—
the advice which the
circumstances
demanded
1
.
He was in
truth
a constant and trusted
power
behind
the
Throne.
To
the Grand-Viziers
he
openly
spoke
of
himself
as
"
a
friend
of
Turkey,"
and this attitude found
its
complement
in bitter
hostility
to,
and
unreasoning
distrust
of,
Russia
—
sentiments
which
he
did
his
utmost to foster
at
home.
Nevertheless,
it
is
questionable
whether
Elliot's
absorbing
attach-
ment to
Turkey
and
her interests
was
really
advantageous
either
to
that
country
or to
his
own,
inasmuch
as
it
inevitably
blinded
him to
Turkish
shortcomings.
Further,
by
acting
as the
Porte's
unofficial
adviser,
he
did
much
to undermine the
independence
of the
Sultan
and his
Ministers,
who
gradually
came
to look
to
Great
Britain
for
guidance
and
support
as of
right,
so that
their
sense
of
responsibility
was
weakened,
together
with their
capacity
and
will to
act
vigorously
in
any emergency.
In
accordance
with his
Instructions,
Elliot's influence was
directed
towards
restricting
the area
of disturbance
and
persuading
the
Porte
to lose
no time
in
restoring
order
and
removing
the
causes
of
dis-
content.
He held
strongly
to the
opinion
that the
Sultan should
be
left to
quell
the disturbance without interference
of
any
kind from
the
outside,
and for this
opinion
he won
both Lord
Derby,
the
Foreign Secretary,
and
the Prime-Minister.
Instead of
taking
steps
to redress the
grievances
underlying
the
revolt,
the Porte
as usual
did
nothing,
even for
a
time
making
no
attempt
to restore
order.
From the
first,
it
had
regarded
the whole
movement
as
insignificant
and
negligible,
like a moorland
fire
that
would
burn itself
out
in
a
night.
Meanwhile,
the insurrection
spread,
and
volunteers
from
Dal-
matia, Servia,
and
Montenegro
threw
themselves
in
increasing
numbers
into
the
struggle
with
the
common
enemy.
The
subject
soon
found
its
way
into the House of
Commons,
where
there was much
plain
speaking
about
the
slow
progress
of
reform
in
Turkey,
insomuch
1
"Upon
questions
of
importance
it
is to
Great
Britain
and
not
to
Russia
that
the
Porte turns
for counsel." Elliot to
Lord
Derby,
July
4th,
1875.