Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE PORTE'S DEFIANT
ATTITUDE
115
that of
Turkey
had
been
weakened
by
her
obstinacy
and
short-
sightedness.
In
spite
of
the
suspicion
under
which
she
had entered
the
Conference,
it
was
admitted
that Russia
had
honestly
and
tem-
perately
striven for a
modus
vivendi,
and
that for the
failure
to
discover
one no
blame attached to
her.
Cleared,
to
that
extent,
in the
eyes
of
Europe,
she now
endeavoured to
induce the
Powers to
acknowledge
her
as
their
mandatory
in a
further
attempt
to
bring
the Porte
to
reason.
Wisely
or
not,
their
consent was
withheld.
III.
The
Russo
-Turkish War
and
the
Treaty
of
San
Stefano,
1
877-1
878
After the
abortive
Constantinople
Conference,
conversations
were
continued for a time in
London,
and on March
31st
the Powers
laid
before
the Porte a
Protocol,
requiring
the
adoption
of
measures
for
the
amelioration,
without further loss of
time,
of the
condition
of
the
Christian
populations
in the
European
provinces
of the
empire.
The
warning
was
added,
that
any neglect
to
carry
out
the under-
takings
demanded
would be deemed
incompatible
with the
interests
of
the
Powers,
as
of
Europe
in
general,
and would
cause them
to
consider
what
steps
the
consequent
situation
might
call for.
Turkey
was, also,
urged
to
negotiate
with Russia
at
once,
with
a view
to
mutual
demobilisation,
so soon as
peace
had
been
concluded
with
Montenegro.
The Porte
replied
(April
9th,
1877), protesting against
this further
admonition as an
unjustifiable
encroachment
upon
the
Sultan's
sovereignty
and
independence.
It
was
willing
to meet
the Powers
on
some
points,
but
on
all
that
it
deemed vital
it
was
inflexible.
It
repudiated
any
outside
right
to
interfere
in
Turkish
affairs in
future,
but,
while
refusing
to
yield
to
force,
reaffirmed
its
intention
to
carry
out
its
own
reforms. The
answer
was
regarded
as a
challenge
to
Russia
;
the
British
Ambassador in
Constantinople
so described
it to
the
Grand-Vizier,
who
admitted
that it
had
been
designed
to
bring
matters to a
crisis
and
force Russia to
make
a full disclosure
of
her
intentions.
There
was,
in
fact,
an
influential
war
party
in the
Sultan's
entourage,
and
the
Mussulman
population
in the
provinces
was
eager
to
cross
swords
again
with
the old
enemy.
Lord
Derby
in
London
and
the
British
Ambassador in
Constantinople
did
their best
to
persuade
the
Porte to
accept
the
Protocol,
but in
vain;
for
it was a
settled
principle
of
Turkish
policy always
to
offer
to
do
something
8—2
n6
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
less
than the
situation
required.
When,
at
last,
the
Sultan,
overcoming
the
resistance
of
the
war
faction,
agreed
to
invite the
mediation
of
the
Powers,
it was
too
late;
for Russian
troops
were
already
crossing
the
Pruth
and
the Asiatic
frontier of
Turkey.
A
drastic
solution of the
Eastern
imbroglio
had now
become
inevitable.
In
spite
of all his
public
declarations to the effect
that
the
maintenance of the
independence
and
complete
integrity
of
the
Ottoman
empire
was a fundamental
principle
of British
policy,
even
Lord Beaconsfield
had,
in
private
intercourse,
already
abandoned
that
position.
There
was, indeed,
a
large
element of
opportunism
in
the
policy
which he was
pursuing,
nor could
it
be
pretended
that
he
knew from the
beginning
how
far,
or even
in what
precise
direction,
that
policy
would take
him.
The arena of
diplomatic
conflict was
for
him more or less new
ground,
and
the
experience
of
the
past
afforded
but
little
help
towards
any
constructive solutions of the
problems
which
had arisen. His
attitude on
the
territorial
question
in
particular
was
for
a
long
time undecided and
obscure,
and
changed
continually.
While
labouring
under the
irritation caused
by
the
Bulgarian
Atroci-
ties,
he had
been
prepared
to
neutralise
Constantinople
with its
vicinity
and make
it
a free
port
"in
the
custody
and under
the
guardianship
of
England,
as
the Ionian Isles were
1
."
Immediately
before the
Constantinople
Conference,
he
thought
of
purchasing
from
Turkey
a
port
on the
Black Sea
—
Batoum,
Sinope,
or Varna
—
as a
means of
neutralising
Russian
action
2
. In a
letter written
to
the
Foreign Secretary
when the
Conference was
over,
he
adroitly
analysed
''the famous
phrase
'
integrity
and
independence,'
"
and drew
the
con-
clusion
that an
empire
might
retain its
integrity
even
though
its limits
were
curtailed,
and that
the
continuance of
sovereign
power
was
independent
of
any
question
of
territorial area
3
.
"
If
war
begins,"
he
wrote
to Lord
Derby
a
few
days
later,
"
I think
it
will end
in
partition."
War
actually began
on
April
24th,
and
therewith
the Ottoman
political system
passed
again
into the
crucible.
Russia had
already
concluded
a
Convention with
Austria-Hungary (January 1st)
by
which
Servia,
Montenegro,
and
the
strip
of
territory lying
between
these
two States
and
forming
the
sandjak
of
Novi-Bazar, were,
in
the
1
Letter to
Lord
Derby,
September
4th,
1876.
2
Conversation with
Gathorne
Hardy,
November
28th,
1876.
Gathorne
Hardy,
First
Earl
of
Cranbrook:
a
Memoir,
1.
377.
3
"England
and
Austria
and
France
will assert their
integrity,
and
expect
it
to
be
acknowledged, though
they
have
all
of
them
lost more
provinces
than
Turkey."
Letter
of
January 29th,
1877.
THE RUSSO-TURKISH
WAR
117
event
of
hostilities,
to be
treated as neutral.
A
supplementary
Con-
vention,
of March
18th,
determined
the territorial
changes
upon
which
the
two Powers were
to
insist
if
the
dissolution of the Turkish
empire
followed.
Austria
was to
receive,
in
permanence,
Bosnia
and
Herze-
govina
with
a
population
of
a million and
a
quarter,
while
Novi-Bazar
was
to be
divided
between Servia and
Montenegro.
Russia was
to
receive
Bessarabia from
Roumania,
and to
have
discretionary
power
to make
acquisitions
in Asia Minor. The
Convention thus
yielded
to
Austria-Hungary,
without that Power
needing
to draw
the sword
or
to
mobilise
a
single
battalion,
all
that
Andrassy
wished.
On
April
16th,
Russia
concluded a further Convention with
Roumania,
permitting
the
passage
of an
army
of invasion
through
that
State,
while
the
Tsar
pledged
himself to maintain
and defend its
existing integrity.
At
the
end
of
the
month,
Montenegro
resumed hostilities as Russia's
ally.
In a Circular
Letter addressed to the
Powers,
Gortchakoff claimed
justification
for the action
taken,
on the
ground
that the Porte had
refused
to listen to
reason.
"Nothing
remains,"
he
added,
"except
to
let this state of
things
continue,
or
to obtain
by
force
what
the
Powers have
failed to obtain
by
persuasion."
In
his
reply
to this
letter,
Lord
Derby
declined to admit that the
Porte's answer
of
April 9th
"removed
all
hope
of
deference on
its
part
to
the
wishes
and
advice of
Europe
and of
security
for
the
application
of the
suggested
reforms,"
and
disputed
the
assumption
that
the
course
which
Russia was
following
was
"in
accordance
with
the
sentiments
and interests
of
Europe."
The
British
Government declared their intention
to
observe
neu-
trality,
so
long
as the
interests held to be vital to Great
Britain
were
respected.
These were stated
to
be the maintenance of
complete
freedom
of
communication between
Europe
and the East
by
means
of the Suez Canal
;
the exclusion of
Egypt
from the
sphere
of
military
operations;
and
the
recognition by
Russia of
the
inviolability
of
Constantinople
and
the
navigation
of
the
Bosphorus
and the Darda-
nelles.
Gortchakoff furnished assurances
upon
all
these
points.
The
acquisition
of
Constantinople
in
particular,
he
said,
was outside
the
purview
of the
Tsar,
who
recognised
that
its
destiny
was in
any
case
a
question
of common
interest
which could
only
be
regulated
by
an
entente
gener
ale,
though
he was of
opinion
that,
in the event
of
change
of
tenure,
it
should not
pass
into the
hands of
any
European
Power.
In a
conversation
with
Lord
Derby
on
June
8th,
Count
Schouvaloff
tde
the
further
offer
that,
assuming
the
neutrality
of
the
Powers,
n8 FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
if
Turkey
sought
peace
before the
Russian armies had
crossed the
Balkans,
this
line
should not
be
passed
and
hostilities should
cease
on
certain
conditions.
These
conditions,
with
the
single exception
of
the extent
of
the
future
Bulgaria,
were more
favourable
to
Turkey
than
those
which were
imposed
on her
by
the
Powers a
year
later.
It
cannot be said that
Russia,
in
entering
the
War,
attracted
much
sympathy except
from the Slavic world and
those
spheres
of
Western,
and
particularly
Anglo-Saxon,
opinion
which
may
be de-
scribed
as
anti-Turkish
in
principle.
Even
in this
country,
although
Gladstone
had
recently
roused
public
feeling
against
the
Turk,
there was
a
strong wing
of the Liberal
party
which
declined to
approve
any
action
that
might
embarrass the Cabinet
at
such a
time.
When the
eloquent
tribune
proposed
to
challenge
the Government's
policy,
his intention was
diplomatically
countered
by
the
joint
efforts
of his
colleagues
Lord
Granville
and Lord
Hartington,
who were
not
convinced
that
the
nation
was so
profoundly
moved
by indigna-
tion
against Turkey
as
the
author of The
Bulgarian
Horrors
believed
1
.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Russophobes
were
clamouring
for war. No-
where
did
the
war
passion
find such marked
expression
as in
the
metropolitan
zone.
Most
people
in
Russia
believed that the
War
would be a mere
promenade
for
their
armies
;
but
they
were
soon to be
undeceived.
Roumania
furnished the
master-key
to the field
of
operations,
since
she
lay
between the Russian frontier and
the
Danube,
beyond
which
stretched
Bulgaria
and
the
Balkans,
with
Turkey proper
on
the
southern
side. The
principality
was
still a
vassal
State of
the
Ottoman
empire;
and
Turkey, regarding
the
Russian Convention
with Rou-
mania as a violation of the
Treaty
of
Paris,
began
at
once the
bom-
bardment
of
Kalafat,
on
the Danube.
Hereupon,
Prince Charles
formally
declared
war,
and
simultaneously
his
country's
political
independence
(May 21st).
Another month
passed
before Russian
troops,
under General
Gurko,
crossed the Danube at
two
places
—
in
the north-east
in the
Dobrudja
and
opposite
Sistova,
in
Bulgaria.
Reaching
the
Balkans,
the
invading army
forced the
Shipka
Pass,
and its
progress
was,
for
a
time,
so
rapid
that
a
continuous march to
Adrianople
and even Con-
stantinople
seemed
probable.
With a
change
in the
Turkish
military
1
Lord
Hartington,
with blunt
commonsense,
uttered
a
truth
generally appli-
cable to rhetorical
politicians
when he
said
of Gladstone that he
refused
to
understand that
not all
the
people
who
listened
to
and admired his
speeches
agreed
with
them.
ATTITUDE
OF
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
119
command
a turn in
the
fortunes of
war
supervened,
and the
Russian
armies
were
thrown on the
defensive,
Gurko
suffering
a serious
defeat
at
Stara
Zagora,
south of
the
Shipka,
and
being
driven
back
to the
mountains,
while Osman Pasha
occupied
Plevna, and,
digging
himself
in,
held
the Russian hosts at
bay.
Further
advance became
impossible
until
this
strong position
had
been
reduced,
and its
siege began
on
July
20th
From
May
onwards,
Lord Beaconsfield
and
the
Foreign Secretary
had been
eagerly pressing
upon
Andrassy
the
expediency
of a
common
policy;
and,
on
July
26th,
a
verbal
agreement
was arrived at
—
the
Prime-
Minister called
it "a
moral
understanding"
—
affirming
solid-
arity
of interests and
pledging
the two
Governments to
identical,
but
separate,
diplomatic
action, and,
should
their
interests
be
endangered,
to
subsequent
united
military
measures.
They agreed
to
oppose
the
exercise
of
an
exclusive
protectorate by
any
Power over
the
Christian
populations
of
the
Balkans,
and to demand the
cooperation
in
the
determination
of
the
terms of
peace
of all the
Signatories
to
the
Treaty
of
Paris
;
Russia was
not
to be allowed
acquisitions
of
territory
on
the
right
bank of the Danube or
to
occupy
Constantinople
;
the
existing
arrangements
as to
the Dardanelles
were to be
maintained;
and
no
great
Slavic
State was to
be established
in the Balkans to the
prejudice
of
its
neighbours.
Andrassy
was, nevertheless,
as resolute
as ever to
keep
out of the
War.
He
explained
his Government's
policy
in the words
(June 22nd):
"
Mettre a Vabri nos inter
its
sans
nous
exposer
a la
necessite de devoir les
sauvegarder
les armes a
la main
—
tel
a ete des
le debut de
la
arise,
tel
teste
le but
constant
de nos
efforts."
Meeting
Bismarck in
September,
Andrassy
told him of
the
agreement,
and
was assured that
he
had
acted
wisely
in
concluding
it.
When the
siege
of
Plevna,
marked
by many
heroic
onslaughts
heroically repelled,
had lasted for
four
months,
General
Todleben,
the
defender of
Sebastopol,
resorted to
close
investment,
and,
on
December
10th,
Osman Pasha
surrendered
with
his
gallant
army.
In
the
meantime,
the Russians and their Allies
won new
successes
in
other
parts
of the
theatre
of war.
Every attempt
of
the Turks
to
capture
the
Shipka
Pass had failed. To the
westward,
the
Montenegrins
had
defeated
the
enemy
in the Zeta
valley
and
captured
Nikshich,
after
a
siege
of
four months. Servia
joined
forces
in
December
and
was
fighting
with
greater
credit
than in
the
late
War. In
Asia
Minor,
the
campaign
had
gone altogether
against
the
Turks,
and
Kars had
been
captured
by
Loris
Melikoff,
a
General of Armenian
extraction.
120
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
By
this
time,
an
ugly
temper
had seized hold of
a
large
part
of the
British
people,
and,
in
proportion
as
the
successes
of
the Russian
arms
multiplied,
the
desire for war increased. On
the
other
hand,
the
Cabinet,
which
had
been
divided on Eastern
policy
from
the
beginning,
was
becoming daily
more difficult to
control.
A
section,
which
took
its cue from Lord
Derby,
was
determined not
to
have
war
at
any
price;
Lord
Salisbury
represented
a
moderating
middle
party,
and
was
against
war
at
the
present
moment
1
;
while
among
the
remaining
Ministers were several
bitter
Russophobes,
though
at
that
stage hardly
one of them
seriously
contemplated
the
prospect
of
hostilities. With the war
party
in the
country
Lord
Beaconsfield
himself was
widely supposed
to be in
sympathy,
the
truth
being
that,
while he welcomed its vociferous
support,
he never
allowed
it
to influence
his
action
or his
judgment.
It
is now known
that it
was
not the
power
behind the
Throne,
but
the Throne
itself,
which was at that time most
eager
for war
2
.
Nevertheless,
for the
Queen's
combative
attitude her Prime-Minister
must be held
essentially
responsible.
He
had worked so
strongly
and
persistently
upon
her
feelings
and
prejudices
that,
in the
end,
he
had
infused
in
her
a far
greater
distrust
of,
and
hostility
to,
Russia
than he had himself ever entertained.
Lord
Beaconsfield
's
principal
concern at that time was that Russia should
not
occupy
Constan-
tinople.
So
early
as
June,
he had
asked
the Porte
to
invite the
presence
of
the
British
fleet
there,
and had
even
offered
to
occupy
the
Gallipoli
peninsula
for
the duration of the
War,
if a
proposal
to
that effect were
formally
made to him. So
determined
was he to
keep
the
Russians
away
from
the
capital
that,
when he
found its
occupation
to
be
regarded by
Lord
Derby,
and also
by
Lord
Salisbury,
as Russia's
good
right
in
virtue
of
her
military
success,
he
persuaded
the
Queen
to tell the
Foreign
Secretary
that it was her
wish that
it
should
not be
permitted,
and
led her to believe
that Great
Britain's
entrance
into the
struggle
would be a
necessary consequence
of the
act.
When, however,
it
became
necessary
to
restrain
the
Queen's
eager-
ness
for resolute counter-action in
Turkey's
behalf,
the task
proved
difficult.
In
reply
to
her
appeal
(June
27th)
for
prompt
measures
with
a view
to
checking
Russia's
forward
march
—
"Be bold!. .
.pray
1
See
his letter to
Beaconsfield of
December
24th,
1877,
in
Life of
Salisbury,
11.
169.
2
The
story,
which is
one
of the
most curious
in our modern
political
history,
is
fully
told
in the
sixth
volume
of
the
Life
of Beaconsfield.
THE POWERS
DECLINE
TO
MEDIATE 121
act
quickly!"
—
the
Prime-Minister,
while
"sympathising
with all
Your
Majesty's feelings
in
the
present
critical state of
affairs,"
pointed
out that
military expeditions
took time and that the
occupa-
tion
of
the
Dardanelles or
any part
of the
Turkish
empire
was
im-
possible
without the
Porte's
permission,
which
would be
given
only
if Great
Britain
assumed the
character
of
Turkey's
ally;
while,
as
for
a
declaration of war
against
Russia,
"there
are not three men in
the Cabinet who
are
prepared
to advise
that
step."
Palmerston,
in
his
day, systematically
kept
the
Queen
in
ignorance
of
important
State
documents. It
might, perhaps,
have been well
if,
on
some
delicate
questions
of
policy,
Lord
Beaconsfield
had
told his
Sovereign
either
more or less than
he
did,
and
avoided the
consequence
of
communica-
tions
made to her in
one sense
being
interpreted
in
quite
another.
So far did
he,
at that
time,
share with
the
Sovereign
the
management
of affairs of
State
that
he
reported
to
her
upon
the votes of his
colleagues
in
Cabinet,
and
classified them
according
to
their
support
of
"her"
policy,
as
he
professed
to
regard
it,
while
the
Queen,
in
return,
praised
or
blamed her
Ministers
accordingly.
On
the
fall
of
Plevna,
Turkey
and
her friends in
England
knew
that the end
could
not be far
off,
and
panic
was
as
great
in
London
as in
Constantinople.
On
December
12th,
the Porte
appealed
to the
Powers to
mediate with the
enemy;
but
they
declined.
At
the end
of the
month,
Great Britain
was asked to
perform
that
service,
and
she
put
the
belligerents
into
direct
communication;
for the Tsar
refused to
negotiate
through any
third
party.
In
the
meantime,
his
armies
were
still
advancing
victoriously.
Recrossing
the
Balkans,
Gurko
took,
in
succession,
Sofia
(January
3rd, 1878)
and
Philippopolis
(January
i6th-i7th),
inflicting
a
signal
defeat on Suleiman
Pasha,
while
Skobeleff
and
Radetzky
captured
an
entire Turkish
army
at
Senova,
near
the
Shipka
Pass
(January
9th).
Peace
now
became
indispensable
for
Turkey,
whose
armies,
de-
moralised
by
a
succession of
defeats
and
retreats,
were
incapable
of
resisting
the
Russian
march to
Constantinople.
On
January
20th,
Adrianople
was
occupied
by
Russian
troops
—
for
the second
time in
half
a
century.
The
Serbs and
Montenegrins
were, also,
multiplying
their
successes,
the
former
occupying
the
old Servian town of Nisch
and
the
latter
capturing
Spizza,
Antivari,
and
Dulcigno
(January
18th),
thus
satisfying
for
the
present
the old
Montenegrin
longing
for
an
outlook
on
the
sea.
The
visible
and
ostensible
attitude of
the British
Government
122
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
had hitherto
been
one
of
patient
vigilance,
though
much
scheming
had been
going
on
behind
the scenes.
Now that
Turkey
was
beaten
and
at
the
mercy
of her
enemies,
Russophobe passions
again
flared
up
dangerously.
Parliament was called
together
earlier than
usual,
and
this
added
greatly
to the
public
excitement.
Though
still
a
united
body,
however,
the Cabinet
was far
from
being
of one
mind.
More
than
ever,
it
was the Prime-Minister's
object
to
prevent
the
occupation
of
Constantinople.
With this
purpose
in
view,
the Govern-
ment
had,
for
months,
been
entreating
the Sultan
to
allow
a British
squadron
to
enter
the
Dardanelles;
but
he
had
declined,
resentful
that
his
old
ally,
while so
ready
with
advice,
had
given
him
no
real
help.
When
Plevna fell
and the
way
to
the
south
lay
open,
Lord
Derby
pressed
the Russian Government
to
give
an
undertaking
that
no
attempt
would
be made to
occupy
the
capital
or
the
Dardanelles,
and was
told
that to seize
Constantinople
had
never
been
the Tsar's
intention,
but
that,
if
Turkey
insisted on
protracting
the
War,
he
would
claim the
complete
freedom
of
action which
is
the
right
of
every
belligerent
State.
A
renewed
promise
was,
however, made,
that
British
interests,
as
already
defined,
would be
respected,
and
it
was
added
that,
if
other interests were involved
and
were
now
clearly
specified,
the Tsar would endeavour to
bring
them into accord
with
those of
Russia.
At
a Cabinet
on
January
12th,
Lord Beaconsfield
proposed
that
the
fleet
should be sent
to
the
Dardanelles,
a measure
to
which
Lords
Derby
and
Carnarvon offered
strong
opposition.
A
split
was
only
prevented by
the
adoption
of Lord
Salisbury's
amendment to ask
Turkey's
sanction to
the
movement of the British fleet
—
which
was
refused
—
and
to
request
an
undertaking
by
Russia
that she
would
not
occupy
Gallipoli.
Impatient
at
the
influences
which
seemed
to
be
restraining
her trusted
Minister,
the
Queen,
in a
letter written
at this
time,
denounced "the
great
barbarians"
(the Russians),
the
"low tone"
of
a
country
which
was not
sufficiently
enthusiastic for
war,
and the Cabinet
itself,
of
which she
was
"utterly
ashamed
"
;
and
even
talked of abdication
(January
10th,
1878).
On
January 23rd
the
peace-loving
section
of the nation heard
with
alarm
that
the
Mediterranean
squadron
had
been ordered to
proceed
through
the
Dardanelles to
Constantinople.
The decision
to
adopt
this
strong
measure
brought
to a head
the
growing
division
in
the Cabinet.
Lord
Derby
and Lord Carnarvon
tendered
their re-
signations,
but,
the
order
being
countermanded,
the
Prime-Minister
OUTBREAK OF
"
JINGOISM"
123
persuaded
the
former to
stay.
There
was
little
generosity
in the act
;
for
though
he was now
satisfied
that his
hesitating colleague
could no
longer
do harm in
the
Cabinet,
Lord
Beaconsfield
greatly
feared
that
he
might
do harm
outside.
The
Queen
gave
reluctant
consent to
Derby's remaining.
As a
further
precautionary step,
a
vote of six
millions for
military preparations
was asked
for,
A war
spirit
without
parallel
since the
Crimean
campaign,
taking
the
new-fangled
and
ugly
form of
"Jingoism,"
was
now
abroad,
and
the
Armistice
of
Adrianople
(January 31st)
failed to
allay
the
fever,
since
in
spite
of
it
the
Russian
troops
continued to
advance. It
was
clearly
Russia's
aim to force
Turkey
to
accept
conditions of
peace
before
the Powers
could intervene.
To
complicate
the
situation,
the
Greeks,
who
had
long
been
eager
to enter the
fray,
were now
threatening
to
throw in their lot with
the victorious
Power,
hoping
to share
in
the
division of the
spoils.
It
was
largely owing
to British
pressure
and
promises
that
they
were restrained.
For several
weeks
longer,
war
between
England
and
Russia
seemed
to
hang
upon
a
thread. On
February
7th,
intense
excitement
was
caused in
London
by
the
report,
received
by way
of
India,
that
Russian
troops
had
reached
Constantinople.
The
Queen
urged
an
immediate
declaration of
war, and,
on
being
told
that the
situation did
not
justify
so
extreme a
measure,
was
disappointed
and
again
talked of
laying
down
her
"
thorny
crown
1
"
;
whereupon
Lord
Beaconsfield
im-
parted
to her the
obvious
fact,
insisted on
by
Lord
Derby
and
Lord
Salisbury
from the
first,
that
"it was never
in
the
power
of a neutral
State
to
prevent
the
entry
of
the Russians into
Constantinople."
The
Cabinet
decided,
however,
on the
Prime-Minister's
proposal,
to
despatch
a
division
of the
fleet to
Constantinople
"for
the
protection
of
life and
property,"
and
to invite
the other neutral
Powers
to take
similar
action.
The
report
which led
to
this
decision
proved
to be
unfounded;
but
it
made the
passing
of the
vote of credit a
mere
matter of
form.
The
British fleet
moved
forward
accordingly,
in
spite
of
Turkish
protests,
while Russia's
reply
was to
advance further
towards the
capital.
Just
two
years
before,
Gladstone
had
wished
to
despatch
vessels
of
war to
Constantinople
by way
of
menace
to
Turkey.
Turkey's
faith
that
Great
Britain
would
extricate her
from
diffi-
culty
had
been
rudely
shaken,
though
the
Sultan had
still a
good
friend
in
the British
Ambassador. Sir
Henry
Elliot
had
been removed
1
Letter to
Lord
Beaconsfield,
February 9th, 1878.
i2
4
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
to Vienna
at
the
end of
1877,
and his
place
had
been taken
by
Sir
A.
H.
Layard,
whose
views were as
antagonistic
to
Russia as his
own.
The
policy
carried
on
in
Constantinople
was
in
consequence
but
little
affected.
Layard
fanned
the
dying
embers
of
hope,
so
long
as
he
dared,
without
adding
new
fuel
in
the
shape
of
actual
assurances
which
he
had no
authority
to
give
or
power
to
substantiate. On
January
7th,
the
Grand-Vizier had startled
him
by
a
"
vehement and
bitter" condemnation
of Great
Britain's
alleged
faithlessness
and
treachery.
After
exemplifying
her
alleged
deceit,
he
added,"
Such is
the
justice
and
humanity
of
England.
She
has
abandoned her old
and
faithful
ally,
and
leaves
us to be crushed
by
her and our
implacable
enemy,
because
forsooth
a
few
Bulgarians
were
killed
1
."
He even said
that he
was now
in
favour
of
turning
from
Great
Britain,
and
settling
with Russia
on the best terms he
could
get.
The
outburst was not
quite just,
but
it
was
far
from
being
altogether
the
contrary.
For
years,
Turkey
had
been
regarded
in London almost
as a
vassal of the British
Crown,
and the
control of
the Porte's
Foreign
Policy might
be said
to have
passed
into
British hands. The
Turk had been so
long
tutored
and
patronised,
protected
and
pampered,
that his self-reliance
and
power
of initiative were
sapped,
and
in
a time of
supreme
crisis there
was left
in
him no
residue
of
vigour
or
power
of
resistance. Yet
now,
after almost
the last vertebra
of backbone
had
been
taken out of
him,
he
was
expected
to stand
upright
and
play
his
part
like
a
man.
So
late
as
February,
the
Sultan,
who
had
already
offered
to
place
his
fleet
at Great
Britain's
disposal,
was
still
begging
that
his old
ally
would
help
him "with
men,
money
or in
any
other
way,"
so
as to
enable
him
to
defend his
capital,
which he declared the
Russians
should enter
only
over
his
dead
body.
When the British Government
were
importuned
to
say
their
last word on the
subject
(February 12th)
Lord
Derby
instructed
Layard,
in a
despatch
which received
its final
form
from
the Prime-Minister's
hand,
to
inform the Porte
that
they
were
"not
prepared
under
existing
circumstances
to incur the
re-
sponsibility
of
advising
an
armed
resistance
to the
entry
of Russian
troops
into
Constantinople."
The cold
comfort
was added that
such
action
by
Russia
would be a violation
of the
Armistice,
which would
entitle
the
Porte to
protest,
though
it
was
to be
presumed
that "armed
resistance
would
be
fruitless and
disastrous."
Being
requested,
hereupon,
to
remove
Russia's
justification
for
advancing
on the
capital
by
withdrawing
the British
fleet
from
Constantinople
waters,
or,
1
Letter
to Lord
Derby,
January
8th, 1878.