Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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TURKISH
DISILLUSIONMENT
125
alternatively,
to come out
into the
open
as
Turkey's
ally
and
assist
her
in
repelling
the
enemy,
the
British Government
flatly
refused
to
do
either
(February
18th).
Thus,
at
the
last,
Turkey's
eyes
were
opened
to
the
real
position.
Trusting
to a hundred
signs
and
intimations,
she
had
reposed
in
Great
Britain
a
blind
confidence,
staking everything
on
British
attachment
and
friendship.
Now,
she learned that the
only
tie
between
the
two informal Allies was
that,
not of
Turkish,
but of
British,
interests.
As
these
latter, however,
were
not
endangered,
a
casus
foederis
was
held not to exist.
The Government
still
used their best
endeavours
to
keep
the
Russians
away
from
the
capital;
but it must be
gravely
doubted
whether the
idea
of
helping Turkey
to resist them
had
ever
been
seriously
entertained.
This
position
was
beyond
a doubt correct.
What
exposed
the Cabinet
to
reproach
was the fact that
it
should have
allowed
its
position
and intentions to be
at
any
time
open
to
mis-
understanding.
The
episode
of Denmark
and
Schleswig-Holstein
had
been
repeated,
not to
England's
credit.
Lord Beaconsfield
had
yet
to
satisfy
his
followers in the
country.
Behind
him,
egging
him
on,
was a
shouting
rather
than
fighting
majority
of the
nation,
whose roused emotions
he had
made
no
attempt
to
restrain,
and who
had
called for the translation
of
his
many
bold words into
equally
bold deeds. He
had,
however,
landed
himself on the horns of a dilemma.
He
had
raised the
expectation
that the
occupation
of
Constantinople
would
be
regarded
as a casus
belli
\
but
now,
when the
danger
seemed
imminent,
he
had to admit
that
Russia
was
quite
within her
rights.
In this
predicament
of his
own
causing,
he
sought
and obtained
from Russia an
undertaking
that
she would
not
occupy
Gallipoli,
on
condition that
Great
Britain
refrained from
landing
troops
on
Turkish
territory
either
in
Europe
or
Asia
(February 19th).
A
little
later,
he
suggested
to the Cabinet
an
idea which he
had
privately
ventilated
before
—
the
purchase
of
some
point
of
Turkish
territory
which
might
be
"
conducive
to
British
interests
"
:
a Black
Sea
port
and a
commanding position
on
the
Persian
Gulf
were
mentioned. The
Quixotic
notion
of a
Mediter-
ranean
League,
which
Italy
and
Greece,
France and
Austria were to
join,
for
securing
the
independence
of
that
sea and
frustrating
Russian
aggression,
was
also
seriously
discussed.
No one
appears
to have
asked
what
motive
France
could have for
entering
an
organisation
so
unequally
balanced,
or
how it
could exist
without
her.
126 FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
On
March
3rd,
Peace Preliminaries were
signed
on
behalf
of the
belligerent
Powers
by
General
Ignatieff
and
Safvet
Pasha
at San
Stefano.
The
terms were not communicated to
the
British
Govern-
ment until
the
23rd;
but,
on the
8th,
the
Cabinet resolved
that
in the
event
of their
"compromising
the maritime interests
of Great
Britain
in
the
Mediterranean,
a
new naval station
in
the east
of the
Mediter-
ranean
must
be
obtained,
and
if
necessary
by
force."
This
assertion
of
the
doctrine
of
might
as
against
that of
right
was
to
be
applied
to
the
injury
of
the
very
State
whose
independence
and
integrity
Great
Britain was at
that
moment
professing
to
protect against
a Power
which
had
defeated
it
in fair
warfare.
Two
years
earlier,
when the Eastern
Question
was
beginning
to
look
serious,
the
Prime-Minister
had written
(May,
1876)
: "Whatever
happens
we shall
certainly
not drift into
war,
but
go
to
war,
if
we
do,
because we
intend it."
The words
faithfully
define
his
policy;
but
it
must
be
added
that
he did
not
go
to
war,
because
he never
intended
to
do so. A
study
of
the
diplomatic despatches
and conversations
which
passed
between the
Foreign
Office and
the
Porte at
that
time,
and
of Lord
Beaconsfield's concurrent
correspondence
with
the
Queen,
his
colleagues,
and his
friends,
makes
it
impossible
to resist
the
conclusion
that all the
admonitions,
remonstrances,
and
veiled
threats
which
were
addressed to Russia
on the
subject
of
Con-
stantinople
were a
gigantic piece
of bluff
1
. Lord Beaconsfield
was,
of
course,
determined to
prevent
the
occupation
of the
capital
if
it
were
by any
means
possible,
and
in
support
of his
assurances
to
the
Queen
on
the
subject
he went
as
far
towards
an
open
breach
with
Russia as
he
dared; nevertheless,
there is
no
justification
for
sup-
posing
that
he was
ever
prepared
to
go
to
war on
this issue
alone,
but
every
reason
to
conclude
that
he was
ready,
if the fortunes
of
diplomacy
went
against
him,
to
accept
accomplished
facts
and
make
the
best of
them. That he
went even so far
as he
did
was
due to
his
knowledge
that it
was
safe to
apply
to
Russia,
in
her then
exhausted
state,
a
very strong degree
of
pressure:
Raouf
Pasha,
the
Turkish
Minister of
War,
who was
sent on a mission
to
Petrograd
in
March,
brought
home
the
assurance that
the
military
authorities
there
were
thoroughly
alarmed
by
the
prospect
of
a war
with Great
Britain.
1
The
biographer
of
Lord
Salisbury
records
that
"
at
a later
period
he
came
to
doubt
whether
there
had
been
substantial
grounds
for the
charge"
made
by
Liberal
politicians
that Beaconsfield
had
"the
intention
of
manoeuvring England
into
a war
in defence of
Turkey," though
both
he and Lord
Carnarvon
had for
a
time
believed
it.
Life of Salisbury,
n.
137.
LORD
DERBY'S RESIGNATION
127
At
a
Cabinet held on March
27th,
the
Prime-Minister
proposed
the
immediate
calling-out
of
the Reserves
and the
despatch
of
a
large
native
force from
India,
with a
view
to
occupying
ports
in
the Levant
commanding
the Persian
Gulf and
the
country
round
Bagdad,
so as
to neutralise the
Russian
conquests
and influence
in
Armenia
1
.
In
the
event,
this
proposal
of
the
forcible
occupation
of the
territory
of
a
friendly
Power was
not carried out
;
but,
towards
the end
of
May,
an
Indian
expeditionary
force
of
7000
native
troops
was landed
at
Malta,
from
which
garrison
it
happily
became
unnecessary
to move
it.
Lord
Derby
was
the
only
dissentient from the
decision,
and he now
definitively
resigned.
In
so
doing
he
merely
withdrew
from
an
in-
tolerable
position;
for
his
place
in the
Administration
had almost
become that of a
Minister
without
portfolio.
On
March
8th
the
Prime-Minister had
informed the
Queen
that the
Cabinet
had
"
taken
the
management
of
the
Foreign
Office into
its own
hands."
For some
time,
he
had,
practically,
himself
acted as
Foreign
Secretary,
so
far as
the
Eastern
Question
was
concerned;
while
Lord
Derby's
functions
were
those of
an
executive
officer
and
more
or less
friendly
critic.
Lord
Salisbury
received
the vacant
office,
the
reversion
of
which
he
had
expected
for
some time.
All
this
time,
pourparlers
of a different
kind were
proceeding
in
two
directions. At
the
end of
January,
a
busy
exchange
of
diplomatic
Notes
between
London and
Vienna
began.
Lord
Beaconsfield
sprang
on
the
Cabinet
the
proposal
of
a
defensive
alliance with
Austria-
Hungary,
and
Lord
Carnarvon alone
opposed
it.
Negotiations
were
accordingly
resumed with
Andrassy
on the basis
of the
"moral under-
standing
"
of
the
preceding
July,
but for a
long
time without
definite
result.
Andrassy
had not
abandoned the
hope
of
coming
to a satis-
factory
agreement
with
Russia. He was as
indisposed
to
hostilities as
ever,
and
was
not
convinced that Great Britain would
fight
in
any
event;
hence
he had
hitherto
played
for
delay.
The
publication
of the
terms
of
peace,
however,
compelled
him
to come to
a definite
decision
:
his
first
comment
on
the San
Stefano
Treaty
was
:
"
Russia
has
played
us
false."
Simultaneously,
there had
been
negotiations
on
the
subject
1
Cyprus
and
Alexandretta
appear
to have been
suggested
as
suitable
for
occupation.
Lord
Derby
left
a
Memorandum
of
the
proceedings
of
this
Cabinet
in
which
Lord
Beaconsfield's
speech advocating
the
seizure
of Turkish
territory
without
permission
was
summarised as
follows: "An
emergency
has
arisen:
the
balance
of
power
in
the
Mediterranean
is in
danger; every
State
must
now look
to
its
own
interests
Proposes
to
communicate with the
Porte,
to
guarantee
the
revenues
now
received,
so that
they
shall not
lose.
This
does
not
involve
alliance
with
the
Porte.
Nor
is
it
inconsistent
with
anything
we
have done."
i28
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
of a Conference
of the
Powers.
So
soon as it
became
certain
that the War
would
end in
Russia's
favour,
Great
Britain and Austria-
Hungary
had
given
both the
belligerent
Powers
to understand that
no
modification of the
Treaties of
1856
and
1871
would be
regarded
as valid without
consultation with the
Signatory
States.
Accordingly,
early
in
February,
Andrassy
sounded the
Powers
as
to
their
willingness
to
confer on
the
subject,
and all
agreed
with
or without
condition.
The
British
Government made
their
participation
dependent upon
the
submission of
the entire
Treaty
to
the free
judgment
of the
Powers
—
a
condition to
which Russia
demurred.
The
Treaty
of San
Stefano was a forced
contract,
and its
territorial
provisions
went
far
towards
justifying
those
who had
suspected
Russia
of
pursuing
interested ends
under the
pretence
of
performing
a dis-
interested
public
duty.
The
principal proposal
was
to create a Greater
Bulgaria
as an
autonomous
principality, covering broadly,
by
the
incorporation
of
Roumelia
and
the
larger part
of
Macedonia,
the
territory
lying
between the
Danube,
the Black
Sea,
and
the
Aegean.
Little more was to be left to
Constantinople
than
Epirus,
Thessaly,
Thrace and
the
peninsula
of Chalcis.
The
proposal
was,
in
effect,
the
revival of
the medieval
Bulgarian empire,
as it
existed before the
Turkish
Conquest.
A
Russian Commissioner
was to
assist in
the
organisation
of
the new
system
of administration and to
supervise
it
for
two
years.
Servia
was to
receive
a considerable
increase of terri-
tory
(including
the old
town of
Nisch)
together
with
independence,
and
her
liability
to
pay
tribute to
Turkey
was to be cancelled. Mon-
tenegro,
which
the
Tsar
had
always specially
favoured,
was
to
be
trebled
in
size and
doubled
in
population by
the
absorption
of
districts
of
Herzegovina,
Albania,
and the
sandjak
of
Novi-Bazar.
It
was
to
retain
Nikshich,
Spizza,
Antivari,
and
Dulcigno,
which
had
been
occupied
during
the War
;
and its
political independence,
which
had
existed
in
practice
for
many years,
was now
to be
formally
recognised.
It
was
proposed
that
the
original
recommendations
relating
to Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
which the
Powers had
urged
on
the
Porte
at
the
Constantinople
Conference
(implying
a limited
autonomy)
should
be at
once
enforced,
subject
to such
modifications
as the
Russian,
Turkish,
and
Austro-Hungarian
Governments
might
deem
needful.
Reforms were also to be
introduced
in
Crete,
Epirus, Thessaly,
and
other
parts
of
European
Turkey,
and
security
and
good government
were
to be assured to the
Armenians.
In
general,
Russia was
liberal
TREATY OF SAN STEFANO
129
in the
grant
of
Constitutions to the Balkan
territories,
though
as
yet
without
Constitutional
government
herself.
Roumania
fared
worst
under
the
Treaty, though
she
had rendered
Russia
invaluable assistance
during
the
War, and,
at one
time,
had
stood
between the
great
Muscovite Power and imminent
disaster.
She
was to receive
political independence,
but was to retrocede
to
Russia
southern
Bessarabia
1
,
in
exchange
for a
portion
of
the
Dobrudja,
which
was to
be taken from
Turkey
in
part
payment
of the
War
indemnity.
Russia
required
for
herself,
in
addition, Ardahan,
Kars,
Bayazid,
and Batoum in Asia
Minor,
with
a
strip
of Asiatic coast.
The
indemnity
was fixed
at
1410
million
roubles,
commutable in
territory
to
the extent
of
310
millions.
Further,
the
Bosphorus
and the
Dardanelles
were
to remain
open,
in time
of
war as of
peace,
to
the merchant vessels
of neutral States bound to
or
from Russian
ports.
In
its territorial
aspects,
the
Treaty
of San Stefano was dictated
by
an
almost exclusive consideration
for certain favoured Slavic
States.
Russia showered favours
upon
the
races
which she had
drawn,
or
hoped
to
retain,
under her
Protection,
but did little for
those
outside
the
range
of her influence.
Thus,
the national
claims of
Greece were
altogether
ignored.
The
Treaty
was further vitiated
by
the
worst defect of most
former
Treaties of
conquest
: in that it
bartered human
beings
like chattels and
placed large
populations
under alien
rule,
not
only against
their
will,
but
with
total
disregard
of ethnical or
historical claims.
Petitions
promptly
rained
upon
the British Government
from
aggrieved
nationalities
—
Turks,
Roumanians, Greeks,
Albanians
—
protesting against arrangements
so
inequitable
and
begging
for
their
revision.
Roumania
was
prepared
to
join
in war
against
Russia
at
once,
if Great Britain would take
the lead.
To
representations
from
these
quarters
Lord Beaconsneld and the
new
Foreign
Secretary
were
not
indifferent
;
but the considerations
which
chieflyweighed
with
them
were the
danger
to the Ottoman
empire
of
a Greater
Bulgaria
subject
to
control from
Petrograd,
and
the menace to British
interests
in
Asia Minor.
Austria was
equally
opposed
to the
Treaty
as
ignoring
her
claims
in
regard
to
Bosnia and
Herzegovina, preparing
the
way
for
the
creation of a
powerful
Slavic
State on her
borders,
and,
in
I
1
Lord
Beaconsfield
suggested
this restitution
in a
letter written to
Lord
Derby
the
preceding
September.
W.&G.III
130
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
consequence
of the
proposed
enlargement
of
Bulgaria, blocking
the
road
to
Salonica,
the
ultimate
goal
of
Habsburg
ambitions. Even France was
alarmed
by
the
prospect
of
a
Russian
naval
base on the eastern side
of
the
Mediterranean
;
and an
attempt
made at
that time to float a
Russian
loan on
the
Paris market failed.
The
first
important
official
act of
the new
Foreign Secretary
was
the
issue to
the Powers of
a
Circular Note
(April
1st) criticising
the
proposals
of
the San Stefano
Treaty,
and
stating
the attitude and
policy
of the British Government
with
perfect
definiteness and
clarity.
This
Note,
the
main
propositions
in
which he had
submitted to
the Prime-Minister
in
a letter
of March
21st,
was in substance
a
challenge
to Russia
in
the
name of all
the Powers which
were
prepared
to take their
stand on the
maintenance of the
existing
Balance of
Power,
whether
in
Europe
or Asia
Minor,
and
the
binding
force
of
international treaties.
Lord
Salisbury
recalled
the
fact
that,
in the
Declaration
annexed to the First
Protocol
of
the London
Conference of
1871,
the
Signatory
Powers affirmed
it
to be "an
essential
principle
of the law of nations
that
no
Power can
liberate
itself from
the
engagements
of a
treaty,
or
modify
the
stipulations
thereof,
unless
with
the consent
of
the
Contracting
Powers,
by
means
of
an amicable
arrangement."
It
was
impossible,
he
said,
without
violating
the
spirit
of this
Declaration,
to
acquiesce
in the withdrawal
from
the
cognisance
of the
Powers of
any
Articles in the
Treaty
of
San
Stefano which modified
existing
arrangements
or
were
incon-
sistent with them.
Coming
to
the details of the
Peace
Preliminaries,
he indicated
the
British
Government's
suspicion
of the
creation,
in the
proposed
Greater
Bulgaria,
of a
powerful
Slavic
State,
possessing
harbours on the
Euxine and
the
Aegean,
and
controlled
by
Russia,
which
would
thereby
obtain "a
preponderating
influence over both
political
and
commercial
relations in
those seas."
It
was also
objected
that the
territorial severance from
Constantinople
of the
Greek,
Albanian
and
Slavic
provinces
which
were
still
to remain
under the
government
of
the Porte
would create
constant administrative
difficulty
and em-
barrassment,
and
not
only
weaken
the Porte itself
politically,
but
expose
the
inhabitants
of
the
provinces
to the
danger
of
anarchy.
The
indemnity
was
criticised from the
standpoint
of
its
form
rather
than of its
amount,
since
it
was to be
open
to Russia to commute
part
of
it
into
territory
or
leave
it
as
an unredeemed
liability
—
a
provision
capable
of
proving
a
powerful
instrument
of
coercion.
THE
SALISBURY
CIRCULAR
131
Turkey having
frustrated the
objects
of
the
Powers
as
agreed
upon
at
the
Constantinople
Conference,
he admitted
that
large changes
might
now be
necessary
in the Treaties
by
which south-eastern
Europe
had
hitherto been
ruled,
since
"good government,
assured
peace,
and freedom
for
populations
to
whom
these
blessings
have
been
strange,"
were
still
the
objects
of Great
Britain's
earnest
concern.
His
Government
would, therefore,
have
willingly
entered a
congress
in
which
the
stipulations
contained
in the Preliminaries of Peace could
have been examined
as a
whole,
"in their relation
to
existing
treaties,
to
the
acknowledged rights
of Great
Britain,
and to
the beneficent ends
which the united
action of
Europe
has
always
been directed to secure."
They
were unable to take
part
in a
congress
whose deliberations
were
to be restricted in the
manner
proposed by
Prince Gortchakoff
.
Both
as
an
exposition
of
policy
and
z
piece
justificative
,the
Salisbury
Circular
was a
State
document of
great ability
and
power,
and
the
praise
awarded
to
it
by
Lord
Beaconsfield,
whose
part
in its
production
was
merely
that
of
retoucheur,
was well deserved. The
Porte had
already
asked the
British
Government
to
help
it
to obtain modifica-
tions of the
Treaty
in
regard
to the limits of
Bulgaria
(which
it
wished
to
restrict
to
the
territory
between the Danube
and
the
Balkans),
the
Armenian
cessions,
and
the
indemnity,
and a
promise
had
been
given
accordingly.
In an
elaborate
reply (April 9th)
Gortchakoff
challenged
the
British
Government to abandon
their
negative standpoint
and
say
not
merely
what
they
did not
want,
but what
they
wanted,
seeing
that
matters could not remain as
they
were.
Every
Power
taking
part
in
the
congress,
he
promised,
would have the
same
complete
freedom of
action which Russia claimed for
herself. He contended
that
the
proposed
Greater
Bulgaria
was
merely
a
development
of the
State which
was
contemplated
by
the
Conference of
Constantinople,
and
justified
the retrocession of Roumanian
Bessarabia as the reversal
of
an
intolerable
decision which was forced
on Russia in the
time
of
her
impotence.
Cessions of
territory,
he
added,
were a natural conse-
quence
of
war,
and if
England
had wished to
spare
Turkey
she
should
have
joined
Russia,
as she was
twice invited
to
do,
in
bringing
to
bear
upon
the
Porte such
pressure
as would
have averted
hostilities.
Turkey
concluded
peace
with
Servia a
little
later,
but
continued
on a
war
footing
as
regards Montenegro.
9—2
i
3
2
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
IV.
The
Berlin Congress and
its
Issues,
1
878-1
880
A.
The Berlin
Congress, 1878
Lord
Beaconsfield
claimed that the
Salisbury
Circular
had
"put
the
country
on its
legs
again."
It
certainly
clarified the
European
situation
and
brought
all the
Powers to
a
sense
of actualities. At
Petrograd
and
in at least one
other
imperial capital,
where
conviction
had hitherto been
lacking,
it was
recognised
that
the British
Cabinet
had decided to make
a firm stand in
the defence of interests which it
honestly
believed
to be menaced
by
Russia's
action.
From
this
time
onward,
the
Eastern crisis showed
signs
of
abatement,
and
diplomacy
passed
into smoother waters.
In
a
letter
written a few
days
after the
signing
of
the San
Stefano
Treaty,
Lord
Beaconsfield claimed that Great Britain was
strong
enough
to have
a
policy
of her
own
and to
carry
it
through
—
a
policy
of which the
purpose
should be to "vindicate and assert her own
rights
and
interests";
and
he
protested:
"we
must think
less of
Bismarcks and
Andrassys
and
Gortchakoffs,
and
more
of our
own
energies
and
resources
1
."
In
truth,
he
had
gained
powerful
auxiliaries
in
the
persons
both
of
the German
and
Austro-Hungarian
Foreign
Ministers.
In his
relations
to the Powers
principally
concerned,
Bis-
marck had hitherto
"hedged";
now,
he took a more decided
stand
on
the side
of
Great
Britain and
Austria,
and in token of
his
change
of
mind
began
to show
an
unwonted
zeal in the cause of conciliation.
The
proposal
of
a
conference of
the
Ambassadors,
originally
planned
for
Vienna,
had in
the meantime
grown
into
something
larger.
Gortchakoff
had
suggested
that
the conference
should be
composed
of
the
leading
Ministers of the
Powers,
as
Plenipoten-
tiaries,
for he
intended to take
part
himself;
and
Bismarck,
accustomed
to
decide
questions
of
policy
proprio
motu,
agreed,
for
once,
with the
Russian
Chancellor.
This
larger
view
prevailing,
Berlin
was
by general
consent
accepted
as the
meeting-place
of
what was now described
as
a
Congress.
There remained
the British Government's
objection
to
sending
Plenipotentiaries
to Berlin or
elsewhere,
merely
to confirm
a
series
of
f
aits
accomplis.
They
claimed,
with
perfect justification,
that
the
Treaty
of
San Stefano
should be
submitted
in
its
entirety
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Powers,
whose
duty
and
right
it would be
to
de-
termine
how far
it
was inconsistent with
the
Treaty
of
1856
and
the
Protocol
of 1
871,
and
to
approve
or
reject any
departures
from
these
1
Letter
of
March
8th,
1878.
THE
SALISBURY-SCHOUVALOFF
CONVENTION
133
agreements according
to
their
full
discretion. Gortchakoff
wished
merely
to
communicate
the
Treaty
to the
Congress, leaving
to each
Power
represented
there
full
liberty
of
judgment
and of action
(la
pleine
liberie de ses
appreciations
et
de son
action).
Such a
concession,
however,
ignored
the
question
in
dispute,
since it
implied
that
Russia
would
not
regard
herself as
bound,
in case
of
disagreement,
to abide
by
the decision of
the
other Powers. This evasion of
the condition
of
their
acceptance
of the
Congress only strengthened
the British
Cabinet's
conviction of
its
importance. Finally,
Gortchakoff
cut short
the
dispute
with
the
curt intimation
that the
Russian
Government
"leaves to the
other
Powers
the
liberty
of
raising
such
questions
as
they may
think
fit to
discuss,
and
reserves
to
itself the
liberty
of
accepting
or
not
accepting
the
discussion of
these
questions."
The
deadlock
which
ensued
was
resolved
by
a
secret
understanding
between the
two
Governments.
Holding tenaciously
to the
view
that
the
Congress,
if
held at
all,
must
possess
unlimited
jurisdiction,
and
convinced that
no
good
could come of a series of
roaming
discussions
directed
to
vague
and
undefined
objects,
the British
Foreign
Secretary
conferred with
the Russian
Ambassador with
a
view
to
ascertaining
how
far
the
Treaty
of San
Stefano
might
be
brought
into line with
the
views of
his
Government,
and so
serve
as the basis of a
general
agreement.
The result
was the conclusion
of
the
Salisbury-
SchouvalofT
Convention
of
May 30th,
by
which
the two Powers
agreed
upon
the
broad
lines of
a
settlement
mutually
acceptable.
In
reality,
the
difficulties
between them
proved
easy
of
adjustment.
Russia was told
that
Great
Britain
cared little
about Servian and
Montenegrin ques-
tions,
provided
her views in
regard
to
Bulgaria
and the
proposed
annexations
in
Asiatic
Turkey
were
fairly
met. In
the
end,
the idea
of a
Greater
Bulgaria
was
abandoned,
the
territory
south
of
the Balkans
being
left
to
Turkey,
while
Russia's
acquisition
of Bessarabia and of
certain
points
in
Armenia,
including
Batoum,
was
to stand.
Turkey's
promises
to
Russia
in
regard
to Armenia
were to
be
made
to
Great
Britain,
also,
who
was
likewise
to
have a voice in
determining
the
future
organisation
of
the Greek
provinces
of
European Turkey.
Moreover,
Russia
renounced the idea of
commuting any
part
of the
war
indemnity
into a
further
acquisition
of
territory.
The
Secret
Convention
was
divulged
in
the columns
of a
London
newspaper
by
the
malfeasance
of a
copying
clerk in
the
Foreign
Office,
employed
on
the
transcription
of
confidential
State
documents
at
the
pay
of
eightpence
an hour.
The
Prime-Minister's
annoyance
at the
i
3
4
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
disclosure
turned
to
dismay
when
he
learned
that
the
Foreign
Office
had decided
to
expose
itself
by
prosecuting
the
offender.
The
practice
of secret
diplomacy
never
exercised
the
Chanceries
of
Europe
more
assiduously
than
during
the
few weeks
immediately
preceding
the
Berlin
Congress.
Great
Britain, Russia,
Austria-
Hungary
and
Turkey
were
all
engaged
simultaneously
in
concluding
surreptitious
conventions
and treaties.
While
negotiating
with
Russia,
Lord
Salisbury
was
bargaining
with
Andrassy,
whom
Gortchakoff
was known to
be
making
strong
efforts to
capture.
Ever
since the
conclusion of the
Declaration,
or "moral
understanding,"
of
July,
1877,
the
British
Government
had
been
pressing
Andrassy
to enter
into a more
binding agreement.
In
diplomatic
usage,
a
reciprocal
Declaration
is a
treaty
with the
strings
untied;
and
he
was now
determined
to tie the
strings.
Neither Lord
Salisbury
nor
Lord
Beaconsfield
trusted
Andrassy,
and it
was their lack
of confidence
in
him,
caused
by
his
refusal
to enter into a
definite
self-commitment,
that had induced them to
fall back on
the
Anglo-Russian
Convention
1
.
Even
during
the
negotiations
now
begun,
Lord
Salisbury
believed
that
Andrassy
might
at
any
time turn
round
and
come to an
agreement
with
Russia,
providing
for
the
partition
with her of the Balkan
peninsula by
a
line
running
from Servia to the Gulf of Rendina.
On
the other
hand,
Andrassy
had
heard with alarm
of the
negotiations
between
London
and
Petrograd,
and was
anxious to know what
they
meant.
Bismarck shared his
apprehensions,
and on
May 25th urged
Lord
Salisbury
not
to come
to
any agreement
with
Russia that would
be
prejudicial
to
Germany's Ally.
After much
pressure
on
Lord
Salisbury's part,
and much
wavering
on
Andrassy's,
an
understanding
was reached.
Lord
Salisbury
defined
the
broad
object
of British
policy
in
European Turkey
at that
time
in a letter to
our
Ambassador at
Vienna,
wherein he told
him
that
"
all
practicable
support
should
be
given
to the races which
are
likely
to
act
as a
barrier
to the
advance of the Slavonic Power."
These
races
were,
preeminently,
the
Turks and the Greeks. On
May
27th,
while
1
In a letter to Elliot at Vienna of
June
3rd,
1878,
Lord
Salisbury
wrote:
"The
necessity
for a
special
agreement
on
the
part
of Her
Majesty's
Government
with
Russia
would
not have
arisen,
if
the Austrian
Government
had
responded
at
an
earlier
period
to the overtures which
have
been
repeatedly
made to them
by
Her
Majesty's
Government to come to an
agreement
for the
full
cooperation
of
Austria
and
England
in
dealing
with the
state
of
things
resulting
from the
War
between
Russia
and
Turkey.
Her
Majesty's
Government
have
never
been
able,
notwith-
standing
the assurances
which
they
have on
various occasions
received
from
Count
Andrassy,
to
acquire
the
conviction
that Austria
might
not
altogether
desert
them,
and
they
have
accordingly
been forced to
provide
against
that
contingency."