Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE
145
brusque
letters,
he accused William I
of
want of
loyalty,
and,
re-
minding
him
of the service which he had rendered
to
Germany
in
1870,
bade
him
mend
his
ways.
Bismarck had said
to Gortchakoff
during
the Berlin
Congress:
"
Do
not
compel
me to
choose between
Russia and
Austria-Hungary.'
*
Apart
from this outbreak
of
pique,
the
fact that
Andrassy
had made
a
mysterious
journey
to
Petrograd, suggesting
the
possibility
of
an
Austro-Russian
agreement,
which
it
was
expedient
to
circumvent,
and the further
suspicion
that
Russia
was
beginning
to
reciprocate
the advances
long attempted
by
France,
convinced
Bismarck that the
best
days
of the
Triple
Entente were
over,
and that for future
security
Germany
must look to a new
combination.
A
Convention concluded
at Vienna on October
7th,
1879,
providing
for a Defensive Alliance
between the
German
and
Austro-Hungarian
empires,
to meet the
contingency
of an attack
upon
either
of
these
Powers
by
Russia,
was
his
answer
to
the
Tsar's menace. Francis
Joseph
welcomed
the Dual
Alliance
warmly;
but William
I
accepted
it
with
reluctance,
conscious
that it
foreboded the
rupture
of an old
dynastic
tradition, and,
contrary
to Bismarck's
wish,
he
insisted
on
informing
the
Tsar of
the
existence,
though
not
of
the
provisions,
of
the
Convention
1
.
While the
negotiations
with
Andrassy
were
still
in
progress,
Bis-
marck
endeavoured to
bring
Great
Britain into the same
partnership.
Four
years
before,
in
the
year
of the war-scare which
marked
the
alienation of
Gortchakoff
and
brought
Russia
and France nearer
together,
he
had
sent his
confidant
Lothar Bucher to
London,
to
explore
the
possibility
of
forming
a
more intimate
friendship
in that
quarter.
The result
appears
to
have been
negative;
but,
from
that
Ime,
Bismarck
dropped
hints
to the British Ambassador
in
Berlin
n
the same
subject,
and
during
the
Congress
he sounded
both
.ord
Beaconsfield
and
Lord
Salisbury, receiving
encouragement
from
le
former.
During
his
intercourse with Beaconsfield he
had
come
)
regard
Great Britain
in a
new
light.
Her Prime-Minister's
bold
roclamation
of an
imperialistic
policy,
as
evidenced
by
the
Suez
Canal
shares
purchase
and
the firm stand
which he had made
against
Russia
both
in
Europe
and
Central
Asia,
suggested
to
him that
Great
Britain
was
destined
to
play again
her old
part
in
foreign
affairs
and
that the
days
of
non-intervention
were ended.
An
alliance
of the
two
military
empires
with
the
strongest
of naval
Powers would be
a
perfect
realisa-
tion
of
his ideal
of a
"coalition
a trois."
1
Bismarck's
Gedanken
und
Erinnerungen,
n.
p. 248.
w.&g.iii
10
i
4
6 FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
On
September
26th,
1879,
Count
Munster visited
the
Prime-
Minister
at
Hughenden,
bringing
with
him a
proposal
of
an alliance.
He
asked
that
the communication
might
be
regarded,
for the
time,
as a
personal
one,
and
said
that the manner of its
reception
would
determine
whether
it
would be
repeated
in
official
form,
adding
that Bismarck
had not as
yet
mentioned the
subject
to the
Emperor.
Beaconsfield was reminded
that,
three
years
earlier,
Bismarck had
already
made
suggestions
of the
kind
through
the
British Am-
bassador
in
Berlin
;
and it was now hinted to
him
that
if
an alliance
had been concluded
earlier,
the Eastern
complications
and the
Russo-
Turkish War
might
not
have occurred. In its
absence,
Germany
had been
compelled
to fall
back
upon
Russia
;
but that makeshift
had
now failed. Of the immediate
future Bismarck drew
a lurid
forecast.
"
Russia
is
preparing
to
attack
Austria;
the
peace
of the world
will be
threatened
;
it is
in the nature
of
things
that
it
will
not be
a localised
war
;
it
will be
a
great
and
general
war. Peace
is
necessary
to
Germany
;
no
country
more desires
or
requires
peace.
To secure
it,
he
proposes
an alliance between
Germany,
Austria and
Great
Britain
1
." It was
suggested
that,
while
under the
arrangement
proposed
Germany
would
enjoy security
against
any
war
of
aggression
aimed
against
her,
Great Britain would
receive
support
for
her
policy
and
interests
in
the
Levant
and the East
generally
2
.
Beaconsfield
assured the
Envoy
that
he
personally
welcomed these
overtures,
and
obtained
permission
to confer
with
the
Queen
and
also
with
the
Foreign Secretary,
then abroad.
In
communicating
with
both he
favoured a
sympathetic
attitude. To
Salisbury
he
said that
the
German
alliance would be
likely
to
be
popular
;
for
the
country
would
regard
it as a natural
sequence
to the Government's
past
attitude
of
suspicion
towards
Russia as a
Power from
which menace
to
the
Empire
was one
day
to be feared. The
Queen
was
not
indisposed
to
respond
to Bismarck's
advances,
provided
there were
no alienation of
France
;
but
Salisbury
was
sceptical
and
suspected
that Bismarck wished
to
use Great
Britain as a
merely
temporary
convenience.
On Beacons-
field's
suggestion,
it
was
arranged
that the
Foreign
Secretary
should
1
Life of
Beaconsfield,
VI.
488,
and
Life
of Salisbury,
11.
364-5
2
The
editors
of
Die
Grosse Politik
der
europdischen
Kabinette,
1
871-19
14,
take
the view that the
object
of
Bismarck's overtures
was
only
to ascertain what the
attitude
of
Great Britain would be
in
the event of
Germany
declining
to
give
un-
reserved
support
to Russia's Eastern
policy
and
losing
her
friendship
in
consequence,
and
it is
true
that Count Munster
's
Instructions
went
no
further
than this. The
Ambassador also
reports
that the
suggestion
of
an alliance
came from Lord Beacons-
field.
Die Grosse
Politik,
etc.
iv.
3-14.
ALLIANCE
OVERTURES TO GREAT
BRITAIN
147
discuss the
question
privately
with the German
Ambassador
;
and this
was done at
Hatfield
on October
15th,
a
week
after
the
signing
of
the
Austro-German
Treaty.
As a
result of a frank
exchange
of
views,
Salisbury
now formed the
conclusion
that the
urgency
of
the
German
overtures
had
diminished since Count
Mlinster had
first
begun
them.
Thereupon,
he
gave
an assurance
that
in the
event of
a Russian
attack
on
Germany
and Austria British
goodwill
and
assistance
might
be
relied
on,
while,
as
for
France,
he
said that
Bismarck
might
feel
sure
that Great
Britain would not
allow an attack
on
Germany
through
Belgium,
and he
was also
confident that
she
would even
be able to re-
strain
any
French
Government
from
joining
Russia
against
Germany
1
.
No more definite
approach
to an
alliance
appears
to
have
been
made on either
side,
and it
is
possible
that
Bismarck,
discouraged by
the absence of
a more cordial
response
in
the
first
instance,
had
already
cooled
down
on the
subject
and looked
for no
practical
result.
Twelve
days
after the
Hatfield
conversation,
Count
Karolyi,
the Austro-
Hungarian
Ambassador,
informed
Salisbury
confidentially
of
the
conclusion of the
Dual
Alliance,
but
made
no allusion
to
the
question
of Great Britain's
adhesion to it.
It
is
quite
evident
that
Beaconsfield
experienced
a
sense
of
keen
relief at
not
having
been
pressed
to return a
positive
answer to
Bismarck's offer.
For,
as
he
wrote to
the
Queen
(November 5th),
4
'it
would have been
a difficult and even
dangerous
affair
to have
altogether rejected
the
contemplated
alliance."
In
the
circumstances,
his
satisfaction
at the time
that
Great Britain was still
"as free as
air,
and
this,
too,
without
showing
any
want of
sympathy
with the
Austro-German
views,"
was
legitimate
2
. The
Queen's
comment on
the
episode,
suggestive
of
a return
of
her former statesmanlike
grip
of
realities, was,
"We are well out
of
it."
The words
aptly
describe
the
feeling
which muse have come over Bismarck
himself,
when in the
general
election
of the
following
April
the British
nation
pronounced
emphatic
condemnation
upon
all
"spirited"
Foreign
Policy
and
sent
the Beaconsfield Administration into
retirement. The
Triple
Alliance
was
completed,
two
years
later,
by
the
adhesion of
Italy
(May,
1882).
1
Life
of
Salisbury,
n.
367-9.
2
Nevertheless,
according
to a
German
diplomatist,
who took
part
in more
than
one
later
attempt
to
draw
his
country
and
Great
Britain closer
together,
Lord
Beaconsfield,
shortly
before
the fall of his
Ministry,
sketched
the outlines
of an
Anglo-German
alliance for
Bismarck's
examination. See Hermann
Freiherr von
Eckardstein,
Diplomatische Enthiillungen
zum
Ursprung
des
Weltkrieges, p. 13.
Cf.
infra
,
pp. 276
ft.
148
FORWARD
POLICY AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
C.
The
Execution
of
the
Treaty of
Berlin,
1
878-1
880
As
was
to be
expected,
Turkey
was in
no
hurry
to
execute the
Treaty,
and,
at the
beginning
of
September,
two months
after its
signature,
Bismarck,
pressed
by
France,
whom
he
was desirous of
conciliating, suggested
the issue of an
Identic
Note
to
the Porte on
the
subject.
The
British
Government,
while
declaring
their
intention
to see the
Treaty
enforced,
thought
such
action
premature,
and
failed
to make
allowance for
the Sultan's
difficult
position.
This
was, also,
the view of
other
Powers,
and
Bismarck
himself
accepted
it.
When
nine
months had
passed
and
the Porte had
still
taken no
steps
to
draw
up
the
Constitutions
required by
Article
XXIII
for Crete and
other
portions
of
European
Turkey, Salisbury
(on August 7th)
made
immediate
and
strong representations
at
Constantinople, recognising
(as
he
wrote to our
Ambassador
there)
that "the
Sultan's inclination
to come
to
an
agreement
and our
power
of
insisting
will diminish with
each
succeeding
month";
but
they
had
little effect.
The
beneficiary
States
which
were
able to
rely
on their own
strength
speedily
made
good
their
treaty rights.
Under the
Anglo-
Turkish
Convention,
Great Britain
occupied
Cyprus
in
July, 1878,
and
placed
the island
under
a
High
Commissioner,
the Turkish
tribute
being
fixed at
£92,800. Nearly
three
years
later
(February,
1881),
during negotiations
with
Turkey
as
to
the
Greek
frontier,
Mr
(after-
wards
Viscount)
Goschen,
then
British
Envoy Extraordinary
at
Con-
stantinople,
proposed
that
the
island
should be
given
back to the Porte
as a
makeweight
;
but the idea did not
spread
beyond
the inner
circle
of
the
Cabinet,
where
it
found no
favour.
Austrian
troops
promptly
entered the
provinces
of
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
(July
29th),
heralded
by
a
proclamation stating
that
they
did
so
"
for
the better
preservation
of
order and
tranquillity."
Moham-
madan
risings
at once
followed,
and a
large army
had to be
employed
in
their
suppression.
The
military
occupation
of
the
sandjak
of
Novi-
Bazar was
effected in
September
of the
following year. Turkey
retained
all
other
jurisdiction,
administrative,
judicial
and
financial;
and,
on
the
whole,
this
experiment
in
dual
control,
on a small
scale,
worked
smoothly
and
efficiently,
the
only
disturbing
influence
being
the
Greater Servian
agitation
encouraged
from the outside.
The
spring
of
1879
nao
^
arrived
before
practical
progress
was
made
in
fixing
the
frontier
between
Bulgaria
and Eastern
Roumelia,
and
the
Russian Government was
anxious
that the
task should
be
com-
I
THE
BULGARIAN UNION MOVEMENT
149
pleted
before
the time came for the
withdrawal of the
Tsar's
troops.
Major-General
Hamley
was the
British
Commissioner,
and
his In-
structions
were
to secure
for
Turkey
such a frontier as she would
be
able
to
defend,
fortify,
and
garrison.
Before the frontier
was
settled,
there were
frequent bickerings
between the
Commissioners on both
sides;
and in
January,
1879,
Gortchakoff,
in
an
arrogant despatch,
charged
the British Government
with
deliberately
impeding
progress.
Salisbury
had no
difficulty
in
proving
that
the
delay
in
question
was
due
to the action of the
Russian
agents,
who
had
assured the
inhabitants
of
Eastern
Roumelia
that the
arrangements
made
by
the
Treaty
of
Berlin
were
merely
temporary,
and
that
the
province
would
after all
be
joined
to
Bulgaria.
A
friendly
understanding,
taking
the
form of
reciprocal
pledges
to enforce
the
Treaty
provisions
without
fear
or
favour,
facilitated the
remainder
of
the
frontier
negotiations;
and,
early
in
June,
the
British Commissioner
was
able to
report
to
Lord
Salisbury
that
the
result of
his
efforts
had
been "as
advantageous
to
the
defence of
Turkey
as could
be desired."
For a
time,
Russian influence
was
supreme
in the
principality.
The first
ruler,
Prince
Alexander
of
Battenberg,
a
dashing
young
Prussian
officer who had
fought
in the late
War,
was
a
nephew
of
Tsar
Alexander II. Russian
Ministers
were
imposed
on
him,
and
Russian
officers
were
freely
seconded to
his
army.
Before
long,
however,
the
Bulgarians began
to
question
the
advantage
of
being
emancipated
from
one
Power
in order to
be
yoked
to
another;
and,
in
1883,
the
Prince
rid
himself
of his
foreign
advisers,
though
Russian
intrigue
continued active
in the
country.
Although
for a time
defeated,
the
cause
of
Bulgarian
Union
was
kept
alive
by agitation
both in the
principality
and
in
the
severed
province.
The movement
was, also,
encouraged by
much
petty
tyranny
and
chicanerie
on the
part
of
the Suzerain Power and its
agents,
and
by
resentment
at the Porte's
jealous
and
short-sighted
policy
in
keeping
Bulgarians
out
of the Roumelian administrative
service. When
the Liberal
party
came to
power
in Great
Britain in the
spring
of
1880,
the
cause of Union received
new
stimulus,
and on
May 31st
Sir
William
White,
our
Diplomatic Agent
at
Bucharest,
warned Lord
Granville that
active measures
might
be
expected
at
any
time. The
plan
matured
only
five
years
later.
On
September
18th,
1885,
the
Turkish
Governor-General of
Eastern
Roumelia
was
deposed
by
a
band
of
military
officers and
despatched
to
Constantinople,
and
the
Union of
the
province
with
Bulgaria
under
Prince Alexander
was
150
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
proclaimed.
With
great
lack of
discretion,
the
Prince
accepted
the
proffered
extension
of his rule
without
consulting
Turkey,
his
Suzerain,
Russia,
his
Protector,
or
the
Signatory
Powers
collectively.
The Sultan
protested
and
made
defensive
preparations,
but did
nothing
further.
What was
more
surprising
was the
attitude of
the
two
Powers which
had
so
bitterly
wrangled
over the
question
of
a
Greater
Bulgaria
in
1878.
While Lord
Salisbury (now Foreign
Secretary
in his
own first
Government),
so
soon as he had
ascertained that
the
Powers were not
conjointly disposed
to reestablish the
Treaty
status
by
force,
decided
to
support
the
Union,
Russia
refused
to
assent
to an
arrangement
which she
had
vainly
endeavoured
to
carry
out
seven
years
before.
Though
so far
bloodless,
the
coup
d'etat
occasioned
violent re-
percussions throughout
the Balkan
peninsula.
Greece and
Servia
at
once demanded territorial
compensation
at
the
expense
of
Turkey,
and the Cretans
again
proclaimed
Union with
the
Hellenic
kingdom.
King
Milan of
Servia
(who
had
assumed
the
royal
status in
March,
1882)
rashly
declared war
against
his
neighbour;
but within
a
week
(November i4th-20th)
his
kingdom lay
prostrate
at
Bulgaria's
feet.
Only
Austria's
intervention
prevented
the
Bulgarians
from
making
a
triumphant
entry
into
Belgrade.
The
Treaty
of
Bucharest
(March
3rd, 1886)
restored the
status
quo.
A
little
later,
the Personal
Union
of
Bulgaria
and
Eastern
Roumelia
was
recognised
by
the
Powers,
the
Sultan
appointing
Prince Alexander Governor-
General
of the
de-
tached
province.
Greece
was
prevented
from
attacking Turkey by
the
stern
action of the
Powers,
France alone
standing
aloof. It
was
by
the
firm attitude
adopted
first
by
Lord
Salisbury
and
later,
on
his
relinquishment
in 1886 of the
Foreign
Office,
by
the Earl of
Rosebery,
that the restless little State
was
held
in
check. When
the Government
of
M.
Delyanni
refused
to
comply
with
the demand
for
disarmament,
a blockade
of the Greek
coasts was
instituted
by
five
of
the
Powers,
France
abstaining. Delyanni
's
resignation
eased the
situation,
and
by
the
capitulation
of
Tricoupis,
his
successor,
the blockade was
raised
and
peace
was
preserved
(June
6th,
1886).
No sooner
had Prince
Alexander
of
Bulgaria's
new
status been
confirmed
by
the Powers than
he
laid
down,
not
unwillingly,
a some-
what
thorny
Crown
(September 7th, 1886).
His
successor was
Prince
Ferdinand
of
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha,
who
was
elected
by
the Grand
Sobranje
on
July
7th,
1887,
though
without
receiving
recognition by
the
Powers
until
February,
1896.
While
the
early
readjustments
under the
Treaty
of Berlin were
THE
CLAIMS OF
GREECE
151
in
progress,
a
Liberal
Government
came into
power
in
England
(April,
1880),
animated
by
a
stronger
desire to see
the
provisions
of
the
Treaty
put
into
force.
Lord Granville returned
to
his old
post
at
the
Foreign
Office. He was not a man
of
rapid
decisions
;
but he
was conscious of the
responsibility
of his
party
and the
country
to the
populations
which
had
been freed from
Turkish
rule,
and
determined
that the
Porte
should
honour its
many
pledges.
Its inertia
was,
however,
still
blocking
the
way,
wherever the
apathy
or
indecision
of
the
Powers allowed
it,
and the
suspicion
was
widespread
that the
British
Government
and
their
Representative
in
Constantinople
were
no
longer
favourable to the exercise of
pressure.
Sir A. H.
Layard's
past
attitude was
inconsistent
with
zealous
acceptance
of
the ideas
represented
by
the new
Ministry.
Once
before,
in a
critical
time,
Great
Britain had
spoken
to
Turkey
with
two
voices,
and
the result
had
been disastrous. He
was,
therefore,
given
leave
of
absence until another
Embassy
could be
found
for
him,
and
Goschen was sent to
Constantinople
as
Special
Ambassador
and
Plenipotentiary,
with a view to the
adjustment
of the Greek and
Montenegrin
frontier
questions
and
the
securing
of better conditions
for Armenia.
The Greeks had
wished to
begin
the
retracing
of their
northern
frontier almost
before the
signatures
to the
Treaty
were
dry,
and
had
to
be
reminded
that,
as
the
arrangement
proposed
was
dependent
on
moral
suasion,
the first
step
must
be to come to an
amicable under-
standing
with the
Porte.
A
long
time was
spent
in
futile
negotiations,
Turkey
objecting
that,
while
she had
originally
been asked
to
give
Greece an
inch,
she was now called
upon
for an ell: the
promise
of
a
frontier rectification had
become
a
demand for a
province.
Here-
upon,
France,
who had
played
a
very insignificant
part
in the
Berlin
Congress
and
the
events which
led
up
to
it,
seldom
exposing
herself
to
odium
from
any
side and
never to
the remotest
possibility
of
langer, posed
for a
time as the
champion
of
the
rights
of
the
Hellenic
ice.
But
no
sooner
had
it
become
plain
that
zealous
support
of the
rreek
claims
would
bring
her into
antagonism
with
Turkey,
than
le fell
back
into
her
old
passive
attitude.
At
that
time,
France was
>reparing
to
seize
Tunis,
and this
fact,
known
only
to
herself,
indis-
>osed
her
to
ruffle
the
Porte
unnecessarily.
In
March,
1880,
since
lo
progress
had
been
made,
Salisbury
proposed
the
appointment
of
international
commission for
investigating
the
question
on
the
>ot
and
making
definite
recommendations to
the
Powers.
A
change
152
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
of Government
having
occurred
immediately
afterwards,
Granville
suggested,
instead,
a
conference in Berlin
;
and
to
this the Porte
agreed.
When
the
recommendations of the
Conference were communi-
cated
to the
disputant
States
(July 15th),
Turkey
declined
to
accept
them,
and the
deadlock continued. Invited
by
Granville to advise
on
further
action,
Bismarck
suggested
that
the
Plenipotentiaries
should
negotiate
with
the
Porte
in
Constantinople
as
to a fresh
frontier
in
Thessaly,
but
substituting
Crete for the
portions
of
Epirus
con-
ditionally
awarded
by
the
Treaty
of
Berlin,
so as
to
avoid
trouble
with the Albanian Mussulmans there. The
Plenipotentiaries
met
on
February
20th,
1881,
Goschen
taking
a
leading
part
as British
Representative.
In a Collective
Note addressed
to
the
Greek Govern-
ment on
April
7th,
the Powers
assigned
to Greece
Thessaly
and
the
district of Artis
in
Epirus,
but
made
no
mention
of
Crete. This
arrangement gave
Greece
something
less
than
the Berlin
decision, and,
as
it left
out of account a considerable Hellenic
population
in
Epirus,
it
created
no
enthusiasm
;
but the
Greek Government
agreed
to
accept
it,
as
did the
Porte, and,
with the
signing
of
the Turco-Greek Con-
vention
of
May 24th,
a
stormy
dispute
was
for a
time
disposed
of.
To the new Liberal Government fell
likewise the initiative
in
the
settlement
of
the
Montenegrin
frontier
difficulty.
In
conformity
with
Article
XXXII of
the
Treaty, Montenegro
duly
withdrew her
troops
from
Dulcigno,
and she
was able to
take
peaceable possession
of the
territory assigned
to her on
the
Herzegovina
frontier;
but not so in
the case
of that
granted
to her
in
compensation
at the
expense
of
Albania.
A
stalwart
but
lawless
people,
who feared civilisation
far
more
than
oppression,
since
against
the latter
they
had
always
been
able
to
defend
themselves,
the Albanians
objected
to the
seizure
of
any
of their
lands,
murdering
the Sultan's
first
Envoy
and
refusing
to
obey
the
second
;
and
fighting
between
them
and
the
Montenegrins
followed.
The
Powers
suggested
the cession
of
a
different
district,
and
the Porte
agreed
;
but
no sooner had the Turkish
troops
been with-
drawn
from
it
than
the Albanians
took
possession,
and
there
was reason
to believe
that
they
did so
as
part
of a
pre-arranged
plot. Hereupon,
the Ambassadors'
Conference held
in Berlin
in
June,
1880,
recom-
mended
that
Montenegro
should receive
back
Dulcigno
with
the
sea-
board as
far
as
the
Bojana.
However,
Turkey
objected,
and
encouraged
the
Albanians
to
revolt;
and,
in
consequence,
the British Government
in
September proposed
the somewhat
stale,
but
usually
effectual,
device of
a
naval
demonstration,
in
support
of
a
Montenegrin
advance
FATE
OF
CHRISTIAN
POPULATIONS
153
to
the
port by
land.
This
time,
the
threat failed to
move
the
Sultan,
and
it
was
only
when
the
alternative
occupation
of
the
prosperous
port
of
Smyrna,
with the
sequestration
of its
customs
revenue,
was
proposed,
and the
case
became
one of
losing
both
daughter
and
ducats,
that he
yielded.
It
was
not difficult to
eject
the
Albanian
garrison
from
Dulcigno,
when
its
presence
was
no
longer
desired
;
and
Montenegro
entered
into
possession peaceably
on November
27th,
the Allied
fleets
withdrawing
several
days
later.
Little was done
under
the
provisions
of
the
Treaty
of Berlin which
called for the
introduction of
administrative
reforms. In
October,
1878,
indeed,
Crete received
a
Constitution,
known as the Pact of
Halepa
; but,
after
an
insurrectionary
outbreak in the
following year,
the
Sultan
repealed
it,
and
placed
the
island under a Mussulman
Governor-General
;
so
that
for
another decade
Turkish rule continued
as before. The Armenians
fared
even worse.
Article
LXI
of the
Treaty required
the
prompt
introduction
by
the
Porte
of reforms
in
the
provinces
inhabited
by
them.
Sir A.
H.
Layard
did his
best to
persuade
the
Porte
to fulfil
its
obligation,
but without
success;
and,
on
June
nth, 1880,
the Powers served
on
it
an Identic
Note
calling
attention
to
the
deplorable
condition
of
the
provinces
and
demanding
the execution of the
Treaty
provisions.
An evasive
reply
was returned
to this letter on
July 5th,
and,
as
nothing
was
done,
a
Collective
Note
was addressed to
the
procrastinating
Government on
September
7th,
repeating
the demand for action
in more
peremptory
terms
—
but
still
without result.
The zeal
of the Powers
in the cause
of
oppressed
nation-
alities had now
begun
to cool down
;
and
the later
history
of these
unhappy
outcasts of Christendom was darkened
by
periodical
out-
rages
and
massacres
in which Turk and Kurd
surpassed
their
worst
records of
savagery.
The
fate
of the
Macedonians,
who were thrust back under
Turkish
le
owing
to
the defeat of
Russia's
plan
of a Greater
Bulgaria,
was in its
y equally
deplorable.
Though
not
expressly
mentioned
in the
Treaty,
Macedonia was intended
to
benefit
by
the
general
stipulation
on
the
subject
of administrative reforms
contained
in Article XXIII. The
pur-
pose
of this
Article was not
fulfilled,
and
the
province
became
the
cock-
pit
of
Balkan
strife.
All
the
adjacent
States
—
Servia,
Bulgaria,
Greece
—
were
intent
upon expansion,
and,
inasmuch as Macedonia
was
the
natural
outlet
for
their ambitions
,
its frontiers
were
periodically
raided
by
its
neighbours.
Turkey
seemed
to humour
each
of
the
rivals
in
turn,
yet
succeeded
in
retaining
undivided
possession
of
the
contested
territory.
154
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
V.
The
Reorganisation of
Egypt:
the
Dual
Control,
1
875-1
880
Since
the
Great
Powers
confirmed Mehemet Ali in the
hereditary
Governor-
Generalship
—
the
title
Khedive
was not
regularised
till
1866
—
Egypt
had
enjoyed
an
increasing
measure of
independence, though
the Sultan's
suzerainty
remained
unimpaired
and was
jealously
re-
asserted
in
successive
firmans. British influence
vied
with French in
the
Viceroy's
counsels,
yet,
faithful to the
tradition which
Palmerston
had done so much to
strengthen,
without
any attempt
at
aggression
or
needless interference.
Not
wishing
to
enter
Egypt
herself,
and de-
termined
to
bar entrance to
any
other
Power,
it was Great Britain's
policy
to maintain the Sultan's
rights
and
to
strengthen
his
Viceroy's
position. Recognition
of the fact that the nearest
highroad
to India
lay
through
Egypt
became,
with
the construction
of the Suez
Canal,
the
primary
consideration
of
British
statesmen;
yet,
neither
before
nor
after the
accomplishment
of that
undertaking,
did concern for
British interests exclude
genuine
solicitude
for the
country's
pros-
perity
and
better
government.
If,
at
any
time,
the voice of Great Britain can
be said to have been
clearly
predominant
at
Cairo,
it
was in the
middle of the
century,
under
Said Pasha.
That
farsighted
ruler died
in
January, 1863, giving
place
to
Ismail,
whose career
of
reckless
extravagance
proved
his own
and
his
country's undoing.
Said Pasha had left
a
public
debt
heavy
in
proportion
to the
national
resources
;
for,
while
borrowing freely
he
had
made insufficient
provision
for
meeting
the
exorbitant
charges
of
his
foreign
creditors.
Whatever
folly
was
to be
laid
to
his account
in
this
respect
was,
however,
surpassed
by
the
wastrel
Ismail,
whose
master-passions
were
self-indulgence
and
prodigality.
Inheriting
a
debt
of
three and a
quarter
million
sterling,
he succeeded
in
increasing
it
step by step,
until
it
amounted to fifteen
pounds
a head
in
a
popula-
tion
composed
in the main
of
small and
impecunious
peasants
and
oppressed
labourers.
Ismail
was a man of
considerable
parts,
with bold
ideas
and not
unwholesome
ambitions. From
the
first,
he
showed
great
eagerness
to
enlarge
his
rights
and
jurisdictions
as
tributary
ruler,
and,
by
means
of
his success in
ingratiating
himself
with the
Sultan,
he
usually
obtained
what he
wanted.
From
each
visit to
Constantinople
he returned
with
a new
firman
making
some
addition
to
his
preroga-
tives,
though inevitably
also to the
tribute
payable
to the
Suzerain.