Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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MILITARY
RIOT AT CAIRO
165
alien
Governments
can never be an
altogether
satisfactory
substitute
for
the least efficient
of
native
Administrations.
It
may
be
true
that
the native
ruling
class
was,
in
the
main,
incapable
and
largely
corrupt
;
but,
at
least,
it
was
Egyptian
and
racy
of the
soil,
and,
when
tried
by
native
standards,
its
incompetence
and
venality
cannot
be
said
to
have excited violent
disgust.
The
personal quality
of
even
the
im-
ported
officials,
however,
was
very
unequal,
and
many
of them
were
neither efficient nor
upright;
while,
at
the same
time,
their
main-
tenance
proved
a
heavy
burden on the
Treasury.
This intrusion of so
large
a
foreign
community,
which
for
the
most
part
had
settled in
Egypt
for
its
own,
and not the
country's, good,
was a source of
profound
offence
to all sections
of the
native
popula-
tion,
but most of all to the
patriotic
educated
classes,
little
susceptible
though they
were to the
cruder forms of
prejudice
and
bigotry,
and
altogether
free from
taint of fanaticism.
European
statesmen
had
long
talked
of
the
possibility
of the
political
internationalisation
of
Egypt.
Here was an internationalisation
of a
far more
objectionable
kind
progressing by
leaps
and bounds.
The
Army
had
grievances
of its
own,
of
which low
and uncertain
pay
and
favouritism
were
those
which rankled
deepest. Early
in
1879,
when,
in
consequence
of the
large
reduction
in the
native
force
insisted on in
the interest of
economy, 2500
officers
were
suddenly
put
on
halfpay
without
receiving
the arrears
due
to
them,
a
military
riot
occurred at
Cairo
(February
18th).
It was
directed
generally
against
the
Government,
but
particularly against
Nubar
Pasha
and
Sir
Rivers
Wilson,
both of whom were
roughly
treated
by
a
large
body
of armed
officers,
while
the
rioters took
possession
of the
Ministry
of
Finance as
the
assumed source
and
origin
of
their mis-
fortune. On that
occasion,
the Khedive
adopted
prompt
measures
and,
with
the
help
of
loyal
troops,
soon succeeded
in
quelling
the
iot.
Nevertheless,
the incident was
alarming
as a
symptom
of
deep-
ated
unrest;
and
the British
Representative
in
Cairo,
in
reporting
pon
it to
the
Foreign Secretary,
spoke
of an
uneasy
feeling
of
dis-
content as
prevailing
among
the
natives,
owing
to
their
jealousy
of
the
large
influx of
highly-paid European
officials.
The
precedent
thus
established
by
the
soldiery
was
of evil
augury.
Soon,
a
more
systematic
agitation
began
against
foreigners,
of
the
kind
which
has
occurred so
often
among
Oriental
peoples
upon
whom
Western ideas and
institutions have been
forced
prematurely.
Secret
meetings
of
malcontents
were
held;
rumours of
intended
pogroms
1
66
FORWARD
POLICY AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
\J\
against
the
Christians became current
;
and
the
leaders
of the
movement
were said to
be
in
confidential communication
with the
direct
agents
of the Khedive.
It
was a
misfortune
that,
at a
time
so
critical,
the
responsible
Government
lacked
initiative,
energy,
and resolution.
For
this,
the
Powers were not
free from
responsibility.
Their
repeated
interferences and
invasions
of the Khedive's
powers,
however
excel-
lent the
intentions
underlying
them,
had
weakened the
Administration,
which,
in
proportion
as
it
forfeited
public respect
and
confidence,
also lost
authority
and the
ability
to
compel
obedience.
In the
Army,
in
particular,
disaffection
deepened,
for the
Khedive
was
able
neither to
pacify
nor
suppress
the
mutineers,
who
had found
an
able
spokesman
in
Ahmed
Arabi,
a
colonel
of
Fellah
origin.
The
first
dangerous
mistake was committed
by
Tewfik, when,
early
in
1
88
1,
he
dismissed the Minister of War at the
bidding
of the
mal-
content
officers.
Before the end of
the
year,
the whole
Ministry
had
succumbed to the
same
influence;
and,
in
February,
1882,
Arabi
himself became
War Minister. In
September,
the Sultan
had
wished
to
despatch
a
force of
occupation
to
his
unsettled
province,
and the
British
Government
were
willing;
but,
as France
objected,
the
despatch
of a
Turkish Commissioner was
suggested
as an alternative.
With
characteristic
inconsequence,
the Sultan's
Ministers sent
two
Delegates,
armed with
different
Instructions,
and each
being
expected
to act and
report
independently
of the other.
The
British
Government were
as
firmly
opposed
to active
inter-
vention
as
ever,
and Lord
Granville,
the
Foreign Secretary,
wrote
at
that
time that the
only
event
which could
justify
even
a
temporary
departure
from this
reserve
would
be
"the existence
of
anarchy
or
some attack on the Canal."
Influences, however,
were
at
work,
which
were soon to
force
his
hands.
In
France,
Gambetta
took office
in
November
at
the head of a
Ministry
most
of whose members
were
but understudies
of
himself,
who with the
Presidency
of
the Council
combined the control
of
Foreign
Affairs.
Jules
Ferry,
his
predecessor,
had leaned
towards
Germany
more
than
the French
nation
approved.
Gambetta
came in as a
strong
advocate
of a close
understanding
with
both Great
Britain and
Russia. It was
not
that
he
loved either
country
—
as
to Russia he
had
declared
only
three
years
before
that an alliance
with
an absolutist
Tsardom
was
"unthinkable"
—
but
he
saw
in such
a double
understanding
the
only
safeguard against
the
Bismarckian
policy
of
coalitions. "Let us
keep
the alliance
with
those
two
Powers
as a reserve
for the
future,"
he
had,
just
before he
took
office,
said
,.
FRENCH
POLICY
IN
EGYPT
167
de
Freycinet;
"leaning
on London and St
Petersburg,
we
shall be
invincible."
He
was not
less desirous
than
Ferry
had been
to
cooperate
with
Great
Britain
in
Egypt;
but
the
cooperation
favoured
by
him
was
to
consist
of active
measures which should exclude
the
possibility
of
participation
in
it
by
any
other
Power,
since he
held
that
in
such
a
relationship
not
more
than two were
good company.
Thiers had
warned
him on one
occasion:
"Whatever
you
do,
never
let
go
of
Egypt";
and Gambetta
held
on
so
long
as he was able
1
.
Convinced
that
intervention would
become
inevitable,
he
was also
prepared
to
find an
opportunity
for it.
The
calculating
spirit
and
quickwittedness
of French
diplomacy
were
well shown
in the
steps
taken
by
Gambetta
to achieve this end.
He was shrewd
enough
to
see the
advantage
of
assuming
the
lead,
and \
this Lord Granville
made
easy
for
him.
Before
he
had been
a month
in office
(December 14th),
he
suggested,
through
Lord
Lyons,
that
the moment was
opportune
for
an
intimate
understanding
between
the
two
Powers,
and
suggested
a frank
exchange
of views
on
the
subject.
For,
while
it
was
obviously
their
interest
to
give
Tewfik
all
practicable support,
the
eventuality
of
the breakdown
of
his Govern-
ment had to be reckoned with.
Granville
was,
at
first,
unwilling
to
bind
himself to
hypothetical
proceedings,
and
accordingly
fell
back
upon
the
well-known
diplomatic
formula
"
liberty
of action."
Undiscouraged,
Gambetta returned to the
charge,
and this time
his
impetuous
will
overcame
opposition.
As a result of conversations
in the
last week
of
the
month,
the terms
of a
Joint
Note to the
Khedive,
whose
authority
was
becoming ominously
feebler,
were
agreed
upon,
and the Note
was
communicated on
January
8th. It
assured
him
that the
two
Powers
would
support
him in his
endeavours
to
cope
with
the
difficulties
of
his
situation,
and
invited
him,
in
somewhat
didactic
terms,
to
draw
from
the assurance confidence
and
strength.
Whether
the
Joint
Note was called for or not
by
the
circumstances
of
the
moment,
from the
standpoint
of Great
Britain
it was
very
untimely;
for her
partner
had
quite recently outraged
nationalist
feeling
by
wanton
aggression
in
another
part
of
the
Ottoman
empire.
Intended
to
encourage
Tewfik
and exert a
salutary
influence
on
public
^
opinion,
it
actually
intensified the
anti-foreign
movement,
since,
by
seeming
to
suggest
more active
interference,
it
confirmed
the
appre-
j
hensions of
thoughtful
Egyptians
that
their
country
was
about
to
share the
experience
of
Tunis.
Granville made
a
strong
point
of
1
Deschanel,
P.,
Gambetta,
p. 304.
\A
\J
1 68 FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
the
fact
that he
had
not
committed his
Government
to
any
definite
measures,
or
to
any
measures
at all.
This
restricted view of the
significance
of the Note
was not
accepted
by
Gambetta,
who took
its
meaning
to be
that
whither France went
Great Britain
would be
prepared
to follow. Reduced
to
the
lowest
terms,
the Note was a
pledge
of conditional
joint
intervention.
About this
time,
Bismarck,
in
response
to
the cooler
temper
of
the French Cabinet since the
fall of
Jules
Ferry,
showed
again special
concern
to
strengthen friendly
relations with
the British
Government,
and with
this
idea
in view he sent his
son,
Count
Herbert,
on a
special
Mission to London. He seems
to
have
thought
that
the
Foreign
Office
was
only
half-informed of the
guiding
lines of German
foreign policy,
and to have attributed
the
responsibility
for this
state of
things partly
to the
British
Embassy
in
Berlin
and,
in a
greater
degree,
to the
German
Embassy
in London. Odo Russell
had,
certainly,
shown a
disposition,
on
occasion,
to
accept
the
conversational
confidences
and
conscious
indiscretions of the
magnetic
Chancellor as serious indica-
tions of
policy,
and to
report
them as such to
the
Foreign
Secretary.
Yet the
fact remained
that the two
Governments seemed never
to
come nearer
to a
permanent
understanding.
Granville welcomed
the
overtures,
and the
assurance,
which
followed,
of Bismarck's
wish
to
give
cordial
support
to
British
policy
in
Egypt
made
his
path
for
a time easier.
Replying,
at the end
of
the
month,
to
suggestions
from
Gambetta
that the
two Powers should assert Dual Control in a
more
definite
fashion,
he now
stated the British
position
in
language
which
admitted
of no
misinterpretation.
"The
British
Government,"
he
said,
"
had no
ambitious
designs
in
Egypt
for
itself,
and would
object
to
an
exclusive
influence
being
seized
by any
other Power."
Gambetta
had fired his last shot. On
February
1st
the
impetuous
tribune
fell,
and
in
de
Freycinet
he
was
succeeded
by
a
Foreign
Minister
in
greater sympathy
with
the
official British attitude.
Up
to
this
point,
that attitude
had
been one of
abstention
from
intervention
except
on the clearest
proof
of
necessity,
in which event there was
to be collective
action
by
the
Powers,
including
Turkey.
Herein,
Granville was
in
complete
accord with the
Head
of
the Government.
Five
years
earlier
Gladstone had warned
the nation in
prophetic
words
against
the
danger
of
setting
foot
in
the
Khediviate,
predicting
that such
action would
lead
the
country
step by step
forward until
it
found
itself saddled
with
the
responsibility,
not
only
of
Egypt,
but
of a
great
North and
Central African
empire.
OUTBREAK
OF
REVOLUTION
169
For three months
longer,
the
struggle
between
the
Khedive
and
the
military junta
continued without
apparent
change
in the
situa-
tion. Towards
the
end
of
May,
1882,
British and
French
squadrons
were
despatched
to
Alexandria for the
protection
of the
foreign
population,
of which a
steady
exodus had
already
begun.
It was
known, however,
that
while the French Government were
professing
loyalty
to Great
Britain,
their
agent
in
Cairo,
de
Blignieres,
was con-
sorting
with the
military
conspirators
and the anti-British
party,
and
endeavouring
to create
faith in
France as the
country's
one and
only
true
friend.
In that
month,
de
Freycinet
himself
urged
the
deposition
of
Tewfik in favour of
Halim
Pasha,
his
uncle,
of whose
goodwill
France had
previously
made
sure.
Now,
insurrection
raised its
head
again,
and
Arabi,
who
had been removed from
the
Ministry,
was
re-
instated
in
deference
to
military
pressure. Early
in the
following
June,
the Porte sent Dervish
Pasha to
Egypt
to confer
with the
Khedive
and
his advisers
and
to take stock
of
the
situation
generally.
A
little
later,
the two Powers
proposed
that a
Conference
of
Ambassadors
should
be held
in
Constantinople,
taking
as the basis of
its deliberations
the
maintenance
of the
rights
of
the
Sultan and the
Khedive,
the
observ-
ance of international
engagements
and the
arrangements
existing
under
them,
whether
with
Great
Britain and
France alone
or
with
all
the
Powers,
the
preservation
of
the liberties
secured
by
the
firmans
of
the
Sultan,
and
the
prudent
development
of
Egyptian
institutions.
The other Powers
agreed;
but the Porte demanded
a
postponement
of
the
proposals
until it should
have tried
to
settle
the
country
in its
own
way.
It
was ominous
that,
at this
time,
batteries
were
being
constructed at
Alexandria
in
proximity
to the
anchorage
of
the
British and
French
squadrons. Required
to discontinue
this
work,
Arabi,
now to
all
intents
a
military
dictator,
refused.
It was now too
late to
check
by
commissioners
and
conferences
the mischief which had so
long
been
brewing.
The
threatened
storm
broke with
startling
suddenness
on
June
nth,
when revolution
flamed
up
in
Alexandria,
taking
the form
of
the
massacre
of
sixty
Europeans
iid
an
orgy
of
looting,
before the rioters
were
suppressed
by
the
Khedive's
troops.
The
Constantinople
Conference
opened
on
June
23rd,
by
which
me it was
known
that
the Dervish Mission had
proved
a total
failure
;
for
the
Egyptian Ministry
was in Arabi's
power
and
the
Khedive's
orders
were
only
executed with
his
assent
and
cooperation.
On
that
day,
the
Sultan
made,
through
Reschid
Pasha,
his
Private
Secretary,
170
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
a
remarkable communication to Lord
Dufferin
(who
had
been
trans-
ferred to
Constantinople
from
Petrograd
in
the
previous
year).
Sus-
picious
of Great
Britain's
movements,
he
put
to him
the
pointed
questions:
"What
are the intentions of
England
in
regard
to the
present?
What
are the
views
entertained
by
Her
Majesty's
Govern-
ment with
respect
to
Egypt
as
regards
the
future?"
Lord
Dufferin
gave
the
assurance that
his
Government had but
one
desire,
which
was
"the
preservation
in
their full
integrity
of
the Sultan's
sovereign
rights,
as
defined
by
the firmans and
the
maintenance
of the order of
things
established under them."
Great Britain's
direct
interests
in
the
country,
he
said,
were the freedom of
the Suez Canal
and an
administration
so
satisfactory
as to
preclude
any foreign
Power
from
finding
an
excuse for
intervention.
Encouraged
by
these
assurances,
Reschid
Pasha
now asserted
that
the
Sultan was
ready
and
willing
to
come to an
understanding
with
Great Britain
to
the exclusion of
France,
"which he
hated";
and
he
offered
to hand
over to the
former "the exclusive control
and adminis-
tration
of
the whole of
Egypt,
reserving
to
himself
only
those modified
rights
of
sovereignty
which
he now
possesses."
Lord Dufferin
replied
that
"if
the Sultan
were to hand
over
Egypt
to
Great Britain
in
fee
simple
with the
approbation
of all
Europe,
he doubted whether
the
British
Government would
accept
such a burden of
responsibility
1
."
Gladstone and Granville
took
it
upon
themselves to
refuse
the
Sultan's
tempting
offer,
to
the
disappointment
of the
Queen
2
.
The
Conference
accepted
the
proposal
of the
British Ambassador
that
the
pacification
of the
country
should be
entrusted
to
the
Sultan's
troops,
subject
to strict
limitations
in
regard
to their
employment
and
the duration of
their
stay.
The Sultan was
willing
to send
troops,
but
not to bind himself
by
conditions
in
doing
so;
and,
as he refused
to
give way
on that
point,
the
Conference
dragged
on for
many
days
without
positive
result.
In
the
meantime,
the condition of the
country
grew steadily
worse,
with
the
result
that the British Government
were
brought daily
nearer to
the
contingency
of active intervention.
Gladstone
and
Granville
were convinced of
its
necessity,
and
the rest
of the Cabinet
now
came
round to
it,
with the
single
exception
of
Mr
Bright,
who
resigned
office.
As the
insurrectionaries
in
Alexandria
had
continued their de-
fensive works
with a view
to
commanding
the
harbour,
the British
1
Despatch
of
June
23rd,
1882.
2
Lord
Morley's Life of
Gladstone,
in. 80.
BOMBARDMENT OF
ALEXANDRIA
171
Admiral
on
July
3rd
received
orders
to
fire on
and
destroy
the forts
and
batteries,
unless
operations
were
discontinued after
due
warning.
Though
invited
to
join
in this
action,
the French
and
Italian
Govern-
ments declined. On
the
nth,
British
vessels
bombarded
and
destroyed
the
forts,
and on the
following
day
native
troops
fired
the
town,
and
departed,
leaving
the
mob to
pillage
it,
whereupon
a British force
was
landed
to
restore
order. So
soon as
the
bombardment
began
the
French fleet steamed
away
in
virtuous
disgust.
Yet
another chance
remained
for
France to reconsider her
attitude,
and
carry
out
her own
policy
of
joint
action, when,
on
July
15th,
the British
Government in-
vited
her,
with
the other
Powers,
to
cooperate
in
measures
for
ensuring
the
safety
of
the Suez
Canal. De
Freycinet
was
willing,
and
his
pre-
decessor
eagerly
pushed
him
on.
When,
on the
18th,
the
Government
asked the
Chamber
for a credit of
eight
million
francs,
Gambetta
lent his
fervent
support
to the
motion.
"Let not France
be
shorn
of her
heritage,"
he
pleaded;
"it
is
not
for
the sake
of
Egyptian nationality
or
the
Egyptian
national
party
that we
ought
to
go
to
Egypt
;
it is for the sake of the
French
nation. What I dread
more
than
anything
is that
you may
hand
over to
England,
for
good
and
all,
territories,
rivers,
and
rights
of
way
where
your
title to live and to
trade is no
less valid than
hers."
The belief
had, however,
at this
time
gained possession
of the
French
people
that
Bismarck was
engaged
in a
plot
for
dragging
it
into a
morass of
foreign complications,
and,
though
this
apprehension
did
not
prevent
France
from
embarking
on
the
Indo-Chinese
and
Madagascar enterprises,
it
now
kept
her out of
Egypt.
The Senate
voted
almost
unanimously
the
money
needed for
the
protection
of
the
Suez
Canal
;
but
in
the
Chamber the
Government
obtained
only
seventy-five
votes,
and
de
Freycinet resigned
(July
30th).
Thus it
was that
France,
who had
been the first
to
promise
the
Khedive
help
in
time
of
need,
and
had
so
long
tried to drive Great
Britain
into
active
intervention,
left
her
ally
to
carry
out alone the
onerous
task of
pacification.
Granville's
judgment upon
the
episode
and
its
issue was
warranted: "We
have
done
the
right
thing;
we
ive shown
our
readiness to admit
others,
and
we have not
the
in-
mvenience of a
partner
1
."
Just
before
this,
Gladstone
told
the
[ouse of
Commons:
"We should not
fully discharge
our
duty
if
we
id
not
endeavour
to
convert
the
present
interior state of
Egypt
from
1
Letter to Sir A.
Paget,
July
28th,
1882.
/
I
172
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
anarchy
and
confusion
to
peace
and
order.
We shall
look,
during
the
time
that
remains
to
us,
to the
cooperation
of the
Powers
of
civilised
Europe,
if it
be
in
any
case
open
to
us. But if
every
chance
of
obtaining
cooperation
is
exhausted the work will
be
undertaken
by
the
single power
of
England"
(July 22nd).
Here
was resolute
language,
of
a
kind
understood
and
beloved of
Englishmen,
and
the House
readily
voted the
money
needed
for
the
equipment
of
an
expeditionary
force,
By
this
time,
the
Sultan had
tardily signified
his
willingness
to
enter the
Constantinople
Conference,
and
was
also
willing
to send
troops
to his disturbed
province, subject
to the
stipulation
that,
simultaneously
with their
landing,
the
British
force should withdraw.
Granville declined
to
comply
with this
demand,
but remained
still
prepared
to welcome Turkish
military
cooperation
on the conditions
already
laid
down,
including
the issue of a
proclamation
disowning
Arabi as a rebel
and
supporting
Tewfik's Administration.
A
proclama-
tion to that
effect
was
issued,
and the
proposal
to
despatch
Turkish
troops
went
as far as the
drafting
of
a
convention
;
but
prevarication
and
equivocation
on the
part
of the Porte led
to
further
delay.
The
Constantinople
Conference
had broken
up
on
August 14th,
and,
when,
a month
later,
a
British
expeditionary
force,
preparations
for which
had been
in
progress
for some
weeks,
was landed at Alexandria under
Sir Garnet
Wolseley,
the
Convention
still
remained
unsigned
1
.
During
the
night
of
September
I2th-i3th, Wolseley,
his
plans
having
been
worked out
to
the smallest detail as to
both
time
and
place,
led his force of
13,000
men
on
the famous
march,
silent
as
the stars
which
were
his
guide,
to Tel-el-Kebir.
There,
at
dawn,
he attacked
and
decimated
the rebel
army,
the remnant
dispersing, glad
to
return
to
their
neglected
farms and
homesteads.
Arabi
saved
himself
by
flight.
With the
surrender
of
1 1
,000
native
troops
near
Cairo and
the
occupa-
tion of the
capital by
British
cavalry
the insurrection
was at
an end.
Now the need
and
justification
for Turkish intervention existed no
longer.
The
Sultan
might
have
finally
rolled
up
the
map
of
Egypt
1
The
contention
advanced
by
some admirers of Lord
Dufferin,
in
proof
of
his
sagacity,
that
he
delayed
the
progress
of the
negotiations
with the
Porte of set
purpose,
until
he could
be
assured that
they
would
lead to
no
result,
is
hardly
complimentary
to that
statesman,
whose
sagacity
rests on
better
evidence. Lord
Dufferin
resented
this
suggestion.
He wrote to
the
Foreign Secretary
at
the
time:
"
From first
to
last
we have acted in
perfect
sincerity
and
good
faith." He
had
attained
the
result
which
he
personally
deemed most
desirable, but,
as he
said,
"without
resorting
to
a
single
dubious act
or
expression."
There the matter
may
be
left.
SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE
REBELLION
173
on
the
morrow
of
Tel-el-Kebir
;
for
Turkish rule
in that
country
had
from that date
ceased
for
ever.
The Arabi
rebellion
has
been
judged
in various
ways,
and its
leader
has been
the
object
both of unfair
condemnation
and
of
indiscriminate
apology.
Though
of
humble
origin,
Arabi
was a man of
considerable
natural
capacity.
That
he
was,
also,
according
to his
lights,
a
patriot,
as
many
a
rebel has
been
before
him,
cannot be
doubted. To
suppose
that
the revolt which
owed
so much to his
leadership
was
merely
a sordid
military conspiracy
would
be to be-
little both its character and
its
proportions.
The
initial
military
etneute
itself had
been
directed,
not
against
the
British,
French,
Greeks
or
any
Christian
foreigners,
but
against
the Turks and the
preference
shown to
officers of the
Sultan in
the
Egyptian army, coupled
with
the
perennial
abuses of oriental
military systems, poor
pay,
rare
reckonings,
and
heavy
arrears.
While, however,
the
mutiny
of
the
soldiery
limited the character of the movement
at
the
outset,
this was
but a
single,
and
ultimately
became
the least
significant, phase
of
a
genuine
national
outburst of discontent
In
its
larger aspects,
the
episode undoubtedly
focussed
a
long-
maturing
resentment
against
the inordinate
growth
of
foreign
domina-
tion
and
the continual
outside
interference with native
institutions,
traditions
and
customs,
which
were
converting
the
dependence
of
Egypt
upon
Turkey
into a still more
hateful
subjection
to Western intruders.
Viewed as
the
expression
of
nationalist
sentiments and
aspirations,
the
revolt was as
legitimate
and unassailable in
purpose
as
it
was crude
and
indefensible in
form.
As, however,
the
movement broadened
and
thus
came to draw
more and
more
of its
strength
from
appeals
to
prejudice
and
passion,
the
good
elements were overwhelmed
by
the
dubious and
the bad
;
every
manifestation
of
foreign
influence
passed
under the
same
unsparing
condemnation
simply
because
it
was
foreign
;
and,
finally,
whatever stimulus
to
success
was
needed,
beyond
the
forces of
interested
motive,
political
discontent,
and nationalist
jealousy
,
was
supplied
by
religious
fanaticism
1
.
So
it
came
to
pass
that
the Arabi
rising
in
the
end
represented
the
>mposite
antagonism
of the
Egyptian
people
against
extraneous
in-
lences of
every
kind
which were
pressing
upon
their
country
and
In
a
despatch
to the
Foreign Secretary
of
June
19th,
1882,
Lord
Dufferin
)te
of
Arabi,
that
"
from
being
the
mere chief
of a
military
faction
he
had
acquired
>t
only
in
Egypt
but
in
the
estimation
of
the
Mussulman
world of
Constantinople
id
elsewhere
the
character and
position
of a
champion
of
the
rights
of
Islam
against
le
aggression
of
the
infidel
Western
Powers."
174
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
making
of
it
something they
did
not wish it
to be. Before
that
point
had been
reached,
however,
the movement
had
passed
beyond
Arabi's
control;
he no
longer
led,
but was
carried on
by
it;
and the
view is
tenable
that the directions into which it was
ultimately
diverted were
not of
his
designing.
Arabi and his
fellow-conspirators
were
duly
tried
by
an
Egyptian
tribunal,
the
prosecuting
counsel
being
French
and
the counsel
for
the accused
English;
and
the trial lasted
through
October
and
November.
There was no wish that Arabi should suffer
Oriental
justice,
and,
the
charge against
him
being
reduced to one of
rebellion,
he followed the advice
given
to him and
pleaded
guilty.
The death
penalty
was
pronounced,
but
only
formally
;
for
it
was
immediately
afterwards commuted to exile
with
degradation
from
military
rank.
No
less satisfaction
was felt
in
England
than
in
Egypt
at
finding
the
adage
that
"
those
who
make revolutions
a detni
dig
their own
graves
"
for once
falsified.
The
eye
of
the
Sultan was
unceasingly
turned towards the
Egyptian
vineyard,
which British
energy
was
steadily
making
more
fruitful
;
for to the
Turk
sovereignty
has ever meant tribute. In the
midst of an unforeseen
conjunction
of
difficulties,
the Porte
pressed
the British
Government to
fix a
definite
day
for
the evacuation of the
country.
To enter into
any undertaking
of the
kind was
obviously
impracticable
;
yet,
in
spite
of
the
possible
developments
of
a
constantly
changing
situation,
the
hope
and intention of the
British
Government,
both
in
1882
and for
many years,
was
a
speedy
withdrawal,
subject
only
to the
fulfilment of
a
given
purpose.
This was
simply
to
"secure
that the order of
things
to be established
shall be of
a
satisfactory
character
and
possess
the
elements
of
stability
and
permanence
1
."
Whatever
may
have been the wishes
of
irresponsible
politicians,
pre-
pared
to
appropriate
territory anywhere,
and
if
against
the will
of
the Powers
so much the more
readily,
it is not
true,
as some French
writers
maintain,
that
Great Britain
contemplated
annexation
from
the
beginning,
as France
did
when
she
entered
Syria
in
i860
2
.
In
a
situation
which
called for
caution
rather
than
great
daring,
for
patience
rather
than
hustling
activity,
and
above
all for an
in-
domitable
faith
in
the
capacity
of
crooked
things
to work
straight,
1
Circular
letter
of Lord
Granville to the
Great
Powers,
January
ist,
1883.
2
Thus
C. de
Freycinet,
speaking
of
England's
position
in
Egypt
in
1882,
writes:
"A
partir
de
ce
moment elle ne
pense plus
a
V
evacuation;
elle oublie
quHl y
a
une
Europe.
Elle
escompte
I'avenir,
comme
si Vavenir
tout entier
lui
apparteuait."
La
question
d'
figypte
(1905), p. 326.
1