Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
BRITISH ANNEXATION OF BURMA
195
binding
them
not to
acquire
Siamese
territory.
To this
suggestion
Waddington
gave
no
answer
1
.
The conclusion
of the
Franco-Burmese
Treaty,
the
knowledge
of
French
designs,
coupled
with a more than
usually
audacious
attempt
made
by King
Thebaw
to confiscate the
property
of a
British
trading
company
in order to transfer its
rights
to
French
rivals,
and his
peremptory
refusal to refer the
subject
of
dispute
to
arbitration,
brought
matters
to a crisis.
Thebaw
had,
in
fact,
become
of late
just
as
ostentatiously pro-French
as he was
ostentatiously
anti-British,
and
it
was felt
that the
time
had come
for a final
settlement of
accounts.
In
October,
the
Indian Government served
on
the
King
an ultimatum
requiring
him to receive
at
Mandalay
a British
Envoy,
who should
cooperate
in
adjusting
outstanding
differences,
to consent
to
the
presence
of a
permanent
Resident
at
the
Court of
Ava,
and to
accept
the advice
of the Indian Government in his
foreign
affairs.
A
force
of
10,000
troops,
one-third
of them
British,
was
despatched
to
Rangoon,
in order
to
give weight
to this document. When
the Burmese Govern-
ment refused
to
comply
with
any
one
of the
demands,
this
force
invaded
the
country, early
in
November,
by way
of the
Irrawaddy,
and
Mandalay
was
occupied
within seven
days.
The Burmese
army
was
unable
to offer
serious
opposition,
and the
King
surrendered
himself
as
prisoner
and was
promptly
deported
to India.
The future
political
status of
the
kingdom
had
to be determined
in difficult
circumstances,
since
the
collapse
of the Government
had
been
the
signal
for an outbreak
of
anarchy.
Three courses were
open.
Thebaw
might
be
deposed,
a
regent being
put
in
his
place,
and the
Burmese
left to
themselves,
subject
to due
safeguards
;
or the
kingdom
might
be converted
into a
vassal-State;
or,
finally,
there remained
the
alternative
of
annexation
to India. Lord
Dufferin
and the
Secretary
of State favoured this last
drastic
solution
of the
difficulty,
though
the
Viceroy's
Council
discouraged
it
as
likely
to
excite
the
hostility
of
China.
Perhaps
no more laconic
proclamation
of the kind
was ever
published
than
that
of
January
1st,
1886,
in
which,
in
fifty
words,
Lord
Dufferin declared the territories
hitherto
governed by
King
Thebaw to
be
his no
longer,
but to have
passed
to
the
British
Crown.
The work
of settlement
proved
arduous.
The
weak
rule
of
a half-
insane
King
had
everywhere encouraged
lawlessness
and
a
spirit
of
rebellion
;
raiding,
robbery
and
local
faction
long
continued
rampant
;
and
the fact that
the small
population
was
scattered
over
a wide
area
1
Despatch
of
Lord
Salisbury
to Lord
Lyons,
September
28th,
1885.
13—2
196
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
—
for
the
annexed
territory,
with
its
4,000,000
inhabitants,
was
larger
than
France
—
made
difficult the
enforcement
of
measures
of
control.
As
the
Burmese
refused
to
cooperate
in the
reorganisation
of
their
own
country,
native
troops
and
police
from
India,
supported
by
a
British
force,
had
to undertake the
task, and,
for
two
years,
a
state
of
war
continued,
with
sporadic
rebellion
either
in
the
interior
or on
the
frontiers
for
the
greater
part
of
two decades.
The
annexation
of
Upper
Burma
necessitated
various
political
adjustments
with
China,
and
also with
France
in
relation
to her
Indo-
Chinese
empire.
China
claimed
ancient,
though
shadowy, rights
of
suzerainty
in
respect
of the
kingdom,
as
symbolised
by
the
decennial
Missions
which
Burma
had been wont
to send
to the
Peking
Court,
there to
present
articles
of native
produce.
These
rights
had
long
been
waived,
yet
the
possibility
of
their revival at
any
time
existed,
with
the
risk,
in
the absence
of
a
clear
understanding
beforehand,
of
dis-
turbance
to
the
friendly
relations with Great
Britain.
The result
of
an
exchange
of views
in
Peking
was the
conclusion
of the
Convention
of
July
24th,
1886,
by
which
China,
with
truly
Oriental
amplitude
of
phrase, agreed
that
"in
all
matters
whatsoever
appertaining
to
the
authority
and
rule
which
England
is
now
exercising
in
Burma,
England
shall
be free
to
do whatever she deems
fit
and
proper
"
; while,
on the
other
hand,
Great
Britain
agreed
that the
decennial Missions
should
continue
to be
sent
by
Burma to
Peking,
according
to
immemorial
custom,
the
members
of such Missions
to be of
Burmese race
1
.
The
Convention
also
provided
for the
demarcation of the
frontier
between
China
and Burma
;
but the
arrangements
on this
head
were modified
by agreements
concluded
in
1894
and
1897.
C.
Disputes
with
France
concerning
Siam,
1
889-1904
Great
Britain
had
long
taken a
friendly
interest in
Siam,
with
which
she
had been
in
treaty
relations since
1855.
Lying
between
Burma
and the Indo-Chinese
possessions
of
France,
its
preservation
as
a
strong
independent
State
had
become of
paramount
importance
for the
Indian
empire.
In
April,
1889,
the French
Government
pro-
posed
that
the
kingdom
should
be
neutralised
and
its
independence
1
This
loosely-drawn
Foreign
Office
Convention
states neither where or
to
whom Burma
sent
these
Missions in the
past,
nor
where or
to whom
they
were
to
be sent in the
future,
leaving
it to be assumed that
Peking
and the
Chinese
ruler
are
implied.
Further,
while
the
preamble
of
the
Convention
speaks
in one
place
of "the United
Kingdom
of
Great Britain
and Ireland"
and in another
place
of
"
Great
Britain
"
only,
as the Power
with
which China
treated,
the
succeeding
Articles
speak
nowhere
of
either
Great
Britain or
Ireland,
but
only
of
"England."
THE
FRANCO-SIAMESE
WAR
197
formally
recognised
by
the
two
Powers,
which should
regard
it as a
permanent
barrier
between the
British and
the French Asiatic
empires.
To
that
end,
a
general
demarcation
of
the frontiers
between
the French
possessions
and Siam and
Burma,
respectively,
was
suggested
Lord
Salisbury
favoured
the
idea,
but
unfortunately
failed
to
take action.
France
again
raised the
question
in
February, 1892,
when
she claimed
influence so far
as
the
Mekong
river,
in
virtue of
her Protectorate
over
Annam.
To this claim
the British
Foreign
Secretary
strongly
demurred,
as
being entirely
new and without
foundation.
Before the next
exchange
of
views,
in the
following
December,
when
Lord
Rosebery
was at
the
Foreign
Office,
the British
Govern-
ment had
provisionally agreed
with Siam as
to the future
frontier
between
that
country
and Burma.
A
feature of the
settlement was
the
recognition
by
Great
Britain
of Siam's exclusive
jurisdiction
over
Kyaing Chaing,
one of the Burmese Shan
States,
lying
on
both
sides
of
the
Mekong,
while
British
influence was held
to extend to the
river
at
one
point
only, owing
to the
acceptance
of British
protection
by
the State of
Kyaing Tong.
As
part
of the same
adjustment,
Great
Britain was to
cede to China her
rights
in
Kiang
Hung,
which,
together
with
Kyaing Chaing,
was
to
form
a
"
buffer"
territory
between
Burma and
the French
possessions. Although
France
had
made the
first
suggestion
of an
all-round settlement
of
boundaries,
she took
offence at this
agreement
on the
ground
that it had been
concluded
without
consultation
with
her.
She,
also,
advanced the
contention
that Siam
had no title to
any territory
on the left
bank of the
Mekong,
and
claimed
this
territory
for
herself
as Suzerain
of Annam.
This
claim was
soon afterwards
supported
by
a formal
charge
of
aggression
against
Siam,
and a demand that the
territory
occupied by
it on the
Annam
side
of
the river should be abandoned.
Rejecting
Siam's
proposal
of
arbitration,
France,
without either
warning
or
offer
of
conditions
of
peace,
occupied
a
Siamese town on
the
Mekong,
and
war
followed
(May,
1893).
Great Britain
could not remain
an
indifferent observer
of
a
dispute
affecting
the
future of a
country
whose
independence
was of
vital
importance
to
India,
and whose trade was for the most
part
in
British
hands;
and
when,
in
April,
it seemed
clear
that
France
intended
to
resort
to
force,
British
vessels of
war were sent
to
Bangkok.
From
the
first,
Siam
was
involved in a
hopeless
struggle,
and
without
the moral
support
of
the
British
Government
the
kingdom
might
have
been
swept
into
the
Indo-Chinese net
in
which France
had
already
landed
198
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD
AND
NEW WORLD
Cochin-China, Annam,
Cambodia and
Tongking.
As
it
was,
more
Siamese
territory
was
seized,
French
gunboats
steamed
up
the
Mekong,
and,
in
the middle of
July,
a drastic
ultimatum was served
on the
Bangkok
Government
demanding,
among
other
things,
the
cession
of the entire left bank of
the river
and
the
payment
of
three
million francs
by
way
of
compensation
for
injury
done
to
French
subjects
and
property.
As
these demands were not
complied
with,
a
blockade of
the Siamese coastwas
declared,
and the
French commander
called
upon
all neutral vessels to leave
Bangkok
within three
days.
This officer had
already
shown resentment
at
the
presence
of a
British
flotilla,
and he
expected
that it
would now
duly
depart.
A
strong
hand at the
Foreign
Office decided otherwise. Lord
Rosebery
was there for the second
time,
and was
proving
himself
a
power
not
to be trifled with. With
a
graceful
erudition and a
happy gift
of
oratory,
more
common in
a
pre-Reform
than
a
modern
statesman,
he combined
a
breadth of
political
outlook and a warm
sympathy
with the
policy
of
imperial
expansion
which drew
him
naturally
to
Foreign
Affairs.
No
Foreign
Minister of his
day
showed
greater
staunchness
and
tenacity
in
contending
for his
country's
just rights
;
yet,
in
negotiation,
none better understood
that
genuine
success consists in
furthering
the
larger
interests
by
the sacrifice of the
smaller.
Learning
that
one
of the British
ships
was about to
leave
Bangkok,
Lord
Rosebery
telegraphed
the order
to remain
(July 30th),
and informed the
French
Government of
what
he
had
done. While
holding
that
the action
of
France had
throughout
been
of an
aggressive
and
provocative
cha-
racter,
the
Foreign Secretary,
nevertheless,
did his
best
to induce
the Siamese
Government
to
give
all reasonable
satisfaction,
with the
result that
the ultimatum
was
accepted
in a modified form
and the
blockade was
raised
by
the
beginning
of
August.
By
the
Treaty
of Peace and
an
accompanying
Convention
which
were concluded on October
3rd, 1893,
Siam conceded
to France
important rights,
and
renounced
in
her favour
any
claim to
territory
on the
left
bank of the
Mekong
and the
islands in
the river.
It was
due to the
moderating
pressure
firmly
exercised
by
Lord
Rosebery
that a
far
more
drastic
claim
was
withdrawn
;
for,
at one
stage
of
the
negotiations,
France had
demanded
the cession
of
territory
100,000
square
miles
in
extent,
equal
to
nearly
one-third
of the
kingdom.
As
a result of
the
settlement,
the
trans-Mekong
Burmese
territory
of
Kyaing
Chaing
remained in British
hands.
In the
adjustment
of the
other
territorial
questions
to
which
the
THE
MEKONG DISPUTE
199
Franco-Siamese
War
gave
rise France had to deal
with
Great
Britain,
and
three
years passed
before an
understanding
was
arrived
at.
The
French Government
clung
tenaciously
to the
claim
that all the
territory
lying
on the
left
bank
of
the
Mekong
belonged
to
France,
and
that
British
influence
began
only
on
the west
bank of the
river.
Lord
Rosebery
firmly
opposed
this
claim,
not
only
as
being
inconsistent
with
British
rights acquired
in
virtue of the annexation of
Burma,
through
which the
Upper
Mekong
ran,
but
because
its admission
would have made the
Indian and
French
Indo-Chinese
empires
conterminous,
contrary
to
the
principles
of British
policy
in
Asia.
Accordingly,
his
efforts were
in
the
first instance directed towards
the creation of an
intervening
neutral or
"
buffer"
zone.
He was
prepared
to
make
great
sacrifices for the sake of such
an
arrangement.
While all
that
was to have been asked
of France
in
the
way
of
territory
was
a
stretch
of
barren
country
which
she
had not
long
owned
and
had
never
explored,
he
offered to throw
into the neutral
zone
the
organised
State of
Kyaing
Chaing,
with
its
capital,
whole
villages
of
Kyaing
Tong,
and
the
control
of the
Mekong.
But,
if
France
did
not
agree,
he was determined
that Great
Britain
should
keep
her
Mekong
possessions
and exercise
to the
full
her
rights
in
respect
of
them.
France, however,
set
up
the
unreasonable
claim that
each
Power should cede an
exactly
equal
amount of
territory,
irrespective
of
intrinsic
or
strategic
value.
Lord
Rosebery
lost
patience
over
the
petty
"acre
for
acre"
principle
of
bargaining,
as
unworthy
of
great
States.
In
the
end,
an
arrangement
for the creation
of
a neutral
zone
50
miles broad
was
adopted,
its
limits
to
be
determined
by
a
joint
com-
mission. Even
then,
France,
pursuing
her
imperialistic
designs
with
determined
pertinacity,
refused
to
regard
the
arrangement
as
final;
and
she
gave
the
British Government no
rest
until
she
had
gained
her
way.
Lord
Rosebery
resisted to the
last;
but
in
1895
Lord
Salisbury,
in
virtue
of one of
the
"graceful
concessions"
by
which
he from time
to time
purchased
the
temporary goodwill
of Great
Britain's
neighbours
and
rivals,
yielded
to France all
that she
demanded
without
equivalent
advantage.
This
was effected
by
the Declaration
of
January
15th, 1896,
which
fixed the
Mekong
as the
boundary
between
the British
and French
possessions
from
the
mouth
of
the
Nam
Huck
northwards
so far
as
the
Chinese frontier.
Simultaneously,
the last
remnant of
exterritorial
rights possessed by
Great
Britain
in Tunis
was
abandoned.
200
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD
AND
NEW WORLD
For
Siam,
the
most
important provisions
of
the
agreement
were
those which
arbitrarily
divided the most
valuable
part
of
the
country
into
British
and French
spheres
of
influence.
In a
published despatch,
Lord
Salisbury gave
the
assurance that
the
selection
of one
part
of
Siam
for this
treatment was
not to
be
regarded
as
throwing
doubt
upon
the title and
rights
of the Siamese rulers to
the remainder
of
their
kingdom;
but
this
disclaimer did not lessen
the
objection
that
the two Powers had
asserted
a
lien
upon
so much
of
Siam as
seemed
to them of
value. The
only
justification
advanced on behalf
of Great
Britain for this
invasion of the
rights
of
a small
nation was contained
in
the
plea
that
the
territory
in
question
affected
"our interests
as a
commercial
nation,"
and that it
might
one
day
be
the
site
of lines of
communication which
would
be
of
great importance
to
neighbouring
portions
of
the
British
Empire.
II. The European Partition
of
Africa;
Heligoland
and
Madagascar,
i
850-1
904
During
the
last
quarter
of the nineteenth
century
the
exploration
of
Africa reached a heroic
climax,
and the
partition
of the Continent
among
the
several
European
claimants seemed
to
have entered
its final
stage.
By
the close
of
the
century,
the vast
expanses
of
this
Continent,
with
the
exception
of the
relatively
small area
which
remained under
native
sovereignty,
had
passed
beneath the
jurisdiction
of seven
States
(here
named
in
the order of extent of
territory)
:
France,
Great
Britain,
Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy
and
Spain.
In
wealth
of resources and in
value
for the
purpose
of
colonisation,
the
territory
acquired
by
Great
Britain as a
result of
the final
arrange-
ment
was,
perhaps,
the
most
important
addition ever made
to the
empire.
It is
difficult
in
these
days
of revived
imperialism
to
appreciate
the
fact
that,
two
generations ago,
the
official
British
attitude towards
African colonisation was
one of weariness
and
positive
disfavour.
In
1850,
the
Privy
Council,
in
approving
the annexation
of
the
Orange
River,
did it
unwillingly
and
urged
upon
the
Queen
that
there should
be
no more
appropriations
of
territory,
however
small,
in
South
Africa.
In
1865
,
a Committee of
the House of
Commons
unanimously
affirmed
that in
West
Africa,
likewise,
"all
further extension of
territory
or
assumption
of
government,
or new
treaties
offering
protection
to
native
tribes,
would be
inexpedient."
When,
two
years
later,
Sir
Philip
Wodehouse
as
Governor of
Cape Colony urged
the declaration
THE
SHEPSTONE
MISSION
201
of
British
sovereignty
over the
region
between
that
colony
and
the
Portuguese colony
of
Angola,
the Colonial
Secretary,
the
Duke
of
Buckingham
and
Chandos,
refused
compliance,
though
some of
the
small islands
in
the
neighbourhood
of
Angra Pequena
were
annexed.
Basutoland was added in 1
868
;
but in
the
same
year
a
petition
for
the
annexation of
Namaqua
and
Damara
Lands,
on the
south-west
coast,
sent to London
by
the German
Missionary Society
which
had
long
worked
there,
was
rejected, though
the North German Government
supported
it.
One effect of
this
marked
indisposition
in
the middle of the
century
to
extend
British
rule
in
South Africa
was that freer
scope
was offered
for the
roaming
instincts of
the
discontented Dutch settlers
at the
Cape,
who
trekked northward
at that
time.
Crossing
the
Orange
River,
they
founded the
Orange
River
State
and
the
republic
of the
Transvaal,
so
introducing
a
strongly
separatist spirit
into the life
of
the
white
population
of
the south. The
first
of these
Dutch
common-
wealths
pursued
a
career of
steady progress
;
while
the career
of the
second
was marked
by
vicissitudes which from the
first
menaced
its
stability
and
ultimately
encouraged
British
designs upon
its
indepen-
dence,
as
recognised
by
the
Sand
River
Convention
of
January
16th,
1852.
Since the
passing
of the Canadian Confederation
Act
in
1867
the
idea of
Union
had
made
headway
in
South Africa
;
and Lord
Carnarvon,
who had
carried
the Canadian Act
and
again
became
Colonial
Sec-
retary
in
1874,
did his utmost to
induce the
Cape
Government
to take
the lead in the
matter,
but
without immediate
success. The
internal
difficulties
experienced
by
the
South
African
republic
and
its strained
relations with the
adjacent
native
populations,
and
particularly
with
the
Zulus,
seemed to convince
Lord
Carnarvon
that
it
would
welcome
the relief and
protection
which would be
afforded
by
his scheme
of
federation
;
and,
should the
Transvaal
be
brought
in,
he
assumed
that
the
Orange
Free State would
be
willing
to
join
later.
In a
"private
and
very
confidential
"
letter
(September
20th,
1876)
to
Lord
Beacons-
field, who,
in
contrast
with the
close attention
which
he
gave
to
foreign
affairs,
allowed
his
colleague
at the Colonial
Office
a
large
measure
of
freedom,
Lord
Carnarvon
spoke
of
his
intention,
subject
to
the
Prime-Minister's
acquiescence,
to send out at
once
Sir
Theophilus
Shepstone
with
"a
secret
despatch
empowering
him
to
take over
the
Transvaal Government and
country
and
to become
the
first
English
Governor,
"
if on his arrival
circumstances rendered
this
step
"in
202
IMPERIAL POLICY IN
OLD
AND NEW WORLD
any
way
possible."
He added
that he was
preparing
legislation
to
enable
other
States
and
Colonies to come into a
South
African Union
voluntarily.
Lord
Beaconsfield
was not
convinced of the wisdom of the
policy
proposed;
but
he made no
objection. Shepstone
went
out,
therefore,
not to
explore
the
ground
in a
cautious
way,
but
to
carry
out
a
pre-
determined
policy
and to
discover
reasons
justifying
it. Led
away by
the
opinions
of a small
and
unrepresentative
minority
of the
popula-
tion,
he
arbitrarily
declared the
Transvaal to be annexed
to the
British
Crown
(April
12th,
1877),
not
even
consulting
the Volksraad
on the
subject.
A
Constitutionwas
promised
;
but in the event
it was
delayed
for
two
years.
In
the
meantime,
protests
rained
upon
the
British
Government from
every
section
of the
population,
and
delegates
were
sent
to
England
to
plead
before the bar of
public opinion
the
cause
of a
hardy
little
people
whose
appreciation
of the
blessings
of
European
civilisation
may
have been
unduly
limited,
yet
whose
passionate
love
of
freedom
was
deserving
of
all
admiration. The
only
result
was
that,
at
the
end of
1879,
tne
Transvaal,
after
enjoying
independence
for a
quarter
of a
century,
was
reduced to the
humiliating
status
of a
Crown
colony.
The answer of
the Boers was
a
solemn
compact
binding
them
not
to
rest
until
freedom had
been
regained.
The
country
was,
by
this
time,
seething
with
disaffection
and
repressed
revolt.
The
Shepstone
Mission was not the
only
miscalculation
made
by
the British
Government
in
South Africa
at that
time.
A still
w
T
orse
one
was
the
decision which sent
Sir
Bartle Frere
thither
in furtherance
of
the
same
design
of a
premature
union. Frere went
out
as
Governor
of
Cape
Colony
and
High
Commissioner
for South
Africa,
which
he
was
expected
to
organise
on
federal
lines;
and Lord
Carnarvon
in-
dulged
the
hope
that
within two
years
he
would become
"the
first
Governor-
General
of
the South African
Dominion."
A
man of out-
standing
ability,
Frere was
yet entirely
unsuited
to his new
sphere
of
duty.
He had served with
distinction in
administrative
positions
in
India,
where
a man
who is not a
great
success
is
apt
to
be
regarded
as a
great
failure
;
and
his mind
ran on
"
forward
movements,"
scientific
frontiers,
tribal
subjugations,
and
imperialistic
expansion
as a
policy
in
itself. He was
honestly
convinced that
British rule
was as
good
for
the
native
States in
South
Africa as it was
in
India,
and
that,
even
if not
welcomed,
it
was nevertheless an
act
of
kindness
to
impose
it on
them.
Zululand was
the
first
native State
to
disappear.
A frontier
dispute
between it
and
the
Transvaal had been referred
to
arbitration,
and
THE
ZULU WAR
203
the
award was
in
favour of
the
Zulus and
their
warlike
King, Cetewayo.
Instead of
allowing
the
award to
take effect
at
once,
Frere endeavoured
to attach to
it
conditions
inconsistent
with
the
independence
of Cete-
wayo's
dominion. In
addition
to
making
amends for
injuries
done
by
his
people
in a
raid
into
British
territory
—
a
demand
which
Cetewayo
was
willing
to
meet
—
he was
required
to
abolish
his
military
system,
to
agree
to British
control
of
his
external
relations,
and to
accept
a
British
Resident.
This was
the
rough
and
arbitrary
method
of
Indian
frontier
statecraft,
translated into
surroundings
where
its
application
was
doubly impolitic
and
dangerous.
The British
Cabinet
had
begun early
to
entertain
apprehensions
that
Frere,
whose masterful
and
impulsive
ways
were well
known,
might
resort to
measures
which would lead to
serious trouble. Lord
Beaconsfield,
in
particular,
was
chagrined
at
the turn which
events
at
the
Cape
had
taken. He
had
kept
the
peace
in
Europe,
while his
colleague
at
the Colonial
Office
had
stirred
up
tumult at the other
end
of
the
world.
In
accepting
the
policy
of confederation
for South
Africa,
he had
never
contemplated
confederation
by
the
sword,
and
his
resentment at
so
untoward
a
development
found incisive ex-
pression.
Early
in
1878,
Lord Carnarvon
gave
place
to Sir Michael
Hicks
Beach,
who
urged
Frere to exercise forbearance
and reasonable
compromise
in his
dealings
with
the
Zulus.
Frere's
answer
was
to
call
for
reinforcements,
and
these were
sent,
though
with
misgiving.
An
ultimatum
offered to
Cetewayo being disregarded,
Lord
Chelms-
ford
invaded
the
King's
country (January
12th,
1879),
w
^h
tne
resu
lt
that
British
arms
quickly
sustained
an
irritating
and undeserved
reverse
at
Isandhlwana
(January
22nd).
The
reverse
was
quickly
retrieved
;
but
Lord
Chelmsford's
unfortunate
conduct
of the
ensuing
campaign
was
responsible
for
further
mishaps
of the
same kind.
The
most
tragic
was
that of
June
1st,
which
involved
the
death of
the
Prince
Imperial
of
France,
who
had
gallantly
pressed
his services
upon
the
British
military
authorities as a
volunteer combatant.
Great
excitement,
mingled
with
indignation,
was
caused
at home
by
the
disaster of
Isandhlwana,
which
was held to
be
due on
the
one
hand
to
Frere's
wilfulness
and
on the
other to
the
incompetency
of
the
military
commander
;
yet,
in
accordance
with an
honoured
tradition
of
the
English public
service,
both
men were allowed
to
remain
at
their
posts.
A
majority
of the
Cabinet
favoured
the
recall
of
Frere;
but
he
only
experienced
a mild
private
rebuke,
duly
counterbalanced
by
warm
public
praise
of his
ability.
The Prime-Minister
defended
204
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD
AND NEW WORLD
the
Government's
action
against
the
attacks
of the
Opposition,
but
only
for form's sake
;
for it
was his
private
opinion
that the wilful
Governor
"
ought
to
be
impeached,"
and
he
strongly
resented
Frere's
apparent inability
to
understand
that he
had
done
wrong
1
.
In view of the
prevalent
public
dissatisfaction,
which was
reflected
by diminishing
Ministerial
majorities
in
parliamentary
divisions,
it
was decided to
send out Sir
Garnet
Wolseley
as
both
High
Com-
missioner and
Commander-in-Chief
for
Natal,
the
Transvaal,
and
the
adjacent
territories,
the
authority
of
Sir Bartle Frere
being
limited
to
Cape
Colony.
The
Queen
protested
vigorously
against
the humilia-
tion thus
inflicted on
"poor
Sir
Bartle
Frere";
but,
while
refusing
to
approve
the new
appointments,
she
accepted
them. Before
Wolseley
took
charge
of
affairs,
however,
Lord Chelmsford
had
inflicted
signal
defeat on
Cetewayo
(July 4th),
so
ending
a
campaign
which,
while
it
excited
enthusiasm
in no
quarter
at
home,
evoked
on the
part
of a
large
section
of
the nation
strong disapproval.
A little
later,
Cetewayo
was
captured,
his
army
disbanded,
and
his
kingdom,
provisionally
divided into a
number
of
chieftaincies,
placed
under
British
Pro-
tection.
The
Beaconsfield
Cabinet fell
in
April,
1880,
and
Gladstone
came into
office. He had
assigned
to the annexation
of the
Transvaal
and
the Zulu War
a
prominent place
in his
indictment
of the
out-
going
Ministry.
Of the former act he
said
that,
even
if
the
Transvaal
were as
valuable as
it
was
valueless,
he
would
repudiate
the annexa-
tion,
since
it
had
been
effected
by
dishonourable
means;
while,
in
deploring
the Zulu
War,
he
spoke
of the ten
thousand
natives
who
had
been
"
slain for
the
only
offence
of
attempting
to
defend
their
independence
and
their
homes."
It
was
natural,
therefore,
that the
Boers of the Transvaal
should look to
the
champion
of
the
rights
of
small
nationalities for the
speedy
restoration
of
their treasured
freedom.
Frere was recalled after a
short
interval;
but,
relying
upon
official
assurances that the new
Government was
proving
increasingly
popular,
that the Boers were
settling
down,
and
that
any
disturbance
of
the
existing
status would be
harmful,
the
Cabinet
gave
no
sign
of
an
intention
to
relinquish
British
sovereignty
in
the
Transvaal,
the
hope
being
entertained
that,
with
confederation
and
the
grant
of
a
liberal
system
of
self-government,
disaffection
would
die
out.
1
Letter
of
June
28th,
1879, quoted
in
Life
of
Beaconsfield,
VI.
438.
Beaconsfield,
who had
an
inborn
contempt
for
failure,
was
equally
severe
on Lord
Chelmsford,
whom he declined to
receive
except officially,
on
his
return
to
England,
though
pressed
to do
so
by
the
Queen,
and to whom
he denied
credit
for
the
culminating
victory
of
Ulundi.
(See
letter
to the
Queen,
August
30th,
1879,
ibid.
VI.
459-)