Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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GERMAN
EAST AFRICA
215
and
West
Africa,
and in
New
Guinea,
Granville determined to
offer
to
Bismarck,
from the
outset,
a
helping
hand
by suggesting
a
mutual
understanding.
So
far
did his
desire to
meet German wishes
go
that he
divulged
to
the Chancellor
(March
25th,
1885)
the
plan
of
a
group
of
British
capitalists
(the
nucleus of
the
British East
Africa
Company)
originating
with Mr
(later
Sir)
William
Mackinnon,
for
opening
up
territory
between the coast
and
the
Lakes,
by
virtue of
concessions
to be obtained
from
the
Sultan,
and
invited an assur-
ance
that its
operations
would
not conflict with
the
interests of
Germany.
German
enterprise
therefore
enjoyed
for a
time not
only
a
fair
field
but
abundant
favour.
Chiefly owing
to the
enterprise,
often far
more
successful
than
ingenuous,
of
Dr
Karl
Peters,
its
originator,
the
German
East African
Company
concluded Treaties with
the
chiefs
of
a number
of native
States in the
interior,
as well as with
Witu,
on
the
Tana,
further north.
By
the
first
delimitation
of
the British
and
German
spheres
of influence in
1886,
the Sultan's
jurisdiction
on
the
mainland
was reduced
to
a
narrow
strip
of coastal
territory,
and,
two
years
later,
he
was
persuaded
to lease the administration of this
to
the
two
Companies,
the British
Company taking
the
northern,
and
the
German
the
southern,
portion.
The
high-handed
proceedings
of
the German
agents,
however,
excited
the
hostility
of
the
natives;
and,
as the
slave-traders,
resentful
at the
measures
then
being
taken to
destroy
their
traffic,
made common cause with
the
malcontents,
a
general
rising
occurred.
A blockade
of
the coast
was now instituted
by
the
two
Powers,
with
a view to
preventing
the
export
of slaves
and
the
import
of
arms;
and
this
lasted
for
nearly
a
year. By
that
time,
the German
Government
had
recognised
that
Peters,
a
man of violent
character
and dubious
reputation,
was a source
of
mischief,
and
his
Company
incapable
of
exercising
administrative
functions
with
efficiency
and credit.
In
1890,
therefore,
Germany's
East
African
dependency
was
placed
under
imperial
administration,
and
the
Sultan
was
bought
out of the leased
territory
on
the mainland.
There
can be little doubt
that,
had Peters
been
allowed
to execute
his
bold
plans,
he would have
carried German
sway
far
north
of Lake
Victoria and into the
valley
of
the
Upper
Nile.
He
did,
indeed,
acquire
important
rights
both on the
Tana
and in
Uganda
—
in the
latter
case,
owing
to the machinations of
the
French Roman Catholic
missionaries,
who did
their utmost at
a later
date to
prevent
this
territory
from
passing
into British hands.
While,
however,
he was
on one
of
his
216 IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
expeditions,
promiscuously
concluding
treaties,
the
British and German
Governments
were
negotiating
an all-round
settlement,
mainly
con-
cerned
with
East
Africa,
yet
also
adjusting
frontiers
and
rounding
off
angular
places
in
the colonial dominions of
the two States both
in
the
south-west
and
the south of
the Continent.
When, therefore,
Peters
returned
to Lake
Victoria in the
autumn of
1890,
it
was to learn
that
on
July
1 st
(nearly
four months
after Bismarck had ceased to be
German
Chancellor)
a
Treaty
had
been
concluded
by
which the
more
ambitious
of his
plans
were foiled.
In the
negotiations
which
led to
this
agreement,
Germany
had
begun
by claiming
as
the natural
hinterland
of her
East
African
dependency
the
whole
of
the
territory
so
far as
the
Congo
Free
State
—
a
demand
which,
if
conceded,
would have transferred
to
her
a
large
part
of
Rhodesia
and
Nyasaland,
already
in British
occupation.
The
British
Government demurred
; and,
in
the
end,
Germany
renounced
in favour of Great
Britain all
claims to the Somaliland
coast, Witu,
and
Uganda,
thus
barring
her
own
approach
to the
Upper
Nile
valley
from
the
south-east, while,
for
the
rest,
her western
boundary
marched
with
Lakes
Tanganyika
and
Nyasa,
with the
Congo
State
and British
Central
Africa,
respectively,
on
their
further
shores.
Germany,
also,
acknowledged
a British
Protectorate over
Zanzibar and Pemba.
A
later West
African
agreement
with
Germany
(November
15th,
1893)
stipulated
that her
sphere
of
influence should
not extend eastward
beyond
the
basin of
the
Shari
; Darfur, Kordofan,
and
Bahr-el-Ghazal
being
excluded
from it.
In
Germany's
favour a
rectification of boundaries
in West
and
South-west
Africa
was
agreed upon, involving
in the
latter case
the
cession
to her
of a
strip
of
territory (the "Caprivizipfel")
giving
access
from
her
territories
to the
Zambesi. Her
most
important gain,
how-
ever,
was
the island of
Heligoland,
lying
in
the
estuary
of
the
Elbe.
In
1884,
and
again
in
1885,
Bismarck had raised
the
question
of the
cession
of the
island,
in
view
of
Germany's
intention to
construct
a
ship-canal
between the
North
and Baltic Seas.
Granville
had not
encouraged
the
overtures,
however,
and the
matter had
gone
no
further.
He was of
opinion
that
while
the
cession
might
ensure
Germany's
friendly cooperation
in
Egypt,
it
would be
unpopular,
and
that
Liberal
Ministers
were
not the
right
people
to make
it
1
. It thus
fell to
Salisbury
to
meet
the German
Government's
wish,
though
it
1
See
Life
and
Letters
of
the
Second
Earl
Granville,
11.
351,
362
and
425.
THE
ANGLO-GERMAN
CONVENTION
217
would
appear
that
Chamberlain
gave
the
effective
impetus
to
the
transaction
1
.
The
Anglo-German
Convention of
1890
satisfied
only
reasonable
men,
and
by
no
means all
of
these,
in
either
country.
The
unreason-
able
on both
sides
wanted
cessions
without
concessions;
but
the
cautious were
unsatisfied,
more
especially
as
Salisbury
chose
to ridicule
the adverse
arguments
;
and it
was not
the
least curious feature
of the
confused
and
largely
futile
controversies which
ensued
that,
while
the
transfer of
Heligoland
was
widely regretted
in
England
as
disastrously
prejudicial
to her naval
power,
in
Germany
the value of
its
acquisition
from
the
standpoint
of naval
defence received for
a
long
time
very
grudging
recognition.
By
an
exchange
of
Declarations
(August
5th,
1890)
France
recognised
the British
Protectorate
over
Zanzibar
and
Pemba,
in return for
concessions of
far
greater importance by
Great
Britain,
who
accepted
the
French
Protectorate
in
Madagascar
and
acknowledged
extensive
claims
by
France
in
Central
Africa.
The
kingdom
of Sokoto
fell, however,
to
the
Royal Niger
Company.
Later,
the
Sultan of Zanzibar
transferred
the administration of
his
pos-
sessions
on the
mainland
and the
adjacent
islands,
exclusive
of
Zanzibar
and
Pemba,
to
the British
Government,
though
without
prejudice
to his
sovereignty;
and,
in
1896,
the
whole of
the
East
African
territories under
British
Protection,
with
the
exception
of
Zanzibar,
Pemba
and
Uganda,
were
merged
for administrative
purposes
in
one East African Protectorate.
A
study
of
the
political map
of
Africa,
with
special
reference
to
the
imperialistic
efforts of the
British,
French,
Belgian
and German
explorers
and
pioneers
from 1880
onward,
will show
how
naturally
these
efforts,
though
directed from
different
points,
converged
upon
the
Southern Soudan. As
the
Protector of
Egypt
and
her
Soudan
provinces,
Great Britain had a
paramount
interest
in
keeping
in-
truders
out
of the
valley
of the
Upper
Nile.
This
object
was
attained
by
a series of
Conventions,
completed
only
in
1899,
the
negotiation
of which
required
in
most cases
generous
compensatory
concessions.
The earliest was concluded with
Germany,
the latest
with
France
2
.
By
various
Treaties and
Conventions concluded
with
neighbouring
Powers
during
the
period surveyed,
an enormous
addition
had
been
made to the
British
empire
and
concurrently
to
its
political,
financial
and
defensive liabilities.
Lord
Rosebery,
who took
a
prominent
part
1
See
Die Grosse Politik der
Europdischen
Kabinette,
1
871-19
14,
VI.
408.
2
See
pp.
250-7.
218 IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD AND NEW
WORLD
in
furthering
this
policy
of
imperial
expansion,
estimated,
in
1896,
that
in the course
of twelve
years territory
to the
extent
of over
two
and
a half
million
square
miles
—
an
area
equal
to two-thirds
of
Europe
—
had
passed
under British rule
;
and he warned
his
countrymen
that
their
popularity
with the rest
of the
world
had not been
increased
in
consequence.
Lord
Salisbury
observed,
on one
occasion,
that Africa seemed
to
have
been created in order to
plague
the lives
of
British
Foreign
Secretaries.
Of
the
territorial
disputes
which
for
many years
clouded
the
relations
between
Great Britain and
France
from 1882
onwards,
none,
with
the
single
exception
of
Egypt,
gave
rise
to
greater
anxiety
than that
which
was
caused
by
the
attempts
of
successive
French
Governments to assert exclusive
sovereignty
over
Madagascar.
Any
claims of
France to
political rights
in
this island
were
of
the most
shadowy
kind,
for
the
French were the
latest
of
European
nations
to
obtain
any
sort
of
footing
there
1
. From the
beginning
of
the nine-
teenth
century,
a
close and ever
strengthening
tie was
formed
between
Great Britain and
the Hovas and
their
rulers,
first
owing
to
the
help
given
to them
by
the
flourishing
Mauritius
colony,
and
still more
by
the
efforts
of the
missionaries,
who carried
to
the
island
many
of the
arts and crafts
of
civilisation,
with
rational
methods
of
agriculture,
reduced the
language
to
writing, brought
in
printed
books,
established
schools and
hospitals,
and
in
great
measure
Christianised
the
popula-
tion.
When
this work had
been
done,
France
stepped
in,
and,
reviving
early
political
claims,
which
long
ago
had
been
formally
renounced,
gave
the
Hovas no rest until
they
had surrendered
their
independence
as
the
penalty
of defeat in war. In
1879,
disputes
on the
subject
of
land
tenure
occurred between French
settlers
and the
Hova Govern-
ment,
which
dared
to
adhere to
its own
interpretation
of
Malagasy
customary
law. In
order to
bring
matters
to
an
issue,
the
French
Government in
1882 claimed
a Protectorate
over
the
north-west
of
the
island,
in
virtue of
agreements
said
to have
been
concluded
in
1
841
with certain rebel
chiefs,
who had
professed
to cede
rights
which
were not theirs
to
dispose
of.
The
claim was
the more
remarkable,
1
"
L'histoire,
la
tradition,
et
beaucoup
Imagination,
avaient
cree entre
Mada-
gascar
et
nous
de
tels liens
qu'aucun
homme
d'Etat
ne
pouvait
les
negliger."
C.
de
Freycinet
(on
the War with
Madagascar
in
1885),
Souvenirs,
1
878-1 893, p.
268.
FRANCE
AND MADAGASCAR
219
since
the
British
and
French
Governments were
pledged
to
act
in
concert
in all
matters
relating
to
Madagascar,
and
since,
in
1868,
they
had
joined
with
America in
recognising
the undivided
sovereignty
of
the
reigning
Queen.
Worse
was to follow
;
for
the French
Government next claimed
rights
over
the
whole
island,
and
when this
claim was
challenged
resorted
to violent
measures. In
June,
1883,
an ultimatum
not
having
met
with
compliance,
Tamatave
was first
bombarded
and
then occu-
pied;
whereupon
the French naval
commander,
Admiral
Pierre,
proceeded
to assert
the
rights
of the
conqueror
as
against
both
the
Hovas
and
the
British
settlers. He insulted
the
British
flag,
ordered
the
British
Consul,
T. C.
Pakenham,
though
dangerously
ill,
to
leave
Tamatave
within
twenty-four
hours
—
an
order
only
frustrated
by
his
death
—
and threw into
prison
and
confined for
eight
weeks Mr
Shaw,
a
missionary
of
many
years'
standing,
on
the
grotesque charge
of
having
tampered
with French
troops
and
attempted
to
poison
their
food
. Redress for these
and
other
indignities
offered to British
subjects
was
demanded and
given,
and
acceptance
was the
easier
in
considera-
tion
of the
plea,
which
appears
to
have
been
well
founded,
that
Admiral
Pierre,
who likewise
died
soon
afterwards,
was insane.
In the
following
year,
the
attack
upon
the
rights
of the Hovas was
resumed on the old
pretext,
and
there followed further
overbearing
treatment
of
British
traders,
whose
interests suffered
greatly. Bravely
though they
struggled,
the Hovas never
had a
serious chance
of
successful
resistance;
yet,
even when
beaten,
they
continued
for a
long
time to
reject
the French
offer
of
peace
on the basis
of a
Protectorate.
In March
of that
year,
the
Ferry
Cabinet
fell,
discredited
by
a
military
defeat
in
Tonkin,
and for a time
imperialism
was
unpopular
in France. The in-
coming
Minister,
de
Freycinet,
took
office with
a
programme
devised to
"
delimit the field of our ambitions and in
consequence
the
extent of
our sacrifices
"
;
and he
accordingly
proposed
to moderate the
French
claims. At
the
end
of the
year,
a
Treaty
was concluded
by
which
the
Malagasy
Queen
gave
to France control of
her
foreign
concerns,
placed
the
Malagasies
under French Protection
abroad,
and
agreed
to
the institution of a
French
Resident at her
capital,
Antananarivo.
Though
the word was
not
used,
the
arrangement
practically
amounted to
a
Protectorate.
The British
Government
attached
great importance
to
de
Frey-
cinet's
assurance
(December 27th)
that
this
agreement
"made
no
change
in
the
Treaties
already
existing
between
the
Hova
Government
220
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD
AND
NEW WORLD
and other
States,"
and that
it
never
entered into
the
thoughts
of
the
French
Government
to
impede
the free
development
of the
private
interests
of
other nations
in
Madagascar.
This
assurance was
repeated
in a
more
specific
manner in
1890,
when Great
Britain
formally
recognised
the French Protectorate. The
Declarations
exchanged
on
that
occasion
(August 5th)
stated
explicitly
that
the
Protectorate
would
"not affect
any rights
or
immunities
enjoyed by
British
subjects
in
that island."
These
rights,
conferred
by
a
Treaty
with
Madagascar
of
June
27th, 1865,
included exterritorial
jurisdiction,
trading rights
over
the
whole
island
(with
the
exception
of
three towns
venerated
as
sacred), equal
rights
as to
the
acquisition
of
land,
most-favoured-
nation
treatment,
and
a
stipulation
that the
import
and
export
duties
should not exceed
10
per
cent, ad
valorem.
The
first
attack was made
upon
the
Capitulations
in
1892.
Salisbury
offered to
accept
French
jurisdiction
over British
subjects
in return for
a
reciprocal
concession
by
France
in
Zanzibar
(May 16th)
;
but
France wanted
something
for
nothing,
and
contended that
the
acceptance
of her Protectorate ''with
its
consequences" implied
the
renunciation of
every privilege
which restricted French
influence.
For three
years,
no
progress
was made on this
question;
but,
in
the
meantime,
France continued the work of armed
penetration
and con-
quest. During 1894
and
1895
ensued more
expeditions,
ultimatums
and
blockadings.
Tamatave was
occupied,
evacuated,
and
occupied
again,
until
at last
the
Hova
opposition
was broken
down,
and
by
Treaties of October
1st,
1895,
and
January
18th,
1896,
first
the Govern-
ment,
and then the
Queen
of the
island,
formally
accepted
French
rule.
Madagascar
was
still
only
a
Protectorate, however,
and,
not
having
been
annexed,
it did not form an
integral part
of the French
dominions.
Hence,
all the
existing
Malagasy
Treaties
and
Conventions were
legally
valid. The French
Government
recognised
this, and,
in
November,
1895,
gave
the
assurance
that,
though Madagascar
had
passed
underFrench
influence,"
no
external difficulties
would or could
arise,"
since the Government
would
"respect
the
engagements
which
they
had
contracted with
certain
foreign
Powers,"
adding:
"France
has
always
been
faithful
to her word
1
." As to the
obligations
which
the
Hovas
had
contracted,
it was said
that
France would observe
"with
complete
loyalty"
the rules of
international law
applicable
in
such a case.
In the
following year,
the effect
of the
change
of status
was
felt
1
M.
Berthelot
in the
Chamber
of
Deputies,
November
27th, 1895.
BRITISH
TREATY-RIGHTS OVERRIDDEN 221
when,
in accordance with
the
principles
which
have
governed
French
Colonial
policy
everywhere
and at all
times,
preferential
treatment
was
accorded
to
French
trade
with
the island.
Salisbury
declined
to
waive
the
right
to
equal
treatment
which
had
been
guaranteed
to
British
subjects by
the
Treaty
of
1865.
^n
an
acute
and
unanswerable
argument
from international
law,
developed
in a
despatch
of
April
25th,
1896,
he contended that
this
Treaty
was still
in full and un-
diminished
force,
and he refused to admit "that
a war which was
avowedly
undertaken
to maintain
the
protectorate
under
which
British
rights
were
unassailable
can
be
used
to
justify
an
arrangement
by
which
these
rights
are
abrogated."
France could
not
gainsay
this
claim,
but she could evade
it;
and
this
was
now done
by
converting protection
into annexation.
A month
after the date of
Lord
Salisbury's
despatch,
a
Bill
with
this
object
was introduced
in
the
Chamber,
and
it
took effect on
August
6th.
An
annexe
to
the Law decreed
the
exemption
of
French
goods
from
import
duties
in
Madagascar
and
the isles. M.
Hanotaux,
then
Foreign
Minister,
admitted that the Law was
intended
to'
meet the
difficulty
created
by
the existence
of
separate
Treaties between
Madagascar
and
Great
Britain and the United
States. The
position
was now
left,
in
his
words,
"clear and
decided,"
but
it
was
by
no
means left
satis-
factory.
Being
masters of the
situation,
the French
authorities
in the
island
spared
no
pains
to harm British
enterprise,
both commercial
and
evangelistic.
Ignoring
the conventional
minimum of
10
per
cent.
ad
valorem,
they
imposed import
duties so
high
as to
exclude
all
goods
except
those of French
origin,
which were
admitted
free;
they
re-
stricted the
coasting
trade to vessels
flying
the French
flag
;
they
gave
preference
to French
subjects
in
the matter of
land tenure
;
and,
in
official
publications,
the natives were bidden
to
buy
only
French
goods
in token of
loyalty
to their new
masters.
In
short,
the
traditional
French Colonial
policy
of
exclusive
trading
was enforced
in the
most
virulent forms. In
one
district,
the French administrator
warned
the
native traders
against buying
from
or
selling
to
any
"
foreigners,"
and
enjoined
them to trade
only
with French
merchants,
on
pain
of
im-
prisonment
in
irons. When
the
British
Foreign
Secretary
brought
this
charge
to
the
knowledge
of
the French
Government,
a declaration
of
its
baselessness was
produced
from the
Governor-
General;
but
the
British
Ambassador in Paris was
able to
prove
that
this
official
had
himself
issued a
printed
Instruction to
the
provincial
administrators
which
practically
bore
out the accusation.
222 IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD
AND
NEW WORLD
It
was
in
vain
that
Salisbury,
in
despatch
after
despatch
sent to
Paris,
recalled
the
undertaking upon
the
strength
of which Great
Britain
had
agreed
to
recognise
the French
Protectorate,
viz. that
"
the
rights
and immunities
enjoyed
by
British
subjects"
should not
be
affected,
and
lodged
his Government's
resolute
"
protest
against
action
which
in
their
opinion
is
inconsistent
with the
international
rights
of
this
country
and with the
assurances
given by
the
Government of the
Republic."
The French
Foreign
Minister
deemed
it a
sufficient
answer
to this
imputation
of
bad faith
to remind Lord
Salisbury
that
French
customs,
legislation
and tariffs
applied
equally
to the
mother-country
and to
the
Colonies,
and to
forward for
his
information
copies
of
the
laws and decrees
by
which British
rights
were annulled.
The new
regime
was
eventually
accepted
by
the
British
Govern-
ment in the
Anglo-French
Convention
of
April,
1904,
under
which
all
protest
against
the
preferential
customs
arrangements
was
with-
drawn.
In
the
meantime,
the trade with
Madagascar
was more
and
more
passing
into
French
hands. In
1896,
only
one-half
of the
value
of
Madagascar's
external trade fell
to
France,
while twelve
years
later
the
proportion
had
increased to four-fifths.
III. Territorial Settlements
with
the United
States
A. The Venezuela
Boundary
Dispute,
1
887-1
899
During
the
later decades of
the
century
the
Monroe
doctrine
gained
new
prominence,
and
attempts
were
made
by
successive
United
States
Governments
to
give
to
it
an
interpretation going
far
beyond
that which
had
hitherto
been
tacitly
accepted.
In a
Message
of
1870, urging
the
annexation of San
Domingo,
President
Grant
formally
asserted
that
"
hereafter
no
territory
on
this
Continent
shall be
regarded
as
subject
of transfer to
a
European
Power,"
and even
predicted
that
the time was
not
far distant
when,
"in the natural
course of
events,
the
European
political
connexion
with
this
Continent will cease." That
declaration
has since remained
a mere
expression
of
opinion;
yet
a later
President, Roosevelt,
could
claim
with
truth
that
the Monroe doctrine
had "not been allowed
to
be
fossilised,
but
had been
adapted
to
meet
the
growing
and
changeful
needs
of America"
(August
nth,
1905).
It was
a fact of
happy
augury
that,
concurrently
with
this
tendency
to attach new
and
far-going implications
to
a
political
maxim which
has
never
yet
received
the force of international
law,
there
has
been
VENEZUELA
BOUNDARY DISPUTE
223
an
increasing disposition
to
resort to
Arbitration for the settlement of
the
Boundary
and
other
disputes
which
have
occurred
from time to
time
between American and
European
States.
The
long-standing
frontier
dispute
between
Great Britain and
Venezuela
relating
to the
western
boundary
of
British Guiana was
settled in this
way
in
1899.
This
dispute
was
practically
as
old as the British
tenure of
the
colony,
and
for more
than half a
century
it
had
been a
source
of constant
friction with
Venezuela. In
1848,
Sir
Robert
Schomburgk
was
sent
out
to
survey
the
colony;
and the
boundary adjacent
to
the Orinoco
as defined
by
him,
and known
as
the
Schomburgk
line,
was
thereafter
accepted by
the
British Government. On
the other
hand,
the
Vene-
zuelan
Government
had claimed the
Essequibo
river,
lying
further
to the
east,
as
the true
and natural
frontier between
the two
territories.
The
fact would
appear
to be
undisputed
that,
in
the
absence of a
clear
understanding,
each side
tried
at
different
times
to
encroach
on
the
other.
In
1886,
towards
the close
of
Gladstone's
third
Administration,
a
Treaty
was drawn
up providing
for
the
submission of
the
dispute
to
Arbitration
by
a third State or
by
several
States,
as
might
be
arranged
;
but,
before
this
agreement
could be
completed,
a new
Ministry
came
into
power
and declined
to
proceed
with the arbitration
proposal,
falling
back
on
the
Schomburgk
line.
Annoyed by
the British
attitude,
the Government
of
Venezuela
had
unwisely avenged
itself
by
the
illegal
and
violent treatment
of
British
subjects trading
in
the
country
;
and
for
an indefensible
act
of the
kind
committed
in
1883
it
was
compelled
to
give
compensation, though
this
was obtained
only
in
1887
as the result of an
ultimatum.
In
that
year, diplomatic
relations
between
the two
countries
were
suspended.
Already,
the
American
Government,
at
the instance of
Venezuela,
had
made
repeated friendly
representations
on the
subject
in
London,
and in
December,
1886,
Mr
Bayard,
Secretary
of
State,
tendered
a
formal
offer
of
mediation,
which
Lord
Salisbury
declined. The
refusal,
however,
had an
important
result;
for
it
determined the
American
Government
not
to allow
the
question
to fall
again
into
the
background,
t
its
instigation,
Venezuela
provisionally
resumed
diplomatic
rela-
ns with Great Britain
in
1890;
but,
as
further direct
negotiations
etween
the
two States
still
proved
unsuccessful,
the American
Ambassador
in
London
in
January, 1895, again
sounded the
British
Foreign Secretary (now
the
Earl of
Kimberley)
as to whether his
Government would
accept
Mediation.
The result was
an
offer to
bei
224
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
the United
States
to arbitrate in
regard
to all
territory
outside the
Schomburgk
line
and the
submission,
by arrangement,
of a
Memoran-
dum
on
the
subject
to the
American
Government.
To
this
Memorandum,
Secretary
Olney
made an elaborate
and,
for
a
friendly
Power,
highly
contentious
rejoinder
(July
20th),
em-
phasising
the American
standpoint
and
the
solidarity
of the
republican
States
of
the American Continent. He
alleged
that
records
published
by
the
British
Government
as official
showed
that,
between
the
years
1884
and
1886,
Great
Britain had
claimed an
extended
dominion over
a
region
of
33,000
square
miles,
and
pointed
out that this was a
virtual
challenge
to
the Monroe
Doctrine,
since
it
implied
the
"forcible
assumption by
a
European
Power of
political
control over
an
American
State."
Charging
Great
Britain
with
basing
her
titl«
to
possession
upon
her
strength
and the
inability
of a
weak
State like
Venezuela
to enforce
its
rights,
he
suggested
that this attitude
was
not
to be defended
or reconciled with "that
love
of
justice
and
fair
play
so
eminently
characteristic of the
English
race,"
and added
that
it was
quite
impossible
that the
United States could
assent to
it. The
British Government
were, therefore,
asked to state
definitely
whether
they
would
consent or decline to submit the
Boundary question
in its
entirety
to
impartial
Arbitration
;
and
it
was
stated
that a refusal would
be
"calculated
greatly
to embarrass
the
future relations between
this
country
and Great
Britain."
Seldom
had a British
Government been
subjected
to
such
plain
speaking
on
its
duty
to
its
neighbours
as
was contained
in
this docu-
ment,
whose
importance
was increased
by
the fact
that a
joint
resolution
of
Congress
had
quite
recently urged
the determination
of
the
dispute
by
friendly
Arbitration. The
Olney
despatch
was communicated
in
August
to Lord
Salisbury,
who had
succeeded
to the
Foreign
Office
in
the
previous
month. In his
reply
(November
26th)
he
entered
into
an academic
discussion of the
Monroe
doctrine,
pointing
out
that the
interpretation given by
the
despatch
went
beyond
the
intentions
of
its author
in
1823,
and
disputing
its
relevancy,
even
in
this
extended
application,
to
the
question
at issue.
Nor was
he
prepared
to admit
the
acceptance
of the
doctrine in
any
form
by
the
British
Government,
since international
law
must be founded
on the
general
consent
of
nations,
and
the doctrine had not
hitherto
been
recognised
by
other
countries.
The
entire
tone of
the
reply
was
in
so
marked
a contrast
to the
conciliatory
attitude
shown
of
late
by
Lord
Salisbury
in
his
negotiations
on
frontier
questions
with
other
Powers
far less
near
than