254
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD AND NEW WORLD
diplomacy,
the
greater
would
be the likelihood of a
settlement
which
would leave
no
ill-will.
There
was
no
angry wrangling
and
pulling
down
of
flags;
having
complimented
Marchand on his
gallant
march,
Kitchener
regretted
that
it
had ended
at
the
wrong
place,
and
in-
formed
him
that it
was his
duty
to claim
possession
of
Fashoda for
the
Egyptian
and British
Governments. Marchand
hinted,
indeed,
at the
possibility
of his
having
to die
at his
post
and his readiness
to
do so if
necessary;
but
Kitchener confined himself to
carrying
out
his
Instructions. These
were
to hoist
the
Egyptian
and British
flags,
and,
having
done
this,
to hand to Marchand a written
protest
against
"any occupation
of
any
part
of the Nile
Valley
by
France,"
as
being
an
infringement
of
Egyptian
and British
rights,
and
to instal an
Egyptian
garrison
on the
spot. Having
done
this,
he
parted
from
his
rival,
as
he
had
met
him,
on terms of
perfect
amity.
The
excitement caused
in
France
by
the
episode
was
intense,
and
it
needed
little effort on the
part
of
the
Paris
Press to
convince
the
nation that its
rights
and honour had been
wantonly outraged.
On
the other
hand,
nothing
was
lacking
in
resolute decision
on the
part
either of Lord
Salisbury
in London or the British
Ambassador
in
Paris,
though
it
was
recognised
that the
alternative
to surrender
by
France
was
war
1
.
Happily,
French
logic
on that occasion
gave
timely
assistance
to
French
diplomacy.
If
the abandonment
of her earlier
standpoint
had
placed
France
in an
inconsistent
position,
the return
to it
enabled her to extricate herself
gracefully
from an awkward
predicament.
No
Power
had
more
persistently
emphasised
the
in-
violability
of the
Egyptian
dominions than France.
As,
therefore,
the
authority
of the Khedive
was
now
being
reasserted
in the
Soudan,
to claim the Fashoda district or
any part
of
it
would
have been
to
1
"
C'etait bien
de
guerre quHl
agissait.
Durant
cette
periode ('
depuis
le mois
de
Septembre 1898 jusqu'au
mois de
Mars,
1899')
nous avons
ete
a deux
doigts
des
hostilites
"
(C.
de
Freycinet,
La
question d'£gypte,
p. 413).
In his
Memoirs,
published
by
the
London
Daily
Telegraph
during
the later months
of
1920,
Count
Witte
states
that
the
French
Government at this time
appealed
to Russia
for
support
and received
the
advice
not
to allow
the
question
to lead to
a
rupture.
He also
states
that
M.
Delcass£
visited
Petrograd
for
the
purpose
of
devising
"a means
whereby
England
might
be
held in
check,"
and
urged
the Russian
Government to
push
on with
the
construction
of
the
Orenburg-Tashkend railway,
since
it would
prove
valuable
as
a
menace
to
India should
the need arise. As the
opportunity
of
obtaining money
for
this
contemplated
work was
too
good
to be
lost,
Russia
agreed,
and
a
loan
was
promised
for
the
purpose.
It
was
disappointment
at
Russia's coolness in the
Fashoda
affair, together
with
the
feeble
stand
she made
in the later
Japanese
War,
which
convinced
Delcass£
and
other French statesmen
that
as an
ally
Russia
left
much
to
be
desired,
and that
the
policy
of
irritating
Great
Britain was
both
a mistaken
and
a
dangerous
one.
The entente
cordiale of
1904
was
a
direct
result
of this
change
of
attitude.