Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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THE
ARMENIAN
QUESTION
235
had been shown
at
the
outset
by
the
Armenians had been
a
reply
to
unprovoked
attacks
deliberately
made
on
them
by
the
Kurds,
with
a
view
to
justifying
subsequent reprisals,
and that
in
these
reprisals
the
aggressors
were
encouraged
by
the local
authorities
and
had
the
support
of
the
Mussulman
population.
Nevertheless,
in a
conversation
with the Earl
of
Kimberley,
Rustem
Pasha,
the
Ambassador
of the
Porte in
London,
ignoring
the
Treaty
of
Berlin and
the
Cyprus
Convention,
coolly
enquired upon
what
grounds
the British
Government based
their
claim
to
interfere
in
the
internal affairs of
Turkey
(March
28th,
1895).
On
May
nth,
a modest
programme
of
reforms,
which had
been
agreed
upon
by
the
British,
French
and
Russian Ambassadors and
approved
by
their
Governments
—
the
Tsar
refusing,
however,
to
be
a
party
to
any
kind
of coercion
—
was communicated to the Porte. What
happened
was
just
what had
invariably
occurred before
in
similar
circumstances.
The Porte
protested,
temporised
and
finally
made
counter-proposals
of a
more
or
less worthless
kind
—
all
for the
purpose
of
evading
action
of
any
kind.
There
was
an
outcry
on the
part
of
generous
humanitarians in
England,
when
the
Government took
no
measures
independently
with a
view
to
compelling
the Porte
to make amends for the
present
and
give
hostages
for the future.
Lord
Rosebery,
however,
held
that
to
have done
so would have
exposed
Great
Britain
to the
very
real
risk
of
having
to
face
the
opposition
of the other
Powers,
and
par-
ticularly
Russia. Unable
to
see
eye
to
eye
on
this
question
with
Gladstone,
who advocated
a
policy
of
resolute
action,
and
deeming
his
position
untenable in view
of the state
of
parties
both in the
House
of
Commons
and
the
country,
Lord
Rosebery
resigned
office in
June.
His
Government
had
done
all
that was
possible by
moral
means
to
move
the Porte
to
action.
Nevertheless,
the fact
remained,
that
the
special
obligation
towards
the
Armenians
which Great
Britain had
undertaken under
the
Cyprus
Convention
still remained
unfulfilled.
The
change
of
Government,
inasmuch as
it
brought
back Lord
Salisbury
to the
Foreign
Office,
encouraged
the
belief
in
Constanti-
nople
that
there would
be an
immediate
relaxation of
pressure
on
the
part
of the
Powers. The
Sultan's
Ministers miscalculated.
One
of the
first
acts of
the new
Foreign
Secretary
was to
impress
on
the
Turkish
Ambassador the
danger
to
the Ottoman
empire
of
further
prevarica-
tion.
He stated that
he
had
been
"much
struck,
on
coming
back
to
office,
to find
how much
ground
Turkey
had lost
in
English
opinion,"
236
IMPERIAL
POLICY IN OLD AND NEW
WORLD
and that "a
settled conviction
was
growing
that
nothing
was
to be
hoped
from
it in
the
way
of
improvement
and
reform,
and
that
all
that could
be done was to finish
with
it"
(July ioth).
After
a
month
had
passed,
his
patience
was
exhausted,
and he came to the
conclusion
that,
since the Powers could
not
withdraw
from
their
position
without
loss of
credit,
energetic
measures should be taken
to secure
the
acceptance
of
the reforms.
Although
Russia
still
opposed
the
use of
force,
whether
by
all the
Powers
together
or
by any
one of
them
alone,
it
was
due to Lord
Salisbury's
insistence
that the Porte
in October
produced
a
scheme
of
reforms of its
own. The
reforms were
to
apply
in the six
vilayets chiefly
inhabited
by
Armenians
and,
in
principle,
in other
parts
of
Asiatic
Turkey
where
Christians
predominated.
Nevertheless,
the
year
1896
brought
a
repetition
of
the
excesses
against
the Armenians. Each month
and week added
its contribution
to the tale of
rapine,
pillage,
extortion
and
murder,
now
local,
now
on a
larger
scale.
Constantinople
was the scene
of the
worst
of these
orgies
of crime.
Following
an attack
upon
the Ottoman
Bank,
made
by
a small band of
Armenian
reformers
for the
purpose
of
calling
attention to
the
desperate
plight
of
their
countrymen,
a
general
massacre
of
Armenians
took
place
between the 26th
and
30th
of
August.
There were scores of
arrests,
and
it
was characteristic
that,
when the
trials
took
place,
the Armenians met
with drastic
treatment,
but the Moslems
with
a
clemency
which
in
many
cases
amounted
to a
condonation
of
guilt.
Many
of
the
former
were
sentenced
to
death,
but
not
one Moslem shared
that
fate;
and
the
periods
of im-
prisonment imposed
were
on
the
average twenty
times
longer
for
the
Armenians
than
for the dominant
race.
The massacres were
followed
by
the
expulsion
from the
capital
of
thousands of
Armenians,
of
whom the
majority
found their
way
into
Asia,
where
a
worse fate
awaited
them.
For
the
Constantinople
emeute
led to
immediate and violent
repercussions
in
the
provinces,
and
particularly
in
Asia
Minor,
where
the
misdoings
of the
political
bank-raiders were
exaggerated
and
avenged
with terrible
cruelty
upon
thousands of their
innocent
countrymen.
The worst
of all
the
massacres
were
perpetuated
in
September
in the
Eghin
district,
where
murder,
plundering
and
houseburning
continued
for
a
day
and a
night.
It
was estimated
by
Consular
investigators
that at
least
1000
people
were
murdered,
and
almost
as
many
houses
destroyed.
Up
to
that
time,
the
Porte
had done
little or
nothing
towards
carrying
out its own scheme
of
reforms.
In
a
despatch
to the
British
THE
STATUS OF
CRETE
237
Embassies
of October
20th,
marked
by
unaccustomed
urgency
of
tone,
and
recalling
the
generous
spirit
of
the
early days
of
1875,
before
he
seemed
to succumb
for a
time to
the
influence of
Disraeli,
Lord
Salisbury bespoke
the
cooperation
of the
Powers in
a
joint
endeavour
to
obtain
the
introduction
into
the Turkish
administration of
such
reforms
as would ensure
better
government
and
put
an end
to its
record
of
cruelty
and
crime.
In
protecting
the
Turkish
empire
from
dissolution,
he
said,
the
Powers had
been
inspired
by
"the
hope
that
the
many
evils
by
which
Ottoman
rule was
accompanied
would
be
removed
or
mitigated by
the
reforming
efforts of
the
Government.
Not
only
has
this
hope
been
entirely disappointed,
but it
has
become
evident
that,
unless these
great
evils can
be
abated,
the
forbearance
of the
Powers of
Europe
will be unable to
protract
the
existence of
a dominion
which
by
its
own vices is
crumbling
into
ruin."
He
pro-
posed,
therefore,
that
the Powers should come
to
a
unanimous
agree-
ment as to
the reforms
needed,
and
should
insist
on their
execution,
"
up
to the measure
of such force
"
as
they
had at command.
France,
Germany,
Austria-Hungary
and
Italy
were
sympathetic,
and
Russia,
though
at
first
opposed
to the
use of
coercion,
acquiesced by
the end
of
November.
There was more admonition
and
expostulation
;
but
little came of
it.
Further murders
and massacres were
committed
in the
following
year;
and in
July, 1897,
Sir
Philip
Currie
reported
that the Porte was
as
reluctant
as ever
to move
by
the introduction
of
reforms,
the
punishment
of known
criminals,
or the enforcement
of
punishments
actually
awarded.
Turkish
misrule
had,
in
fact,
taken
a new lease of
life. Seven
years
later
(July,
1904),
Sir
N. O
'Conor,
the
British
Ambassador of that
day,
was
still
complaining
to the
Grand-Vizier
that "the
present
radical
vice of
gross
misgovernment
continued
to
render the life
of
every
Armenian
unendurable."
B. Crete and
the Graeco-Turkish
War,
1878-1898
One of the
tragedies
of
the Eastern
Question
has
lain
in the
fact
that
imperious political
readjustments
have so often
been
made
piece-
meal,
in the vain
hope
of
eluding
difficulties
and
rendering
more
tolerable
to the Ottoman
empire
the
disturbance
incidental
to
in-
evitable
changes.
Meanwhile,
misgovernment
has
continued
as
before,
while
unbearable conditions
have seemed
to
receive
the
sanction
of
the
Powers which had made
themselves
responsible
for
the
welfare
238
IMPERIAL
POLICY IN OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
of the
oppressed
populations,
and
yet
nothing
has been
gained
in
the
end
by
procrastination.
At
any
time
since
the
middle of
the
nine-
teenth
century,
it
might
have seemed
that
Crete was
ripe
for
severance
from
an
empire
in
which
it
was
absorbed
by
force,
and
to
which it
had never
been attached in
sentiment
;
yet,
twenty years
after
Delyanni
had
vainly appealed
to the
Congress
of
Berlin
to
sanction
annexation
to
the
Hellenic
kingdom
on
historical and ethnical
grounds,
the
island
still remained
one of the most
sullen
and
disaffected
parts
of
the
Sultan's
dominion.
The
application
to Crete
of
the
Organic
Statute of
1868,
modified
according
to
existing
needs,
had
been a
condition of
its
retention
by
the
Sultan
in
1878
;
and,
in
October of
that
year,
a
Constitution,
known
as
the Pact of
Halepa,
was
issued,
creating
inter alia a.
Governor-
General,
with an
'
Adjoint
'
belonging
to
the Orthodox
Greek
faith,
and
a
representative
Assembly.
In
the
territories under
Turkish
rule,
however,
the best of laws never
made an
alien
Administration
popular,
and,
when revolt broke out
again
in
1889,
the Pact of
Halepa
was
annulled,
in
token
that
the
Cretans still
held their
political
liberties
by arbitrary
favour
only.
The refusal
of
the Porte
to
grant
reforms
demanded
by
the Cretan
Assembly
at the end of
1895
led to a
renewal of revolt and
to conflicts
with the
Turkish
troops,
which resorted to drastic
reprisals.
In
the
following August,
the
Ambassadors in
Constantinople
drew
up
a
scheme under which
the island was to have
political
autonomy
and
a
Christian
Governor
;
this the
Porte
accepted,
and a law was
promul-
gated accordingly.
The
concession,
however,
failed
to arrest the dis-
content of
the
Christians,
while
it
proved
a
source of offence to
the
Moslems.
All this
time,
the Greek Government
was
looking
on
expectantly,
prepared
to intervene on however
slight
a
pretext.
The
justification
was
afforded
in
February, 1897,
when
Athens was thrown into excite-
ment
by
reports
of Mussulman attacks
upon
the Christians at Canea.
Arms
and ammunition
found
their
way
to
Crete
freely
and
mysteriously,
and
many
of the leaders
of
the Cretan
revolutionary
cause resident on
the
mainland
crossed over to the island. The
Great Powers were
already
represented
by
a
strong
naval force
in
Cretan
waters,
and
they
refused
the
Sultan's
request
that
he
might
send additional
troops, fearing
the
effect
upon
the excited
population.
Whatever
might
have been its attitude
if
calm counsels
had
been
possible,
the hands
of the
Greek
Cabinet were
now forced
by
public
ARMED
INTERVENTION
OF
GREECE
239
opinion.
On
February
nth,
Prince
George
of Greece sailed
over to
Crete
with
a flotilla of
torpedo
boats,
and
four
days
later Colonel
Vassos,
bearing
the
King's
orders to
occupy
the island
and
eject
the
Turkish
garrisons,
landed with
1500
men
near Canea. These hostile
acts
amounted
to
a
declaration
of
war,
and
the Porte
appealed
to
the
Powers
to intervene. The
German
Emperor
called for
the immediate
blockading
of the Greek
coast,
as
in
1886,
until
the
illicit
expedition
should
have been
withdrawn,
and
other Powers
favoured
this
course.
The
British
Government,
conscious of a
strong
current
of national
opinion
favourable
to
the Greek
cause,
were
unwilling
to
commit
themselves
until
the future status of Crete had
been
determined;
and,
as to
this,
they
advocated the
conversion
of
the
island
into an
autonomous
province
of the
empire.
Immediately
on
landing,
Colonel
Vassos had
issued a
proclama-
tion
announcing
his
occupation
of
the
island in his
King's
name. This
was
a defiant
challenge
which
the Powers
could not
ignore.
Some
of
them were
in favour of
serving
on
the Greek Government an
ulti-
matum
demanding
the immediate recall of the
expedition;
but,
on
the
proposal
of
France,
who
supported
Great
Britain and
Italy
in
their wish
to
let Greece down
lightly,
the milder
procedure
oisomma-
tion was
adopted.
Called
upon
to
withdraw,
and reminded that its
action was
a
violation
of
the
Treaty
of Berlin
(March 2nd),
the
Greek
Government
refused,
influenced doubtless
by
the
recollection
that
two
successive rulers of
Bulgaria
had been allowed
to
override
the
Treaty
no
less
arbitrarily.
Lord
Salisbury
had,
in
the
meantime,
accepted
the blockade
proposal, though
stipulating
for
its
limited
operation
;
and on March
21st
this
measure was
applied,
but restricted
to
the
island.
As, however,
the Hellenic Government
showed
no
disposition
to
withdraw,
the blockade
was,
at
the
end
of
the
month,
extended to
the mainland.
All
the
Powers still acted
together
;
yet
not all of them
were able
to
give
cordial
support
to
the work of coercion.
Lord
Salisbury,
who
throughout
took
the lead in
the concert of the
Powers,
saw
clearly
that
the
mere
dragooning
of
Greece,
however she
might
have
merited
such
treatment,
would not solve
the Cretan
problem.
Accordingly,
his
energies
were
directed towards
obtaining
the
withdrawal
from
the
island
of
the Turkish
and
Greek
troops
equally,
with
a view
to
the
speedy
reorganisation
of the administration
under a
new
Governor.
To
the
grant
of
autonomous administration
the
Porte offered
no resistance
;
but
it
claimed
that a Turkish
subject
holding
the
Orthodox
Greek
240
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
faith
should
be chosen
as
Governor. For
Greece,
however,
no
solution
of
the
Cretan
question
was
satisfactory
which
failed
to
place
the
ad-
ministration
of
the island in
her hands
either
as
mandatory
of
the
Powers
or
(as
she
demanded) by
means
of
annexation.
The
guerilla
war
begun by
the Greeks
in
Crete
proved
the
prelude
to a bolder
military enterprise.
The
outburst of national
ardour
which
had
driven
the
King
and
Government into
aggressive
measures
revived,
in
intense
form,
the old
animosities and
resentments of the
Greeks
against
the Turks at
their
doors;
and,
in
March,
the
Powers
were faced
with
the
imminence of an
invasion
of
Macedonia.
On
April
6th,
the Ambassadors in
Constantinople
presented
to
the Porte
and the Greek
Ministry simultaneously
a
joint
Declaration,
to the
effect
that,
in
the event of a
conflict,
their
Governments would
hold
the
aggressor entirely responsible
and
that,
however a
struggle
so
begun might
end,
they
would not
allow
him to
derive from it
the
slightest advantage.
Incited
by repeated provocative
acts
of
Greek
troops,
who had
crossed the frontier
at
several
points,
the Porte
suspended
diplomatic
relations
with
the Hellenic
Government
on
April
18th,
and
war
broke
out.
In a
number of minor frontier
operations
the Greeks at first
seemed
to
carry
all
before them.
As
the
campaign developed,
how-
ever,
the
superiority
of their
adversaries,
alike
in
fighting
quality
and
in
numbers,
told with fatal effect.
Isolated victories continued
to be
won,
but,
again
and
again,
positions
were
occupied
only
to be relin-
quished immediately
afterwards in
panic
and
flight.
The land
campaign
was
practically
fought
and
decided
on
Greek
soil,
while
on the water
Greece,
owing
to sheer
supineness,
achieved
no
result of
value,
though
all the conditions
and
chances were
in
her favour.
A
sequence
of defeats
brought
about the dismissal of the
Delyanni
Cabinet
(April
28th)
and
the
appointment
to office of the
Opposition
leader Ralli.
Already
it
was clear how
the
campaign
would end.
The Allies had been
prepared
to
propose
terms of
peace
as soon
as
the
belligerents
had
taken each other's
measure;
and,
so
early
as
April 23
rd,
Lord
Salisbury
sounded
the
other Cabinets
as
to
the
expediency
of
deciding
upon
the form
and conditions of interven-
tion. On
the eve
of his
dismissal,
Delyanni
had
been
ready
to
cease
hostilities
on
honourable
terms;
after
later reverses in
Thessaly,
the
incoming
Ministry
welcomed mediation
by
the Powers on whatever
terms
they
might
propose.
As a condition
of an armistice
Turkey
demanded
that the old
frontier
should be
restored,
which would
have
THE
GRAECO-TURKISH
WAR
241
meant
the
retrocession to
her
of
Thessaly.
Lord
Salisbury
refused
to consider the
proposal,
being
determined that no liberated
Christian
populations
should
be
put
back
under Turkish
rule.
With the
signing
of the Armistice
on
May
i9th-20th
the War
came to
an end.
In the
ensuing
peace
negotiations
the
greatest
difficulty
was
caused
by
the
frontier
question,
though
the Porte
also
pressed
for a
larger
indemnity
than the
Powers
were
prepared
to
sanction.
Upon
the
frontier
question
Lord
Salisbury
was
immovable,
and on
June
30th
he told
the Turkish
Government
that,
while
willing
to
discuss
any
territorial
adjustments
in
Thessaly
which could be shown to be
required
for
strategical
reasons,
the British
Government
"could
not
consent to
any
rectification of
the frontier between Greece
and
Turkey
which would
involve as a
consequence any
considerable
number
of
Greeks
being
replaced
under the
rule
of
the
Turkish Government."
Hereupon,
the
Porte
resorted to its habitual
policy
of evasion
and
obstruction;
and
it was
only
after the Powers
had issued
a stern
warning
of their
determination to
bring
to
an end
the futile
negotia-
tions,
which had
"
no other result
than
that
of
delaying
the
conclusion
of a
peace
in
which all
Europe
is
interested"
(July
8th),
that
it
capitulated.
The
definitive
Treaty
of Peace was
signed
on December
4th,
1897. By
it,
the
frontier between the two
States was
rectified
by
the
cession to
Turkey
of
several
minor
districts,
and the
indemnity
was
fixed at
£T4,ooo,ooo.
In
order
to
enable
Greece
to
pay
this sum
and
set her
finances
in
order,
Great
Britain
joined
France
and
Russia
(March
29th,
1898)
in
guaranteeing
a
loan to her
of
£6,800,000,
re-
payable
within a
maximum
period
of 60
years.
During
the Cretan
controversy
and the Graeco-Turkish
War,
Germany,
while at
one with the other Powers
in
desiring
to shield
Greece from
the worst
consequences
of
her
indiscretion,
showed
on
the whole a
friendly disposition
towards
Turkey.
Baron
von
Marschall,
the
German
Ambassador
in
Constantinople,
had
already
entered
on
a
policy
of
deference to the
Sultan,
which
ultimately
won
for
Germany
a
dominating
influence at
the
Porte
and
secured
to her
concessions
and
privileges
of
great political
and
material
value.
The
withdrawal
of Greece
and her
preoccupation
with
the
cam-
paign
on
the mainland
relieved
the tension in
Crete,
though,
owing
to
want of
unity
amongst
the
Allies,
the
settlement
of
the
island
was
still
long
protracted.
The decision
to
put
in
operation
the
scheme
of
autonomous
government
which
was
drawn
up
in
August,
1896,
required
the
election of a
Governor,
and,
for
more
than
a
year,
the
W.&.G.III
16
242
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD
AND
NEW WORLD
claims
of
different
aspirants
and
nominees
were
considered with
a
dwindling
prospect
of
agreement,
the island
being
in
the
meantime
administered
in
commission
by
the
Admirals.
In
March,
1898,
owing
to
the
rejection
of her advice that it
should
be
administered
for a
time
by
two Powers at their
pleasure,
Germany
withdrew from the
Concert,
bidding
the other
Powers
dispose
of
Crete as
they
would,
since
she took
no further
interest in
it.
Austria-Hungary
soon
followed
this
example.
The Cretan
Question
had,
in
fact,
begun
to
tire all
the
Powers,
though
none of them
seemed
willing
to
recognise
that
the deadlock
which
had
occurred
was
due to their
own
indecision and
divided
counsels.
In
June
a
Provisional
Government was
instituted,
in
spite
of
Turkey's indignant
protest,
providing
for the
administration of
the
coast-towns
by
the Admirals
and of
the interior
by
the Cretan
Assembly
and
Executive.
Then,
at the
beginning
of
September,
another Mussul-
man outbreak
occurred
at
Canea,
as a
result of
which a number of
British
soldiers
and
sailors were
killed or
wounded,
many
hundreds
of native Christians
massacred,
and
the town
fired,
by
the
mob.
The
consequence
was
a
decision to
enforce the
immediate withdrawal
of all Turkish
troops
and officials
from the
island
and
to disarm the
Moslem
population.
As
the Porte
refused to recall its
soldiers,
and
the
Turkish
Governor declined
to move
in
the
absence
of
Instructions
from
Constantinople,
the
Allied
troops ejected
them
by
force
on
November
5th.
By
this
time,
the
need
of a
regular
Government
had
become cle;
to
the
four
acting
Powers;
and,
with a
view
to
bringing
about
a
coi
dition
of
things promising
stability
and
permanence,
Prince
George
Greece was offered the
position
of
High
Commissioner
(Harmostes
which he
accepted
on
November
26th,
the Porte
agreeing.
With
tl
promise
of the
Powers
to
provide
a
loan of
£160,000
and the immediat
advance of
one-fourth of this sum to
enable the
High
Commission
to set
up
house,
the
new Government assumed office under favoui
able
auspices,
and the
Regent's
formal
installation
took
place
December
21st.
Several
days
later,
the Admirals sailed
away.
VI.
Reconquest
of
the Soudan and
the
Fashoda
Dispute,
1885-1899
The
longer
the
British
occupation
of
Egypt
lasted,
the more
ii
patient
became
the demand
of the
Sultan and of France
for
it
termination.
While, however,
Great Britain
had
never
ceased
to
reg£
BRITISH
TENURE OF EGYPT
243
her
presence
in
the
country
as
temporary,
it
was obvious to the rest
of
the
world that
no
Government
with a
sense of
responsibility
could
give
a
promise
of
evacuation,
to
take
place
unconditionally
on a
fixed
date.
The
British
Cabinet,
nevertheless,
offered to discuss
with
the
Porte the conditions
of
eventual
withdrawal and
any
practicable
measures
to be
adopted
in
the
meantime
for
reducing
the
sphere
of
intervention.
With
this
object
in
view,
Lord
Salisbury
sent Sir
Henry
Drummond Wolff on a
Special
Mission to
Constantinople
in
August,
1885.
The result
was
the
conclusion
of
a
Convention
(October
24th),
providing
that a Turkish
and a
British
High
Commissioner
should
be
despatched
to
Egypt,
there to
cooperate
with
the
Khedive
in
the
reorganisation
of the
Army
and
the reform
of
the
general
administra-
tion.
So soon as
the
High
Commissioners
were convinced that
the
time had arrived
when
withdrawal
would be safe
and
expedient,
they
were
to
report
to that effect
to
their
Governments,
which
would confer
as to the
conclusion
of a
Supplementary
Convention
on the
subject.
The
proposals,
necessarily,
were not
very
explicit,
but
they
were
honestly
meant
;
and
Great Britain
had never
before
gone
so
far in
her wish to
satisfy
the
Porte and remove the
suspicions
of
France.
Wolff
went to
Egypt
as the
British
High
Commissioner,
and
Mukhtar Pasha
was
appointed
on behalf
of
Turkey.
For a twelve-
month,
they
observed,
investigated,
and
conferred,
discovering
no new
and
solving
no old
problems;
and then
they
reported. They
failed
to
agree
as to
the
best
way
of
reorganising
the
Army
;
they
had little
fault
to find
with the civil
administration;
and,
while
they
condemned
the
Capitulations,
they
devised
no
plan
for
abolishing
them.
The
critical
question,
however,
was
the withdrawal
of the
British force
;
and,
in
the
hope
of
reaching
a conclusion
on this
head,
Lord
Salisbury
sent
Wolff to
Constantinople
on a second
Mission
in
January,
1887.
In
a
memorable
letter
of
Instructions
addressed
to the
Special
Envoy
(January 15th),
the
Foreign
Minister
repeated
the
desire of
his
Government to
satisfy
the
Sultan,
yet
warned
him,
in the
spirit
of Lord
Granville's
pledges
in the
past,
that
they
could
not
"fix
even
a distant
date
for
evacuation
until
they
are able to
make
provision
for
securing beyond
that date
the
external
and internal
peace
of
Egypt."
He
accepted
the
principle
of
the
"
neutralisation of
Egypt,"
but
subject
to
conditions
"designed
to
maintain
the
security
and
maintenance
of
the
whole
arrangement."
Hence,
he
laid
it
down as
a
basic
principle
that
"the
British Government
must
retain the
right
to
guard
and
uphold
the condition
of
things
which
will have
been
brought
about
16—2
244
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD
AND NEW WORLD
by
the
military
action and
large
sacrifices of this
country.... England,
if
she
spontaneously
and
willingly
evacuates the
country,
must retain
a
treaty
right
of
intervention
if
at
any
time
either internal
peace
or
external
security
should be
seriously
threatened."
In the
succeeding negotiations,
after much
humouring, Turkey
concluded a
Convention
(May
22nd,
1887) providing
for evacuation
at
the
end
of
three
years
on the conditions
stated. Two
years
after
the
British
force had
been
withdrawn,
the British
supervision
of the
Army
was to
end,
and
Egypt
was thereafter to
enjoy
territorial
im-
munity (sureteterritoriale)
—
an
indefinite status
preferred
by
the Sultan
to
neutralisation. On the
ratification
of
the
Convention,
the Powers
were to be invited to
recognise
and
guarantee
the
inviolability
of
Egyptian
territory.
Provision was made
for a
joint
Anglo-Turkish
military occupation
of a
temporary
character
in certain
contingencies.
It
was
part
of the
arrangement
that
the
Contracting
States
should
endeavour to induce the Powers
to
agree
to the abolition of exterri-
torial
jurisdiction.
Owing
to the
pressure
and threats
of
France,
who
objected
to a British
right
of
reentry
in
any
circumstances,
the
Sultan
did
not
ratify
the
Convention,
though
it was understood
that
he
was
willing
to do so.
When,
later,
he invited the
Foreign
Office to
resume
negotiations
in
London,
Lord
Salisbury,
annoyed
as
much
by
Turkey's
cowardice
as
by
French
intrigue,
refused.
Once more France
had
blundered.
Wishing
to
expel
Great
Britain from
Egypt,
she had
merely
strengthened
and made more
permanent
her
position
there.
British
relations with France
had seldom been
so
strained
as
during
the
period
which intervened between the two
Egyptian
Conventions
;
and both Lord
Salisbury
and Lord
Rosebery
complained
bitterly
of
the
hard
life which our
neighbour
led
them.
After six months
of
contention,
Lord
Rosebery
came
to the conclusion
that France was
making
mischief of set
purpose.
"Our relations
with
France,"
he
wrote
to Lord
Lyons
(August
10th,
1886),
"are
really
more
trouble-
some
than with
any
other Power
1
."
At
that
time de
Freycinet
was
President
of
the Cabinet and
Foreign
Minister;
and,
having
been
guilty
of
the
mistake of
allowing
Great
Britain
to
enter
Egypt
alone,
he was
bent
on
retrieving
his
reputation
by
compelling
her
withdrawal.
This
would
have been
a brilliant
achievement,
had
it succeeded.
In
September,
1886,
he
sent
M.
Her-
bette
as
Ambassador
to
Berlin,
in
proof
of
his wish
to
establish
a
permanent
entente
with
Germany;
and,
in
the
following
month,
the
1
Lord
Newton,
Lord
Lyons:
a
record
of
British
Diplomacy,
11.
374.