Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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BOOK
V
THE
SECOND
AND
THIRD
SALISBURY
ADMINISTRATIONS
AND
AFTER,
1886-1907
SECRETARIES
OF
STATE
FOR
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
February,
1886
: Earl
of
Rosebery.
August,
—
: Earl
of
Iddesleigh.
January,
1887:
Marquess
of
Salisbury.
August,
1892
:
Earl of
Rosebery.
March,
1894
:
Earl of
Kimberley.
June,
1895:
Marquess
of
Salisbury.
November,
1900:
Marquess
of
Lansdowne.
December,
1905:
Sir
Edward
Grey,
Bart,
(aftenvards
Viscount
Grey
of
Fallodon).
UNDER-SECRETARIES
OF
STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
James
(afterwards
Viscount)
Bryce {Parliamentary).
Right
Hon.
Sir
James
Fergusson,
Bart.
(Parliamentary).
Sir
Philip
W.
Currie
(afterwards
Lord
Currie)
(Permanent).
Sir Thomas
H. Sanderson
(afterwards
Lord
Sanderson)
(Assistant)
.
James
William
Lowther
(afterwards
Lord
Ullswater) (Parlia-
mentary).
Sir Edward
Grey
(afterwards
Viscount
Grey
of
Fallodon) (Par-
liamentary).
Sir
Thomas H. Sanderson
(afterwards
Lord
Sanderson)
(Assistant),
Sir H.
Percy
Anderson
(Assistant).
Hon.
Francis
L.
Bertie
(afterwards
Viscount
Bertie
of
Thames)
(Assistant).
Right
Hon.
George
N.
Curzon
(afterwards
Earl
Curzon
of
Kedleston).
Hon.
Francis H.
(afterwards
Sir
F.
H.)
Villiers
(Assistant).
Sir Martin Le
M.
H. Gosselin
(Assistant).
Right
Hon. St
John
Fremantle Brodrick
(afterwards
Viscount
Midleton) (Parliamentary).
Viscount Cranborne
(afterwards
Marquess
of
Salisbury)
(Parlia-
mentary).
Francis
A.
(afterwards
Sir
F.
A.)
Campbell
(Assistant).
Hon.
Charles
Hardinge
(afterwards
Lord
Hardinge
of
Penshurst)
(Assistant).
Henry
Algernon George
Earl
Percy
(Parliamentary).
Sir
Eldon
Gorst
(Assistant).
Lord Edward
George Petty
Fitzmaurice
(afterwards
Lord
Fitz-
maurice)
(Parliamentary).
Right
Hon. Sir
Charles
Hardinge (afterwards
Lord
Hardinge
of
Penshurst)
(Permanent).
Hon. Sir Eric
Barrington
(Assistant).
Louis
(afterwards
Sir
L.)
Mallet
(Assistant).
Walter
L. F.
G.
(afterwards
Sir
W.)
Langley
(Assistant).
February,
1886
August,
—
April,
1889
September,
1891
T
CHAPTER
III
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
THE
OLD
AND
THE NEW
WORLD,
1885-1899
I. Frontier
Disputes
in
Central
Asia
A. The
Afghan
Boundary
Delimitation,
1
884-1
895
HE
attempts,
made
in
1873,
to
delimit
the
Afghan
Frontier
on
the northern side had
resulted
in
the
acceptance
of the
Oxus as
indicating broadly
the limit
of
the
Ameer's
sphere
of
influence. In
the absence of
clearly
defined
boundaries, however,
the
danger
of
renewed friction
increased with
every
further Russian
advance.
Since
the settlement of
Afghanistan
in
1881,
Abdur Rahman had
remained
faithful to his
pledges,
and,
in
order to
appease
the
growing
alarm
entertained in his
country,
the
guarantee
of aid in
repelling
unprovoked
aggression
was
formally
renewed in
1883.
For Russia was
steadily
asserting
her
influence
over southern
Turkestan,
and in
the winter
of 1
880-1 the Teke
Turkomans had been
finally subjugated.
There
was little to
be
said in
favour of
the
unruly
Tartar khanates
;
yet,
while
their
absorption
was a
gain
for
orderly government
in that
region,
for
Afghanistan
it
meant the nearer
approach
of an unwelcome
neigh-
bour.
Then,
early
in
1884,
Merv,
which
had
so
long
and
so often been
declared to lie outside
the
range
of
Russia's
interest
or
desire,
was
occupied,
and,
in the
autumn of that
year,
Sarakhs,
on
the Perso-
Afghan
frontier,
was also
appropriated.
Lord
Granville's remark
to the Russian Ambassador
in
London,
that
the
news of the
occupation
of
Merv
"had not been
received
by
us with
indifference,"
did
not
improve
the
situation,
nor
did the
transmission
to
Petrograd
of a
long
historical
essay
recounting
all the
promises
and
undertakings
which the
Russian Government
had
given
on
the
subject
since
1873.
^n v
*ew °f
P
2^*
occurrences,
there
was
much
justifiable
apprehension
as
to what
would
be
Russia's
next
objective
;
and
some alarmists
professed
to believe
that
the fate
of
Herat
itself
already
hung
in the balance.
More
and
more,
the convic-
^
tion
took root
that
there could
be no
certainty
of
any
check
to
the
\
Russian
advance,
until it
struck
against
the hard
granite
of
a
legal
compact
between
civilised
Governments which understood
that the
written
pledge
of
the
one was the
security
and
defence
of the
other.
188 IMPERIAL
POLICY IN OLD
AND
NEW WORLD
In
order
to
bring
about such an
understanding,
however,
it
was
necessary
to
determine
exactly
where
Afghanistan
ended and the
Russian
empire,
actual
or
potential,
began.
The
position
of Great
Britain
was
that
she was
responsible,
whether she
wished
it or
not,
for
the
defence of a
kingdom
whose
northern
frontier was undefined
and
unknown, and,
in
any
event,
was
many
hundreds of miles distant
from
the confines of
India,
and
whose ruler and
people
were,
to
say
the
least,
uncertain allies.
It
was not the least
valuable
of the
services
of
Lord
Ripon
to
India
that,
convinced
of
its
being high
time
that
British
responsibilities
were
accurately
defined,
and that it was wiser
to stake the
security
of the Indian
empire
upon
a
formal
agreement
with a
European
Power
than
upon
an
unstable alliance with
a
despotic
Oriental
ruler, he,
in the
last
year
of his
viceroyalty,
instituted
a
joint
British
and
Russian
Boundary
Commission
with this
end
in
view.
The
completion
of
the Commission's
work
fell within the term
of
his
successor,
Lord
DufTerin,
whose
appointment
to
the vice-
royalty,
in
the late
summer
of
1884,
was received with universal
approval.
He took
over the office towards the end of the
year, looking
forward
to a
tranquil
and
uneventful
administration
and
prepared
to
regard
such an
experience
as
"the
greatest
success
and
triumph"
to
which he could
aspire.
He
went
to India
as a convinced
supporter
of what
was
known
as
"Lord
Ripon's
policy."
That
policy having
been
deliberately adopted,
he was for
continuing
and
"making
the
best of
it";
nor was he
convinced
that it
would not succeed
"if
but
given
a fair and
patient
trial
1
."
He did
not believe
that Russia
enter-
tained
aggressive
designs
against
the Indian
empire
;
and,
though
there
were
still about him
ageing
officials of the alarmist
type
who
were
honestly
convinced that
only
the
appearance
of a Muscovite
Napoleon
was needed to
precipitate
a Central
Asian
catastrophe,
he
gave
the
Russians credit for
commonsense
and,
within
limits,
for
good-faith.
Having,
as
Ambassador
in
Petrograd,
studied
Russia at close
quarters,
he
regarded
normal
standards
as
applicable
to
her,
and
his
exceptional
knowledge
of
Eastern
questions,
combined
with
his
wide outlook
and
freedom
from
narrow
prejudices,
enabled
him to
bring
to the
problems
confronting
him a
judgment
not
only
dispassionate
but
singularly just.
To
him,
the weakest
points
of
the
"buffer"
policy
were
that the
frontier
for whose
integrity
we were
responsible
was too
long,
distant,
and
vulnerable
to admit of
any
real
protection,
and
that
the
Afghans
were so
little interested in
the
outlying
territories
that
they might
not
1
Letter to Lord
Randolph
Churchill,
July
30th,
1885.
THE
PENJDEH
EPISODE
189
be
willing
to
light
with
any
heart for
their retention.
He,
nevertheless,
cordially
favoured
the
settlement of
the Frontier
question by
means of
a
convention.
The
proceedings
of the
Boundary
Commission
began inauspiciously.
The
principal
Commissioners,
Major-
General
Sir
Peter Lumsden
1
for
Great
Britain
and General
Zelenoi for
Russia,
were
to have been on
the
spot
in the
late autumn
of
1884.
Lumsden,
with
his
party,
was
up
to
time,
but
only
to
hear that his
Russian
colleague
was
ill
and could
not
be
expected
before
February.
Pending
the arrival
of
Zelenoi,
a
/
strong
Russian force
had been
trying
to forestall
the
issue
by pushing
to
the
south of
Sarakhs
and
occupying
as much
of the
disputed
area
as
possible,
while
the
Afghans
had
done
their best to frustrate this
design.
The
Russians were bent
on
appropriating
the
fertile
Penjdeh
district,
which
hitherto
had
been
regarded
as
lying
within the
Afghan
sphere,
and
had
given
notice
that
any
counterclaim would be con-
tested.
In
November,
they
had
advanced close to the town of
Penjdeh
and
were
in contact with the
Afghan
outposts.
They
were
also
asserting
a claim to
the Zulflkar
Pass,
which
the Indian
military
authorities
had
likewise
determined
to retain for
Afghanistan.
So acute
was the situa-
tion
becoming
that,
early
in
March
(1885),
the
Queen
appealed
to the
Tsar,
as in
1875,
to use
his
personal
influence to avert
a
conflict,
and
the Indian Government
received orders from London
to
have an
army
corps
in
readiness
to
occupy
and defend
Herat,
should a
rupture
ensue.
A crisis
was
reached
and war
threatened
when,
on
March
30th,
the
Russian
and
Afghan
forces
came into
collision,
and the latter
were
driven out
of
Penjdeh
with
a
loss of
500
lives.
Rashness and
provoca-
tion were
alleged
on both
sides,
and
probably
with
justice
;
yet,
from
the
first,
the Russian
military
command had
shown
an
overbearing
spirit, though
the Government
at
Petrograd
tried
to
minimise
its
indiscretions,
as
due to
disregard
of
orders.
Happily
for the
prospects
of
peace,
the Ameer
was out
of
the
country
at
the
time,
having gone
on
a visit to
the
Viceroy
to
Rawal
Pindi,
in
the north of
the
Punjab.
While he remained
at that
distance,
and in
tranquillising surroundings,
it
was not difficult
for
an
urbane
Viceroy
to
impose upon
him restraint in a
trying
position.
Abdur
Rahman was
persuaded
not
to take
the
episode
tragically,
and,
on
Lord
DufTerin's
suggestion,
he
agreed
to
abandon
Penjdeh,
on
con-
dition
that the
Zulflkar Pass remained to
Afghanistan.
.
The
Government at
home likewise
kept
calm
throughout
the
\
1
He
was
appointed August 25th,
1884.
i
9
o
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN
OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
crisis. While
declaring
his
determination
to
"have
right
done,"
and
seeking
a
vote
of credit
as
a
measure of
precaution,
Gladstone
set
his
face
sternly against
the
party
which
had
again appealed
to
angry
passions
;
and
with
a
reference
to
arbitration of the
question
of
responsibility
for the
Penjdeh
incident
—
a
British
proposal
which
Russia
accepted
unwillingly
—
the war
clouds
began
to
disperse,
so
that
by May
2nd the
sky
was
again
clear.
On
Lord Granville's
pro-
posal,
it had
been
agreed
that
Penjdeh
should
be
regarded
as
neutral
ground,
to be
occupied
by
neither
side,
until an
agreement
by
negotia-
tion in
London
should have determined
the
question
of
title. A
general
understanding
was reached on
May
22nd,
and
the
way
was
now
open
for the
arrangement
of details on the
spot.
For the anxieties of
the British
Government at that
critical
time
there was
compensation
in
the
praiseworthy
attitude
of
the
Ameer.
Not
only
did
Abdur
Rahman show a restraint and
moderation
which
greatly
eased
the
task of his
ally;
but,
while
at
Rawal
Pindi,
he
gave,
both
publicly
and
privately,
pledges
of
good-faith
and
attachment to
the British
Government
and
Crown,
the
sincerity
of which
admitted
of no
doubt.
He, nevertheless,
made
it
clear that the
presence
of British
Agents
in his
kingdom
remained
undesired
by
him. Lord
Dufferin
showed all his
wonted
tact
in the
handling
of
the
"strange
strong
creature,"
as he
called
his
guest
the Ameer.
By treating
him
through-
out
the
palaver
as
a
royal
personage
he made the
gratified
Ameer feel
like one. Abdur
Rahman,
as
jealous
of
his
position
and
rights
as
any
of
his
predecessors
had
been,
was
superlatively
pleased
when,
just
before
his
departure,
the
Viceroy,
with whom
was a
royal
Prince,
received the
Ameer
at
a
special
durbar,
not as a
protege
but as
an
ally,
with
all
the
honour due to an
independent Sovereign. Equally gratifying
were the
evidences of
loyalty
which the
Penjdeh
episode
called forth on
every
hand in
India. Native Princes
freely
volunteered
military
and financial
help,
and
the tone of the Press and
public
opinion
left no doubt that
the Russian menace
had
for
the
time drawn
the native races more
closely
together.
However
little
they
may
at
heart have liked
British
rule,
they
could
not
deny
that it
was
at least
honest
and
fairly
unselfish,
and
they
had no wish for a
change.
No
sooner
had
Lord
Granville removed
the frontier
question
out
of
the
danger
zone
than
the Gladstone
Government
came to an end
;
and
during
the
greater
part
of
the
subsequent
negotiations
an untried
statesman was
at the India
Office,
in the
person
of Lord
Randolph
Churchill
(June,
1885
—
February,
1886).
This was one of
Lord Salis-
AFGHAN
FRONTIER
DELIMITED
191
bury's
experimental appointments,
variously
viewed
by
his own
party,
but
amply
justified
by
the
event.
Wisely
preserving
silence until
he
had
carefully
taken his
bearings,
the
new
Secretary
of
State
during
his
brief
term
of office showed a
sagacity,
a
restraint in
his
decisions,
and
a
grasp
of affairs
for which
few
people
had
given
him credit.
He
was
himself
in
sympathy
with Lord
Lytton's plan
for
breaking
up
Afghanistan,
and,
if he could
have
followed his
personal
bent,
he
would
probably
have
been
equally
prepared
to
break
up
Russia's
Asiatic
empire
into the
bargain,
as
the
only
effective
solution
of
the
Central
Asian
problem;
but as
a
statesman
he
recognised
that
such
ideas
were
not
practical
politics.
It
was a
fortunate
check
upon
an
excess
of
temperament,
and
upon
a
disposition
to
defer
unduly
to
the
military
view,
that
on
all
important
questions
Lord
Randolph
never
failed to
seek
Lord
Salisbury's sage
counsels.
Before Lord
Salisbury's
short-lived
first
Administration
came to
an end
in
November,
the
Penjdeh
dispute
had
been settled
on
the
lines
already agreed
upon (September 10th), Penjdeh
being
assigned
to
Russia and
Zulfikar and the Pass
to
Afghanistan.
Then,
Glad-
stone returned
to
office,
but
only
for a few months
;
for
in
the
following
July
he was defeated on the
question
of
Home
Rule. Lord
Salisbury
now
formed his second
Cabinet,
in which he succeeded
the Earl
of
Iddesleigh
(on
his death
in
January,
1887)
at
the
Foreign
Office,
Viscount
Cross
holding
the
Secretaryship
for India.
The details of the
frontier delimitation remained
still to
be decided on the
spot,
and,
owing
to
the
difficulties
encountered,
frequent
disagreements
and
consequent
interruptions
retarded
the
progress
of
the
work,
since
constant
reference,
now to
London,
now to
Petrograd,
was
necessary.
So
impossible
did an
understanding
seem
to be
at
one
time,
that
the British
Representative,
Colonel Sir W.
Ridgeway, proposed
to
confine
the attention
of
the Commission to the collection of
geo-
graphical
and statistical
data,
leaving
the
boundary-line
to be
settled
by negotiation
in
Europe,
a
proposal
to which
the Russian Govern-
ment
demurred.
By
the
autumn
of
1886,
the delimitation
of the
Frontier had
almost
reached
the
Oxus,
and
negotiations
in
situ
were
discontinued,
the
remainder
of the task
being
left to the home
Govern-
ments. The final
Protocol,
delimiting
the
Frontier between
the
Hari-
Rud
and the
Oxus,
was
signed
in
July,
1887.
Abdur
Rahman
remained
constant
to
his British
allies
until
his
death in
1901.
Several
supplementary
frontier
demarcations were
effected
during
the
last
decade of the
century.
In
particular,
the north-eastern
frontier
i
9
2
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
of
Afghanistan
was denned
in
the
Pamirs
region
by agreement
between
the
British
and Russian Governments
(March
nth,
1895),
which
undertook
to use their
friendly
influence
with
the
two Ameers of
the
territories
affected.
Relieved
from
the
menace
of a
Russian
invasion of
India,
the
military
party,
instead
of
standing
at
ease and
letting
well
alone,
turned
their attention to
forward
movements
in
other
directions.
The
Boundary
Agreement
had
settled the
limits
of
Afghanistan
to the
north;
now,
it
was
desired to restrict
the Ameer's
influence in the
east
by
transferring
the
Border
tribes there
from his
nominal control
to
the real control
of the
Indian
Government.
The
object
was
in
part
attained,
but
at
the
expense
of a
series of
little frontier
Wars
which
for
many
years
exercised
a
disturbing
influence on Indian
opinion
and
proved
a serious
tax
upon
the
country's
resources.
A
return
made to
the House of Commons
in
January, 1900,
at
the instance of
Mr
(now
Lord) Morley,
of the Wars
and
military operations
on or
beyond
the
borders of British India in which
the
Indian
Government
had been
engaged
since
1849,
enumerated no Wars
or
expeditions
during
the
fifty years
following
that
date,
of which
64
took
place
in
the
twenty years
from
1878
to
1898.
A
frontier War
which was de-
liberately
sought by
the
military party,
and caused
much difference
of
opinion
both
in
India and at
home,
was that
which led to
the annexa-
tion of
Chitral.
Relations
had
been established
with
Chitral
during
the
viceroyalty
of
Lord
Lytton
;
but
disturbances in
the
Gilgit
district led
to
the
withdrawal
of the
British
Agency
there
in
1880,
and
it
was not
reestablished
until
1889,
from which
time the Indian Government
subsidised
the
ruler of Chitral and
supplied
him
with
munitions
of
war
on a
moderate
scale,
in view of
suspected
Russian
aggression
in
the
Pamirs.
Finally,
in
order
to
put
an
end to the
repeated
attacks
on Chitral
by
neighbouring
chiefs,
and to establish
lasting
internal
order
in
the
State
itself,
the
Indian
Government
first
occupied
this
outlying
territory
in
1895,
and then
annexed
it to
the
empire.
In
the
same
year,
the
boundary
of Chitral
in the direction
of
Afghanistan
was
delimited
by
an
Agreement
with
the
Ameer.
Among
Indian
statesmen,
and even
military
strategists,
opinion
was divided
as
to
whether,
on
the
whole,
the effect of
these frontier wars was
so much
to
pacify
as
to
unsettle,
since
they
created
among
the free
tribes
a
constant
fear
of
aggression.
FRENCH
ACTIVITY IN
BURMA
193
B.
Annexation
of Upper
Burma,
1
878-1
886.
Lord
Dufferin
had
hoped
that
the most
characteristic
achievement
of
his
viceroyalty
might
be
tranquillity.
The
hope
was
vain,
for in
"the
unchanging
East"
change
is
ceaseless,
and it was
the
peculiarity
of
India
in
especial,
as
he
said,
that
"the
bottom
was
always falling
out
of
the
bucket." Before
the
Afghan
Boundary
Question
had
been
settled,
trouble arose on
another
frontier of
the
Indian
empire.
Burma,
lying
to the
east,
had
never
been
a
good
neighbour,
and for
a
long
time
had
been
a
very
bad
one.
Already,
there had
been two Burmese
Wars,
as a result of which
the
Kings
of Ava had
forfeited
to India
their
provinces
on the
Sea
of
Bengal,
since
known as
British
(Lower)
Burma.
Burma
might
have settled down to friendlier
relationships
had it been left alone. French influence
was, however,
active in
the
kingdom,
and,
thus
encouraged,
its attitude became more and more
one
of studied
provocation.
This had
particularly
been the case since
the accession
in
1878
of
the
savage
ruler
Thebaw,
whose short
reign
had
proved
one of
tyrannical
misgovernment,
violence
and
cruelty.
He
had
begun
it
by
the murder
of
such members
of the
royal
family
as were
displeasing
to
him,
and
one of
his last acts
as
King
was the
massacre of
several hundred
prisoners
in
Mandalay gaol.
Under
him,
neither
life nor
property
was
secure,
and he seemed
to
take a
particular
pleasure
in
overriding
the
rights
of British
subjects
resident
in
his
country.
So
hostile did he
become,
and so
capricious
was
his
temper,
that the British
Representative
in his
capital
was recalled
for
safety's
sake and was not
replaced.
In the
meantime,
France
steadily
followed her
policy
of
"pacific
penetration,"
in the
hope
that
Burma would in due
time
pass
under
her formal
Protection,
though
her
Governments
were left
in
no un-
certainty
whether
any
attempt
to
impose
French dominion
upon
States
lying
on the flanks of
the Indian
empire
would be
regarded
by
Great
Britain as a
hostile act.
Burma
responded
readily
to the
French
advances.
Special
Embassies were
repeatedly
sent
to France
from
1872
onward,
and
in
1874
tne French
Agent
in
Mandalay
concluded
with
the
Burmese
Government
a
Treaty
so
objectionable
that,
on
the
request
of
the
British
Government,
it
was not
ratified.
When
one
of
these
Missions
arrived
in
Paris
in
August,
1883,
the
British
Ambas-
sador
on
several
occasions reminded
the
French
Foreign
Minister
of
Great
Britain's
special
interest
in
Burma
and
urged
that
any
agree-
ment
which
might
be
concluded should be restricted
to
purely
w.&g.iii
13
194
IMPERIAL
POLICY
IN OLD
AND
NEW
WORLD
commercial
questions.
Ferry
made
light
of
the
negotiations
which
were
proceeding
and
gave
satisfactory
assurances.
Nevertheless,
the
innocent
negotiations
resulted in the
ratification
of an earlier un-
completed
Treaty
which
proposed
to
establish direct
diplomatic
relations
between the two countries.
Challenged
on this
point,
Ferry
now
admitted that "the Burmese desired to
throw themselves
into the
arms of
France,"
but
added
that
France
had
no wish to afford
them
this
solace,
and
that
nothing
in
the nature
of
an
alliance,
military
or
political,
was
contemplated.
By
Conventions
in
1883
and
1885,
however,
the
Burmese
Government conferred
special
commercial and
other
privileges
on
French
subjects.
In a
report presented
by
him
to
the
Chamber
of
Deputies
in
July, 1885,
on
behalf
of
the
Commission to
which the latest
Treaty
had
been
referred,
de Lanessan advocated a bold
extension of
French
operations
in
the Indo-Chinese
peninsula.
While
speaking
euphemistically
of
a
"tentative
pacifique"
and
professing
to
disown
political
aims,
he made it clear that not
merely
commercial
but
political
expansion
must be the ultimate
objective,
and
that this
expansion
ought
to
be
at
the
cost of Burma and
Siam,
neither of
which
he
could
regard
as a
"
regularly organised
kingdom."
He
particularly
mentioned
the
Great
Lake,
with
the
region adjacent,
and
the
kingdom
of
Luang
Prabang,
both of
which
Siam
was to be
required
to
"disgorge"
1
.
These
openly
avowed aims attracted the
attention both
of the
India and the
Foreign
Office, and,
on
August
28th,
Lord
Randolph
Churchill
begged
Lord
Salisbury
to
warn the French
Government
that
the undue
pushing
of French commercial
ambitions in Burma
would
"
necessitate such
prompt
and
decided measures as
may
most
effectually
satisfy
the
paramount
rights
of India in
the
Indo-Chinese
peninsula
2
"
—
words
indicating
that
the annexation of
the
Ava
kingdom
was
already
thought
of.
Discussing
the
question
in
the
following
month
with
Lord
Salisbury, Waddington suggested
that
negotia-
tions should be
opened
with a
view to the division
of
the
Indo-Chinese
peninsula
into
spheres
of
influence
;
whereupon,
the
counter-proposal
was made that
two Powers should
adopt
a
self-denying
ordinance,
1
De Lanessan
subsequently
became
Governor
of French
Indo-China;
and
the
French treatment
of Siam
under his
influence
was,
in
the words of
a
British
Foreign
Secretary,
"
in exact
fulfilment
of the
programme
of
undisguised aggression
and encroachment
laid down in
his
published
work
on French colonial
policy."
(Despatch
of
Lord Roseberv
to the
Marquis
of
Dufferin at
Paris,
September
5th,
1893O
2
W. L. S.
Churchill,
Lord
Randolph
Churchill,
1.
522.