Ward A.W. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 1783-1919. Volume 3
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LORD DUFFERIN'S MISSION
TO CAIRO
175
the
peculiar
temperament
and
gifts
of Lord
Granville
at
that
time
found
appropriate scope.
It was
clearly
impossible
to allow
France
any
opportunity
of
reentering
Egypt by
the
door which
she had
first
herself
closed
behind her
in
May,
and
then
deliberately
locked
in
July.
Accordingly,
a
necessary
safeguard
was
the cessation
of the
existing
divided
jurisdiction.
In a
despatch
to
the Powers of
January
3rd,
1883,
which
may
be
regarded
as the basis and
justification
of
all further
development
of
British
policy
in
Egypt,
Lord Granville laid down the
objects
which his Government
intended to
pursue
in
undertaking
more
direct
responsibility
for
the
country's
welfare. He
referred,
in
particular,
to the need
for reforms
relating
to
taxation,
justice,
and
local
and national
government,
and foreshadowed the abolition of
the
Dual Control
of Finance
in
favour
of the
appointment
of a
single
European
adviser.
Sir A.
Colvin,
the
British
Controller at that
time,
hereupon resigned,
and the Khedive
abolished the two officers
by
decree.
Granville,
certainly,
carried
concession
far
by
inviting
France
to nominate
the new
adviser; but,
since
she
declined,
Colvin
was
appointed.
The French Government
duly protested,
and resumed
"
liberty
of action." The sensitive
pride
of France had been wounded.
Having
renounced the
relationship
towards Great
Britain of a
partner,
she
assumed
the
role
of sheer
obstruction. For
twenty years,
she did
little more
in
Egypt
than block her
rival's
way
and
impede progress
in
every
direction.
Lord
DufTerin had been sent
from
Constantinople
to Cairo at
the
end
of
1882,
commissioned to
carry
out the needed reforms.
Two
months later
(February, 1883),
he issued a monumental
report
on
Egyptian reorganisation,
a
document of statesmanlike
grasp
as well
as
literary
charm.
Its
keynote
was
"
the
metamorphic spirit
of the
age."
This
spirit,
it
said,
had
reached and
influenced
the
Egyptians,
even
of the strata
to which
the
oppressed
fellah
belonged,
"nor,
like
his
own
Memnon,
has he remained
irresponsive
to the
beams
of the new
dawn." Lord Dufferin believed that
the
Egyptians
were
capable
of
self-government,
and,
convinced that
"the
valley
of the Nile
could
not be
administered
with
any
prospect
of
success
from
London,"
drew
the
logical
conclusion
that
it
must
be
governed
in Cairo
by
the
Egyptians
themselves,
under
just
so
much
guidance
as
might
be un-
\
avoidable.
He,
therefore,
urged
the
creation,
"
within
prudent
limits,"
of
representative
institutions,
from
communal bodies
upwards,
in
sympathy
with
"those instincts of
patriotism
and freedom
which
it
has
been our
boast
to foster
in
every
country
where
we
have set
our
176
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
foot."
The
British
Government,
only
too
glad
to do
something
positive
towards
meeting
nationalist
aspirations
and
conciliating
Liberal
opinion
at
home,
approved
of
the
recommendations,
and
they
were
promul-
gated
in an
Organic
Decree
of
the
following
May,
in
which month
Lord
DufTerin returned to
Constantinople.
So
rapid
was
the
transformation
of
the
government
of
the
country
under the
Occupation
that,
by
the
time of Lord
Dufferin's
departure,
its status had
become
in
effect,
though
not in
form,
a British
pro-
tectorate. The
Khedive
and his
Ministers
were
allowed to
preserve
the outward
show
of
independence;
yet already they
were little more
than
marionettes,
playing
to
strings
that were not
always
even
in-
visible. From
Constantinople
no interference was
permitted,
and,
when the Sultan
forbade the Khedive to
make
changes
in
the Adminis-
tration without his
consent,
his
Viceroy
had
to
plead
that he was
no
longer
his own
master.
"
Le veritable Khedive de
VEgypte"
he
said,
1
'
c'est Lord
Dufferin.
C'est de
lui
qu
y
ema?ient
tous les
ordres,
et le Khedive
n'en est
que
Vinstrument
de transmission." Sir
Evelyn Baring
was now
appointed
British
Agent
and Consul-
General,
and
he
settled down in
Cairo to
the work of his life in
September,
1883.
VII. The Rebellion in the Soudan
and
the Gordon
Mission,
1
883-
1
885.
In
January, 1883,
there
were discussions between the
British
military
authorities
and
the Khedive's
advisers
regarding
the
possibility
of a
reduction,
which
Lord
DufTerin
had
recommended,
of the
army
of
occupation.
Any
such
pleasant hope
was frustrated
by
a new out-
break of
rebellion,
this time in
the
Soudan
provinces
of
theKhediviate.
The Soudan had never been held
by Egypt
on a
very
secure tenure.
Such
sovereignty
as
had
been exercised
there dated from the
time
of Mehemet
Ali
;
but from the first
it had
been
illusory
and
precarious.
In that
region,
vast and
vague,
the
rulers
of
Egypt
had for a
century
been
conquering,
yet
had
never
wholly
conquered.
Under
Ismail,
however,
the Suakin
and Massowah
districts were
formally assigned
to
Egypt
by
the
Sultan,
who
confirmed
the Khedive
as their
hereditary
ruler.
In
1870,
Sir
Samuel
Baker,
who
had
already
done valuable
work of
exploration
in Central
Africa,
annexed to
Egypt
the
Equatorial
provinces,
suppressing
the slave-trade
and
opening
up
the Great
Lakes
to
navigation.
In
1874
he
was
succeeded
as Governor-
General
by
General
Charles
Gordon,
who
did much
for the settlement
of
the
THE
SOUDAN
REBELLION
177
Soudan
and the
consolidation of
Egypt's
empire
on the
Upper
Nile.
He
waged
drastic
war
upon
the
slave-trade
and
rooted
out the nefarious
traffic within the
territories
under
his
rule;
and
then,
in
1879,
the
year
of
Ismail's
deposition,
he
resigned.
Roughly,
the area of
the Soudan
nominally
held
by Egypt
in
1883
extended
1650
miles from north
to south
(Assouan
to the
Equator),
and from 1200
to
1400
miles
from
east to
west
(Massowah
to the
western
limit of
the Darfur
province).
It
was a
hopelessly
impoverished
country,
in
which
pashas
oppressed,
tax-gatherers
plundered,
and the
soldiery
were
prone
to
violence;
discontent
and disaffection
being
widespread
in
consequence.
All
the conditions
existing
there were
singularly
favourable
to
the success of
any
leader who
might
prove
able
to
focus the
resentments and
vague
aspirations
of a wild and
fanatical
population;
and such a
leader
appeared
in
the
person
of a
Mahdi,
or
Messenger
of God.
This
remarkable
man,
the Sheik
Mohammad
Ahmed of
Dongola,
after he had
lived
for
a
time
as
a
recluse
upon
an
island in
the
Nile,
waiting
for his
call,
made
himself
known in the late summer of
1881,
claiming
to be a Saviour
foretold
of the
Prophets
and
commissioned to
emancipate
the
faithful from
alien rule and win
the
heathen
world for Islam. The
religious
appeal
of the
Mahdi,
enforced as
it
was
by
rude
eloquence
and
fiery
fanaticism,
produced
a
powerful
effect
upon
the
ignorant
tribesmen.
From the
first,
the crusade was taken
up
with
great
enthusiasm,
and for
the
next two
years
its
progress
was
unbroken. Such resistance
as the
Egyptian garrisons
in
the disturbed
area offered was feeble
and
half-
hearted,
and the
Mahdi's
victories
swelled his hosts until there seemed
a
fear
that
Egypt
itself would
be
overwhelmed.
In
the
spring
of
1883,
General
Hicks,
an
English
officer
on
the
iff
of the
Egyptian Army,
who
had
been
appointed
its Commander-
i-Chief
, undertook,
with
the
approval
of
the Khedive and
his
advisers,
equip
and
lead
an
expedition
for
the
reconquest
of
the revolted
;gion.
The
idea
was
discouraged,
though
not
forbidden,
by
the
British
Government,
who
believed that
their
responsibility
in the
itter
might
be met
by simply
holding
aloof from
what,
they
were
>nvinced,
was an
impolitic
and
dangerous enterprise.
Hicks
had a
)d
friend at Cairo in Lord
Dufferin,
who,
nevertheless,
urged
him
not to
push
his
operations
beyond
the
western bank of the
White
Nile,
and
to
be satisfied with the
reconquest
of
the
province
of
Senaar.
Although
unquestionably acting
in
accordance
with
the
wishes
of
the
Khedive
and the
Egyptian
Government,
Hicks
received
very
W.&G.III
12
178
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
inadequate
support
from
either
in
the
necessary
preparations
1
.
When
the
expedition
was
already
on its
way,
in
the
middle
of
April,
Hicks
had
to
complain
to the Minister of War
that
he
lacked
both men and
food,
that
the
pay
was
in
arrear,
and that
his
river-boats
were
too
few,
out
of
repair,
and without fuel.
From modest
beginnings
his
plans
expanded.
Having
driven
the rebels from
Senaar,
he
determined to
push
on to
Kordofan. Minor
successes still
encouraged
him
unduly,
and,
late in
May,
he
reported
to Lord
Dufferin from
Khartoum
his
belief that faith in
the
Mahdi was
rapidly
decreasing. By
August,
matters were
badly
amiss with
the
expedition;
men, moral,
money,
transport
—
everything
that
was essential was
lacking. Early
in
Sep-
tember,
Hicks and
his
army
of
10,000
nondescript troops,
ill-fed,
ill-found,
ill-disciplined
and
ill-paid,
quitted
Khartoum,
and on the
24th
the
Nile,
for a westward march in
the
direction of
Kordofan,
intending
to
challenge
the Mahdi at El
Obeid.
Owing
to
treachery,
he was led into the
desert,
and
on November
5th,
when but two
days'
march from
his
objective,
his
army
was
surprised by
a
strong
rebel
force,
and
he
and all his men
perished.
In
France,
the
Hicks
disaster was
ostentatiously
welcomed,
in the
hope
that
it
would
expedite
the end of the British
occupation
2
.
Its
effect was
precisely
the
reverse.
While,
on the
one
hand,
it
destroyed
for
the time
the
prestige
of
the
Egyptian
Government,
discredited
the native
Army,
and
compromised
British
authority,
it also
frustrated
the
hope
of
reducing
the force of
occupation
and banished to the land
of
dreams the idea
of
evacuation.
For,
if
the
presence
of the British
in
Egypt
now became more
difficult than
before,
it also became more
necessary.
Moreover,
a new
danger
had
appeared
in the
person
of
Osman
Digna,
an
ex-slavedealer,
whom
the
Mahdi had
appointed
Emir in
the
Suakin
district,
and who had collected a
large
force
with
which he terrorised
the
surrounding
population.
Already,
the
expediency
of
abandoning
the
Soudan
and
concen-
trating
attention
upon
the defence of a nearer frontier
had
been
urged
upon
the
Egyptian
Government
by
the
British authorities.
It
was
suggested
that Kordofan and
Darfur,
with the
region beyond,
should
be
regarded
as outside the
Egyptian
pale.
To the renunciation
of
any
part
whatever of the
territory
the
Khedive and
his
Ministers
were
vehemently
opposed;
but,
owing
to
pressure,
the
decision to
abandon
1
Hicks wrote
to Lord Dufferin on
his
return
to
Constantinople:
"Your
de-
parture
from Cairo
has
been a
calamity
to me."
2
Letter
of Lord
Lyons
to Lord
Granville,
November
23rd,
1883.
THE BRITISH
OCCUPATION
179
the Soudan
from the
latitude
of
Assouan
or
Wady
Haifa
was taken
at
the end
of the
year.
Lord
Granville,
at this
time,
formulated the
relations
between
the
two
Governments
in a
despatch
which
showed
how
far
Egypt
had
already
forfeited
independence.
"In
important
questions,"
he wrote
to Sir
Evelyn
Baring,
"where
the
administration
and
safety
of
Egypt
are
at
stake,
it is
indispensable
that
Her
Majesty's
Government
should,
as
long
as the
provisional occupation
of the
country by
English troops
continues,
be assured that the advice
which,
after
full consideration
of
the
views of the
Egyptian
Government,
they
may
feel it their
duty
to tender to
the
Khedive,
should be
followed.
It
should be
made clear to the
Egyptian
Ministers and
Governors
of
provinces
that the
responsibility
which
for the time rests
on
England obliges
Her
Majesty's
Government
to insist
on
the
adoption
of
the
policy
which
they
recommend,
and that it will
be
necessary
that those
Ministers
and
Governors
who
do not follow
this
course
should cease to
hold
their
offices
"
(January
4th, 1884).
On
this Instruction
being
communicated
to
him,
Cherif
Pasha,
who
had been Prime-Minister
since
September,
1882,
resigned
in
protest,
and
Nubar
Pasha formed a
Ministry
pledged
to
the
policy
of
with-
drawing
from the
Soudan.
An
endeavour
was made
by
the
British Government
in
June
of
this
year
to relieve
the
financial
difficulties
caused
in
part by
the
rebellion
and the Alexandria
indemnity
claims.
A
proposal
to
release,
for
the
purposes
of the
general
administration,
such
part
of the revenue
as
was
not
required
for the service
of
the
public
debt
was
vigorously
opposed
by
France,
concerned
as
ever
for the interests
of
the
bond-
holders,
though by way
of
purchasing
her
support
Lord
Granville
had
promised
that the
British
Occupation
should cease
in 1888
at
the
discretion of the Powers.
Two
Conferences were
in
consequence
needed before
an
arrangement
was
arrived at
by
the
London Con-
vention
of March
18th,
1885
;
and then
the
promise
of conditional
evacuation
no
longer
held
good.
French writers later admitted
the
shortsightedness
of
their
Government's
attitude
1
.
The abandonment of the Soudan
implied
more than
the
negative
decision
to
leave
it
alone;
for there were
Egyptian
gar~isons
there,
1
"Notts avons eu le tort de ne
pas profiter
de
cette occasion
unique
Plutot
que
de
riduire le
revenu de la dette
egyptienne
<Tun demi
pour
cent,
nous
avons
repousse
le
rare
avantage
politique qui
nous etait
offert.
L'absorbant souci de VinterH
des
creanciers,
qui
nous avait
dejd fait
commettre tant
de
fautes,
nous a
fait
commettre
cette
derniere,
et
nous avons
consolide de nos
mains
I'edifice
encore
chancelant
des
Anglais
dans la
vallee du
Nil." C. de
Freycinet,
La
question
d'£gyple, p. 436.
k
180
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
and
these
could
not
be left to
their
fate. A
suggestion
made
to the
Government
that
General
Gordon,
of
earlier Soudan
and
later
Chinese
fame,
might prove
helpful
in
the
work
of
evacuation
led
to
overtures
being
made to him.
The
Cabinet was
divided on the
subject,
the
Prime-Minister,
Lord
Derby,
and
the Earl
of
Kimberley
being
at
first
opposed
to
the
despatch
of
Gordon,
while
Lord
Granville,
Lord
Northbrook,
and
the
Marquis
of
Hartington
favoured
it. The
decision to
engage
his
services was
taken on
January
18th,
1884,
at
a
meeting
attended
by
Gordon,
who
appears
to
have left
on the
minds
of
Ministers the
impression
that
the
danger
at
Khartoum
had been
exaggerated,
and that
the
withdrawal of
the
garrisons
would
not be
a
difficult
matter.
The
Government's
idea was that
Gordon's
Mission
should
be
one
of
investigation,
leaving
them with a free hand
as to
the
measures to
be
adopted
on
the
strength
of his
report.
So ran
his
Instructions of the
'same
day
;
but
there followed the
very
elastic
proviso
that he
was
to
regard
himself as authorised and bound
to
perform
"
such
other
duties as the
Egyptian
Government
may
desire to
entrust
to
you
and as
may
be
communicated to
you
by
Sir
E.
Baring."
Inasmuch as
the views of
the
British
and
the
Egyptian
Govern-
ments
on
the
general
question
of
the abandonment
of
the
Soudan
differed
fundamentally,
this
proviso
was,
to
say
the
least,
hazardous.
Gordon left
London on
January
18th,
optimistically
confident
of
complete
success,
and
convinced that
the settlement of
the
Soudan
would
occupy
but a
few months at
the most
—
an
opinion
which no
one in
Cairo shared. At
that
time,
he
agreed
that the
Soudan was for
Egypt
"a
useless
possession
—
ever was so and ever will be
so,"
and
he
understood
clearly
that its
evacuation had been
"
irrevocably
decided
on,"
and that his
concern
was
simply
with the
garrisons,
their
safety
and
withdrawal,
while
the Soudanese
in
general
were
to be
left
as
"
God has
placed
them
1
." It
was
ominous,
however,
that,
before
he reached
Cairo,
he
was
speculating upon
the division of the
region
into a
series
of
sultanates,
just
as had
been
the case before the
Egyptian
conquest,
and the
union of
these
in some sort of confederation.
The
supplementary
Cairo Instructions went far
beyond
the
British
Government's
first
plan,
for
they
spoke
frankly
of
"establishing
organised government
in the different
provinces
of the Soudan."
Gordon was
still
to be
bound to
the
policy
of
evacuation
;
but
he
was
to
be free
as to the
measures which
that
policy might
involve.
He
had
already,
at his
own
request,
been nominated
to his
old
office
of
:
Memorandum
on his
Mission
written
by
Gordon,
January
22nd,
1884.
THE GORDON
MISSION
TO KHARTOUM
181
Governor-General
of
the
Soudan, and,
while the
appointment gave
to
him a
more
authoritative
status,
it
is
not
unlikely
that with
it
he
became conscious
of a
greater independence.
He reached Khartoum
without
mishap
early
in
February,
by
which time he
seemed to
have
forgotten
that
he was
engaged
on
a
Mission defined
by
written
Instructions;
his
judgment
and
move-
ments became
increasingly
erratic;
he was
continually
changing
his
mind
—
and
naturally
so,
since
by ignoring
his
Instructions
he
had
lost
his
bearings.
While in
Cairo,
he
had met
Zobeir
Pasha,
an old
slave-trader,
who had
aforetime wielded
great
authority
in
the Soudan
and whose
services
he
wished
to
secure. He
now
entertained
the idea of
creating
a
sort of neutral
State or
zone
between
Egypt
proper
and that
part
of the Soudan
to
which
the Mahdi's
influence
was
to
be
restricted,
and of
placing
Zobeir
in
charge
of this
area as
Governor,
with his seat at
Khartoum.
Sir
Evelyn Baring,
General
Stewart,
and Nubar Pasha all
favoured the
idea; but,
on its
being
communicated
to
the
British
Cabinet,
it met with
strong
disapproval,
and,
eventually,
Zobeir
found
his
way
not to
Khartoum
but,
for
reasons
of
caution,
to Gibraltar.
By
the end
of
February,
Gordon was
avowing
the
policy
of
"
smashing
the Mahdi"
—
an
operation
which he
believed would
be
"comparatively easy,"
as it
was
merely
a
question
of
more men and
more
money.
He even
proposed
that
Egypt
should
continue
to main-
tain its
position
as
suzerain Power
responsible
for the
government
of
the Soudan
and the
appointment
of
the Governor-General and
Mudirs.
Already,
the
British
Government,
disconcerted
by
these
and
other
suggestions
at
variance
with
their
plans,
had sent
emphatic
refusals
to sanction
military operations
of
any
kind or to assist
Gordon with
troops.
Nevertheless,
so late
as
August
23rd,
Gordon
continued to
call for the
despatch
of a British
expedition
to the
Soudan
;
and
one
of
his last
messages,
addressed both to
the Khedive and
the
British
Agent,
was to
the effect
that,
"if
the Sultan
would send
20,000
of
his
troops,
the Soudan
could
be handed
over to him."
In
the
meantime,
the Mahdi was astir
and
collecting
his followers
for an attack
upon
the
intruder
who
disputed
his
authority
;
and
by
the
end
of
April
fears
were
entertained in
Egypt
that Khartoum
would
soon
be isolated and
Gordon's
chances of
coming
away
would
dis-
appear.
Sir
Evelyn
Baring
was
already
preparing
the
Home Govern-
ment
for the
contingency
of
a
relief
expedition.
The
Cabinet saw
no
reason for
alarm,
but,
in the
middle of
May,
convinced
that
Gordon
182
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
was
acting
no
longer
as their
servant but as his
own
master,
instructed
him
to
consider,
and if
possible
adopt,
"measures for his own
removal
and
that
of
the
Egyptians
at
Khartoum who
have
suffered for him
and
served
him
faithfully, including
their
wives
and
children,
by
whatever
route he
may
think
best
1
."
By
this
time,
withdrawal was
impossible,
and
soon
Khartoum
was
practically
invested.
For several
months,
the Cabinet discussed
the
question
of
a relief
expedition
without
being
able to make
up
its
mind,
though
the section
represented by
Lord
Hartington
and
Lord Northbrook never
wavered
in the
opinion
that,
whether Gordon had acted
wilfully
or
not,
the
Government
and
the
country
owed
him a
responsibility
which could
not
be
honourably
evaded.
In
July,
a
half-expedition
was decided
on.
A
rescue
force was to be sent so far
as
Dongola
for a
start,
on the
understanding
that it would
proceed
further on
the
way
to
Khartoum,
unless Gordon
had succeeded
in
withdrawing,
as
Gladstone
per-
sisted
in
believing
that he
would.
Of two
routes
considered,
the
desert
route from Suakin
(which
was
in British
occupation)
to Berber
and the
slower Nile
route,
the
latter was
chosen,
though
it involved
a
serious loss of
time in
prepara-
tions. Lord
Wolseley organised
and commanded
the
expedition,
and
he
reached
Cairo
on
September
9th
and
Wady
Haifa on October
5th,
when the Nile
progress
and
campaign
began.
It
was
a
great
enterprise,
skilfully
planned
and
doggedly
carried
through;
and the
failure
to
achieve
the
ultimate
aim
detracts
from
neither
the boldness of its
conception
nor the heroism of the
troops. By
Christmas,
the
main
part
of the
expedition
was at
Korti,
where
the force was divided.
Sir
Herbert
Stewart,
with one
column,
marched across the
desert
in order
to strike
the Nile
again
at
Metemma,
while General
Earle continued
up
the river towards
Berber,
with a
view
to its
capture.
Stewart
met with
a
horde
of
Dervishes on
January
17th,
and
in
the
ensuingengagement
was
mortally
wounded
;
but he
brought
his
force
to the
Nile,
where four
steamers
awaited it. Sir
Charles Wilson continued
the
advance
by
river
towards
Khartoum,
learning
on
the
way
(January
27th)
that the Mahdi
had entered
the
city
and
Gordon
had been killed
two
days
before.
The
news of the
disaster
created
intense
excitement
in
England
and
let loose floods of
controversy
which left
permanent
traces
behind
them.
For
his share in
the failure of
the
relief
expedition
Gladstone
had to face
much blame
and
recrimination,
while
colleagues
whose
responsibility
was
at
least
equal
to
his
escaped
lightly;
but,
for
an
1
Lord
Granville
to
Sir
Evelyn
Baring, May 17th,
1884.
\
GLADSTONE'S
DEFENCE
183
incriminated
Minister,
he
bore
his
afflictions
very
aggressively.
In
later
private
utterances,
he admitted
that the
despatch
of Gordon
was
a
great
mistake,
but a
mistake
"greatly
excusable,"
and
reproached
the "hero of
heroes"
for
having
claimed the
right
to
turn
"upside-
down and
inside-out
every
idea
and
intention
with which
he left
England
"
and
for
which he had obtained the Government's
approval.
Neither Gladstone
nor his
Cabinet
sympathisers
seemed
ever
to
grasp
fully
the
fact
that for
the
despatch
of
Gordon,
whether wise
or
not,
the
country
did
not blame them
;
its blame was concentrated
upon
their failure to stand
firmly by
the
man of their own choice. Nor
was
Lord
Granville
more
convincing
in his
plea
that Gordon's
venture
was a "forlorn
hope,"
that
against
forlorn
hopes
the
gods
themselves
are
powerless,
hence that
in war "there is no
obligation
in
honour
on the commander of an
army
to
risk
lives"
in their behalf. The
obvious answer was that Gordon was
not
sent
on
a
military
but an
administrative Mission
—
a
Mission
which,
in Gladstone's
words,
was
one
of
"peace
and liberation"
—
so that
appeals
to the
hazards
of
warfare had
no
application
to his case
1
.
1
There was a
good
deal of
futile
controversy
over the
question
whether
Gordon's
work was or was
not intended
to
be
limited to
reporting.
If
it
was,
there existed
no
valid reason for
sending
him
into the centre
of Africa at all. With
his
knowledge
of the
country
and
people,
and
the
knowledge
of the
military position
which others
could
have
given
him,
he
could
have
reported equally
well in
Cairo,
if
not
in
London.
If
the Government had wanted
merely
a
Report,
they
should not
have
sent
a
commander who had
been Governor-General of
the
Soudan,
but
his
orderly,
who
could
at least have
been relied on
to return
home with
a
full
note-book.
The
Cabinet
adverted,
further,
to
the fact that Gordon
had
gone
beyond
the
letter
of
his
Instructions of
January
18th. But those Instructions
were intended to
be
supple-
mented in
Cairo,
and were
supplemented,
and
Gordon
left
London with the
authority
and
the
injunction
to do
exactly
what
the Khedive's
advisers
on the
spot
deemed
expedient. Certainly,
Gordon was a
difficult
subject
to
deal
with and one
impossible
to
keep
in his
place.
He
was
so
familiar
with
the exercise
of
authority,
and
had so little
respect
for
the obedience
required
of and habitual
to
the con-
ventional
official,
that
strict
fidelity
to
Instructions
of
any
kind
was the
one
thing
that
should not have
been
expected
of
him. He was
both
too
strong
and
too
head-
strong
a man
to be
bound to
the letter of
any
order.
But
all
this,
too,
his
employers
knew
beforehand.
How far
he
actually
deviated from his final orders
and
how far
he
was
justified
in so
doing
are
questions open
to
legitimate
difference
of
opinion
;
but
such
questions
do
not
affect the material issue.
It was
Gladstone's
opinion
that
Gordon
never had
any
reasonable
hope
of
setting
up
a
Government
in
Khartoum,
and
that
he
should have
withdrawn
as soon
as
he
recognised
the
impracticability
of
his
self-imposed
task.
Undoubtedly,
Gordon
could have
extricated his own
person
from
danger
with time
to
spare
;
but
he was
concerned for
the lives of the
garrisons
;
and
they,
at
least,
had
not been sent
into
the interior of
the
Soudan on
a
"
forlorn
hope."
It
is
true
that
the
garrisons
were not
British
;
but
a
British Government had
compelled
the
adoption
of a
policy
which
made the
attempt
at their safe withdrawal a
moral
duty.
It
was
impossible
for
Great
Britain,
who
had
practically superseded
the native
Administration of
Egypt,
to
pretend
that that
duty
was
no
concern
of hers.
7
1
84
FORWARD
POLICY
AND
REACTION,
1874-1885
Several
years
later,
Gladstone wrote: "In
the
long
and
compli-
cated
Egyptian
business we
were
for the
most
part,
as I
think,
drawn
on
inevitably by
a
necessity
of honour
1
."
That
was
unquestionably
the
case
with
the rescue
expedition
to
Khartoum.
But no one blamed
the
Government
for
having
undertaken
that
gallant
yet
fruitless
exploit.
The
country's grievance
was that the
national
honour had to wait
so
long
for
recognition,
and that the failure of
the Nile
enterprise
was,
humanly
speaking,
a
consequence
of
delay.
On the
receipt
of
the news of Gordon's fate the
Government,
with
a view
to
appeasing
national
feeling,
announced that the
expedition
would
be resumed
in the autumn and would
prosecute
its task until
the
Mahdi's
power
had been broken. Such was their serious
intention
at the
time,
and
preparatory
measures
were ordered
accordingly,
in-
cluding
the
commencement
of
a
railway
from
Suakinto Berber. Second
thoughts,
however,
suggested
a
waiting policy,
and,
when Sir
Evelyn
Baring
advised the entire
suspension
of
operations,
in
view
of the
fact
that the main
object
of the
expedition
had been
defeated,
both
the
Government
and the
country
accepted
this view. It
was,
there-
fore,
decided
to
fix
the southern
administrative
limit of the
Egyptian
empire
at
Wady
Haifa,
leaving
the
whole of the Soudan
beyond,
with
the
exception
of the Red Sea
littoral,
in
the
possession
of the rebels.
Lord
Salisbury,
coming
into
power
in
June,
1885,
although
he
had
condemned
the
policy
of evacuation while
in
Opposition,
now
warmly
upheld
the decision
of the
outgoing
Ministry.
In
the same
year,
the
Mahdi died and the
Khalifa Abdullah-el-
Taishi
succeeded
to
his
authority,
though
the
religious
character
of
the
Mahdist movement
gradually
disappeared.
The
Soudan
remained
in the
Khalifa's
hands for ten
years,
until the
activities
of a rival Power
in
the
basin
of the
Upper
Nile
compelled
the
British Government
to
resort
to
counter-measures,
with a view
to
reasserting
the
rights
of
the
Khedive.
1
Letter
to Lord
Granville,
March
12th,
1888.