The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan

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FOREIGN RELATIONS: HOJO REGENCY 409

copper coins. The money that was imported and circulated was pre-

dominantly Northern Sung coins; that from Southern Sung comprised

an insignificant amount. In 1242, a merchant vessel belonging to

Saionji Kintsune returned from Sung China carrying 100,000 kan

worth of

coins,

along with parrots and water buffalo. This 100,000 kan

of Sung coins was equivalent to the entire amount of coins minted

annually in the Southern Sung. Thus, the importation of these coins

had a significant impact on the economies of both Sung China and

Japan.

The tremendous outflow of Sung coins to Japan as well as to various

parts of Asia aggravated the economic crisis throughout the Southern

Sung, causing the government to adopt stringent regulations to curtail

the

flow

of copper coins to Japan. The excessive exporting necessary to

obtain the Sung coins also disrupted the Japanese economy. For exam-

ple,

according to the

Teid

kennenki,

the export of rice from the west-

ern provinces mentioned in the edict probably means most of it was

Chinzei mai (Kyushu rice), which was favored by the Kyoto nobles.

Because of Japan's chronic natural disasters and frequent famines, this

measure was most likely adopted out of fear that the export of rice to

China would exceed productive capacity and so reduce the income

from the shoen and koryo.

While the history of foreign relations to the mid-thirteenth century

was evolving around these problems, the power structure of the

Kamakura bakufu was consolidated; the Ho jo family regency system

was secured; and the bakufu's control over the western provinces -

the base for foreign relations - was strengthened. The transport route

for the continental goods from Hakata along the Seto Inland Sea to

Kyoto expanded to reach the warrior stronghold at Kamakura, which

became the terminus. Kamakura received a large amount of material

goods from the continent by two routes: from Kyoto and from Hakata

through the Inland Sea. This movement of

goods

increased from mid-

to late Kamakura times, and economic circulation and regional culture

developed throughout the entire century.

The Kaidoki of 1223 records that Yuihama in Kamakura was

crowded with houses and had several hundred ships anchored there.

Ten years later, in 1232, during the regency of Hojo Yasutoki, a small

island - Wake no shima - was constructed with contributions solic-

ited by the priest Oamidabutsu to facilitate ship docking, and it be-

came a base for both domestic and foreign trade. Subsequently, the

40 Shinlei zoho kokushi taikei (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1932), p. 409.

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4IO JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

importation of continental goods into Kamakura increased further.

And along with the consolidation of water routes - the opening of the

Asahina canal between Kamakura and Musashi Matsura in 1241, for

example - the warrior government at Kamakura increased in prosper-

ity, supported by wealth acquired through trade. When we consider

the growth of the cities during the Kamakura period in the light of

Japan's relations with East Asia, we must take special note of the

prosperity of the port cities along the Inland Sea, such as Hakata,

Kamakura, and Kusado Sengen,

which, is contrast with Kyoto,

served as entrepots for foreign trade.

The bakufu issued legislation to limit foreign traffic on the Inland

Sea linking Hakata and Kamakura when it became too active. In 4/

1254 a bakufu document addressed to Nikaido Yukiyasu and Ota

Yasutsura prohibited the possession of more than five Chinese vessels

ordered the destruction of ships beyond that number.

According to

the Kento

hybjoshu-den,

Yasutsura was a member of the Council of

State

{hydjoshu)

and head of the Board of Inquiry

{monchujo)

and

Yukiyasu administered the fifth

hikitsuke

and head of the Administra-

tive Board

{mandokoro).

If we accept the interpretation that "suits by

commoners and nonhousemen in Kamakura were administered by the

mandokoro

and suits by such individuals from the provinces were han-

dled by the

monchujo,"

then this law must have been intended to limit

private trade among trading merchants in both Kamakura and the

provinces.

Thus, the earlier interpretation that this ordinance was

addressed to Dazaifu requires reexamination. If we consider the way

the law was transmitted, as well as the state of communications be-

tween Japan and the continent, then the law must have extended even

to Dazaifu and Hakata.

What exactly was this ordinance? Koryo and Sung China were suf-

fering from wako attacks and an excessive outflow of coins. Japan

faced several problems: an international legal order

necessitated by

the residency of foreigners in Japan; an outflow of rice exceeding

productive capacity which was destroying the income structure of the

shoen

and

koryo

and fanning the crisis of famine; and the rapid increase

of Chinese imports into Kamakura. Furthermore, Japan's internal

41 Murakami Masana,

Maboroshi no

Kusado

Sengencko

(Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1980).

42 AK, 1254/4/29, vol. 33, p. 561.

43 For the various theories about the 1254 regulation, see Osa Setsuko, "Kencho rokunen

'tosen' seigenryo ni kansuru shomondai," in Chukyo tanki

daigaku ronso

1 (March 1966).

44 Along with this we must also consider that there were then a rather large number of Japanese

residents in Ningpo. See Sogabe, Nisso kinkahei kmyushi, pp. 166-67.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE MONGOL INVASIONS 411

politics were shifting toward Hojo authoritarianism. These problems

were probably considered when writing the ordinance.

We must recognize, however, that this law was an attempt by the

Kamakura bakufu (the Hojo) to protect its own official trade vessels

and to strengthen its own control over trade while limiting trade with

Sung China in general. We should also consider the course leading

toward the bakufu's monopolization of public trading vessels in the

late (post-Mongol invasion) Kamakura period. Although the limita-

tion ordinance certainly is significant to the history of Kamakura for-

eign relations, this does not mean that it was immediately and perma-

nently enforced. Judging from later conditions, it did not seem to limit

private foreign trade. But in 4/1264 the bakufu did order Dazaifu to

stop the official trade vessels.

This action was probably taken in light

of the Mongols' imminent conquest of the Southern Sung.

THE MONGOL INVASIONS

In 1206 the Mongol unifier, Genghis Khan (1162-1227), unleashed a

stormlike campaign of warfare, utilizing incomparably powerful cav-

alry forces. The campaign lost force by the mid-thirteenth century,

but in the process it created a new political situation. A great new

empire emerged, encompassing the nomadic pasture lands of the

northern plains, the Islamic cultural sphere, large parts of East Asia,

and even a portion of Europe. By the era of the fourth khan, Mongke

(1208-59), control of the Mongol Empire had shifted from the Ogotei

line to the descendants of Tului, exacerbating

tendency toward disin-

tegration. When Kublai (1215-94) succeeded his brother Mongke as

Great Khan, the situation became critical. Mongke appointed Kublai

as commander in chief with authority to rule northern China; of all the

Mongol leaders, Kublai was the most friendly toward China. After

Mongke's death, Kublai fought for the position of Great Khan with

his younger brother Arighbugha (P-I266) who placed primary impor-

tance on the Mongol homeland. Calling together the great council

(Khuriltai), Kublai proclaimed his own succession. Thus, at least in

name, Kublai became the leader of

the

Mongols. But in reality he had

45 Sato Shin'ichi and Ikeuchi Yoshisuke, eds., Chusei hosei

shiryoshu

(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,

1955).

P- 222.

46 Concerning the cultural interchange during the Kamakura period, see Kawazoe Shoji,

"Kamakura jidai no taigai kankei to bunbutsu no inyu," in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi, vol. 6

(chusei

2) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1975).

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412 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

to create his own authority, the Yuan dynastic order, whose political

base lay in the Chinese agricultural region.

The Yuan dynasty attacked Japan twice - first in 1274 and then

again in 1281. The attackers were called Yuan pirates

{genko).

In this

chapter, I shall call these attacks Mongol invasions

{Moko

shurai),

they are referred to in contemporary sources. The two wars them-

selves are known from the era names as the Bun'ei and Koan cam-

paigns. One can consider the significance of the Mongol invasions in

Japanese history in two

ways.

The first is to look at them in the context

of East Asian history, using a time frame from the Mongol invasions

themselves to the end of the Kamakura period, during which the

bakufu, fearing yet another attack, kept its defense structure intact.

This would be, in other words, a cross-sectional analysis. But such an

approach has two problems: how to regard the Mongol invasions from

the standpoint of Japan's relations with Yuan, Koryo, and Southern

Sung and how to analyze Japan's internal situation in terms of politics,

economics, society, thought, and culture. The second approach re-

veals how this unprecedented foreign attack functioned in terms of the

Japanese consciousness of foreign peoples, that is, in the formation of

a national consciousness. This is a sort of vertical analysis.

Because I

cannot use both approaches here, I shall first describe the interna-

tional situation leading to the Mongol invasions, and then explain the

reasons behind them.

Because the Japanese-Mongol negotiations were initiated through

Koryo, the relationship between the Mongols and Koryo requires

some clarification.

This relationship began when the Mongols at-

tacked the Tungusic Jurchin kingdom of Chin (1115-1234). The

Chitan people, previously subject to the Chin, had revolted and rav-

aged the northern area of Korea; consequently, in 1219, Koryo joined

the Mongols to subdue them. Later, however, Mongol envoys periodi-

cally visited Koryo, demanding and collecting large amounts of trib-

ute.

But in 1225, when Ogotei (1168-1241) succeeded Genghis Khan,

47 Murakami Masatsugu, "Mongoru teikoku no seiritsu to bunretsu," in Iwanami koza sekai

rekishi, vol. 9 (chusei 3) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970).

48 There are numerous studies dealing with the Mongol invasions, and for a history of these

studies, see Kawazoe Shoji, Moko shurai kenkyu

shiron

(Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1977).

49 The following discussion is based mainly on Kawazoe, Chusei Kyushu no seiji to bunka, pp.

103—33.

Consequently, I have not listed each document. Two representative works on the

Mongol invasions are by Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Genko noshinkenkyu (Tokyo: Toyo bunko, 1931);

and Aida Niro, Moko shurai no kenkyu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1971). For more

details, see Kawazoe, Moko

shurai

kenkyu shiron.

50 The following discussion of Japanese-Koryo relations is based on the first two chapters of

Ikeuchi, Genko no shin kenkyu.

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THE MONGOL INVASIONS 413

Mongol ambassadors returning to China with Koryo tribute goods

were attacked and murdered. Under the pretext of punishing the mur-

derers, Ogotei appointed Sartag as commander in 1231 and sent him

to invade Koryo. Thus began the Mongol invasions of Koryo which

continued for the next three decades. Koryo moved its capital to

Kanghwa Island and continued a heroic resistance. But the people and

land of Koryo were trampled under the hooves of the Mongol cavalry;

corpses covered the fields; and after the Mongols passed through,

nothing was left behind.

At the time of the fourth Mongol ruler, Mongke, the Koryo court

left Kanghwa and surrendered to the Mongols. Prince Chon departed

for an audience with Mongke, but Mongke died suddenly at his battle

headquarters in Szechuan Province, and the prince instead met

Kublai, who was proceeding north. In order to defeat his younger

brother Arighbugha, Kublai found it necessary to win over Koryo. So

he altered his earlier policy of successive attacks and adopted a moder-

ate policy toward Koryo, while continuing to rely on the success of

those raids.

Koryo's King Kojong died after hearing that the fortress on

Kanghwa Island had been destroyed by the Mongols, and Crown

Prince Chon succeeded as King Wonjong, securing his position with

Mongol backing. Peace seemed to have returned to Koryo. However,

when Kublai defeated Arighbugha and consolidated his position as the

Mongol ruler, he reversed his moderate policy and instead demanded

strict compliance with the heavy obligations he imposed on the Kore-

ans.

Thus the Mongols assigned to Koryo the responsibility of negoti-

ating with Japan. As the base for the invasion of Japan, Koryo was

forced once again to face difficult times.

While Kublai and Arighbugha were fighting each other, a man

known as Li T'an held sway in Shantung Province. In 1262 the South-

ern Sung persuaded him to raise a rebellion against the Mongols.

However, Li's rebellion was put down in only half a year, and the

Southern Sung's calculation that they could weaken Mongol power

proved inaccurate. Before that, just a month after his accession,

Kublai dispatched envoys to the Southern Sung, demanding the for-

mal establishment of peace negotiations, but the Sung imprisoned the

envoys. With this they had assisted Li T'an's rebellion, which consti-

tuted a challenge to the Mongols.

Kublai began to raise an army to invade the Sung. In 1268 he

attacked Hsiang Yang in Hupei and, after a five-year assault, finally

forced its surrender. The Mongol army then seized Ngo Chou (Hupei

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

414 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

Province, Wu Chang) and in 1275 occupied the Southern Sung capital

of Lin'an (Hangchou). There were attempts to revive the Southern

Sung, but in 1279, two years before the Koan campaign, the young

Sung emperor Ping perished at sea in the battle of Yaishan. Kublai had

at last defeated the Southern Sung and brought all of China under his

control. Thus my conclusion is that the Mongol threat to and invasion

of Japan was related to this attack on the Southern Sung.

In Kangan (south Kyongsang Province), a part of Koryo close to

Japan, lived a man named Ch'oe I who enjoyed Kublai's favor. He

reported information he had heard about Japan to Kublai, telling him

that the country's laws and government were superior, and advised

him to open negotiations with Japan, which had been in communica-

tion with China since Han and T'ang times. Ch'oe further recom-

mended that Koryo guide the Mongols to Japan. This is the back-

ground of Kublai's dispatch of emissaries to Japan requesting diplo-

matic relations. Thus in 1265 negotiations commenced between Japan

and the Mongols.

A document from the Mongols (dated 8/1266 and arriving in Japan on

1/1268)

first described the Mongols' might and then recounted how

they had brought peace to Koryo, explaining that the Mongol-Koryo

relationship was like lord and vassal or father and son: Koryo was the

Mongols' "eastern vassal state." Japan is close to Koryo, the document

continued and, since Japan's founding, had normally had exchanges

with China but had not yet concluded peace with it. Saying that

perhaps "your honorable country" is unaware of these circumstances,

the document expressed the Mongols' wish to establish friendship

between the two states. The wording was courteous and did not de-

mand Japan's submission, but it concluded that if there were no other

way, the Mongols would resort to force of arms. Reminiscent of the

edicts issued by the emperor in the Han Chinese state,

this document

coupled the Mongol sense of superiority with a Chinese moral view,

following traditional Chinese foreign-policy forms. From ancient

times China had, in return for the tribute goods that neighboring

kingdoms brought and presented at the Chinese court, granted these

states "gifts" of a higher value than the tribute, preserving a China-

centered foreign-policy structure. Ever mindful of Chinese tradition,

Kublai naturally patterned his actions after that policy. The type of

51 Ishihara Michihiro, "Gendai Nihonkan no ichi sokumen," in Wada hakase kanreki kinenkai,

ed.,

Toyoski

ronso

(Tokyo: Wada hakase kanreki kinenkai, 1951).

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THE MONGOL INVASIONS 415

relationship that Kublai first sought with Japan was probably this sort

of tribute-gift exchange,

one that combined politics, foreign rela-

tions,

and economics.

Why did Kublai seek peace with Japan in 1266? The Mongols were

preparing to attack the Southern Sung, and Kublai, judging the Sung

to be strong, proceeded carefully with his attack plans. Part of these

plans required strengthening control over Koryo. In his document

Kublai referred to Koryo as the Mongols' "eastern vassal state." With

Kublai's military backing, Koryo's King Wonjong had suppressed the

military officials who had previously controlled national politics and

had increased his own authority as sovereign. Thus, from Kublai's

point of

view,

Koryo was indeed a newly attached country. Using the

negotiations with Japan as a tool, Kublai was able to intensify his

domination over Koryo. Also, in preparing to invade Southern Sung,

Kublai had come to realize that Japan, even though it was a small

eastern island really not worth taking, it could not be left alone. Japan

traded with the Southern Sung and therefore continuously added to

the Sung's

financial

strength. Seen in this light, Japan had to be cut off

from the Sung and added to Kublai's empire. And this would be

possible if Koryo were used as a go-between. Even in the event that

Japan did not reply positively, Kublai would have a good excuse to

punish Koryo. There is no way to know whether Kublai did think in

these terms, but it is reasonable to suppose that he did.

One view regards Kublai's dispatch of

envoys

to Japan as stemming

from his desire for trade through amicable relations.

But even grant-

ing that motive, there was still the matter of

the

attack on the Southern

Sung, and so trade alone could not have been the chief reason. The

aforementioned Mongol document came about because of the prevail-

ing circumstances, and it expressed a conciliatory foreign policy. In

any case, Kublai's attempt to negotiate with Japan was linked to his

invasion of Southern Sung, which was itself related to his Koryo

policy. Therefore, he had not definitely decided from the outset to

invade Japan. Rather, that decision emerged during the six Japan-

Mongol negotiations covering nearly eight years.

The Koryo party, led by P'an Pu, arrived at Dazaifu as envoys of the

Mongols in the first month of 1268. The Mongol and Koryo docu-

ments were given to the provincial governor Muto Sukeyoshi, went

through the Kamakura bakufu, and then to the court at Kyoto. Au-

52 Tanaka, Chusei taigai

kankeishi,

p. 19.

53 Kayahara Shozo, "Moko shurai no ichi hihan," Rekishi to chiri 10 (August-October 1922).

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

4l6 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

thority

for

foreign relations

lay

with

the

court,

but the

decision

reply or not was actually controlled by the bakufu. Kamakura decided

not

respond, and so the party of

envoys

returned without receiving

an answer. The Mongols sent more envoys, but Japan was unyielding

its

refusal,

and

this eventually resulted

in the

Mongol invasion.

What explains

the

bakufu's persistent refusal?

The

answer will also

explain the reason

for

the Mongols' attack on Japan.

From the moment the Kamakura bakufu received the Mongol docu-

ment,

considered

a declaration

war and therefore strengthened

Japan's defenses. Nichiren's famous treatise

Rissho ankoku-ron

(The

establishment

the legitimate teaching

for

the security

the coun-

try) expressed the same interpretation

the document,

emphasizing

that

it was not

only

the

bakufu administrators who interpreted

the

communique

as a

declaration

war.

understand

the

reasons

for

such

interpretation and the adoption

firm attitude, we need

consider how Japan obtained information about the Mongols and what

that information was.

Information concerning international relations was learned primar-

ily from the Southern Sung, through Japanese priests who had visited

Sung, Sung priests who came to Japan, and merchants. But Sung was

constantly pressured by the Mongols,

and its

hatred

for

the Mongols

was strong.

For

Sung,

the

Mongols were nothing

but

invaders

and

conquerors.

The

person responsible

for

formulating Japan's Mongol

policy was Hojo Tokimune.

was strongly influenced

by the

patri-

otic

and

nationalistic religious thought

the Sung priests and based

his foreign policy on information from these priests. The authoritarian

control

the Hojo family's main line had increased from the time of

Tokimune's father, Tokiyori, and the rejection of the Mongol commu-

nique was decided

by a

very small group led by Tokimune. We must

remember that

the

bakufu, which held

the

real power over Japan's

political and military affairs, represented the warriors. Thus the Mon-

gol invasions were

meeting between

people with strong tendencies

toward conquest and

society governed by warriors.

The nobles deliberating

how to

respond

to the

Mongols lived

in a

closed society clinging

ancient practices. Because Japan's relations

with the continent had long since ceased, the nobles were not able

make

informed judgment

Japan's international relations. Most

of their debate, therefore,

was

devoted

interpreting

the

Mongol

54 Kawazoe Shoji, Nichiren-sono

shiso,

kodo to Moko shurai (Tokyo: Shimizu shoin, 1971),

p. 55.

THE MONGOL INVASIONS 417

document. In addition, the real power at court, the retired emperor

Gosaga, was made emperor by the Hojo family after the Jokyu distur-

bance, and thus Kamakura's wishes were directly reflected in the

court's deliberations. The Koryo document that accompanied the

Mongol communique appealed to the Japanese to accept the Mongol

request, as the Mongols only sought recognition of their moral influ-

ence.

But this had no decisive influence on Japan's decision. We

should not overlook the fact that in its continental relations, Japan had

a tradition of familiarity with southern China and an estrangement

from the north. Further, Japan's traditional attitude was to confront

China as an equal or superior, which was the principal reason for

Tokimune's unyielding attitude.

Kamakura adopted its own plan for foreign conquest, appointing

the provincial governors Muto Tsunesuke and Otomo Yoriyasu as

commanders in an attack on Koryo, the base for the Mongol attack on

Japan. In addition, the bakufu constructed a stone wall along the

entire Hakata Bay coastline as a defense against the Mongols. The

Japanese selected the third month of 1276 as the date for their attack.

The plan was to prepare troops and boats primarily in Kyushu but this

idea was ultimately abandoned, and Kamakura instead concentrated

on strengthening its defenses. Immediately after the second Mongol

invasion, the bakufu drew up a second plan to invade Koryo, using

outlaw bands from Yamato and Yamashiro provinces. But this plan

was abandoned too.

Both of these plans attempted to use a foreign-policy issue to help

solve internal political problems. In 9/1274, claiming that there was a

rumor of an impending invasion by the Mongols, Kamakura ordered

the descendants of the Kanto warrior Shodai Shigetoshi to proceed

to their holdings in Higo Province and the deputy of Nikaido

Ninsho, the jito of Ata Kitakata in Satsuma Province, likewise to

proceed to that holding. The bakufu also ordered them to subdue

the local outlaw bands (akuto) in those holdings.

Just before this

order, Nichiren and his followers, whose teaching of the supremacy

of the Lotus Sutra continued to spread rapidly throughout society in

light of the Mongol problem, intensified their criticism of the

bakufu. Nichiren was regarded as perpetrating unlawful acts under

the very noses of the Kamakura military leaders and accordingly

suffered tremendous persecution. The Kamakura bakufu, that is,

55 For the "foreign defense" (ikoku keigo) against the Mongol invasions, see Kawazoe Shoji,

Chukai, Genko borui hennen shiryo

—

ikoku keigo banyaku shiryo no kenkyu (Fukuoka:

Fukuokashi kyoiku iinkai, 1971).

418 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

the Hojo main line under Tokimune, saw its political task as resolv-

ing the various internal social contradictions that were eroding the

existing social structure. These social contradictions, as expressed by

the outlaw bands, coincided with the Mongol problem and con-

tinued to become more serious. Clearly the Mongol threat was used

to try to solve these internal political problems, chief among them

that of the akuto.

The unyielding bakufu attitude - Hojo Toki-

mune's "resolute" attitude toward the Mongols - resulted from these

circumstances.

All of these conditions on the continent and in Japan ultimately led

to the Mongol invasion. The first Mongol invasion, the Bun'ei cam-

paign, came in 10/1274. Combined Mongol-Koryo forces of some

28,000 men and 900 ships passed through Tsushima and Iki before

landing at Hakata. They immediately withdrew when it appeared use-

less to continue fighting, and tremendous damage from the so-called

divine wind

(kamikaze)

forced them to return home. The second Mon-

gol invasion, the Koan campaign, came in the fifth month of

1281

and

lasted for three months. The Mongols attacked with an eastern-route

force composed of 40,000 Mongols, Chinese, and Koreans, and a

Kiang-nam force of 100,000 (composed primarily of conquered South-

ern Sung troops), and 3,500 ships. But this time as well the Mongols

suffered a destructive blow from the kamikaze in which the greater

part of their force sank to the bottom of the sea.

The origins and course of the Koan campaign differ in many respects

from those of the Bun'ei campaign. The Yuan dynasty regarded the

first attack as unsuccessful but not as a defeat; the second invasion was

intended to rectify the failure of the first. Several important consider-

ations were involved in the second invasion. At the time of the first

attack, the Yuan attached considerable importance to its Koryo policy,

as it was closely linked to the task of subjugating the Southern Sung.

But in the second invasion, the Mongols were pressed to resolve a

number of problems that followed their defeat of

the

Sung, such as the

treatment of

large number of captured Sung mercenaries. The Mon-

gol's activities also included redirecting already-conquered peoples

toward a new area for conquest, and so they used many defeated Sung

professional soldiers, the basis of their mercenary system, to invade

Japan.

56 Abe Yukihiro, Moko shurai (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1980), pp.

20-21.

57 Atagi Mitsuo, Ajia no seifuku

ocho,

vol. 11 of Sekai no rekishi (Tokyo: Kawade shobo 1969).