The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan

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FOREIGN RELATIONS: EARLY MUROMACHI 429

This is the only Muromachi bakufu order dealing with the suppression

of wako. The document clearly expressed Yoshimitsu's intention to

arrange the suppression of the wako under the chain of command from

shogun (bakufu) to Kyushu tandai (shugo).

The final epoch of Imagawa Ryoshun's foreign policy was marked

in Korea by the fall of Koryo and the founding of Choson, and in

Japan by the unification of the Northern and Southern Courts. On the

Korean peninsula, in the seventh month of 1392, Yi Song-gye (1334-

1408),

who had achieved some success in suppressing the wako, re-

ceived the abdication of King Kong Yang and was "installed by the

ministers" as king (reigned 1392-98?). He was the dynastic founder,

Taijo,

of the Yi dynasty's Choson. In Japan, in the intercalary tenth

month of the same year, the fifty-seven year conflict between the

Northern and Southern Courts was brought to an end with the victory

of the Northern Court.

From the outset Choson adopted a conciliatory policy toward Japan.

Taejo inherited from the former dynasty the task of subjugating the

wako,

but he aimed for amicable relations with the outside world and

also reorganized the country's own military system and strengthened

defenses.

In the year of Taejo's accession, the new dynasty sent an

envoy to Japan requesting that the "government of the seii taishogun"

(the Muromachi bakufu) suppress the wako}

The bakufu responded

that it was ordering the Kyushu tandai to subjugate these wako in its

name. As Kyushu tandai, Imagawa Ryoshun's dealings with Choson,

as with Koryo, involved the return of captives in response to Korean

requests for piracy control and his interest in obtaining such items as

the Buddhist Tripitaka. The number of captives returned to Choson

increased greatly. But when the courts were reunified, the coincidental

link between defeating the Southern Court in Kyushu and suppressing

piracy disappeared. Shogunal restrictions on the Kyushu tandai as a

subordinate local officer of the Muromachi bakufu became stronger.

The tandai's growing wealth from trade, conducted in the guise of

returning Korean captives, was exceeding the limits appropriate to a

local bakufu official and was arousing the shogun's jealousy. Thus,

Imagawa Ryoshun was removed from his post as Kyushu tandai in

1395-

82 Nakamura, Nissen kankeishi no kenkyu, vol. I p. 149. Nakamura Hidecaka, Nihon to Chosen

(Tokyo: Shibundo, 1966), provides a good summary of Japanese-Korean relations from

ancient times through the Tokugawa period.

83 Zuikei Shuho, Zemin kokuhoki (Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1975), pp. 91-92. This work,

written in 1466, is an invaluable source for the study of Muromachi-period foreign relations.

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430 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

The problem of suppressing piracy and the development of

the

tribute

system that accompanied the founding of the Ming dynasty were the

common threads running through Japan's relations with Koryo,

Choson, and Ming China in the Nambokucho period. When consider-

ing the East Asian international order centered on the Ming, one must

examine the Ming policy of prohibiting overseas travel which was

inseparable from the tribute system.

This policy prohibited all Chi-

nese from going abroad; whereas the tribute system

was

foreign policy,

the overseas prohibition was domestic policy. Together the two had a

significant influence in East Asian international relations. The impetus

for Emperor T'aitsu Hung-wu's issuance of the overseas prohibition

order lay in his fear that internal political divisions might link up with

foreign powers, leading to a domestic political crisis. This fear was

directly related to the Japanese wako problem. In concrete terms, it

was generated by two incidents, which I shall discuss next.

After the defeat of the late Yuan-period rebels, Fang Kuo-chin and

Chang Shin-cheng, who had held sway in the Kiangsu and Chekiang

areas,

some of their surviving followers established bases on the

coastal islands. They tried to revive their influence by joining with

people on the mainland and, moreover, by linking up with the

wakd.*

Thus,

for the Ming, the wako were not simply a foreign concern but

also a problem linked to internal discontent. This is why the Ming

insisted that Japan control the wako.

The second incident, involving Hu Wei-yung and Lin Hsien,

brought about a decisive rupture in Japanese-Ming relations.

One of

the meritorious subjects involved in the founding of the dynasty, Hu

Wei-yung, had risen to become left chancellor, or head, of the Secretar-

iat because of his superior political talent. But after becoming left

chancellor, Hu exercised authoritarian policies and planned to usurp

the throne. Attempting to enlist Japan's aid in this endeavor, Hu

linked up with Lin Hsien, the leader of Ningpo-wei (Yin District in

the province of Chekiang). Hu falsely accused Lin of a crime and

banished him to Japan, where he put him in touch with Japanese

leaders. Next, Hu Wei-yung announced the restoration of Lin Hsien

to his former post, and he dispatched a messenger to bring Lin back,

secretly sending a message to the "King of Japan" seeking military

Sakuma

Shigeo,

"Mincho no kaikin seisaku," in

Tohogaku,

no. 6

(1953).

This incident is recorded in the

Mingshih,

Chuan

91,

treatise 67 (military 3, section on coastal

defense).

This incident is outlined in

Mingshih,

Chuan 322, in pt. 3, "Foreign

Lands."

Also see

Sakuma,

"Minsho no Nitchu kankei o meguru ni, san no

mondai."

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FOREIGN RELATIONS: EARLY MUROMACHI 43I

support. This king of Japan sent four hundred soldiers under the

priest Nyoyo, misrepresenting them as an envoys merely bringing a

tribute of large candles. Within this tribute, however, he concealed

gunpowder and swords. But when Nyoyo landed in China, he found

that Hu Wei-yung and his group had been executed in the first month

of 1380, based on a tip from an informer. Six years later in 1421, it

became clear that Nyoyo and the "King of Japan" were involved in the

affair, and Lin was executed along with his whole clan. Emperor

T'aitsu was enraged over Japan's actions and severed relations; he

reinforced the policy forbidding Chinese to go overseas and strength-

ened China's coastal defenses.

These is some doubt concerning the details of this affair, but the real

problem is identifying the "King of Japan" who colluded with Hu

Wei-yung and Lin Hsien. One view is that it was perhaps a leader of

the wako}

In Chuan 13 of Ming

T'aitsu

shihlu

(Veritable records of

Ming T'aitsu), in an entry for

7/1381,

we learn that the King of Japan,

Ryokai (Prince Kaneyoshi), dispatched the priest Nyoyo and others to

Ming, bearing goods and ten horses as tribute, but the Ming emperor

did not accept their offering. So Nyoyo appeared as Prince

Kaneyoshi's messenger, but at that time the prince was no longer

leader of the Southern Court in Kyushu. This role had passed to

goseisei shogun

miya.

As in the case described earlier, it was only a

matter of using Prince Kaneyoshi's name. Nyoyo may well have had

connections with the Kyushu Southern Court, but he might also have

been connected with the wako. Therefore, the "King of Japan" at the

time of the Hu Wei-yung incident could have been the leader of the

Kyushu Southern Court

(goseisei shogun

no miya), Southern Court

forces with wako connections, or wako simply using the name of the

Southern Court in Kyushu.

The Ming regarded the "King of

Japan"

as a pirate, and his connec-

tion with an internal Chinese plot was truly a serious problem. Be-

cause this incident followed so closely on the last one, Emperor Hung

Wu's distrust of Japan grew stronger, and he also cut off diplomatic

relations and intensified the ban on Chinese going abroad. This prohi-

bition had been carried out at one point during the late Yuan, but

from the beginning of the Ming it became permanent and was contin-

ued for some two hundred years. Furthermore, the plotting of Hu

Wei-yung and Liu Hsien was a convenient opportunity for the Ming

emperor to complete his authoritarian structure. Here we can see a

87 Tsuji Zennosuke, Nisshi bunka no koryu, p. 123.

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432 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

pattern by which wako or

wakd-like

forces helped define Ming internal

politics.

The tribute system and the ban on overseas travel represented a

unified internal-external relationship, and together they exerted a

great influence on East Asian international relations. Tribute brought

by various foreign lands to the Ming was rewarded by Ming gifts in

return,

which is properly termed tribute trade. Virtually all the trib-

ute items were either luxury goods for China's upper class or military

necessities. The Ming government monopolized the import and pur-

chase of these resources and allowed only a very small portion to be

traded by general merchants under government supervision. Overseas

trips by Chinese were forbidden under the formal prohibition in force

from the beginning of the Ming dynasty. Through the tribute system

and this ban, the Ming government was able to protect itself against

piracy and to monopolize trade. Both policies were in accord with its

political and economic goals. The travel prohibition struck a blow

against the Ming trading merchants, but on the other hand, it ex-

panded the area of activity for overseas Chinese to the south and for

merchants from the newly risen Ryukyu kingdom.

THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM AND JAPAN

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu dispatched envoys to Ming China in 1374 and

1380 in order to establish relations, but his offers were rebuffed.

Subsequently, Yoshimitsu reunited the two courts and rose to the

highest position in the civilian bureaucracy, that of prime minister. He

dismissed Imagawa Ryoshun, who had succeeded in pacifying

Kyushu, and now placed that island - the base for foreign relations -

under his own control. Yoshimitsu furthermore subdued Ouchi

Yoshihiro, a warrior with considerable power in foreign affairs who

held several

shugo

appointments and was becoming a rival force to the

shogun. By these actions, Yoshimitsu achieved control over Japan's

politics. However, he resigned from his public offices and became a

free agent and therefore was not in a position to open formal relations

with the Ming as the representative of Japan. In 1401, Yoshimitsu

dispatched a mission to the Ming headed by Soa, a member of his

coterie of artists and aesthetes (doboshu), as chief envoy, with a

Kyushu merchant as his assistant. This appointment of shogunal

88 Momose Hiromu, Minshin shakai keizaishi kenkyu (Tokyo: Kenkyu shuppan, 1980), p. 6;

Tanaka, Chusei taigai kankeishi, p. 86.

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THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM AND JAPAN 433

doboshu and merchants as envoys was an exception, however, and

never occurred again.

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu sent a document addressed to the emperor of

the Great Ming dated 5/13/1401 under the title Nihon jusango Dogi

("equivalent in rank to imperial family")-

In it, Yoshimitsu sought

to establish relations in accord with the customary practices of the

past, and he listed the tribute goods he was sending. He also re-

turned a number of Ming citizens who had been captured by wako.

In the eighth month of the next year, 1402, Soa's party returned to

Japan, accompanied by a Ming envoy whom Yoshimitsu received

warmly. They brought with them an edict from the second Ming

emperor, Chien Wen, which began with the words, "you, King of

Japan, Minamoto no Dogi," and invested Yoshimitsu as ruler and

ordered him to accept the Ming calendar. In other words, the edict

proclaimed that Japan should be vassal to the Ming. However, three

years earlier a war had broken out between Chien Wen and his uncle

(later Emperor Ch'engtsu Yung Lo); and only two months before his

envoy reached Japan, the city of Nanking had fallen, and Chien Wen

had perished in the flames. Yung Lo, known as the greatest warrior-

emperor in Chinese history, had toppled his nephew and seized the

throne for

himself.

In 3/1403 a party of Japanese envoys headed for China with the

returning Ming envoy. Japan's document to the Ming was also in the

form of an edict. Opening with the words, "King of Japan, Your

Subject, Minamoto," it congratulated Emperor Ch'engtsu on his en-

thronement and offered gifts. The document mentions many military

items:

twenty horses, one thousand spears, one hundred large

swords, and ten thousand kin of sulfur. It seems that some of the

three hundred people accompanying the mission were carrying weap-

ons to trade. These were probably sent to gain profits, anticipating

an increase in Chinese military requirements for internal purposes.

Ch'engtsu received this tribute just when he was on the verge of

sending an envoy to announce his accession. He was exceedingly

pleased and sent back the envoy with a reply. In contrast with

T'aitsu, Ch'engtsu had a positive attitude toward the outside world,

89 The document is found on p. 97 of the Zemin kokuhoki. A draft can be found in the diary of

Gon no daigeki Nakahara Yasutomi, "Kofuki," in Zoho Shiryo taisei, vol. 37 (Kyoto: Rinsen

shoten, 1965), p. 3. For an overview of Japanese foreign relations documents, see Kawazoe

Shoji, "Kodai-Chusei no gaiko monjo," in Kagamiyama Takeshi sensei koki kinenkai, ed.,

Kobunka ronko (Fukuoka: Kagiyama Takeshi sensei koki kinen ronbunshu kankokai, 1980).

90 Sakuma Shigeo/'Eirakutei no taigai seisaku to Nihon," in Hoppb bunka kenkyu, no. 2 (1967):

121.

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434 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

which accounts for the subsequent development of active Ming for-

eign relations.

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu had referred to himself as "King of Japan,

Your Subject, Minamoto" when corresponding with the emperor of

China; in return he received from the Ming a gold seal investing him

as the king of Japan. This was a shift away from Japan's traditional

policy of regarding China as an equal and accepting the Ming tribute

system: Japan was incorporated into the East Asian international order

centering on the Ming emperor. It was on this occasion that one hun-

dred Yuan Lo tallies were brought, commencing the so-called tally

trade

(kango

boeki).

Yoshimitsu's relations with

Ming

China

During the era of T'aitsu (Japan's Nambokucho era), Yoshimitsu

twice tried to establish relations with the Ming but was rebuffed. The

Ming joined instead with Prince Kaneyoshi, head of the Seiseifu,

which could also be called the successor to Dazaifu. Ming relations

with Japan became active in the reign of the Yung Lo emperor

Ch'engtsu who was quite positive regarding foreign affairs. In compari-

son with T'aitsu, who devoted his energy to internal institutional

consolidation, Ch'engtsu planned to maintain internal institutions by

working actively in the foreign arena.

In the case of Japan, the wako

problem was directly connected with China's internal security, and so

the matter of reducing Japan to the position of

vassal state was a task

of some urgency. The first half of the Ch'engtsu's twenty-two-year

reign corresponded to the era of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu's negotiations

with the Ming: The relationship between the two countries was nor-

malized according to the Chinese model, and a friendly relationship

was preserved. Ch'engtsu never ceased to praise Yoshimitsu's success-

ful efforts to suppress the wako.

In opening diplomatic relations with the Ming, Yoshimitsu hoped to

develop normal trade. This policy reflected the inclinations of the

merchants in northwestern Kyushu, especially Hakata. It was also

congenial to the

ryoshu

class of

the

west Japan seacoast and the farmers

of Tsushima, Iki, and Matsura. Yoshimitsu established an internal

control structure, and the political situation generally stabilized. By

successively dismissing and overthrowing Imagawa Ryoshun and

Ouchi Yoshihiro, Yoshimitsu absorbed their real authority in foreign

91 Ibid., pp. 118, 136.

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THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM AND JAPAN 435

affairs and strengthened a base from which he could open normal

relations with Ming and Choson. However, the Ming would not per-

mit direct trade by vassals, as was clear from the case of Shimazu

Ujihisa: Trade was allowed only to the king. This was why Ashikaga

Yoshimitsu sent tribute to Ming China as the "King of Japan."

Yoshimitsu's adoption of the title King of Japan represented a denial

of the traditional foreign-policy concepts of Japan's ruling class, which

had considered Japan to be China's equal, and it was criticized by

contemporaries. In his Zenrin kokuhoki, Zukei Shuho claimed that

Yoshimitsu was wrong to call himself the king of Japan, to use the

character for

subject,

and to write the Chinese era name. Most contem-

porary specialists on ceremony shared this criticism. In more recent

times there have been several criticisms of Yoshimitsu's action as being

disrespectful of the sovereign or as being a "national shame," criti-

cisms based on the ideal of supreme loyalty.

In contrast, members of

the nobility and those close to Yoshimitsu argued that any change in

the form of the documents could destroy Japan's traditional foreign-

policy course and the sense of equality between Japan and the Ming.

But they did not fault Yoshimitsu out of any concern over loyalty to

the emperor. Rather, their concern lay in a fear that Yoshimitsu's

policies might lead to subjugation to the Ming. The title King of Japan

was problematic because it indicated that Ashikaga Yoshimitsu had

transformed his position from warrior hegemon to ruler of a feudal

state.

Yoshimitsu's motive in reversing the traditional course of foreign

policy and initiating relations with Ming China has also been debated.

One thesis argues that his motive was to acquire trading profits.

Suganuma Teifu's Dainihon shdgyoshi (first published in 1892) ex-

plained Yoshimitsu's relations with the Ming exclusively from the

standpoint of trade, and many since have contended that it was the

income that could be gained from missions to China that motivated

Yoshimitsu to open relations with the Ming.

Enormous sums were

required to build such projects as the Kitayama villa, said to have cost

100,000 kan, and for the frequent Buddhist ceremonies. The large

gifts of copper coins, silk, brocades, and so forth that the Ming envoys

brought to the shogunal court were certainly a major economic attrac-

tion. This tribute-gift exchange was in reality simply trade, and

92 Tsuji, Nisshi bunka no koryu pp. 140 ff.

93 Usui Nobuyoshi, Ashikaga

Yoshimitsu

(Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1960), p. 187; Kobata,

"Kango boeki to wako," p. 52; Tanaka, Wako to kango boeki, pp. 55.

436 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu's Japan-Ming relations represented his own per-

sonal monopoly of it.

That Yoshimitsu was motivated by a desire for trading profits is

generally accurate. However, the actual role of Ming trade in shogunal

and bakufu finances, which included income from the

goryosho

(the

bakufu's direct holdings) and levies on pawnbrokers and sake dealers

in and around the capital, is unclear. Moreover, even though the Ming

"gifts,"

that is, the importation of Chinese goods, may have satisfied

the desires of Yoshimitsu and his followers, it is unclear how they were

related to the bakufu's finances. In any event, it is too narrow to

attribute Yoshimitsu's motive in opening Japan-Ming relations solely

to profits.

Others have sought a political explanation for Yoshimitsu's actions.

Sato Shin'ichi argues that by representing himself to the Ming em-

peror as "King of Japan, Your Subject, Minamoto no Dogi,"

Yoshimitsu brought the various lords of Kyushu under his control and

through them brought stability to the central political arena, thereby

forcing the diverse factions participating in Ming trade to recognize his

position as king. In other words, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu's position as

king was guaranteed by the Ming emperor.

This is the Ming tribute-

system theory. Sato examined the importation of copper coins in terms

of its political function, whereas earlier scholars had focused only on

its economic aspects. He also viewed Yoshimitsu's control of trade

through the tally system as an attempt to increase his own political

power. Sato's study was a breakthrough, explaining Yoshimitsu's

Ming relations in terms of political history when previously scholars

had emphasized Yoshimitsu's profit motivation. We should also note

Miura Keiichi's thesis that the Ming tally system - and the system

whereby the king of Choson received books from and granted posts to

traders - functioned as a kind of overseas shiki (rights) system that

augmented Japan's internal shiki system. It was used, Miura feels, to

maintain Japan's internal ruling structure.

Yet questions remain: Why did Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, who had

come to wield absolute power, feel the need to seek an even higher -

and foreign - guarantee?

The theory of control over private trade

was criticized for overemphasizing political factors and ignoring other

94 Sato Shin'ichi, "Muromachi bakufu ron," in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi, vol. 7 (chitsei 3)

(Tokyo: Iwanami shocen, 1963).

95 Miura Keiichi, "Chusei koki no shohin ryutsu to ryoshu kaikyu," in Nihonshi kenkyu, no. 65

(March 1963).

96 Haga Norihiko, "Muromachi bakufu ron," in Nihon rekishigaku kenkyukai, ed., Nihonshi

no mondaiten (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1965).

THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM AND JAPAN 437

forms of economic income to the bakufu.

Furthermore, Sasaki Ginya

raises a question that is indeed difficult to answer: In the turbulent

international situation of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centu-

ries, did Ashikaga Yoshimitsu and the ruling class really grasp, in any

coherent political and international way, the relationship between na-

tional trade and their own political power?

Sasaki's view of the motivation behind Japan-Ming relations is that

Japan hoped to eliminate the insecurity caused by fear of a Chinese

invasion. In order to do so, Japan, already a latecomer, had to become

part of the Ming tribute system as soon as possible and thus cease to be

the "orphan" of East Asia.

For centuries the Japanese had feared

attack by the Silla, and the Mongol invasions provided real grounds

for fearing a Ming attack. Then too, the Ming had tried to use the

Mongol invasions to China's advantage in the negotiations with Japan.

Sasaki sees Yoshimitsu's adoption of the title King of Japan not only as

stemming from his own personal predilection to "serve the great" but

also as an honest expression of the almost traditional uncertainty and

fear toward "Great T'ang" or "Great Ming" which derived from his

responsibility and position as Japan's feudal monarch and ruler.

Sasaki's argument is, in a broad sense, an explanation in terms of

political motives, but he sees it as a political response, albeit uncertain,

at a stage when Japan could not yet understand Ming Chinese foreign

policy.

Most studies of Yoshimitsu's motives start from the end product of

the entire history of Japan-Ming relations and argue back toward the

origins; they try to surmise actual conditions from the surviving docu-

ments. As Sasaki stated, it is difficult to prove that Yoshimitsu dealt

with the situation from a clear political and international perspective.

That he had a fuzzy perception of Chinese foreign policy can be seen

from the fact that he dispatched an envoy during the Chingnan inci-

dent (1399-1402). When considering Yoshimitsu's motivation, we

must recognize the importance of that first 1401 mission. I have al-

ready explained that there was a strong demand for normal trade from

the trading merchants of western Japan, and that in responding to this

demand, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu was himself eager for profits. In his

document to the Ming emperor, Yoshimitsu emphasized his establish-

ment of control over the entire country and proclaimed his qualifica-

tions to open relations with China. Furthermore, besides the required

97 Tanaka, Chusei taigai kankeishi, pp. 78-79.

98 Sasaki "Higashi Ajia," p. 113. 99 Ibid., p. 114.

438 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

tribute, Yoshimitsu also returned the Ming prisoners captured by the

wako,

an act that Sasama Shigeo has called a kind of primitive slave

trade.

100

These, then, are the various theories concerning Yoshimitsu's mo-

tives in establishing relations with Ming China amidst the political and

economic conditions of Japan at the turn of the fifteenth century. We

cannot simply select only one of these theories as correctly identifying

the motive; rather, we must adopt a syncretic and comprehensive view.

It is true that trading profits were in large measure misdirected toward

the extravagant life-style of Yoshimitsu and his coterie, but it is also

true that they stabilized the bakufu's finances. Thus we can see that

such profits from trade did work to the advantage of what the Zemin

kokuhoki and Miura Hiroyuki call "the country,"

101

that is, the

Muromachi bakufu structure. Furthermore, Japanese-Ming relations

conducted in the name of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu and the Muromachi

bakufu were of obvious help in controlling Kyushu. Even though the

title King of Japan is ambiguous when considered in regard to the

court, it did clearly indicate the primary agent of Ming relations,

Japan's feudal ruler. Through Yoshimitsu's action, Japan joined the

East Asian Sinocentric tribute system and achieved a guarantee of

international security. The wako problem was the real intermediary in

this relationship as far as Ming China was concerned.

The tally trade system

Tally refers to a certificate of proof that authenticated an envoy or

mission.

102

Already in Yuan times there was a system of tallies for

foreign-trade purposes, called panyin kongho wenpu (half-seal tally reg-

ister),

which was also used for domestic trade. The Ming practice of

issuing tallies to foreign trading vessels, a blend of these two systems,

began in 1383, and was first applied to Japan in 1404. The Ming tally

system was one in which some two hundred tallies and four volumes of

records were collected and kept in each country. In Japan's case, the

tallies were divided into two sets, labeled nichi and hon. One hundred

of the nichi tallies and one volume each of the nichi and hon tally

records were kept in the Board of Rites at the Ming capital in Peking,

and one hundred of the hon tallies and a volume of the nichi tally

100 Sakuma, "Eirakutei no taigai seisaku to Nihon," p. 124.

101 Miura Hiroyuki, Nihonshi no kenhyii, vol 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1930), p. 973.

102 Among the early inclusive studies of the tally trade was that by Kayahara Shozo, "Nichimin

kango no soshiki to shiko," in Shigaku zasshi31 (April, May August, and September 1920).