The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan

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THE MONGOL INVASIONS 419

The problem of Koryo was also important. Koryo adopted passive

tactics throughout the first Mongol invasion, attempting to evade

control by the Mongols, who were primarily intent on conquering

Japan.

Then, shifting tactics to support the Mongol attack, King

Chungyul hoped that the Mongol subjugation of Japan would allevi-

ate the exhaustion of his own country. Some scholars argue that this

shift was actually to prepare for the Japanese wako.

1 disagree, for

as I showed earlier, Koryo's problem with the wako was rather se-

vere,

and I believe that Koryo tried to solve it by relying on the

Mongols' power.

Many scholars hold that the Mongols invaded Japan to obtain its

wealth. They are particularly taken with the idea that the Mongols

wished to conquer a Japan that was believed to have been full of gold,

as related in The Travels of Marco Polo. The fact that Japan exported

gold dust to Sung supports this contention. With the defeat of the

Southern Sung, the Yuan dynasty no longer needed to concern itself

with maritime trade between Japan and Southern Sung; furthermore,

it had seized the prosperous port cities of Kiang-nam. These ports

traded extensively with Japan, and naturally the rumor that Japan was

a country rich in gold circulated widely. Gold was especially coveted

by the Mongols, although it was also well known that Japan produced

pearls and many other prized goods. The desire for wealth from the

conquest of Japan became a much clearer motive in the second Mongol

attack.

Kublai's proclamation to his generals leading the invasion clearly

indicates the Yiian's intentions in the second invasion. In his proclama-

tion, Kublai indicated that the.first reason for the invasion was Japan's

internment of his envoys. By executing the Mongol envoys, Japan

blocked the Mongols' attack for a long time, but this action had catas-

trophic effects stemming from the differences in foreign-policy out-

look between Japan and the Yuan. In response, therefore, Kublai

called for seizure, invasion, and conquest of the Japanese people and

lands.

A third invasion of Japan was impossible. The Yuan court was

plagued with both a factional struggle characteristic of the Mongol

Empire and continual widespread wars of resistance by its conquered

peoples. The burden of the people under Mongol control was over-

58 Nakamura Hidetaka, Nissen kankeishi

kenkyu, vol. 1, p. 78; Tamura,

Chusei

Nitcho boeki

kenkyu, p. 24.

59 Aoyama, Nichirai

koshoshi no

kenkyu, p. 32; Ikeuchi, Genko

no shin

kenkyu,

p. 200.

60 Atagi, Ajia no

seifuku

ocho,

p. 314.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

420 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

whelming,

as it included those from the invasions of Japan, Champa

(South Vietnam), and Chiao Chih (Kingdom of Annam and North

Vietnam). Moreover, the economy of the Yuan court was racked by

unrelenting inflation.

In the era of King Chungyol, Koryo suffered under Mongol de-

mands related to the planned third invasion of Japan, but scattered

entries in the

Koryosa

in the reigns of King Chungyol and his successor

King Chungson point to a relatively peaceful relationship with Japan.

However, while Japan was planning an attack on Koryo during the

Mongol invasion, a bellicose and deprecatory view of

Koryo

was form-

ing among the Japanese people, which revived and even strengthened

the legend of Empress Jingu's "conquest of the three Han countries."

The Mongol invasions strengthened the Hojo family's control over

Kyushu. With the Muto family's position diminished as the main

support of bakufu control in Kyushu, however, they were unable to

check the wako's activities. In the late Kamakura period, the various

contradictions of the prevailing social order became severe. The na-

tional power of Koryo itself also was weakened. Under these circum-

stances, the wako became very active. In the seventh month of

1323,

large-scale pirate raid took place, and one hundred wako were be-

headed in Cholla Province. In the Nambokucho period, these raids

developed into full-scale pirate attacks.

After the Koan campaign, despite Japan's and the Yuan's adversary

relationship, trading vessels traveled back and forth openly, and there

was a brisk economic and cultural interchange. In the year following

the Koan campaign, 1282, the Yuan began cutting timber to use for

ships to attack Japan and several times issued orders for the construc-

tion of vessels. They planned to invade in the eighth month of 1283.

But the peoples of Kiangsu and Anhwei had suffered military conscrip-

tion and the harsh labors of ship construction for many years, and in

more than two hundred localities they rose in revolt, forcing abandon-

ment of the plan. Nonetheless, the preparations fcr the attack contin-

ued, albeit on a smaller scale. But rebellions arose in Fukien,

Kwantung, and other areas, and in 1284 the office responsible for

coordinating the attack

was

abolished. But the preparations still contin-

61 Hacada Takashi states that the major reason for the frustration and failure of the Mongol

attacks on Japan was the resistance of the various Asian peoples under Mongol domination.

Hatada Takashi, Genko - Moko teikoku no naibujijo (Tokyo: Chud koronsha, 1965).

62 Iwamura Shinobu, "Gen jidai ni okeru shihei infureshon," in Toyo

gakuho,

vol. 34 (March

1964).

63 Ikeuchi, Genko

no shin

kenkyu, chap. 12.

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THE MONGOL INVASIONS 421

ued, and the office was revived in 1285. The Mongols planned to

attack from Happo in the eighth month of

1286.

But the Yuan dynasty

had been sending troops for several years to Champa and Chiao Chih,

and so this plan had to be abandoned because of a severe lack of

manpower. It is said that when they heard this, the conscripted sol-

diers from south China raised shouts of joy that resounded like thun-

der. Even though the uprisings continued in both the north and east,

Kublai Khan would not give up the conquest of Japan but continued

with the preparations. With his death in

1/1294,

however, the con-

quest of Japan was no longer possible.

While Kublai continued to prepare for conquest, he also tried to

effect Japan's subjugation through diplomatic means, and these at-

tempts continued even after his death. Following the Koan campaign,

the Mongols sent at least four ambassadors to Japan carrying royal

edicts:

Ju Chih and Wang Chun-chih in 8/1283; Ju Chih and Wang

Chi-weng in 5/1284; Chin You-ch'eng and Kuo Lin in 10/1292; and I-

shan I-ning in 3/1299. However, the first and second missions failed to

reach Japan, and on the third mission Chin You-ch'eng was detained

for years in Japan, where he subsequently died. On the fourth mission

I-shan I-ning won over Hojo Sadatoki in Kamakura and ex-Emperor

Gouda in Kyoto and contributed to the development of Japanese cul-

ture through his broad knowledge. The Mongols' purpose in dispatch-

ing the envoys, however, was never achieved.

Even as the Yuan dynasty attempted to invade Japan on two occa-

sions and continued to seek a military solution, they established a

monopolistic trade system that permitted trade by Japanese merchant

vessels. However, in 10/1292 when

Japanese merchant ship landed at

Ch'ing-Yuan (Ningpo) seeking trade, weapons were discovered hidden

on board. Accordingly, the Yuan immediately strengthened its coastal

defenses and appointed a commander in

chief,

intensifying their cau-

tionary attitude toward Japan. Soon thereafter, however, Kublai died.

The edict of 1298 failed to sway Japan, and rumors of Japanese

revenge against the Mongols circulated. The Mongols' fear of Japan

increased, and Mongol court officials began to adopt a firm attitude

toward Japanese trading vessels. In response to this, and to illegal

persecution by Yuan court officials, the Japanese found it necessary to

arm themselves for self-defense, and a kind of forced trade ensued. In

addition, Japanese pirate attacks on the Yuan continued. Thus the

Yuan forbade private trade and repeatedly sent out commercial offi-

cials to regulate it.

While the Yuan dynasty prepared for a third attack on Japan, or

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

422 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

attempted to lure the Japanese to its side, Japan did not dismantle the

defense structure prepared for the Mongol invasions. The institutional

exemplification of this was the establishment of the Chinzei tandai

(western defense command)

in Hakata to rule on lawsuits (mainly

civil suits) in Kyushu where warriors were forced to devote their entire

attention to foreign defense. Hojo family members were successively

appointed to head the office. Previously, the center of Kyushu govern-

ment had been at Dazaifu, but now it shifted to Hakata. The Chinzei

tandai

was organized around 7/1300, the year after the Yuan envoy I-

shan I-ning came to Japan. Because the Chinzei tandai was a

Kamakura bakufu organ for controlling Kyushu and hinged on for-

eign defense, it was granted authority primarily over foreign relations.

Because the Chinzei tandai also functioned as a link in the Hojo's

control of the entire country, it meant that the control of foreign

relations was directly connected from Hakata to Kamakura within the

Hoj 6 family

itself.

However, as it became obvious that it was merely a

local office for Hojo family authoritarian control, the Chinzei tandai

gradually lost the support of Kyushu warriors and suffered the same

fate as did the bakufu.

In 4/1264 the Kamakura bakufu had curtailed its official ships to

China as the conditions leading to the Mongol invasions began to take

shape. But in 4/1290 the bakufu allotted "money seized from Chinese

ships"

to construct the Raizan Sennyoji, a temple in Chikuzen. There-

fore,

nine years after the Mongol invasions, Japanese trading vessels

were entering China with the official approval of the Kamakura

bakufu. Documents 70 through 73 in Volume 1 of the Aokata

monjo

pertain to a Chinese vessel wrecked in Hizen in 4/1298; the greater

portion of the cargo was consigned to the Hojo family. This is a partial

indication of why Kamakura was excited about the importation of

Chinese goods.

Thus,

from the end of the Kamakura period into the Nambokucho

era, trading vessels for the purpose of constructing temples and

shrines were dispatched to Yuan China with the approval of the

Kamakura bakufu. Among these, for example, were a vessel for the

construction of the Kenchdji (departed in 1325 and returned the next

year) and one for the construction of the Great Buddha at Kamakura

in 1329. A ship for the construction of Sumiyoshi Shrine in Settsu

was also dispatched under bakufu protection in the final years of this

64 For Chinzei tandai, see Sato Shin'ichi, Kamakura jidai

sosho

seido no kenkyu (Tokyo: Unebi

shobo, 1943), chap. 5; Seno, Chinzei

gokenin

no kenkyu.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

FOREIGN RELATIONS: EARLY MUROMACHI 423

period. The ship for the construction of the Tenryuji temple dis-

patched by the Muromachi bakufu during the Nambokucho era is

well known.

Temple and shrine construction projects of this magni-

tude required enormous wealth, and so Japan relied on foreign trade,

from which it was easy to obtain great profits. And we should not

forget that it was the Hojo family's control over Japan's coastlines

along the Inland Sea and Kyushu that enabled the dispatch of these

trading vessels.

Thus,

in regard to Japanese-Mongol relations after the invasions,

even while the Mongols prepared for a third invasion (a military solu-

tion) and attempted to induce Japan's surrender (a diplomatic solu-

tion),

there were also cultural exchanges, and trade was brisk.

The

bakufu publicly authorized the trading vessels so that they would not

be mistaken for wako, and these ships became the precedent for the

later tally trade with Ming China. On the other hand, the wako trade

also increased. So in postinvasion Japanese-Yuan relations we see two

trends developing that served as forerunners of the trading structure

of the succeeding era: authorized trade and piracy.

FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY MUROMACHI

PERIOD

The Muromachi bakufu was presented with its first diplomatic prob-

lem in 1366 with the arrival of the Koryo envoys,

requesting in the

name of the Yuan dynasty the suppression of wako raids which had

become especially fierce after 1350. Koryo periodically dispatched

envoys to Japan in response. The Muromachi bakufu saw the Koryo

mission as significant, for two reasons. First, this was the first time

that Koryo had sent a mission requesting the suppression of piracy

since the fall of the Kamakura bakufu. The Muromachi bakufu dis-

patched its own envoy privately and achieved a peaceful relationship

with Koryo, thus taking the first steps toward seizing authority for

foreign relations. Second, although the Muromachi bakufu acceded to

65 Miura Hiroyuki, "Tenryuji-bune ni kansuru shin kenkyu," in Shigaku zasshi 25 (January

1914),

reprinted in Nihonshi no kenkyu, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1922).

66 Kimiya Yasuhiko, Nikka bunka koryushi (Tokyo: Fuzambo, 1955), is the most comprehensive

work dealing with the Sino-Japanese cultural interchange this era. Tsuji Zennosuke, Nisshi

bunka no koryu (Osaka: Sogensha, 1938), describes the cultural exchange between the two

countries from ancient times to the early modern period.

67 Mori, Shintei Nisso boeki no kenkyu, p. 525.

68 On this subject, see Aoyama, Nichirai

koshoshi

no kenkyu, pp. 91-97; and Nakamura, Nissen

kankeishi no kenkyu, vol 1, pp. 203-26.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

424 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

Koryo's desire to establish diplomatic ties, it did not do so as Japan's

official representatives. Because Kyushu, the local agency of Japanese

foreign policy, was under the sway of

the

Southern Court, the Kyushu

tandai

- who controlled the bakufu's forces on the island - could not

exercise his authority and thus could scarcely suppress the pirates as

requested by Koryo. And this forced the Muromachi bakufu to con-

sider in earnest the subjugation of Kyushu.

The next diplomatic problem to arise for the Muromachi bakufu

was the arrival of Chinese envoys following the founding of the new

Ming dynasty. These envoys did not initially approach the bakufu but

negotiated with Prince Kaneyoshi, the Southern Court's general for

the conquest of the west

(seisei

shogun).

In the first month of 1368, Chu Yuan-chang (1348-98), having

toppled the Yuan dynasty, was enthroned as emperor at Yungt'ien-fu

(Nanking). He called his new dynasty Ta-ming (Great Ming) and

changed the era name to Hung-wu (Vast militance). The Grand Pro-

genitor (T'aitsu) Chu Yuan-chang based his state on Confucianism,

which regarded the Ming as the center of the world, and he expected

to establish an international order in which the surrounding barbarian

states would bring tribute to the Ming as the Middle Kingdom. In the

eleventh month of the same year, T'aitsu sent envoys to Annam,

Champa, Koryo, and Japan announcing the founding of the dynasty.

He aimed for the restoration of a Chinese world order based on ex-

change (gifts or trade, allowed by the Ming in return for tribute from

the foreign states).

This exchange represented a form of etiquette

demonstrating friendly political relations between states and, at the

same time, having an economic aspect as it involved an exchange of

goods.

The Ming accordingly revived the appointment of commis-

69 Ming shih-lu records dealing with Japan are collected in Nihon shiryo shusei hensankai, ed.,

Chugoku-Chosen no shiseki ni

okeru

Nihon shiryo

shusei,

Minjitsuroku no bu (Tokyo: Kokusho

kankokai, 1975), vols. 1-3 (abbreviated as Min jitsuroku). Likewise, Ming shih (abbreviated

as Minshi) is included in the same collection in Rekishi no bu, vol. 1. Ishihara Michihiro,

Yakuchu Chugoku seishi Nihonden (Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1975), which includes the

Japan-related sections of the Ming shih, provides a valuable overview of Sino-Japanese rela-

tions from Chinese official histories, from the Wei

chih

to the Ch'ing shih.

70 The following are studies on Sino-Japanese relations in the early Ming: Ikeuchi Hiroshi,

"Minsho ni okeru Nihon to Shina to no kosho," Rekishi to chiri 6 (May-August 1904);

Sakuma Shigeo, "Minsho no Nitchu kankei o meguru ni, san no mondai," in Hokkaido

daigakujimbun kagaku ronshu, no. 4 (February 1966); and Imaeda Aishin and Murai Shosuke,

"Nichimin koshoshi no jomaku," in Tokyo daigaku shiryo hensanjoho, no 11 (March 1977).

Also see the following studies that deal with Japanese-Ming relations: Akiyama Kenzo,

"Nichimin kankei," in Izvanami kdza Nihon rekishi, vol 1 (1933); Kobata Atsushi, Chiisei

Nisshi tsuko boekishi (Tokyo: Toko shoin, 1941); and Tanaka, Chiisei taigai kankeishi.

71 Sakuma, "Minsho ni okeru Nihon to Shina to no kosho," p. 8.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

FOREIGN RELATIONS: EARLY MUROMACHI 425

sioners at Ningpo (Ming chou), Ch'uan chou, and Kuang chou, to

oversee the exchange.

T'aitsu's first envoy to Japan was killed en route by pirates. He

dispatched another in 2/1396 and, in a threatening manner, pressed

the Southern Court general Prince Kaneyoshi to send tribute and to

suppress the pirates.

Prince Kaneyoshi, however, had the Ming en-

voy killed and refused the demands. One reason that the Ming had

chosen to negotiate with the outpost of the Southern Court was its

geographical proximity in Kyushu's Chikuzen Province, but they also

thought that it was the successor to Dazaifu, Japan's traditional local

agency for foreign relations.

However, when the Ming sent a third

envoy to Japan in 3/1370, Prince Kaneyoshi presented a

hydsen

(piao-

chien,

a foreign-policy document presented to a Chinese emperor) in

which he referred to himself

"subject." He sent his vassal Sorai and

others with tribute to Ming in

10/1371,

at which time he returned

more than seventy men and women who had been captured at Ming-

chou and Tai-chou.

Prince Kaneyoshi thereby completely reversed

his previous attitude, accepting the Ming international order and enter-

ing into a subject relationship.

Representative bakufu warriors from Kyushu traveled to Kyoto plead-

ing with the bakufu to develop a plan to revive its declining power in

Kyushu. One reason that the Muromachi bakufu did not earlier subju-

gate the Southern Court's last fortress of Seiseifu and its ruler was that

the bakufu was not recognized by foreign countries as sovereign in

Japan, and thus the bakufu leaders prepared with great care their plan

for pacifying Kyushu. At the center of this plan was Hosokawa

Yoriyuri, aiding the young shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. It also in-

volved the appointment as Kyushu tandai of the Ashikaga kinsman

Imagawa Ryoshun, who possessed both civil and martial abilities.

After thorough preparations, Ryoshun set off for Kyushu in the sec-

ond month of

1371.

Because the Muromachi bakufu concentrated its

power on overthrowing the Southern Court in Kyushu, an attack on

the Seiseifu fortress at Dazaifu became a necessity. Prince Kaneyoshi's

change of attitude toward the Ming was quite natural under the cir-

cumstances.

When Prince Kaneyoshi's envoy arrived at the Ming capital, T'aitsu

accepted him as Japan's official ambassador and treated the prince as

72 Minjitsuroku no bu, vol. I, pp. 1-2. 73 Tanaka, Chusei laigai

kankeishi,

p. 55.

74 Minjitsuroku no bu, vol. I, p. 8; Ming

shih,

p. 284.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

426 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

"Japan's true ruler." During T'aitsu's era, Japan dispatched about ten

envoys to China. Among them, the 6/1374 and 9/1380 missions sent by

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu were turned back because they did not have

proper documents. The 6/1374 Shimazu Ujihisa mission was also

turned back because the Ming said he was not

ruler but only

vassal.

Two missions are of uncertain nature, and all the other six were from

the "Japanese King Ryokai" (Yoshikane) in

10/1371,

4/1378, interca-

lary 5/1379, 5/1380, 7/1381, and n/1386.

In the first three, Japan

forwarded a hydsen under Prince Kaneyoshi's name and offered

horses, swords, armor, sulfur, and other items. However, the fourth

mission was turned back for insincerity; the fifth's tribute was re-

jected; and the sixth had both its documents and tribute rejected.

Prince Kaneyoshi's name, "King of Japan," was credible with the

Ming up until the third mission; thereafter, even though rejected by

the Ming, the Japanese attempted diplomatic contacts with the Ming

under his name. Those in charge of foreign affairs actually believed

that under Prince Kaneyoshi's name, relations would be acceptable to

the Ming. Because it appears that Prince Kaneyoshi resigned the post

seisei

shogun in 4/1374

and died in 1384, the only mission that he

unquestionably dispatched to China was that of

1371.

The other mis-

sions were probably dispatched by Kaneyoshi's successor, the

goseisei

shogun

tniya,

using the prince's name as he had already been recog-

nized by the Ming as "Japan's true ruler," although this is not known

for certain. By this time the Southern Court's influence in Kyushu was

already on the wane, and these may have been bogus envoys to Ming

China sent by pirate forces.

The Ming envoys to Prince Kaneyoshi at Dazaifu arrived in Hakata

in the fifth month of 1372. This was during Imagawa Ryoshun's siege

of the Seiseifu at Dazaifu, and so the envoys were detained at Hakata

and could not present the prince with the Ming calendar and other

items symbolic of his status as a subject of the Ming. Responding to

the changed political situation, the Ming envoys instead went to Kyoto

and entered into negotiations with the Northern Court. In

8/1373

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu sent them home to China and then dispatched

his own ambassador with a reply, returning at the same time some 150

Chinese and Korean captives. However Ming T'aitsu refused to accept

the tribute relationship on the grounds that it lacked proper documen-

tation. Thus, the Muromachi bakufu's initial negotiations with the

75 Kawazoe Shoji, Imagawa Ryoshun (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1964).

76 Kawazoe Shoji, "Kaneyoshi Shinno

meguru Kyushu

Nambokucho,"

Rekishi

koron

(September 1979): 92-99.

FOREIGN RELATIONS: EARLY MUROMACHI 427

Ming ended in failure.

In this incident, the Muromachi bakufu un-

der the Ashikaga shogun was keenly aware that it had not received

recognition as Japan's representative in the Sinocentric East Asian

international order. To do so, the bakufu would have to defeat Prince

Kaneyoshi - whom the Ming recognized as "Japan's

true

ruler" - and

suppress the wako. Thus the pacification of Kyushu became even

more urgent. Only after the political opposition between the two

courts had been settled in favor of the Northern Court did Ashikaga

Yoshimitsu become "King of Japan."

In 2/1375 Koryo's King U sent an envoy to Japan requesting that it

suppress the wako raids. In response, Japan dispatched an envoy offer-

ing Koryo dyed cloth, painted folding screens, long swords, wine

vessels, and other items. On that occasion the Tenryuji monk Tokuso

Shusa sent the following letter expressing the bakufu's intention:

"Kyushu is broken apart by rebelling subjects and does not pay trib-

ute;

the stubborn subjects of the Western seacoast have become pi-

rates.

But these are not the doing of the bakufu. We are planning to

dispatch a general to Kyushu to pacify the area and can promise to

suppress the pirates."

This indicates that the Muromachi bakufu was

counting on Imagawa Ryoshun's operations in Kyushu and hoping to

use his success in negotiations with Koryo.

In 8/1372, Imagawa Ryoshun forced Dazaifu's surrender and cap-

tured Prince Kaneyoshi and his chief military supporters, the Kikuchi

family, at Kikuchi in Higo Province, and in 8/1375, he killed Shoni

Fuyusuke at Mizushima in Higo. The Shoni family had held shugo

appointments since Kamakura times and had inherited the office of

Dazai no shoni the highest post of local responsibility within the

Dazaifu structure. Imagawa Ryoshun secured the supremacy of the

bakufu force in Kyushu by first proceeding from Dazaifu to Seiseifu

and then defeating Shoni Fuyusuke, the warrior of highest local au-

thority in Dazaifu. Shimazu Ujihisa, who brought Shoni Fuyusuke to

Imagawa Ryoshun, subsequently found himself having to follow

Ryoshun's orders. However, he not only came into control of

Chikuzen Province, the Shoni's home territory and the base for admin-

istering Kyushu; he also seized the Shoni's authority over foreign

affairs. As the real successor to Dazaifu, Imagawa Ryoshun came into

control of Japan's foreign policy.

77 Imaeda and Murai, "Nichimin koshoshi no jomaku"; and Murai Shosuke, "Muromachi

bakufu no saisho no kenminshi ni tsuite," in Imaeda Aishin, ed., Zenshu no shomondai

(Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1979). 78 Koryosa, kwan 133,

Yolchon

46, Shin U.

428 JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

Ashikaga Yoshimitsu secured shogunal authority only after Kyushu

had been subjugated. Except for his reception of the Ming envoy in

1372,

Imagawa Ryoshun's dealings with Ming are not mentioned in

any sources. It was natural that Ming would not conduct formal nego-

tiations with Ryoshun,

he was only a

vassal.

But it also goes without

saying that there were always hidden problems stemming from the

Ming's relations with the Southern Court in Kyushu.

That being the case, Imagawa Ryoshun's public diplomatic dealings

were with only the two Korean dynasties, Koryo and Choson. The 9/

1377 visit of the Koryo envoy Ch'oe Mong-ju seeking suppression of

the wako was an epoch-making event in Ryoshun Koryo negotia-

tions.

Ch'oe Mong-ju, a noted scholar and high government official

of the pro-Ming faction, was praised as the greatest statesman of his

day. Ryoshun received Ch'oe warmly, returned several hundred prison-

ers captured by the

wako,

and suppressed the pirates of Tsushima, Iki,

and Matsura. From then on, Koryo dealt directly with the real power

holder in Kyushu, "the Kyushu defense commander Minamoto no

Ryoshun," when seeking the suppression of pirate attacks. Ryoshun,

taking advantage of this role, dealt directly with Koryo without con-

sulting the bakufu. At this point, the Muromachi bakufu recognized

that direct control over foreign relations was necessary to crush the

Southern Court in Kyushu, and fortunately for the bakufu, Ryoshun's

supporter, Hosokawa Yoriyuki, was the real power in bakufu politics.

Ryoshun's return of the captives was an "enterprise similar to a com-

mercial act contracted to obtain compensations,"

and in this sense

his dealings with Koryo were a kind of "trade" appropriate to the

wako period.

However, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, aspiring to become "King

of Japan," could not be expected to allow the situation to continue

forever. When Ryoshun's protector, Hosokawa Yoriyuki, was toppled

from power in the Oryaku incident of

1379,

the repercussions affected

Ryoshun's position as Kyushu landai, and Yoshimitsu's designs on

control of foreign policy intensified. A shogunal order of 6/8/1381 in

the

Nejime

monjo,

addressed to Ryoshun as

shugo

Osumi,

prohibited

the akuto (outlaws) of that province from crossing over to Koryo and

committing outrages; that is, the order prohibited pirate activities.

79 Shiryo shusei hensankai, Chugoku-Chosen no shiseki ni okeru Nihon shiryo shusei, Sangoku,

Korai no bu, p. 238. 80 Tanaka, Chusei laigai kankeishi, p. 99.

81 Kawazoe Shoji, ed., Nejime monjo, vol. 3 (Fukuoka: Kyushu daigaku bungakubu, Kyushu

shiryo kankokai, 1955), p. 56.