Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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Humanistic logic
187
HUMANIST
LOGIC
AND
DEVELOPMENTS
IN
TEXTUAL
EXEGESIS
Introduction
In pointing
out
that
the
context
for
humanist dialectical innovations
was
their preoccupation with oratory
and
with textual exegesis,
I do not
mean
to imply
that
the
significance
of
contributions
of
major humanist
dialecticians
like
Valla
and
Agricola
was
confined
to the
study
of the
non-
rigorous
and
descriptive
use
of
language.
A
distinction does, however, need
to
be
drawn between
the
original
and
influential work
of
Valla,
Agricola
and distinguished specialists
in the
Greek
of
the ancient logical texts
and the
humanist textbook writers
of the
latter
half
of the
sixteenth century.
56
There
is
little doubt
that
the
humble manual writers serving
the
immediate
needs
of
universities
and
schools failed
to
understand
the
significance
of
the
trail-blazing
dialecticians' major breaks with traditional
logic,
or
if
they
did,
failed
to
transmit
it in
their textbooks.
In
part
this
is the
fate
of
textbook
writers. Even today, logic textbooks include material which
a
standard
notion
of
curriculum suggests 'ought'
to
figure, because
it is
'part
of the
baggage
which
has
been dragged through
the
centuries with
the
label
"Aristotle"
on one
side
and
"logic"
on the
other', whether
or not it is any
longer
pertinent
to
contemporary
views
on the
nature
of
logic.
57
Because
of
their avowed interest
in
problems
of
textual exegesis
and
oratory,
humanist textbook writers
did
give
prominence
to
those topics likely
to
prove
useful
to the
intending lawyer, courtier
or
other practitioner
of
oratorical
and
exegetical skills. Inevitably this meant giving increased space
to discussion
of
'informal' sequences
of
arguments which
at its
worst
amounts
to an
almost metaphorical notion
of
'logic'
as a
discipline
appropriate
to the art of
discourse.
Furthermore, humanist dialecticians were concerned with ratiocination
in types
of
discourse whose
structure
they correctly considered opaque
to
syllogistic
analysis, notably
the
increasingly fashionable dialogue form
(arguing equally plausible alternative points
of
view
to a
balanced
probabilistic conclusion).
58
Where
for
scholastic logicians their study
was a
56. For details of the textbook tradition, see
Cambridge
History
1982, pp. 797-807 (L. Jardine). See
also
Risse 1964, Vasoli 1968a.
57.
See, for instance, Burnyeat's remarks about the way in which enthymeme continues to figure in
textbooks in Burnyeat unpublished.
58. See L. Jardine 1977, 1983; C.J. R. Armstrong 1976, Dear 1984.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
i88
Logic
and language
stage along the road to the higher disciplines of
natural
science, theology
and metaphysics, for humanists it was a means to the analysis and
understanding of canonical texts (literary and
legal),
and orations (ancient
and modern; forensic and epideictic), and an aid to composition of
discursive writings emulative of'golden' Latin. All those humanists whose
names are now catalogued as
authors
of reforming texts on logic/dialectic
regarded those works as merely one item in a revised
arts
curriculum, whose
focus
was the study of the great textual relics of antiquity
—
what down to
the early decades of the present century were called the 'classics'.
Valla's
Elegantiae was the mainstay
of
humanist discussions of the
lexical
and syntactical subtleties of the Latin language.
Agricola's
Latin version of
the fourth-century Greek manual of oratorical practice, Aphthonius'
Progymnasmata,
was probably as influential within the revised curriculum as
his De inventione dialéctica. The
Progymnasmata
are a graded series
of
exercises
in eloquence starting with the invented fable, passing through the first-
person imaginary speech
of
a famous hero or heroine
of
antiquity on some
occasion
celebrated in literature, and concluding with a law-court
declamation.
59
The prominence in educational
terms
of
both these works is
shown by the fact
that
Erasmus, who dedicated
himself
to the production of
suitable texts for liberal
arts
teaching in the mid sixteenth century, published
a condensed edition
of
the former, and emulated the
latter
in his De copia, his
De
conscribendis epistolis and his De ratione studii.
60
Set alongside the two
authors' dialectic texts, these major works in eloquentia do indeed provide a
liberal
arts
context for the reorientation of dialectic studies.
Specifically,
they pin the study
of
dialectic to occasion, pragmatic requirements and the
one-off
argument.
61
As
a whole, the pedagogic works of
Valla
and
Agricola
provide a
characteristically 'grammatical' approach to language (both
Valla
and his
detractors refer to his Dialecticae disputationes as the work of a 'grammar-
ian'). Concentrating as they do on 'usage' (the Latin
of
the best authorities of
antiquity), they
feel
obliged, in their
treatment
of argumentation, to try to
account for extended persuasive discourse (of the kind found in Cicero's
orations, say), as
well
as isolated valid sequences of propositions. The
absence
of
such discussion in the traditional
logic
syllabus has consequences
beyond the study
of
logic
itself. A glance at a late medieval commentary, or
59. On the
Progymnasmata,
see
Marrou
1958;
Bonner
1977, p. 251.
60. On
Erasmus
and the
humanist
dialectical/rhetorical
tradition,
see
Chomarat
1981.
61. On
humanist education
and its
liberal
arts focus,
see
Grafton
and L.
Jardine
1986,
Bolgar
1954.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
189
indeed
a
commentary
by an
early humanist textual exegete like Guarino
da
Verona,
on any
ancient text makes
it
clear
that,
packed
as
these
commentaries
are
with significant textual detail, they offer
no
analysis
of
the discursive framework into which this material
is
fitted, making
it
difficult
for the
student
to
follow
the
narrative thread
or
sense of the work.
Battista Guarino's version of his father Guarino's lecture notes
on
Pseudo-
Cicero's
Ad
Herennium
is
vividly
anecdotal, cumulatively overwhelming,
but discursively unhelpful after this fashion.
62
When
Agricola
maintains,
at
the outset
of
his treatment,
that
one of
dialectic's duties
is to
'teach',
in
Cicero's
extended sense (communicating some knowledge
to
someone),
he
paves
the
way
for the
enthusiastic use of topical analysis
and
dichotomous
method
as
procedures
for
clarifying
the
structure
of
a piece
of
writing
(or
speech)
so
that
the
student
can
grasp
its
discursive organisation,
or as one
might loosely say,
its
'argument',
and is
thereby taught how
to
employ
a
similar procedure
for his own
compositions.
63
Ramus' dichotomous keying
was
embraced enthusiastically
by
arts
teachers
in the
middle
and
later decades
of the
sixteenth century
for its
ability
to
make
vivid
to the
student
in a
clearly tabulated version
the
complex
running threads
in any
sophisticated piece of writing.
64
William
Temple's
A
Logical Analysis
of
Twenty
Select Psalms (1605), Johannes
Piscator's Analysis logica epistolarum Horatii
omnium
(1596)
and his
analysis
logica
of the gospels
and St
Paul
and
Abraham Fraunce's logical analysis
of
one
of
Horace's Odes are typical products
of
this tradition.
65
Whilst
a
far cry
from formal
logic,
they
do
provide
a
method
of
reading which identifies
and groups thoughts and illustrations so
that
the
argument
or
arguments of
the work
are
accessible
to the
reader.
In
essence, these
are the
early tools
of
text criticism
in
our modern sense.
66
It
is significant as
proof
of
the hold
that
methodical analysis
as
promoted
by the
Ramists took
on the
popular
academic imagination
that
while dialecticians like Charpentier
and
Digby
challenged
the
uniqueness of Ramist dichotomous method, they neverthe-
less
felt called upon
to
give
prominence
to
alternative methodical
procedures
for
textual analysis
and
composition
of
their own.
67
62.
See
Grafton
and L.
Jardine
1982. 63.
Agricola
1539, p. 1
(prooemium).
64.
See Ong
1958a;
L.
Jardine
1974a,
pp. 41-7.
65.
On
Temple,
see L.
Jardine
1974a,
Howell
1956. On
Piscator
and
Fraunce,
see
Howell
1956, Ong
1958a.
66.
See Ong
1958a,
Grafton
and L.
Jardine
1986.
67.
On the
Digby/Temple
dispute
over
method
see L.
Jardine
1974a.
On
Digby,
see N. W.
Gilbert
i960, pp. 200-8. On
Charpentier,
see N. W.
Gilbert
i960, pp.
145—52.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
190
Logic
and language
Abraham
Fraunce
In this context we may take as a single example of the text-exegetical wing
of
humanist dialectical development Abraham Fraunce's The Lawiers Logike
(1588).
68
This little manual is a typical compromise between an urge to
demonstrate the practical usefulness
of
humanist topics-logic and a desire to
'cover'
the
standard
teaching material.
69
It is also typically Ramist in its
conflation
of rudimentary humanist dialectic and practical 'reading'
techniques suitable for
literature
and for the analysis of existing law-court
speeches
and the preparation of fresh ones. It formed a pair with its
companion volume The Arcadian Rhetorike (thus, incidentally, making clear
the deliberate distinction sustained by humanist educators between so-
called
'rhetoricised' dialectic and rhetoric itself) to provide the English
gentleman with a practical, vernacular
treatment
of all he needed to know
about use
of
language
in the two major areas in which he was
likely
to need
such knowledge - namely, applied forensic debate (in his capacity as lawyer,
statesman or
civic
functionary) and the reading and appreciation of 'high'
works
of
literature
(a suitable pastime for those of gentle birth). Fraunce's
manual is included here as a characteristic example
of
humanist-influenced
dialectical
practice, the typical successor to the theoretically stringent and
innovative
works of
Valla,
Agricola,
Caesarius, Melanchthon and other
major figures.
70
Practical
considerations have apparently utterly overwhelmed abstract
and theoretical considerations in Fraunce's work. Indeed, the most
appropriate
term
to use, in my
view,
for the function of dialectic in
Fraunce's, and any number
of
other similarly motivated manuals
of
the last
decades of the sixteenth century, is 'occasional'. Suiting the occasion,
concentrating on
locally
generalised or generalisable rules binding form and
content of an argument, is the object
of
the instruction offered. One might
add
that
the difference between the 'occasional' focus
of
such a manual and
the abstract and theoretical emphasis
of
the late scholastic manual is in many
ways
the difference between the educational aspirations of the two systems
-
the goal of the
latter
being 'expertise',
that
of the former being
'urbanity'.
71
Furthermore, crucial assumptions
of
the new dialectic, such as
the assumption
that
inference forms other
than
those handled by medieval
logicians
might be entitled to serious and systematic consideration (a main
68. On
Fraunce,
see
Howell
1956;
Hamblin
1970, pp.
139-42.
69.
Hamblin
1970, p. 140.
70. See
Risse
1965,
Vasoli
1968a.
71. See
Grafton
and L.
Jardine
1986.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
191
plank in
Valla's
and Agricola's argument), and
that
something like
Boethius'
topical maxims might offer further locally valid rules guarantee-
ing
argumentation, have been lost from
view.
Fraunce refocuses his
treatment of a dialectic embracing a relaxed notion of 'reasoning' around
the contention
that
all argumentation, however superficially loose, is
ultimately to be checked for validity by reducing it to syllogistic form,
because only the syllogism is 'certain' (it is not to be used in such form, but it
should be
thus
tested):
Now
if these propositions bee doubtful,
then
therof be made questions, which are
to bee prooued by
third
arguments, fet from the affections of the
other
two which
were ioyned in the axiome, and lastly are to be concluded by syllogisme, the onely
iudge of all coherence or consequence: as finally, Methode has only to deale with
the ordering and setling of many axioms, thereby to giue sentence of methodicall
proceeding or vnorderly confusion. And therefore I see no reason why I should
with the common Logicians, chop in Canons, Maximaes, and rules
of
consequence,
as they call them, applying them to euery argument of inuention, seeing
that
syllogismes,
and onely syllogismes are the
true
and onely rules of consequence and
inconsequence, as I said before.
72
Fraunce does go on to make it plain
that
he countenances an almost
unlimited range
of
ad hoc argument strategies as 'pro-syllogisms', in actual
discourse,
thus
aligning
himself
with
the 'any good argument is admissible'
school,
but the flexibility
of
the notion
of
alternative types
of
inference has
been sacrificed in the interests of textbook neatness.
Fraunce
himself
makes it clear
that
by 'new' logic he means a new type of
practical handbook (preferably tailored to the needs of particular individ-
uals - logic for lawyers, logic for preachers and so forth), facilitating clear-
thinking and persuasive argument. Neither he nor any
of
the other English
manual writers of the second half of the sixteenth century (Seton and
Carter, Wilson, Fenner and so on) make claims for the originality of their
work
for formal logic as a specialist discipline.
73
They do insist
that
some
mastery
of
their discipline (such as it is) is a prerequisite for a career based on
an
arts
education.
Humanist
dialectic and scientific method
Agricola's
De inventione dialéctica is exclusively concerned with the analysis
of
the kind
of
texts, or the kind
of
discourse, which
will
be encountered by
72.
Fraunce
1588, f. 7
r_v
.
73. For
details
of
these
authors'
manuals,
see
Risse
1964, pp.
25-31,
82-105;
L.
Jardine
1974a;
Howell
1956-
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
192
Logic
and
language
students
of the
liberal arts.
But
some post-Agricolan dialectic manuals
do
attempt
to
deal with scientific reasoning
or
'demonstration'.
By the
very
nature
of the
humanist dialectic manual, discussion
of
demonstration,
or
reasoning leading
to
scientifically certain conclusions, tends
to be
included
out
of an
urge
for
completeness
rather
than
out of any
real interest
in or
specialist understanding
of
this topic.
74
This
is the
case
in
'hybrid' manuals
like
those
of
Caesarius
and
Melanchthon. Both these authors associate their
discussion
of
demonstrative procedures with
a
priori
and
a
posteriori methods
of
proof used
by
geometers.
75
In the
light
of the
present account,
it is not
surprising
that
humanist dialecticians
are
derivative
and
muddled
in
their
discussion
of
demonstration, since
it
harks back
to a
kind
of
logical
analysis
which
the
whole drift
of
their
own
version inclines against.
It was, however,
the
inadequacy
(and
sometimes incompetence)
of
this
part
of the 'new'
dialectic manual which attracted
the
scorn
of
sixteenth-
century Aristotelian logicians
and has
since attracted similar scorn
on the
part
of
historians
of
formal
logic,
not to
mention historians
of
science
absorbed with
the
origins
of
scientific method.
76
It
would,
of
course, have
been better
had
humanist dialecticians decided
not to
tackle scientific
reasoning
at all,
rather
than
dealing with
it in an
inadequate
or
confused
fashion. Here
we
come
up
against
the
inevitable interaction between history
and individual achievement
in
intellectual history. As long
as
distinguished
thinkers like
Valla
proposed
a
radically different approach
to
reasoning,
namely
a
sceptical acknowledgement
that
an
argument must always
fall
short
of
certainty,
and
that
greater
or
lesser degrees
of
likelihood were
the
object
of the
logician's attention, they could hold their
own
against their
scholastic adversaries.
But
once schoolteacher dialecticians
had
expanded
their textbook treatment from
Agricola's
framework
of
plausible reasoning
to include schoolroom subjects which needed
to be
'covered', they proved
vulnerable
to
charges
of
woolly
thinking
and
absence
of
logical
rigour.
By
the
end of the
sixteenth century
the
diffusing
of
focus
in the
humanist
dialectic manual
had
paved
the
way
for the
reintroduction
of
the systematic
Aristotelian manual, uncontroversially covering
the
material
of
Aristotle's
Organon
for the
student
in
need
of
a clear introduction
to
traditional
logic.
74.
See N. Jardine in this volume for a full treatment of scientific demonstration.
75.
On demonstration in the humanist manual, see
L.
Jardine
1974a,
pp. 47-58. See also N. Jardine 1976
and 1979; N. W. Gilbert
i960,
pp.
86-92.
N. Jardine 1984, p. 240, points out the comparatively
greater sophistication of Melanchthon in discussing scientific method. On Melanchthon, see also
Boisset 1967. 76. See Risse 1964.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
193
THE
IMPACT
OF HUMANIST
GREEK
STUDIES ON
LOGIC
Introduction
Apart
from individual humanists' explicit technical interest in dialectic,
their influence is to be felt on logic studies as a result of activities more
conventionally
associated with their linguistic specialism: the retrieval of
uncorrupted texts in the ancient languages, the establishing of editiones
principes of the opera of major and minor authors, and the translation of
Greek
into classical Latin. A striking example of the unobtrusive but
powerful
effect of such activities is provided by the editio princeps of the
Greek
works of
Aristotle,
published at Venice by Aldus Manutius between
1495
and 1498.
77
The Aldine Greek Aristotle printed the logical works as a
body
of texts which thenceforth became codified as the 'Organon' (the
Categories,
De interpretation, Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and
Sophistici elenchi). But it appears
that
the supposed chronological order of
the works and the title (Organon), which gives unity and fixity to Aristotle's
logic,
are established for the first time with the Aldine printed text.
78
The
Latin Aristotle of the Middle
Ages
had meant, where the logical
works
were concerned, Boethius' translations (or translations attributed to
Boethius),
together with supporting works fortuitously grouped with
Aristotle's
works in the curriculum (such as the pseudonymous Liber sex
principiorum).
79
With the establishing of a
standard
Greek text came
emended Latin translations, which in
turn
prompted revised commentaries
from
specialist logicians. Because
of
his commitment to the texts
of
a
'pure'
Latin
Aristotle, established by Lefevre d'Etaples, the commentator
Johannes
Eck,
despite his overt commitment to conventional scholastic
logic,
found
himself
led in the direction
of
revised
readings and reconsidered interpreta-
tions of Aristotle's texts, even though he was not in general in sympathy
with
the 'grammatical' dialectic of the humanists. Discussing Aristotelian
demonstration, for example, he comments as
follows:
Demonstration [apodeixis] is syllogism conferring knowledge. This the ancient
texts read corruptly as 'apotiticon' or 'apodytecon', and Qodocus Trutfetter]
77.
Minio-Paluello
1972, pp.
483-500
at 491
('Attività
filosofico-editoriale
aristotelica
dell'umanesimo').
78. Ibid., pp.
492-3.
See p. 144
above
for the 1493
date
for the
first
commentary
on the
complete
Organon (by
George
of
Brussels
and
Petrus
Tartaretus).
79. See
Minio-Paluello
1972;
Lohr
1967 to
1974a;
Cambridge History 1982, pp.
45-79
(Dod).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
194
Logic
and
language
Isennachensis derived 'apotiticon' from 'apos',
that
is
'concerning',
and
'titicon',
that
is
'discipline'.
But
Lefevre d'Étaples
has
eruditely
and
assiduously expunged
this mistake.
80
Even
before
the
establishing
of
standard
'pure' Greek
printed
texts
and
Latin
translations, partial translations into elegant Latin
of
individual logical
works
by
distinguished humanists like
the
Byzantine Argyropulos encour-
aged noted humanists like George
of
Trebizond
and
Poliziano
to
offer their
own
contributions
in
areas conventionally left
to the
specialist logician's
attention.
81
The Greek commentaries
It
was not
only
the new
humanistic translations
of the
texts
of the
logic
corpus themselves which
led to
modified readings,
and
hence
a
revised
view
of
dialectic itself
(for
instance, Argyropulos' translations
of
Aristotle's
logical
works,
and
Lefevre's paraphrases).
82
Humanist-inspired Greek
expertise also made
it
possible
for
commentators
to
appeal
to the
authentic
tradition
of the
early Greek commentators
on the
Aristotelian corpus.
These Greek commentators were already familiar
as
sources
of
Boethius'
commentaries.
83
In their
own
explorations
of the
texts
of
Aristotle's works
on
dialectic,
specialists
in
Greek language texts like Argyropulos
and
Poliziano stressed
the vital importance
of
the works
of
Alexander
of
Aphrodisias, Ammonius,
Simplicius
and
Philoponus
for a
'true'
(i.e., Greek) understanding
of
Aristotle.
84
In
his Praelectio de dialéctica, Poliziano expresses
the
hope
that
the
'barbarous moderns' 'Burley, Herveus, Ockham, Heytesbury
and
Strode'
have been superseded.
'If,
therefore,
you
were
to ask me', he
writes,
'who
were
my
instructors
in the
Peripatetic School,
I
would
be
able
to
show
you
piles
of
books
in
which
you
might enumerate Theophrastus, Alexander,
Themistius, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus,
and
others besides, from
80. Aristotle
1516—17,11,
f. 63
v
: 'Demonstrado est syllogismus faciens scire. Hie antiqua litera corrupte
legit apotiticon seu apodytecon, et d(ominus) Isennachensis flexit apotiticon ab apos, id est de, et
titicon, disciplina. At d(ominus) Stapulensis erudite et diligenter hanc mendam expunxit.' On Eck,
see Seifert 1978. On Jodocus Trutfetter Isennachensis, see
Lohr
1970, pp.
151-2.
81.
On Poliziano and dialectic, see //
Poliziano
1957, pp.
161-72
(Vasoli) and Vasoli 1968a, pp.
116-31.
82. Minio-Paluello 1972,
Cranz
and Schmitt 1984.
83. See Stump in Boethius 1978 for the influence of the
Greek
commentators on Boethius' reading of
Aristotle's
Topics.
84. The impact of
these
commentators is on Aristotelianism as a whole, taking in the scientific and
metaphysical
works as well as logic. For the relation between new translations and commentaries,
see Schmitt 1983a.
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Humanistic logic
195
Aristotle's
household.' These
it
is who
give
access
to the
'purity'
of
Aristotle
('Aristotelis
puritatem').
85
For
Poliziano,
the
soundness
of a
reading
will
depend upon
the
commentator's knowledge
of the
Greek original
of the
text
and the
attention
he
pays
to
Greek commentators' interpretations
and
explanations.
A
fine example
of
a commentator who lived
up to
Poliziano's
expectations
in
this respect
is
Agostino
Nifo.
Calling
himself
a 'Peripatetic'
rather
than
an
Aristotelian,
in
order
to
indicate
his
allegiance
to the
'real'
Aristotle
of the
Greek texts, Nifo produced
a
sequence
of
intelligent
and
sensitive
commentaries during
the
early decades
of
the sixteenth century.
86
Agostino Nifo
I
have already described
the
mature humanist response
to the 'new'
Aristotle
in the
work
of
Valla
and
Agricola,
both
of
whom insist
that
their
approach
is not
inconsistent with
a
humanised Organon. Nifo's commen-
taries
on
Aristotle's logical works,
and in
particular
his
commentary
on the
Topics,
are a
crucial
part
of
the 'grammatical' developments
in
logic
of the
late fifteenth
and
early sixteenth centuries.
He is
also
an
appropriate case
to
take
in the
context
of
the present discussion, since
his
sensitivity
to the new
texts
of
Aristotle, coupled with
his
persisting loyalty
to the
Aristotelian
logic
camp,
has
resulted
in his
being chastised
by
traditional historians
of
logic
for
diluting
or
muddling
the
treatment
of
logic,
whilst
he is
largely
ignored
by
historians
of
humanist
logic.
I
shall concentrate here
on
Nifo's
treatment
of
the Topics, since
I
have argued
that
this
is the
focus
of
humanist
logical
interest
and
curriculum reform.
For
the
Topics
Nifo,
like other commentators, uses
a
substantially
Boethian
translation
of
the text, although
he
adds marginal remarks
on the
Greek
of
the text wherever appropriate.
One
of
the incidental
(and
perhaps
not accidental) consequences
of
this
is
that
Boethius' own commentaries
on
Aristotle's
and
Cicero's Topics remain pertinent
to
discussion
(the De
differentiis topicis
and the In
Topica Ciceronis). Nifo begins
his own
commentary with
a
definition
of
dialectic
in
relation
to
topics-theory,
which
is
entirely characteristic
of his
urge
to
defer
to the
Greek
commentators:
By
dialectic Alexander understands
not all of
logic,
but
topical method, which
Aristotle
teaches
in
these books. Averroes,
in the
proemium
to his
paraphrase
of
the
Topics,
infers this from
the
fact
that
dialectic means speech between
two
[people],
85. In Poliziano 1553, pp.
528-30
at 529. On the
Greek
translator's views on the
Greek
commentators,
see Vasoli 1968a, pp.
106-31.
86. See Risse 1964, p. 218.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
196
Logic
and
language
one
of
whom
struggles
to
vanquish
the
other,
and
since Aristotle assigns
the
'places'
by
means
of
which this
can be
achieved
to
these books,
he
rightly adopts
the
term
dialectic
for
this topical method.
87
And
he
closes
his
commentary with
a
firm statement about
the
vital
importance
of the
Greek tradition:
These
are the
things
we
have written
on the
Topics, expounded both from
Alexander
and
from Ammonius.
For in
Aristotle's words
we
find many obscurities,
and many differences
in the
written texts.
For in the
Greek codices which were
at
hand,
we
read several fragmented texts.
We
collated
in
turn
many Greek exemplars
and interpreted from them
in
such
a way as
seemed better
to us. We
looked
at the
expositions
of
many Latin authors
... In
addition
we
looked
at
certain
new
translations
of
Averroes,
or
rather
his
more blathering confusions, which since
the
translator
did not
understand,
no one can
understand them.
In
addition
we
looked
at Albertus whose surname
was
Magnus,
who
expounded this book most
obscurely,
yet
much better
than
he
expounded
the
books
of
natural
philosophy.
For
in those latter
he
said nothing
of any
value.
For he
followed
translations from
Arabic
into Latin,
in
which
there
are as
many errors
as
words. Indeed, because
in
logic
he
followed
translations from Greek into Latin, therefore
he
made fewer
errors.
We
looked also
at
several running commentaries
by
foreigners, which
are
not reasonably called running commentaries, because nothing concerning what
Aristotle
wrote
is
interpreted. From these, therefore,
we
received
no
assistance,
but
only
inextricable questions which
are
directed towards what they themselves
say,
not
to
those things
on
which Aristotle pronounced
. . .
Therefore,
if we had not
read
the
expositions
of
Alexander
and
Ammonius, scarcely
one
word would have
been
well
interpreted
by us. For it is a
disgrace
that
those
who
wish
to
interpret
Aristotle's
works dare
to
interpret them without knowledge
of the
language
in
which
Aristotle wrote
and
without
any
expositors
of
Greek
to
show them
the
way.
88
87. Nifo 1540* f- 2
V
: 'Et per dialecticam no(n) omnem logicae partem Alexand(er) intellexit, sed
methodum topicam, quam in his libris edocebit Aristoteles, cuius causam Auerroes in proemio
paraphrasum
librorum topicoru(m) assignat ex eo, quia dialectica significat sermonem inter duos,
quoru(m) alterum alter vincere enititur. & cum Aristoteles his libris assignet loca, ex quibus hoc fieri
potest, iure dialectice nomen huic topice methodo Aristoteles appropriauit.'
88.
Ibid.,
f.
I39
v
:
'Haec sunt, qu(a)e scripsimus in libros topicoru(m), tu(m) ex Alexa(n)dri, tu(m) ex
Herminii [Ammonii] expositio(n)ibus. habuimus aut(em) in verbis Arist(otelis) no(n) paruas
obscuritates,
& in scripturis differe(n)tias. na(m) in codicibus graecis, qui p(rae) manibus habe(n)tur,
co(m)plures text(us) fragme(n)tos legimus. co(n)tulimus ad inuice(m) multa graeca exe(m)plaria, &
sic ex
ipsis
interpretati sumus, vt melius nobis visum est. vidimus multoru(m) Latinoru(m)
expositio(n)es, vt Hedenalphi, vt Angeli camerinatis, vt Roberti Culuerbini, vt Britannici, vt
cuiusda(m), que(m)
o(mn)es
co(m)mentatore(m) voca(n)t. Insuper vidimus Auerrois nouas
quasdam
translatio(n)es, imo potius blacteritias confusiones, quas cum translator non intellexerit,
nemo potest eas intelligere. Insuper vidimus Albertu(m) cognome(n)to magnu(m), qui
obscurissime hu(n)c libru(m) exposuit, longe tamen melius, qua(m) exposuerit libros philosophiae
naturalis.
In
illis
enim nihil boni dixit, nam sequutus est translationes ex arabico in latinum versas, in
quibus
sunt tot errata, quot verba, quia vero in logica sequutus est translationes ex graeco in latinum
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