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Humanistic logic
177
English
logicians and their technically refined formal
logic
for opprobrium,
establishing them as the main butt of humanist ribaldry and vituperation
down
to the seventeenth century.
19
Humanist criticism of
logic,
then, begins with criticism of the profess-
ional logician, and the structuring of the university curriculum around the
terminology
and the technical problems
of
the
logic
course. Early humanist
educators are unanimous in their insistence on the comparatively modest
role
logic
ought to play within a student's total training. Associated with
this disparagement
of
traditional
logic
instruction is a general commitment
on the part
of
humanist educators to initiating language study with a study
of
grammar which attends to the subtleties
of
the Latin language rather than
to the terminology and technical niceties which would be required at a later
stage
if
the student were to pursue
logical
studies into their higher specialist
reaches. Thus early humanist treatises on education, like Vergerio's De
ingenuis moribus
20
make passing reference to the need for competence in the
trivial
arts
of
grammar,
logic
and rhetoric, but insist upon eloquence and in-
depth familiarity with the literary works of antiquity as the basis for
true
learning.
21
The same kind
of
emphasis is to be found less programmatically
in a work like Bruni's AdPetrum Paulum Histrum dialogus ('Dialogue for Pier
Paolo
Vergerio').
Celebrating Salutati's formative influence, Bruni writes
of
his approach to Latinity:
Neither are you one
of
those, in my
view,
who takes pleasure in vain loquacity. Nor
do you incite us in
that
direction, but
rather
to speak gravely, steadily, and so
that
we
seem to
understand
and feel what we speak. To which end, your desire is
that
we
should have a sound grasp on
that
about which we dispute, not simply in itself, but
so
that
we have an understanding
of
its consequences, its antecedents, its causes, its
effects,
and everything in short which relates to the
matter
in hand. For no debater
who
is ignorant of these things
will
be able to dispute without appearing inept.
22
This
sensitivity to language is not, in Bruni's
view,
to be confused with the
preoccupations of contemporary dialecticians. They, on the contrary,
distort
that
subject, as all scholastic study distorts and deforms
true
learning:
But
what about dialectic, which is a most essential art for conducting disputations?
Does
dialectic maintain a flourishing reign, subjected to no calamitous defeat in this
19.
Ibid., p. 38 (1.7):
'Dyalectica
pars
esse
potest,
utique
terminus
non est; et
potest
pars
esse
matutina,
non
serótina.'
For
Petrarch's
hostility
to
English
logic
and
logicians,
see ibid., pp.
35-38
(1.7) passim.
20. On
Vergerio
see, in
this
context,
Robey
1980. 21. See, for
instance,
Robey
1980, p. 47.
22. Prosatori latini 1952, p. 52:
'Ñeque
enim
tu es, ut
opinor,
quern
garrulitas
vana
delectet,
neque
ad
earn
rem nos
cohortaris;
sed ut
graviter,
ut
constanter,
ut
denique
ita
verba
faciamus,
ut ea
quae
dicimus
sapere
atque
sentiré
videamur.
Itaque
tenenda
probe
res est, de qua
disputare
velis;
nec ea
solum,
sed
consequentium,
antecedentium,
causarum,
effectuum,
omnium
denique
quae
ad
earn
rem
pertinent
habenda
cognitio.
His
enim
ignoratis
nemo
disputator
poterit
non
ineptus
videri.'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
178
Logic
and
language
war
of
ignorance?
Not at all. For that
barbarity which resides across
the
ocean
has
launched
an
attack
on
dialectic also.
But
what people,
for
God's sake? Those whose
very
names make
me
shudder: Ferebrich, Heytesbury, Ockham
and
others
of
this
kind,
who all
seem
to
have dragged their names from
the
cohort
of
Rhadamanthus.
And
what
is
there, Salutati, leaving aside this pleasantry, what
is
there,
I say, in
dialectic which
has not
been thrown into confusion
by
British sophisms? What
which
has not
been diverted from
that
ancient
and true way of
disputing
and
transformed into absurdities
and
trivialities?
23
These
humanist educators stress
the
fact
that
Roman approaches
to
ratiocination (such
as
Cicero's)
are
more appropriate guides
to
this study
than
the
technical disciplines developed from Aristotle's Organon
by the
moderni.
If
we bear
in
mind
the
fact
that the
study
of
Roman dialectic
and
rhetoric
had
been continuous down through
the
Middle
Ages,
whereas
that
of
Aristotelian
logic
had
been hampered
by
poor texts,
a
need
to
rely
on
secondary accounts
and on
Roman 'versions'
of
Greek
sources, this amounts
to
a
criticism
of
relatively
'new'
specialisms
as
against
old
practical
preparations
for
public
office.
Humanist pedagogues couple this preference
for
'general' education with
the
view
that if one is
going
to
study
Aristotelian
logic,
it
must
be
from
the
Greek texts
and
with
the
help
of a
Greek
tradition
in
commentary.
In
other words,
if
logic
is to
exist
as a
specialist
discipline
it
must
be a
'humanised' specialism.
It is not,
however,
until
we
come
to
Lorenzo
Valla
that we
find
a
humanist whose criticism
of
contemporary
logic
and its
teaching extends
to a
replacement discipline,
as
opposed
to a
vague general preference
for
Roman accounts
of
argument
practice over Greek theory
(as
propounded
by
traditional Aristotelians).
Lorenzo Valla
Two
of
Valla's
major works
are
concerned with
the
crucial position
of the
study
of
language
for
learning:
the
Dialecticae disputationes
and the
Elegantiae.
The
latter
is a
detailed, subtle
and
justly celebrated account
of
nuances
of
Latin meaning
and
usage.
The
former
is
increasingly widely
acknowledged
as a
seminal work
in
humanist dialectic.
24
The two
make
up
23. Ibid.,
pp.
58-60:
'Quid autem de dialéctica, quae una ars ad disputandum pernecessaria est? An ea
florens regnum obtinet, neque hoc ignorantiae bello calamitatem ullam perpessa est? Minime vero.
Nam
etiam illa barbaria, quae trans oceanum habitat, in illam impetum fecit. At quae gentes, dii
boni?
Quorum etiam nomina perhorresco: Farabrich, Buser,
Occam,
aliique eiusmodi, qui
omnes
mihi videntur a Rhadamantis cohorte traxisse cognomina. Et quid est, Coluci, ut haec ioca omittam,
quid est, inquam, in dialéctica quod non britannicis sophismatibus conturbatum sit? Quid quod non
ab
ilia vetere et vera disputandi via separatum et ad ineptias livitatesque traductum?' On 'Buser', see
English Logic
1982.
24. On the importance of
Valla's
Dialecticae disputationes,
see Kristeller 1964a, pp. 33-5; Vasoli 1970, p.
256; L. Jardine 1977, 1983.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
179
what
one
might
call
a
tripartite
critique
of the
tactics
and
technical
achievements
of
scholastic
logic.
In the
Elegantiae
Valla
contends
that
many
of
the
'problems' which preoccupy philosophers
and
logicians admit
of
ready solution
by
careful consideration
of
grammar
and
syntax.
25
Whilst
the traditional logician
(and
historian
of
logic)
is
bound
to
throw
up his
hands
in
despair
at
such
wilful
misunderstanding
of the
fundamental
assumptions
of
formal
logic,
Valla's
challenge
is a
real
one. He
maintains
that
a
genuine desire
to
extend
the
range
of
problems
on
which formal
logic
can
gain
a
purchase
has
produced
a
spuriously difficult series
of
subsidiary
branches
of
logic,
for
instance, those dealing with suppositio.
To fit a
discussion
of
problems raised
by the
slipperiness
of
ordinary language usage
to
a
discussion
of
formal validity whose focus
is the
syllogism does indeed
require something like suppositio theory
to
deal with problems
of
meaning
and reference
of
terms.
But,
Valla
suggests,
one
might prefer
to
concede
formal
logic's
limited sphere,
and
tackle ordinary language problems from
the point
of
view
of
the linguistic specialist
(a
preference shared
by
modern
linguists).
The
second
and
third
parts
of
Valla's
attack
on the
logic
curriculum
are
launched
in his
Dialecticae disputationes,
and
both contribute towards
dislodging
validity from
its
central position
in
discussion
of
ratiocination.
26
In
the
first place,
Valla
privileges Quintilian's version
of a
programme
of
instruction
in
ratiocination suitable
for the
'orator'
(that
is,
effectively,
for
the average non-specialist user
of
ratiocinative
skills).
The
account
of
loci
-
seats
of
argumentation
or
topics
-
which
Valla
takes verbatim from
the
Institutio
oratoria
in the
Dialecticae disputationes makes
'apt'
arguments
(ratiocinative strategies which
do
the
job
in
hand,
regardless
of
their formal
validity)
the
focus
of
the dialectician's attention. Formal validity is here only
one amongst
a
number
of
possible
guides
to
choice
of
argument
in
support
of
a
given
position.
27
Informal validity (as
Jonathan
Barnes
has
engagingly
called
it)
28
and
soundness
are
locally
acceptable guides
to the
appropriate-
ness
of a
particular chain
of
reasoning. This shift
in
emphasis
is
already
hinted
at in
Bruni's remark quoted earlier
that
Salutati
was not
simply
content
to
grasp what might 'fittingly' (probe)
be
said
on a
given
subject,
but
25.
See Vasoli 1968a;
Cambridge
History
1982, pp. 808-17 (Percival); Grafton and L. Jardine 1986.
26. The
Dialecticae disputationes
survive in a number of redactions, of which the published text is in fact
(probably
for political
reasons)
least explicit about its shifted focus of attention. For the various texts,
see Zippel's introduction in L. Valla 1982.
27.
On topics-logic and its influence (largely through the impact of Boethius' De
differentiis topicis),
see
Stump in Boethius 1978 and in
Cambridge
History
1982, pp. 273-99; Bird
i960,
1962.
28.
Boethius
1981, p. 82 (Barnes).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
i8o
Logic
and
language
required knowledge
of its
antecedents,
its
consequences,
its
causes,
its
effects,
and
whatever pertained
to it - in
other words, was interested
in
rules
of
inference tailored
to the
orator's needs.
Several
things happen (from
the
historian
of
logic's
point
of
view)
when
the focus
of
attention
is
switched from Aristotle's classic discussions
of
syllogistic
and
their associated scholia
to
topics-theory.
In the
first place,
demonstrative inference ceases
to be
privileged over non-demonstrative
inference.
The
fact
that
one
kind
of
reasoning holds universally, whilst
the
other
is
strictly 'occasional',
is
irrelevant
to the
issue
of
whether,
in
context,
one
or the
other
is
tactically more suitable
to
persuade
an
audience.
Secondly,
formal validity
as
such ceases
to
preoccupy
the
dialectician/
logician,
as
opposed
to how
'good'
the
argument
in
hand
is for the
purpose
—
whether
on the
whole arguments
of a
certain form command
assent.
An
inference like 'Socrates
is
married. Therefore Socrates
is not a
bachelor' takes
its
place with
an
inference like
'If
it
is
day,
it is
light.
But it is
day, therefore
it is
light', even though
the
former
is not
formally valid,
whereas
the
latter
is.
29
One
of
Valla's
contributions
to
this
latter
discussion
is
to
challenge
the
view
that
the
list
of
expressions generally agreed
to be
logical
constants
is
self-evidently complete
and
exclusive,
thus
opening
the
possibility
that
arguments traditionally judged
to be ad hoc
might have
a
claim
to be
considered
as
generalisable argument forms.
30
It is unfortunately difficult
to
allude
to
such
a
'shift
of
emphasis'
on
Valla's
part
without inviting
the
kind
of
disparaging comment from historians
of
logic
which
has
steadily accompanied
any
reference
to
topics-theory
as a
source
of
inspiration
for
humanist dialecticians.
31
But it
will
become
apparent
when
we
consider
the
important
textbook
of
Rudolph
Agricola
that
this shift
is the key to
humanist redefinition
of
dialectic
as a
curriculum
subject. Linked
to
this shift, however,
and
less easily dismissed
by
logicians
as mere 'soft' thinking
is the
interest
Valla
displays,
in the
final book
of
his
Dialecticae
disputationes,
in a
number
of
argument strategies discussed
by
Greek
and
Roman logicians and judged
on
occasion
to be
compelling,
but
whose
logical
nature
is
problematic. These include sorites
—
the
heap
—
and
antistrephon
—
dilemma,
or the
horned argument
—
as
well
as
more familiar
forms like induction.
32
The
extensive
treatment
of
these argument
29. On the importance of the notion of commanding the audience's assent as a vital part of choice of
argument,
see Burnyeat 1982b and unpublished.
30. For further discussion, see L. Jardine 1983.
31.
See, for example, Ashworth
1974a,
Stump in Boethius 1978 and in
Cambridge
History
1982,
pp.
273-99.
32.
For recent discussion of such argument forms, particularly in the context of ancient treatments
(some
of which were sources for humanist dialecticians), see Barnes 1982, Burnyeat 1982b.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
181
strategies in
Valla's
work succeeds in bringing into ratiocinative promi-
nence techniques
of
dubious or problematic validity, which historically had
fascinated Roman orators by their ability to prove irresistible in debate.
Valla's
careful discussion of 'good' (compelling) and 'foolish' (overtly
sophistical) uses of sorites and dilemma is a natural development out of his
determination to extend the range
of
strategies covered in dialectic, so as to
include open discussion of 'convincing' argumentation. However, the
significance
of
the argument strategies considered in
Valla's
third
book was
apparently lost on a number
of
later authors of treatises on dialectic whose
treatment was otherwise indebted to
Valla's
Dialecticae disputationes. It is a
mark of the wide influence of
Valla's
repastinatio of dialectic
that
virtually
every
post-fifteenth-century humanist dialectic manual includes some
minimal treatment of classic sorites, in spite of its not finding a place in any
medieval
manuals.
33
But it is equally the case
that
textbook treatments
betray little understanding of the significantly different outlook which is
implied in
that
inclusion. For the 'heap' argument is irresistible when used
astutely in debate, in spite of the fact
that
its formal validity remains
problematic.
34
Rudolph Agricola
Rudolph
Agricola's
De inventione dialéctica marks the turning-point in the
fortunes of a humanistically inspired dialectic. Not only was this work
fundamentally innovative as a teaching text, but its fortuna was directly
linked with the emergence within the European universities of humanistic
courses of study, separate from the traditional faculties, which included
their own versions
of
the key
trivium
subjects, and specifically
of
dialectic.
35
Completed
around 1480 and published in
1515,
the De inventione dialéctica
enjoyed
a modest reputation until the
1530s,
when it 'took off' as a teaching
text, reprinted in numerous editions, paraphrased, epitomised and adapted
for
the use
of
particular faculties in particular universities across Europe. At
the same time, it is not a textbook, in the sense
of
eclectically
assembling all
current material as more or less
part
of an introductory
logic
course.
Agricola's
treatise
runs
a strong sceptical philosophical line, and the material
it covers is insistently partial in accordance with its promotion of a
recognisably
partisan
view
of ratiocination.
36
33. As it is in
modern
textbooks.
For
discussion
of the
'heap'
argument,
see
Wright
1976.
34. For a
fuller
discussion
of
Valla's
treatment
of sorites, see L.
Jardine
1983, pp.
272-5.
35. On the
pervasive
influence
of the De inventione dialéctica, see
Prantl 1855-70,
iv, ch. 21;
Vasoli
1968a;
Heath
1971; L.
Jardine
1974b,
1975. For a
checklist
of the
numerous
editions
of
Agricola's
treatise,
see Ong
1958b.
36. On
Agricola's
scepticism,
and its
relation
to his
treatment
of
dialectic,
see L.
Jardine
1983. On
scepticism
in the
Renaissance,
see
Popkin
in
this
volume.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
l82
Logic
and
language
Agricola's
title
is
suitably propagandist
and
controversial.
It
advertises
the work
as a
topics-logic treatise
('De
inventione'), whilst
at the
same time
insisting
that
topics-logic
is the
core
of
dialectic
(rather
than
a
subsidiary
part
of
it,
or
even
a
part
of
rhetoric:
the art
of
ad
hoc
persuasion
in
traditional
terms)
- 'De
inventione dialéctica'. As
a
polemical gesture Agricola's choice
of
title
has
been
as
effective
a
deterrent
of
serious modern scholarly interest
as
it was
provocative around 1500
- an
extraordinary amount
of
scholarly
energy (past
and
present)
had
been expended
on
trying
to
decide whether
Agricola's
work
is a
contribution
to
rhetoric,
or an
intervention
in the
history
of
logic.
The
answer
one
gives,
of
course, relates directly
to
one's
view
of the
traditional logicians' claim
that
topics-theory
was
essentially
a
debased branch
of
the study
of
argumentation, best treated with 'rhetorical'
topics
as a
division
of
rhetoric.
If
one accepts this
view
(as
propounded
in,
say,
Peter
of
Spain's Summule logicales),
37
then
Agricola
'rhetoricises'
and
debases dialectic.
If,
however,
one
regards topics-logic
as
providing
an
account
of
a less restrictive
and
non-demonstrative
logic,
and as a
possible
contender
in
this respect with Aristotelian demonstration, where
the
discourse
to be
analysed deliberately defies syllogistic rigour
(the
Socratic
dialogue,
for
instance), then
Agricola's
move
has to be
treated seriously.
38
It
marks
a
conscious move towards
an
account
of
systematic reasoning which
includes reasoning which falls short
of the
deductively rigorous,
and
towards
the
development
of
a logic
of
language use. Such
a
study, amongst
other things, reveals limitations
in
traditional notions
of
certainty
and
absolute
truth in
relation
to
ratiocination,
and
opens
the way
forward
to
modern empirical notions
of truth.
39
The
three
books
of
Agricola's work consolidate
Valla's
innovatory
emphases into something like textbook form.
The
first book catalogues
and
surveys
the
Aristotelian/Ciceronian topics,
in a
treatment which clearly
owes
much
to
Boethius'
De
differentiis topicis.
40
The
second book deals with
argument forms,
and
allocates
a
significantly subsidiary role
to
formal
validity
(and
specifically
to the
syllogism).
Here,
as in
book
1,
the
emphasis
is
on
the
informal validity
of
practical arguing,
rather
than
on the
absolutely
guaranteed forms. Characteristic
of
Agricola's
outlook
is the
view
(which
37.
For the text of the
Summule,
see Peter of Spain 1972. On the content of the
Summule,
see Mullally
1945-
38. For the view that Aristotle himself took a
less
rigid stance than traditional readings allow, see Owen
1968,
Aristotle
on
Dialectic
1968, Burnyeat 1982a. In this case humanist dialecticians may have been
more astute readers of the ancient logical texts than their detractors are prepared to admit.
39. See L. Jardine 1983, Dear 1984, Burnyeat 1982a.
40. See Stump in Boethius 1978 on Boethius' topics.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
183
might
be
philosophically supported
by a
modern logician)
that
syllogisms
are
of
limited use
in
arguing
a
case, because
it
is necessarily
the
case
that
any
reasonable person
who
accepts
the
premises
of a
syllogism
as
true
already
accepts
the
conclusion. More usually,
he
argues,
the
debater is concerned
to
shift
the
audience's beliefs sufficiently
to
persuade them
to
accept
a
hitherto
unacceptable conclusion.
The
third book
of the De
inventione dialéctica
pursues this theme
by
discussing
in
detail
the 'art of
influencing',
41
including
persuasive strategies, delivery
and a
variety
of
subterfuges
designed
to
command assent.
If one
wanted
to
characterise this closing
discussion,
one
might
say
that
Agricola's
view
of
disputation
is
Socratic,
involving
the
interplay
of
participants' discourse
in
dialogue, rather than
Aristotelian.
The
work ends with
an
elegantly worked example
of an
argument between opponents
who
hold fundamentally incompatible
beliefs,
which shows
the
necessity
for
'commanding assent'
by
logically
unconventional means.
An
Academic sceptic proposes
to
convince
an
Epicurean
that
'quisquis sine uirtute
sit, eum
esse infelicem' (whoever lacks
virtue
is
unhappy):
He
will
not
assume
at the
start
that
virtue is
the
greatest good,
for
that
is in no
respect
more probable
than
that
which
was
aimed
at: nor
again
that
whence
is
derived this
proposition,
that
man's greatest
natural
concern
is for
virtue. Therefore
he
commences further back.
He
asks whether
it is
admitted
that
the
soul
is
better
than
the body?
But
this also must
be
built from
a
Socratic induction.
It
must
be
asked
whether
the
driver
is
superior
to his
chariot,
the
helmsman
to his
ship,
the
master
to
his house,
and the
ruler
to
his people,
or in
general whether
he
thinks
that that
which
commands
is
superior
to
that
which serves,
and
whether
he
thinks
the
body
is
ruled
by
the
soul. Which
if
he concedes
it, it
will
be
necessary
for him to
concede
that
the
soul
is
superior
to the
body. Which when
it has
begun
to be
agreed,
it
follows
necessarily from this
that
the
actions
and
whatever pertains
to the
soul
are
superior
to things
of the
body. Whence
if
we have taught
that
virtue
is
peculiar
to the
soul,
pleasure peculiar
to the
body,
it
will
be
established
that
virtue
is
better
than
pleasure.
Which
itself
will
perhaps
be
required
to be
shown
. . .
42
41.
Ashworth
1974a,
p. 11.
42. Agricola 1539, p. 447: 'Non sumet
ille
co(n)tinuo uirtutem
esse
summum bonum: id enim nihilo
probabilius est, quam id quod intendebatur: nec id etiam unde istud deducitur, uirtutis curam
maxime naturalem
esse
homini. Aldus igitur ordietur. Quaeret ecquid fateatur animam corpore
meliorem esse? Sed et hoc quoq(ue) muniendu(m) est Socratica inductione. Qu(a)erendum est, an
aurigam
curru, & naue gubernatorem, & dominum domo, & principem popularibus, & in
uniuersum quod imperet praestantius
esse
putet eo quod paret, an & animi imperio putet corpus
regi.
Quae si concédât,
necesse
erit concédât, animum corpore potiorem
esse.
Quod ubi constare
coepit, sequatur hinc
necesse
est, actiones & quaecunq(ue) animi corporis rebus
esse
potiora. Quod si
docuerimus hinc, propriam animi uirtutem, propriam corporis uoluptatem
esse:
constabit uirtutem
esse
meliorem uoluptate. Quod ipsum erit fortasse quaerendum . . .'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
i84
Logic
and language
And
so on. The choice of an Academic sceptic as adversary in this model
debate is a self-conscious one. For it is the Academic who claims to hold
nothing as certain (no premises as true), but to argue reasonably towards the
most plausible possible case
—
in this instance a case which
will
convince an
Epicurean, although the Epicurean's key beliefs are not shared by the
Academic.
43
What is striking here, once again, is the shift of emphasis.
Although
scholastic exercises like the disputation and the obligation hinge
crucially
on the 'pro-syllogisms', or manoeuvring strategies prior to a
clinching
formal inference, instruction is focused on the
latter.
44
Agricola
shows
himself primarily concerned with training the would-be debater in
the skirmishes for position which accompany any
attempt
to drive an
argument home ('we must
start
further back'). And this is undoubtedly the
stage in actual debating which requires most ingenuity and mental agility,
both in written texts which argue a case and in familiar oratorical contexts
—
most notoriously in the law-courts.
45
It should perhaps be added
that,
in my
view,
Agricola's
approach to
dialectic teaching is essentially a
return
to a position prior to the strenuous
professionalisation of the study and teaching of
logic
during the high
Middle
Ages.
In the intervening period
logic
as a science had overshadowed
logic
as an art, a fact
that
humanist dialecticians were fond of stressing.
46
Agricola's
De inventione dialéctica is therefore influential in two differing,
but equally
important,
ways.
On the one
hand
he challenges the
Aristotelian
view
of
logic
at a philosophical
level,
and identifies humanist
dialectic with the 'art of persuasion' as
part
of an intellectual case for
'likelihood'
over 'certainty'. On the other he heralds in the applied dialectic
handbook,
exclusively
concerned with practical argument strategies at the
expense
of
the study
of
formal inference, which brought humanist dialectic
into ill-repute. In this
latter
respect he prepared the way for the most
notorious of the advocates of 'loose' reasoning, Petrus Ramus.
Petrus
Ramus
Petrus Ramus was the dialectician who succeeded in popularising the new
humanist dialectic as an alternative focus for the
arts
curriculum. Although
43.
Agricola's
interest
in
Academic
scepticism
is
emphasised
by
Alardus
throughout
his
commentary
in
the 1539
edition
of the De inventione dialéctica; see L.
Jardine
1983, pp.
268-9.
44. On
scholastic
debating
procedures,
see
Schilling
1969, ch. 6. See
also
Hamblin
1970, pp.
89—134
('The
Aristotelian tradition').
45. On the
dialogue
and the
dialectical
(in our
modern
sense)
argument
as key
humanistic
genres
see
C.
J. R.
Armstrong
1976.
46. See, for
example,
Vives'
attack
on
traditional
logicians
in his In pseudodialecticos:
Vives
1979a.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
185
modern scholars
are
undoubtedly correct
in
their opinion
that
intellectually
he
was
neither
a
major innovator
nor the
most outstanding dialectician
of
his generation,
his
open commitment
to the
revised dialectic programme
(centred
on
topics-logic)
of
Valla
and
Agricola
as
controversial
and
progressive,
and
his own position
as a
Protestant martyr
(he
was murdered
in
the
St
Bartholomew's
Day
Massacre
in
Paris
in
1572),
brought
that
programme
to
prominence throughout Northern Europe.
47
Ramus took
the original
and
conceptually somewhat obscure developments
of
Agricola,
made their consequences
for the
teaching
of
dialectic
explicit
and
packaged
them
for
mass consumption. His importance
is
thus
as
much
a
matter
of
the
number
of
popularising versions
of
this
new
approach
he
made available
as a
question
of
his
own
originality (contemporary adversaries like Antonio
de
Gouveia
were quick
to
point
out how
much Ramus owed
to
earlier
innovators like
Agricola).
48
In his
pioneering work
on
Ramus,
W.J. Ong
established
a
quite remarkable publishing history
for
Ramus'
rather
modest
works
on
dialectic.
49
Ramus' contribution
to
humanist dialectic
is
thus
represented
in the
literature
primarily
as a
cornering
of the
market
in
textbooks
—
a
reasonably accurate version
of the
story
in my
view.
50
However,
it
would
not do to
understate
Ramus' actual influence
on
developments
in
humanist
logic.
As I
said when discussing
Agricola,
one
version
of
the change
in
outlook
on
logic/dialectic effected
by
humanists
is
that
they drew Socratic dialogue within
the
consideration
of
the logician.
Following
on
from this position, Ramus advertised himself as
a
Platonist
(although
he
was driven
to
moderate his claims
for
his dialectic
in the
face
of
more sophisticated
Academics'
objections
to the
inconsistency
of his
'Platonic' position).
In the
spirit
of
Plato,
he
continued
to
stress
the
importance
for
logic
of
'dialectical'
(in our
modern sense
of the
word)
argument
and of
dialogue techniques.
He
asserted
the
equivalence
of the
rules
of
dialectical argumentation
(as
derived from
Agricola
via his own
teacher
Johannes
Sturm) with
the
rules
of
operation
of
natural
reason.
51
He
maintained
that
given
certain technical constraints
on the
'axioms' from
which
argumentation
started,
dialectical reasoning would
yield
absolute
truth.
52
And he
privileged dichotomous 'method' (display
of
material)
as
47.
For a scathing
assessment
of Ramus' contributions to logic see Ashworth 1974a.
48. Gouveia 1543, e.g., f. 2
V
, f. i4
v
, ff, I7
v
-i8
r
. See Vasoli 1968a, p. 412.
49. Ong 1958a, 1958b.
50. For a detailed study of the various modifications and revisions of Ramus' dialectic in successive
versions of his textbook, however, which argues for a significant intellectual influence on sixteenth-
century thought, see Bruyère 1984. 51. See Vasoli 1968a, pp.
333-404.
52.
On Ramus' three rules, see L. Jardine 1974a, N. W. Gilbert
i960,
Bruyère 1984.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Logic
and
language
the ideal method
of
presentation
on the
grounds
that
this was
the
procedure
favoured
by
Plato himself.
53
Ramus' dichotomous method
is a
procedure
for
displaying material
(for
instance,
the
material proper
to a
particular teaching discipline like
geometry
or
grammar)
in the
most clear
and
most easily grasped fashion
for
comprehension
by the
student.
The
teacher commences with
the
most
general definition
of the
subject ('dialectic
is the art of
discoursing
well'),
followed
by the
division
of
that
subject into
two
parts
('dialectic consists
of
invention
and
judgement'), with explanations
and
examples displayed
under
the two
heads.
He
then proceeds
to
key down each
arm
of
the array
in
turn,
conveniently displaying
the
material under each head
in
tabular form.
In this
way,
theoretically,
no
material
is
omitted,
and the
process always
moves
from
the
more
to the
less general concepts
of the
subject under
discussion.
54
Dichotomous keying became
an
extremely voguish
way of
proceeding
in organising teaching,
and in
textbook
and
manual presentation.
But it
would
not do to be too
dismissive
of the
original incentive
to
modify
traditional methods, simply because
the
'school' came
to
abuse
it. It
must
be
said, however,
that
once
we
move
to
consideration
of
the impact
of
Ramist
method,
we
have moved away from developments
within
logic
into
the
emergent discipline
of
textual
exegesis.
It
is, however, desirable
to do so, in
order
to
anticipate
and
avoid
the
confusion which tends
to be
caused
by
attempts
to
assess humanist attention
to
method (which strives
in the
direction
of
textual
and
literary problems) alongside scholastic incursions
into deceptively similar areas associated with their particular professional
interest
in
mathematical
and
scientific reasoning. Whilst
the
histories
of
the
two
are
inevitably somewhat intertwined, peculiarly humanist contribu-
tions tend
to be to
their
own
field
of
expertise
—
that
is, to
text criticism.
55
Almost
all
critics
who
have dealt with 'method'
as a
general term have
run
scientific
and
literary discussions
of
method together.
It
probably
was the
case
that
the
humanists fudged
the
issue
by
deliberately employing
the
technical term 'method'
for
more
or
less systematic sequences
of
reasoning
analysed
out of
texts.
53.
On Ramus and method, see in particular Bruyère 1984; see
also
Crescini 1965, L. Jardine 1974a,
N.
W. Gilbert
i960.
54. For a full
discussion
of Ramist method in relation to other ancient and Renaissance treatments of
methodical presentation, see Bruyère 1984.
55.
See N. W. Gilbert
i960,
Vasoli 1968a, Crescini 1965.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008