Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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Traditional logic
forward
a
series
of
new propositions,
and the
respondent
had to
reply
to
each
by
saying
'I
grant
it', 'I
deny
it' or 'I
doubt it.'
156
In
each case
his
reply
was
supposed
to
depend
on the
logical
relationship
the new
proposition
had
to
the set of
propositions already granted.
If it
followed
he had to
grant
it,
and
if
it was inconsistent
he had to
deny
it
—
hence
the
testing function
of
an
obligational
disputation.
In the
doctrinal disputation
the
respondent
had to
uphold
a
thesis
or
quaestio, which
was
supposed
to be
true.
The
opponent
attacked
the
thesis
by
offering arguments against
it, and the
respondent
had
to reply
to
each attack
by
analysing
the
argument
and by
saying
'I
grant
it',
'I deny
it' or 'I
distinguish
it' to
each
part
of
the argument,
as
well
as to the
argument
as a
whole. Obviously
the
doctrinal disputation also
had a
testing
function,
for
both
the
respondent
and the
opponent
had to be
aware
of
all
the relevant
logical
relations,
but
both
the
atmosphere
and the
procedures
were
different.
The
substance
of the
initial thesis
is now a
genuine issue;
truth
is
paramount;
and 'I
distinguish'
has
replaced
'I
doubt.'
In
later
authors, including Seton, Toletus, Fonseca
and
Augustinus Hunnaeus,
the
type
of
disputation described
is the
doctrinal disputation.
157
The
most notable
part
of
medieval
logical
writings
to be
incorporated
in
the late sixteenth-century textbook
was the
parva logicalia. This included
a
simplified
discussion
of
some exponibles,
158
but I am
most concerned here
with
supposition theory, together with
the
related doctrines
of
ampliation
and appellation. Even some humanists were
willing
to
allow
a
place
to
these
doctrines,
and
Thomas More wrote 'All
the
same,
that
book
of the
Little
Logicals
(so
named,
I
think, because
it
contains
but
little
logic)
is
worth
the
trouble
to
look into
for
suppositions,
as
they
call
them, ampliations,
restrictions, appellations.'
159
Javelli argued
that
the
parva logicalia were
156.
Clichtove in Lefevre d'Etaples 1520, f. I29
v
,
also
allowed the
response
'distinguo'. This was not
usual, though it occasionally appeared in fifteenth-century sources, e.g., Paul of Pergula 1961, p.
102;
[Cologne] 1493, f. lxxxiii
r
. The latter argued that 'distinguo' was already covered by the
allowed
responses
'affirmo' and 'nego'.
157.
Seton 1545, sigs. H iiii
v
-vii
v
; Toletus 1587, ff. 6
vb
~7
rb
; Fonseca
1964,11,
pp. 612-22 (his
discussion
is
somewhat unlike the other sources); Hunnaeus 1584, pp.
87-116.
There is a
discussion
of the
doctrinal
disputation in Angelelli 1970, with references to Hunnaeus and Toletus. Angelelli says
that
obligational disputations exhibit the
question
method and what I have called doctrinal
disputations, the
argument
method. It should be noted that the doctrinal disputation has its roots in
medieval writings (not to mention practices): see Albertus Magnus, Pseudo- 1498. This treatise has
been edited with other material in Die
mittelalterlichen
Traktate
1980.
158.
Toletus 1587 devoted book ill (ff. 2o
va
-7
rb
) to modal and exponible propositions. Cf. Fonseca
1964,1,
pp.
230-48.
See n. 138 above for further references. Toletus should be compared with Du
Trieu
1662, sig. A 3
r
: 'Cum enim, ut antea dixi, disponendis ad logicam adolescentibus omnia tradi
non possint, delectus habendus est, eaque potius tradenda, quae et minus spinosa sunt, et magis
necessaria. Hinc nihil dico de enuntiationibus modalibus, exponibilibus, de inventione medii, et
nonnullis
aliis
generis ejusdem.'
159.
More's
Epistola
ad
Dorpium,
in Vives
1979a,
p. 171.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
i68
Logic
and
language
essential
to the
understanding
of
syllogistic
and
disputation;
160
and
Fonseca
suggested
that
the
doctrines were needed
to
deal with
fallacies.
161
He
warned
that
they were 'unrefined, uncouth
and
remote from use',
and
that
to dwell
on
them
at
length was dangerous
to
good language. However,
he
said, some loss would come about from ignoring
the
doctrines altogether;
and
he
proceeded
to
give
a
full
account
of
supposition, appellation
and
ampliation.
162
Remnants
of the
theory
are
still
to be
found
in the
seventeenth century, even
in
such resolutely non-scholastic writers
as
Franco Burgersdijk.
163
It
seems
that
Nifo's
arguments
to the
effect
that
supposition theory
was not
Peripatetic,
and
both should
and
could
be
replaced
by
genuinely Peripatetic principles,
had had
little
effect.
164
The
theory
of
consequences was also incorporated into some
of
the
new
textbooks,
but in a
severely truncated form. Javelli prided himself
on
omitting
the
various
views
of
modern logicians which obscured more
than
they clarified,
165
and
neither Toletus
nor
Fonseca dwelt
on the
matter
at
great length.
166
Gone
are the
lengthy definitions
of
a consequence,
and the
lengthy analyses
of
the criteria
for a
valid formal consequence; gone
too are
most
of
the examples
of
different kinds
of
consequences.
167
Instead
we
find
just
a
few consequences
to do
with
truth
and
modality. The most interesting
feature
is
that
the
so-called paradoxes
of
strict implication, 'From
the
impossible anything
follows',
and 'The
necessary
follows
from anything',
160.
Javelli 1580, p. 83B: 'quaedam opuscula, quae
parva
Logicalia nuncupantur,
sine
quibus pene
impossibile est assequi veram et perfectam syllogizandi ac disputandi scientiam'.
161.
Fonseca
1964,11,
pp. 676—8: 'Sunt autem adeo inculta, horrida, et ab usu remota, quae superioris
aetatis homines in hisce, ac similibus rebus commenti sunt, ut,
nisi
plurima reiiciantur, satius sit ea
prorsus not attingere. Verum ut in his multum, ad diis immorari inutile est, ac bonis literis
perniciosum, sic ea omnino contemnere (quod multi hoc tempore faciunt) non
sine
mediocri
iactura
contingit.'
162.
Fonseca
1964,11,
pp. 687-752. Cf. Toletus 1587 (lib.
11),
ff.
I3
ra
-i8
ra
.
In cap. 12 (f. 18
ra
) he moves on
to opposition, followed by aequipollence (cap. 15, f.
I9
rb
)
and conversion (cap. 16, ff.
I9
vb
-20
rb
).
163.
Burgersdijk 1637, p. 124: 'Concreta acceptio scholasticis dicitur
personalis,
qui admodum prolixe
disputant de vocabulorum acceptionibus, sive, ut illi loquuntur, de suppositionibus.' Cf. Du Trieu
1662,
pp.
90—9,
for a discussion of supposition theory, but not of ampliation and appellation.
Like
Javelli
he thought that a knowledge of supposition theory was necessary for syllogistic:
'Praemittimus autem hunc tractatum tractatui de argumentatione et syllogismo, quia ad
cognoscendas regulas et vitia argumentationis, ac praecipue syllogismi, ejus notitia est necessaria'
(p.
90). For a longer seventeenth-century discussion of supposition theory, see John of St Thomas
1930,
pp. 29-42,
166-182.
164.
For Nifo's discussion of supposition theory see Nifo
1521b,
ff.
86
r
-i03
r
.
See also Nifo
1553a,
f.
l6
va-vb
165.
Javelli 1580, p. 97B: 'In hoc nostro tractatu de consequentiis non est intentio nostra immorari in
recitandis modernorum logicorum variis et captiosis sententiis, quae magis involvunt quam
illuminent addiscentis intellectum.'
166.
Toletus 1587, cap. 1-2, ff. 27
va
-8
va
; Fonseca
1964,1,
pp.
328-50.
Fonseca's account is the fullest. Cf.
John of St Thomas 1930, pp. 59, 196-200. Such authors as Du Trieu ignore consequences.
167.
For details of the material that had disappeared see Ashworth
1974a,
pp. 120—42.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Traditional logic
169
appear only
in a
reinterpreted
form, whereby
the
impossible
can
lead
to
necessary, contingent
or
impossible propositions,
and the
necessary
can
follow
from such propositions, provided
that
they
stand
in a
meaning
relation
to the
antecedent.
168
In
adopting this
view
Fonseca
and
Toletus
were
rejecting
the
tradition
of
Buridan
and
Marsilius
of
Inghen,
in
which
the paradoxes
of
strict implication
had
been accepted
as
formally valid
consequences
169
and
were apparently aligning themselves with
the
fourteenth-century English tradition
of
Richard Billingham,
the
Logica
Oxoniensis
and
Ralph Strode,
as
well
as
with Paul
of
Venice
and the
fifteenth-century Thomists
of
Cologne.
In the
English tradition, valid
inferences
had
been defined
as
involving some kind
of
meaning relation-
ship;
170
and the
paradoxes
of
strict implication accepted only
as
materially
valid.
171
The
relation
of the
theory
of
consequences
to
syllogistic
is of
some
interest. There
are
three
issues:
the
status
of
conversion,
the
status
of
consequences
in
syllogistic reduction
and the
status
of
the syllogism itself.
In
each
case
the
problem arises from
the
Aristotelian characterisation
of
argumentation
as
embracing
the
syllogism, enthymeme, induction
and
example.
Whether
the
rules
of
conversion could
be
fitted into this scheme
or
not had
been
a
topic
of
much debate
for
logicians from Kilwardby
and
Albertus
Magnus
in the
thirteenth
century
to
Nifo
in the
sixteenth
century.
172
The
problem arose because
an
enthymeme should
be
expanded
into
a
syllogism,
yet
syllogisms
in the
second
and
third
figures could only
be
reduced
or
proved
by the use
of
conversion,
and
this
led to
circularity. This
problem
in turn
affected
the
status
of the
other rules used
in
syllogistic
reduction.
On the
whole
the
later
authors
solved these problems
by
maintaining silence
on the
issues,
and by
dropping explicit references
to the
consequences used
in
syllogistic reduction, except
for the
rule: 'Whatever
168.
Fonseca
1964,1,
pp. 342-4; Toletus 1587, f. 28
rb
. Neither makes an explicit reference to a meaning
relation, but their examples make it clear that they are presupposing this.
169.
See Buridan 1976, p. 31; for Marsilius, see Pschlacher
1512,
f. 203
v
. This tradition was followed by
various early sixteenth-century Parisians and by Nifo: see Ashworth
1974a,
p. 134.
170. Logica Oxoniensis
s. XV, f. 4
vb
(Consequentiae):
'Consequentia est bona et formalis quando
consequens formaliter intelligitur in antecedente, ut homo currit ergo animal currit.' See also
Strode 1973, p. 2: 'Consequentia bona de forma dicitur cuius si sicut adequate significatur per
antecedens intelligatur sicut etiam adequate significatur per consequens intelligitur; ut si quis
intelligit te
esse
hominem, intelliget etiam te
esse
animal.'
171.
Logica Oxoniensis
s. XV, f. 5
rb
: '13a regula quod consequentia bona et materialis est quando
antecedens est impossibile vel consequens necessarium'; Billingham s. XV, f. 56
r
(Consequentiae);
Strode 1973, p. 2. See also [Cologne] 1493, ff. ciii
v
-ciiii
r
; Paul of Venice 1472, pp. 65-6. For some
discussion see Ashworth
1974a,
p. 135.
172.
See
Cambridge
History
1982, pp.
292-3
(Stump); Nifo
1553a,
ff.
9
va
-io
ra
.
He quotes
Kilwardby,
whom he calls Culverbinus, a number of times, here and elsewhere.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Logic
and
language
follows
from
the
conclusion
of a
valid consequence
follows
from
the
premise.'
173
However,
so far as the
syllogism
itself
was
concerned, Fonseca
and Couto both appealed
to the
notion
of a
consequence. They explained
that
the
notion
of
consequence
was
wider
than
that
of
argumentation.
An
argument was
a
special kind
of
consequence
in
which
a
term could appear
in
the premises which
did not
appear
in the
conclusion.
174
Hence
a
syllogism
was
a
formal consequence.
A
supplementary issue
was the
definition
of a
syllogism
as an
oratio,
a
sentence
or
piece
of
discourse. Earlier authors
had
often explained
that
the
oratio
in
question was
a
hypothetical proposition
of
the form:
'If A and B
then
C.'
175
Javelli took
up the
question,
and
summarised
the
positions which could
be
taken, without settling
the
issue.
176
By the
seventeenth century, authors tended
to ask
neither about
the relation
of
a syllogistic argument
to
consequences
nor
about
the
sense
in
which
a
syllogism could
be
called
an
oratio.
The
most burning issue with respect
to the
syllogism
had to do
with
the
status
of
the fourth figure.
177
The
issue revolved around
the
three
different
definitions
of
major
and
minor terms. Peter
of
Spain
had
defined
the
major
term
as
that
which appears
in the
major,
i.e., the
first, premise,
and the
minor
as
that
which appears
in the
minor,
i.e., the
second, premise.
178
As
Buridan recognised, this definition clearly allows
for a
fourth figure.
179
It
also warrants indirect modes
in
which
the
minor term
is the
predicate
of
the
conclusion.
Some late medieval logicians
followed
Buridan
in
recognising
a
fourth figure;
180
others were more hesitant.
181
In the
sixteenth century
there
were
three
developments. First,
the
renewed Aristotelianism
led to the
reappearance
of
Aristotle's definition
of the
major
and
minor terms with
reference
to
their comprehension.
182
On
this definition,
there
are
only
three
figures
but
indirect modes
are
possible. Second,
the
renewed
173.
This rule is found in Toletus 1587, f. 3i
rb
; Fonseca
1964,1,
p. 404. For a discussion of syllogistic
reduction and the way in which consequences were used in the early sixteenth century, see
Ash
worth
1974a,
pp. 239-46.
174.
Fonseca 1964, 1, pp. 328-9, 358;
Collegium Conimbricense
1607 (part 11), cols. 265-6. If a non-
syllogistic consequence is defined as one in which all terms in the premise must appear in the
conclusion, there is another reason for rejecting the paradoxes of strict implication, in which the
premise and conclusion can exhibit completely different terms.
175.
E.g., Marsilius of Inghen 1516, ff. 2
va
-3
rb
. His final definition (f. 3") is: 'Syllogismus vocalis est
oratio hypothetica in qua quibusdam positis aliud in voce et in significatione a premissis et qualibet
earum sequitur in consequentia necessaria virtute propria premissarum.'
176.
Javelli 1580, p. 76A. Nifo
1553a,
f. 5
rb
mentioned the view of Averroes that an
oratio
was a rational
hypothetical proposition but (f. 4
va
)
seems
to have taken it for granted that one could call a
sequence of distinct propositions an
oratio.
177.
For a full discussion see Ashworth
1974a,
pp. 224-9.
178.
Peter of Spain 1972, pp. 43-4. Cf. Toletus 1587, f. 28
vb
. 179. Hubien 1975.
180. Tartaretus 1503a, f. lxv
rb_va
; Eck in Aristotle
1516-17,
n, f. xii
rb
.
181.
Marsilius of Inghen 1516, f. 26
ra_vb
.
182.
Fonseca 1964, 1, p. 364;
Collegium Conimbricense
1607 (part 11), col. 357.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Traditional logic
171
importance of
Averroes
led to the popularisation of his arguments against
the fourth figure, culminating injacopo Zabarella's treatise on this issue.
183
These
arguments had mainly to do with an informal distinction between
natural and
unnatural
argumentation, and the fourth figure was rejected as
unnatural. Third, yet another definition of the major and minor terms
appeared, whereby the major term was said to be the predicate of the
conclusion
and the minor term to be its subject.
184
On this definition
there
is
a fourth figure and
there
can be no indirect modes. The definition is found
in Philoponus,
185
but he does not seem to have been cited by those using the
definition. Another possible source for the definition is the frequent remark
made in texts which
followed
Peter of Spain,
that
the major term is, as a
matter of fact, normally the predicate of the conclusion.
186
This second
source may help to explain the fact
that
many writers, especially in the early
seventeenth century, tended to define the major and minor terms in
accordance with their position in the conclusion while at the same time
denying
the fourth figure and recognising the indirect modes.
187
If these
writers were really
following
Philoponus, they were committing a
logical
crime;
but
if
they merely believed
that
in most cases the major term would
be the predicate of the conclusion, they were on safer ground. The only
writer I know of who explicitly defended such a position was Laurentius
Maiolus,
at the end of the fifteenth century. He argued
that
although the
major term should be defined as the predicate
of
the conclusion, the relation
of
the middle term to the other terms in the first figure was such
that
the
major term could be recognised in the absence
of
the conclusion. It was then
possible
for the natural order of the terms to be reversed in the conclusion,
and for indirect modes to be formed.
188
He also explored at some length the
issue of
three
possible definitions of the major and minor terms, and the
effect
that
each would have on Galen's claim
that
there
was a fourth
figure.
189
A century later Pace remarked
that
the popular definition of the
major term as the predicate of the conclusion must be wrong because it
ruled out the possibility of indirect modes.
190
183. J.
Zabarella
1597, fT.
101—32
(Liber de quarta syllogismorum jigura).
184.
Nifo
1553a,
f.
27
th
;
Keckermann
1600, p. 407;
Sanderson
1618, p. 123;
Burgersdijk
1637, p. 170.
185.
Philoponus
1544c,
f. I7
va
.
186.
Seton
1545,
sigs.
H
iii
r
,
H
iiii
v
.
Cf.
Melanchthon
1834-60,
xm, col. 596 (Erotemata dialectices). In his
first
logic
text,
Compendiaria dialectices ratio, he had
made
no
reference
to the
order
of the
terms
in
the
conclusion
and
gave
Peter
of
Spain's
definition:
ibid., xx, col. 732.
187. See I.
Thomas
1964 for an
analysis
of the
flaws
in
various
Oxford
logicians,
including
Robert
Sanderson.
Earlier
Nifo
had
accepted
the
fourth
figure
as a
consequence
of his
definition:
Nifo
1553a,
f.
27
vb
.
Unfortunately
he did not
attract
followers.
188.
Maiolus
1497,
sigs.
c i
r_v
, e i
r
~
v
. 189. Ibid.,
sigs.
d
vi
v
-e
iiii
r
,
especially
e
i
v
-ii
r
.
190.
Pace
in
Aristotle
1597, p.
i39
a_b
.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
172
Logic
and language
With
these two exceptions, sixteenth-century discussions of indirect
modes and the fourth figure seem to have ignored the fundamental question
of
how the initial definition of syllogistic
terms
affected the issue of what
modes and figures were logically possible. Moreover, many textbooks
simply adopted a position without enquiring whether it could be given a
logical
justification. Syllogistic may have been regarded as central to logic,
but it was not always handled
well.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
7
LOGIC:
CRITICISMS
BY
HUMANISTS
Introduction
Humanism encountered Aristotelian logic
as a
central component
in the
scholastic curriculum,
a
curriculum which
it was
humanists' ambition
to
replace with
one
more appropriate
to a
'classical' education.
1
Because
it
was
from their position
as
teachers
of
the liberal
arts that
humanists challenged
traditional
treatments
of
logic,
their interventions
in the
field have tended
to
be characterised
as
crucially disruptive
and
destructive,
and
they have been
blamed
for
producing
a
hiatus
in the
development
of
formal logic from
which
the
discipline
has
barely recovered.
2
Although recent scholarly
work
has
established humanist dialectic
as an
area
of
energetic intellectual
activity,
the
secondary
literature
continues
to
give
credence
to the
view
that
the activity
was
fragmented
and
eclectic,
and
continues
to
assume
a
fundamental lack
of
relevance
of
developments associated with humanist
dialectic
to the
development
of
logic proper.
3
This
is,
however,
to
underestimate
the
importance
of
Renaissance
developments
in
logic,
both
in the
context
of
specifically humanist
interventions
and,
perhaps even more importantly,
in the
light
of
cross-
influence
and
interaction between humanist
and
scholastic scholarly
contributions.
In
spite
of
scholastic logicians' insistence
on the
formal
nature
of
their concern with ratiocination
(as
opposed
to the
more 'linguistic'
interest
of
terminists
and
moderni), technical exploration
of
argument forms
was
inevitably conducted with
at
least sidelong glances
at
other available
approaches.
4
Furthermore, separate specialist discussions
do not
remain
1.
See, e.g., the account of Petrarch's knowledge of, and attitude towards, traditional logic in Garin
1969,
pp.
137-77.
For an example of the way in which
this
combination of technical knowledge and
intellectual hostility towards scholastic logic persisted as a feature of humanist involvement with the
subject,
see the account of Juan Luis Vives' attack on traditional logic in Vives 1979a.
2. See, for example, Kneale 1962, p. 300.
3.
See Risse 1964,
Ash
worth 1974a, Prantl 1855-70.
4. See Ashworth in
this
volume on the relation between logic and philosophy of language.
173
HUMANISTIC
LOGIC
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
174
Logic
and
language
neatly
cut
off from
one
another
in the
context
of the
curriculum
and the
textbook. Thus
(to
take
a
single example)
the
Aristotelian Agostino Nifo
chooses
to
react
to the
humanist Lorenzo
Valla's
reformulated dialectic
in
his Diabetica ludicra ('Schoolroom dialectic/Playful dialectic'),
rather
than
to dismiss
it out
of
hand.
5
By the end
of
the period, logic textbooks tend
to
be more readily characterisable
as
'hybrid'
than
as
'scholastic'
or as
'humanist', because
of the
cross-fertilisation which
has
gone
on
between
schools.
And whatever their avowed affiliation, they have tacitly discarded
the more technical aspects
of
medieval
logic (especially those, like suppositio
theory, which
had
grown
up
independently
of the
material contained
in
Aristotle's
texts
on
logic).
In
evaluating humanist contributions
to
dialectic,
it should
be
borne
in
mind
that
by the end of the
sixteenth century,
the
sources
on
which
a
professed Aristotelian might draw were markedly more
varied
and
unhomogeneous
than
during
the
Middle
Ages.
6
To
assess
a
peculiarly humanist approach
to
logic
and the
contribution
it
made
to
Renaissance logic
as a
whole
it is
desirable
to
begin
by
abandoning
the
now
customary approach
of
tracing modifications
in
dialectic teaching
from chronologically prior
to
chronologically subsequent humanist
pedagogue,
and
from textbook
to
textbook.
7
Such
an
approach concedes
a
linear notion
of
'development',
as of
'influence',
and
inevitably charac-
terises individual authors
as
representatives
of
artificially constructed
'schools'.
8
Whilst
the
present treatment
is
bound
to
proceed chrono-
logically,
it
will
concentrate
on
individual humanists' contributions
to dialectic as
part
of
their overall perspective
on the
liberal
arts
and
as
part
of
their commitment
to a
revised programme
of
university education suited
to
their liberal
arts
goal. And
it
will
emphasise
the
closely similar development
in Aristotelian treatment
of the
appropriate areas
of
their logic teaching,
suggesting considerable communication amongst authorities
in
different
schools,
and
testifying
to an
inevitable convergence, historically,
in
their
aims
and
attitudes. By avoiding
the
cataloguing
and
classificatory approach
to Renaissance logic
I
hope
to
give
an
account which
will
prevent
the
reader
5.
See
Ash
worth
1976, L. Jardine 1981.
6. See, for instance, Schmitt 1983b, chs. 1 and 4, and
McConica
1979 for discussion of the varied nature
of Aristotelianism in the English universities in this period.
7.
This approach was firmly established, for obvious reasons of convenience and expository clarity, by
pioneering authors in the field like Risse 1964, Vasoli 1968a, N. W. Gilbert
i960
and Howell 1956. It
enabled them to describe the contours of the field and to catalogue and describe economically
hitherto neglected treatises and textbooks.
8. Although his work is compendious, and
does
proceed largely in chronological sweeps for
convenience of exposition, Vasoli 1968a manages to avoid such simple notions of'influence' -
remarkably,
considering the pioneering nature of the work. My own debt to Professor Vasoli and to
this work is immense.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Humanistic logic
175
being
tempted into dismissively discarding the whole run of texts which
will
concern us here, as muddled and derivative. For a rounded
view,
I
suggest
that
this account
of
specifically
humanist
criticism of, and innovation
in, logic should be read in close conjunction with chapter 6, 'Traditional
logic',
which maps out the developments with which humanist treatments
interacted.
9
The
history of medieval and Renaissance logic has traditionally been the
history of the great medieval syllogistic logicians and the fortuna of their
innovatory treatments down through the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies.
10
When historians of logic characterise humanist dialectic as a
misguided
and non-rigorous intervention which disrupted the smooth
development of medieval syllogistic
logic,
they confirm their own
commitment to the interests and techniques pioneered by logicians like
William
of Sherwood.
11
It is not surprising, then, if these scholars find the
very
different approach of the humanists trying. They hold up against the
'non-rigorous' humanist treatment of ratiocination, the 'rigour' of a
commitment to formal validity as the central focus for the study
of
logic
—
a
commitment,
that
is to say, to those fixed
patterns
of
argumentation which
guarantee
that
from any
true
premises whatsoever one can only infer a
true
conclusion.
12
Humanist treatments
of
logic,
on the other hand, have a good
deal in common with the interests of some recent, modern logicians, who
have
chosen to
give
a good deal of attention to non-deductive inference,
and to 'good' arguments (arguments which can be counted on to win in
debate), and the problematic
nature
of their validity.
13
Like modern
logicians
they are interested, above all, in 'good' arguments.
A
humanist treatment of logic is characterised by the fundamental
assumption
that
oratio may be persuasive, even compelling, without its
being
formally valid (or without the formal validity
of
the argument being
ascertainable). It takes the
view,
therefore,
that
any significant study of
argument (the subject-matter
of
logic/dialectic)
must concern
itself
equally
with
argument (strictly, argumentation) which is compelling but not
amenable to analysis within traditional formal
logic.
14
It is this fundamental
difference
of opinion over what is meant by 'compelling' argument which
accounts for the dogmatic insistence (on ideological grounds) of the
scholastic (and of the historian of scholasticism)
that
the humanist is a
9. See Ash
worth
in
this
volume.
Risse's
account
(Risse
1964) may
also
usefully
be set
alongside
the
present
discussion.
See
also
Risse
1965.
10. See, for
example,
Cambridge History 1982. 11. See, for
example,
Kneale
1962.
12.
Formal
validity
is
defined
at the
outset
of any
reputable
modern logic
textbook.
13.
See, for
example,
Hamblin
1970. 14. See
Nuchelmans
1980.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
176
Logic
and
language
'grammarian'
or a
'rhetorician'. Either term announces that what
the
humanist is concerned with is
not
'rigorous'
in the
restricted scholastic sense:
all
discourse
not
amenable
to
such 'rigorous' analysis is,
for the
scholastic,
a
matter
for the
grammarian
(to
parse
and
construe)
or the
rhetorician
(to
catalogue
its
persuasive devices).
It is in the
same spirit that humanists
always
refer
to
their study
of
ratiocination
as
'dialectic' (reasoning
conducted
between
two
interlocutors), rather than
as
'logic',
to
emphasise
the active, pragmatic nature
of the
argumentation which captures their
interest.
15
Early humanists
Petrarch
had
ostentatiously little time
for
formal
logic.
16
In a
list
of
his most
loved
books, jotted
on the
flyleaf
of one of
his manuscripts,
he
includes
a
single
standard medieval treatment
of
logic
and
stresses 'nothing beyond
that'
(as a
gesture towards
the
prominence
of
such study
in the
traditional
curriculum).
17
In the
face
of the
strictly formal interests
of
high
scholasticism,
Petrarch's inclination
is to
disparage
logic
teaching alto-
gether, rather than
to
replace
it. It is, in his
view,
an
unnecessarily time-
consuming
and
distracting pedantry,
not to be
confused with real under-
standing
and
intellectual maturity, which issue from genuine intimacy
and familiarity with antiquity:
Consider
those
who
spend their entire life
in
dialectical altercations
and
cavillings;
this
is
what
I
predict
for all
those things:
the
repute
of
those matters,
and
certainly
of
themselves,
will
evaporate,
and a
single grave
will
suffice
for
their bones
and
their
name.
For
since death freezes
the
tongue,
not
only
are
they compelled
to
remain
silent,
but
those matters also
are
silenced.
18
Petrarch readily concedes that dialectic
is a
necessary propaedeutic
to
knowledge;
what
he
deplores
is the
tendency
of
logicians
to
treat their
subject
as a
goal
in
itself, rather than
as a
means
to a
larger end: 'Dialectic
can
be
a
part,
but it is
certainly
not an end; and it can be a
part
for
early
in the
morning,
but not far
into
the
evening.'
In his
disparagement
of
unnecessar-
ily
technical
and
'quibbling'
logic
Petrarch specifically singles
out the
15.
See, for instance, Nifo 1540 on this choice of label for a logic which centres on topics.
16.
On Petrarch's attitude to logic, see
Garin
1969, pp.
139—77;
Vasoli 1968a, pp. 9-15.
17.
SeeUllman 1973, pp.
127-8:
'Tractatus et nil ultra'. Ullman suggests that the work intended is Peter
of Spain's
Summule logicales,
which is plausible. See also Reynolds and Wilson 1974, p. 117.
18.
Petrarch 1933-42,1, p. 18 (1.2): 'Respice et hos qui in altercationibus et cavillationibus dyalecticis
totum vite tempus expendunt seque inanibus semper questiunculis exagitant; et presagium meum
de omnibus habeto: omnium nempe cum
ipsis
fama corruet unumque sepulchrum ossibus sufficiet
ac nomini. Cum enim mors frigidam linguam stare coegerit, non modo ut sileant
necesse
est, sed ut
de his etiam sileatur.' See Vasoli 1968a, p. 9.
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