Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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Humanistic logic
197
Nifo's
running comments throughout
the
Topics insist
on the
lack
of
competence
of the
logician without good Greek.
Not
surprisingly,
in
view
of
Boethius'
own
indebtedness
to
Alexander,
Nifo's
reading
of the
Topics takes
him in the
direction
of the De
differentiis
topicis,
which
in
turn
takes
him
towards humanist dialecticians like
Valla.
Unlike
traditional scholastic logicians, Nifo regarded topics-logic
- or
'dialectic'
-
as
an
independent
and
independently interesting exploration
of
ratiocination, which concerns itself with 'good' arguments
in the
practical
context
of
debating.
And the
detail
of his
commentary offers
a
view
of
Aristotle's
exploration
of
argument forms which allows
for the
possibility
of
systematic study
of
non-demonstrative inference.
On
this
view,
the
Topics
presents
a
wide range
of
arguments
the
acceptability
of
whose
conclusions
will
depend upon
the
ability
of the
disputant
to
convince
his
audience
of
the acceptability
of
the premises.
As far as the
argument forms
are concerned, their validity
is
assured
if
and only
if
they
can be
recast
in one
of
the
formally valid syllogistic moods. This
is
certainly
the
view
of the
relation between syllogistic
and
topical dialectic which Nifo offers
in his
textbook,
the
Dialectica ludicra
89
It
is
a
fitting
tribute
to
Nifo
that
his kind
of
reading
of
Aristotle's
text
of
the Topica is currently enjoying
the
approval
of
ancient philosophers.
90
Humanist programmes
for a
revised dialectic curriculum reflected
a
desire
for a
flexible organon reorientated
to
include
the
kinds
of ad hoc and
occasional
arguments appropriate
to
oratory
and the
law-courts. Together
with
humanistic influence
on the
establishing
of a
'pure' Aristotle
and
humanist contributions
to the
retrieval
and
appreciation
of the
substantial
body
of
early commentary
on
Aristotle's scientific
and
logical works,
it
ensured
that
the
study
of
logic
or
dialectic
—
whether explicitly 'reformed'
or avowedly Aristotelian —
was
permanently altered
by the
impact
of
humanism.
In the end, the
value
of
this humanist influence probably lies
in
factas,
ideo minus errauit. vidimus etia(m) co(m)plures externoru(m) cursus, quos non ab ratione
cursus voca(n)t, quia nihil de verbis Arist(otelis) interpreta(n)tur. ex his igitur omnibus nihil
iuuamenti accepimus, sed solum inextricabiles quaestiones quae mouentur ad ea quae ipsi dicunt,
non autem ad ea quae Arist(oteles) tradit. In his abundant, & in his maiorem partem expositionis
faciunt.
Nisi igitur legeremus Alex(andri) & Herminii expositio(n)es, vix unum verbu(m) bene
esset
a nobis interpretatum. turpe enim est vole(n)tibus exponere Aristo(telis) libros, vt
illos
audeant
interpretari ignorata lingua, in qua Aristoteles scripsit: nullisque graecis expositoribus iter
demonstrantibus.'
89. See Ashworth 1976; L. Jardine 1981.
90. Nifo is here taken simply as one representative and competent example of a trend in reading the
Topics
(of a kind which we have argued was inspired by humanism). For similar representative
interest to be found in Nifo's discussion of demonstration, see N. Jardine in this volume.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
198
Logic
and language
its variety, as
well
as in its impressive linguistic and exegetical competence.
And
it may
well
be
that
when humanist contributions are evaluated as
part
of
a serious debate about classical treatments of inference and the ars
disserendi, it
will
transpire
that
modern reappraisals of Aristotelian
logic
were
already anticipated by humanist-influenced commentators.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
VI
NATURAL
PHILOSOPHY
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8
The
natural
philosophy of the Renaissance was far from being a
homogeneous body of knowledge uniformly accepted and taught in the
universities. As one might expect during a rebirth
of
learning, new
views
of
nature
and of man's place in
nature
took their place alongside those of
classical
antiquity
then
being rediscovered and explored for a wisdom long
lost. Yet a surprising amount of energy was focused on what might be
termed 'traditional
natural
philosophy', i.e., a philosophy of
nature
hallowed
by tradition in the Latin West from the twelfth century onwards
and constituting a major
part
of university studies. In essence this was an
Aristotelian
philosophy, for the texts
that
were commented on were those
of
the
Lyceum,
but it also contained a considerable accretion
of
Neoplatonic
elements as
well
as the developments of Islamic, Jewish and Christian
commentators. The diversity of sources from which it sprang and the
variety
of situations in which its teachings took root argue against its ever
having
been a monolithic system of thought.
1
Indeed, the tradition it
embodied was complex, hardly capable of being characterised in simple
terms. More, its written expression was prolix, and few scholars have had
the inclination or the stamina to read and analyse the many printed works
and manuscripts in which its teachings are preserved. Yet it was a
particularly fruitful tradition, for it provided the seed-bed from which
many disciplines now respected as
parts
of'modern science' emerged. The
difficulty
of studying it is matched only by its importance, which until
recent years has not been
fully
appreciated by intellectual historians.
The
following
account makes no claim to completeness: it proposes only
to sketch the main outlines of this
natural
philosophy and to supply a
sampling of illustrations
that
may enable the reader to capture its spirit, its
values
and its limitations. It begins with a brief description of the transition
from the Middle
Ages
to the Renaissance and
of
how
disciplines concerned
i. For a
survey
of the
diversification
within Renaissance
Aristotelianism,
see
Schmitt
1981, § vi and
1983 a; on the
similar
situation
within
the
Middle
Ages,
see Dictionary
of
the Middle Ages
1982-,
1,
pp.
456-69
(Wallace).
201
TRADITIONAL
NATURAL
PHILOSOPHY
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202
Natural philosophy
with
nature
fared over the years roughly between 1200 and 1650. The main
exposition
is concerned with methodological and stylistic innovations
within the period, with the way in which
natural
philosophy fitted into the
overall
structure
of
knowledge,
how as a philosophy it stood in relation to
the more specialised sciences, what its empirical content was in particular
and the various
ways
in which it was systematised by writers interested in
philosophical synthesis. Concluding sections focus on the relationship
between
natural
philosophy and medicine, and on critiques of the former
that
led to its downfall and the rise of the modern era.
THE
MEDIEVAL-RENAISSANCE
TRANSITION
At
one time it was fashionable to propose a
sharp
dichotomy between the
philosophy of the Middle
Ages
and
that
of the Renaissance, as though their
subjects of interest and methods of investigation were markedly different.
In the study
of
nature
it has been found difficult to identify and to maintain
such a distinction. The development of thought in this area from the onset
of
the
thirteenth
century to the mid seventeenth may be likened more to a
continuum
than
to a series of discrete jumps. Beginning with Albertus
Magnus
at Paris and with Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon at Oxford,
and continuing to the textbook syntheses of four centuries later,
natural
philosophy was concerned with much the same questions and yielded
answers
that
were intelligible within a fairly constant framework. By and
large the setting was
that
provided by Aristotle's
libri
naturales,
i.e., the
Physics,
De
caelo,
De generatione et corruptione, Meteorology, De anima, Parva
naturalia,
and so on, with accretions from other sources. Sensible
matter,
that
is, material things as they appear to the senses, provided the generic
subject of consideration. This served to distinguish
natural
philosophy or
natural
science
(philosophia
naturalis
and
scientia
naturalis
were used
inter-
changeably
throughout the period) from mathematics, which was con-
cerned with quantitative being, and from metaphysics, which was
concerned with being in general, abstracting from its material and im-
material instantiations.
2
Within this generic subject, various disciplines
were
identified as concerned with the different kinds of things
that
incorporated sensible
matter
in their make-up. The eight books of the
Physics
supplied the basic principles behind these disciplines, whereas the
remaining treatises examined the causes and properties of the heavens,
2. The
distinction
of the
sciences
on
this
basis
is
explained
by
Thomas
Aquinas
1963a,
pp. 3-18,
50—65
(qq. 5 and 6 of his
commentary
on the De trinitate of
Boethius).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Traditional
natural philosophy
203
elements and compounds, the atmospheric region and different organisms
(including man)
that
inhabit the universe.
A
number of features may be noted as characteristic of
natural
philosophy throughout this time span. For one, it was usually
part
of a
systematic world
view,
expressed in a technical language
that,
if not
barbarous from the viewpoint of Latinity, approached jargon in its actual
employ.
Again,
it was characterised by divisions into schools, many arising
from the traditions of geographically diverse universities, others associated
with
religious orders such as the Augustinians, Dominicans and Franciscans.
In the context of Thomist, Scotist and Ockhamist thought
natural
philosophy was invariably oriented towards metaphysics and ultimately
theology,
whereas in Averroist circles it was more commonly ordered
towards medicine. In both cases it was pursued for its instructional value
—
providing general (and later, classical) knowledge of the world of
nature
that
would be open to either speculative or practical development. And by
and large its problems were approached speculatively, with little reliance on
experimentation or refined methods of observation, and with a general
mistrust of mathematics as an
effective
instrument
of philosophical
reasoning.
Against
this common background, however, it is possible to identify
changing emphases
that
became more noticeable as the centuries progressed
and led ultimately to the 'new science' of the seventeenth century. The
major innovation was the
return
to classical sources, with the increase this
brought in knowledge
of
the Greek text
of
Aristotle
and
of
the many Greek
commentaries on his works. The
Aristoteles
Latinus
of earlier centuries
showed
little critical awareness of texts and was based on translations of
varying,
often inferior, quality; this limitation, coupled with the pervasive
desire for systématisation, led to benign interpretations
of
the Stagirite
that
could
seriously depart from his thought. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
commentaries on the
libri
naturales
were more faithful to the text and more
intent
on discerning, and usually defending, its original meaning. But the
resulting linguistic and philological expertise was not an unmixed blessing;
it encouraged an inherent conservatism among Renaissance Aristotelians
that
was hardly characteristic of their medieval counterparts, who would
freely
depart from the pagan Aristotle
if
they saw this to be in the service of
truth.
3
3.
Such
conservatism
was
caricatured
by
Galileo
in his
portrayal
of
Simplicio
in his 1632 and 1638
dialogues;
the
extent
to
which
Cesare
Cremonini
may
have
been
the
model
for
Simplicio
is
discussed
in
Schmitt
1984, § xi.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
204
Natural philosophy
A
counterbalancing feature of the Renaissance study of sources was the
knowledge
it provided of alternative approaches to
nature.
The complete
works
of Plato became available and along with them Neoplatonic
interpretations of Aristotle
that
conciliated him with the teachings of his
mentor.
4
A fuller knowledge
of
Neopythagorean doctrines also resulted, as
did
that
of the Hermetic tradition. Stoic and atomist texts were similarly
made available, and these provided new insights into physical problems,
carrying over into the seventeenth century. But even at the beginning
of
the
sixteenth century a fairly tolerant
attitude
towards opposing schools began
to manifest itself.
5
Within scholastic Aristotelianism, for example, nomi-
nalist positions insinuated themselves within both the Thomist and the
Scotist
traditions, and when the
Jesuits
attained prominence a studied
eclecticism
characterised their works. The fierce partisan loyalties of the
Middle
Ages
were somewhat relaxed; to a remarkable degree the physical
works
of Aristotle supplied common ground on which followers of
Alexander
of Aphrodisias and Simplicius, Avicennians and Averroists,
Neoplatonists and scholastics of various affiliations could argue out their
differences.
Another contrast between the earlier and the later ambiences was the
emergence, especially in sixteenth-century Italy, of strong technological
and artisan traditions.
6
Extensive work in architecture and military
engineering fostered interest in the applied branches
of
mathematics, notably
in the mechanics of Archimedes. The recovery of the
Mechanics
attributed
to Aristotle and his school induced
natural
philosophers to reconsider the
mechanical doctrines of the ancients and to locate these within the larger
corpus of physical science.
7
Similar developments in painting and the fine
arts
led to renewed interest in optics or
perspectiva,
and Copernicus' proposal
of
a Pythgorean, as opposed to a Ptolemaic, universe gave new
life
to
astronomy.
8
In the Middle
Ages
these
scientiae
mediae
pertained to the
quadrivium,
to preparatory studies, but in the Renaissance they entered
directly into the university curriculum. The fact
that
disciplinary domains
were
jealously guarded did not prevent some crossing over from
4.
Jacopo
Mazzoni,
for
example,
attempted
a
complete
reconciliation
of the
philosophies
of
Plato
and
Aristotle:
see
Mazzoni
1576 and 1597; for
details
see
Purnell
1971 and 1972. On the
introduction
of
Platonic
philosophy
into
the
universities
of the
Renaissance,
see
Schmitt
1981, § in.
5.
This
is
particularly
manifest
in the
work
of
John
Mair and his
disciples
at
Paris,
to be
discussed
below;
see Garcia
Villoslada
1938 and
Élie
1950-1.
6.
Excerpts
from
treatises
in the
technological
tradition
are
given
in
English
translation
in Mechanics
1969; see
also
the
review
of
this
by
Schmitt
1981, § xn.
7. For the
place
of the Mechanics in
Renaissance
culture,
see
Rose
and
Drake
1971.
8. The perspectiva
tradition
is
surveyed
in
Lindberg
1976; on
Copernicanism
see n. 17
below.
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Traditional natural philosophy
205
mathematics
to
natural
philosophy, with consequent debate over
the
strengths
and
weaknesses
of a
physical mathematics,
that is, a
mathematics
concerned essentially with physical problems.
9
Court patronage subsidised
studies
in
this field
for
their practical value,
and
provided
a
setting wherein
new
instruments
and
even experiments could
be
devised
to
study
the
motion
of
weights
and
similar subjects.
10
A
related infusion into
natural
philosophy came from
the
close alliance
that
was
promoted between
the
practical science
of
medicine
and its
speculative underpinnings
as
found
in the
study
of
nature.
Just as
Galileo
claimed
for
himself
the title
of
philosopher
as
well
as that
of
mathematician,
so physicians
in the
late Middle
Ages
and the
Renaissance
saw
themselves
as
both
philosophi
and
medici,
with their university degrees qualifying them
in
this
way.
11
Such
an
orientation
did
more
than
advance
the
study
of
herbs
and
materia
medica.
It led to
refined observation
in
analysing symptoms,
to
contrasting methods used
by
Aristotle
and
Galen when identifying
the
principal organs
of
the human body
and to the
study
of
such organs through
the practice
of
surgery
and
accurate pictorial representation.
Somewhat connected with
the
medical development came
a
shift
of
interest within logic
as an
academic discipline.
The
late Middle
Ages
saw an
extensive development
of the
summulae
tradition
and a
nominalist concern
with formal logic
and
sophismata,
both
of
which served
well
the
instructional needs
of the
young.
12
The
Renaissance reacted against
the
hair-splitting such
logica
docens
involved
and
directed attention
to a logica
utens
instead.
Not
only
did
Aristotle's
Rhetoric
and Poetics now
come
in for
their share
of
attention,
but the Topics and the Posterior
Analytics
became
fields
of
concentration also.
The
thirteenth
century
had
pioneered
in
studies
of
scientific methodology; with
the
recovery
of
Greek
commentaries
on the
Analytics
and a
deeper understanding
of
the methods employed
in
medicine
9. The area of investigation where this first occurred was astronomy, because of the fact that physical
astronomy, as contained in Aristotle's De
caelo,
was taught by philosophers, whereas mathematical
astronomy, as presented in Ptolemy's
Almagest
or Sacrobosco's
Sphaera,
was taught by
mathematicians; inevitably mathematicians began to speculate about the physical reality of their
constructs (e.g., eccentrics and epicycles), and philosophers had to be concerned whether their
spheres fitted the mathematical theories being taught. See Westman 1980. The same merging of
interests began to manifest itself in the study of motion. Girolamo Borro wrote a treatise De
motu
gravium
et
levium
(1575) while teaching natural philosophy at Pisa; some years later the professor of
mathematics there, Filippo Fantoni, composed a similar De
motu,
and so did Galileo when he
replaced Fantoni in that post. For details, see Galilei
i960,
pp.
13-131;
Schmitt 1981,
§§ix,
x, xi; and
Wallace
1984, pp.
230—48.
10.
Most of the treatises mentioned in n.6 above were composed under the patronage of, for instance,
the Duke of Urbino, the Duke of Savoy and the
Grand
Duke of
Tuscany;
see also Westfall 1985.
11.
See Galilei, 1890—1909, x, p. 353. On the education of physicians at that time, see Bylebyl 1979.
12.
Cambridge History
1982, pp.
159-381.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
206
Natural philosophy
by
Hippocrates and Galen, in pure mathematics by Euclid and Pappus and
in applied mathematics by Archimedes and Hero, these studies proliferated.
Significant
advances were made, particularly in the logic of discovery
associated with the demonstrative
regressus
and related methods of
resolution and composition.
13
METHODOLOGICAL
AND
STYLISTIC
INNOVATIONS
From the foregoing it is apparent
that
methodology was one of the areas
wherein pronounced changes began to become manifest with the advent of
the Renaissance. At the risk of oversimplifying, in what
follows
these
changes,
some of which were also stylistic,
will
be grouped in four
categories,
namely mathematical, observational, technological and
disputational, so as to provide a framework in which major contributions
may be discussed. The division is proposed not as exhaustive but as
illustrative of the types of innovation discernible within the period.
By
mathematical changes are meant developments in applied mathemat-
ics
that
ultimately were to have significant impact on the study
of
nature, as
exemplified,
say, in the works
of
Oresme and Copernicus. Both Grosseteste
and Roger Bacon had introduced a form
of
mathematicism at Oxford with
their 'metaphysics of light', but it remained for Bradwardine and others at
Merton
College
in the fourteenth century (especially Heytesbury and
Swineshead)
to offer detailed quantitative solutions to problems respecting
local
motion and qualitative change.
14
The findings of these
calculators,
as
they were called, were quickly assimilated at Paris by Buridan and his
students, among whom Oresme is particularly noteworthy.
15
Apart from
working
out techniques for calculating ratios and graphing changes
geometrically,
Oresme proposed a clockwork model of the motions of the
13.
A
comprehensive
survey
of
this
development
is Aristotelismo véneto 1983,1, pp. 221^77
(Papuli);
see
also
ibid., pp.
435-57
(Berti);
N. W.
Gilbert
i960;
Randall
1961;
Wallace
1972-, 1, pp. 117-49.
14.
On
Grosseteste,
see
Crombie
1953 andMcEvoy 1982; for
Bacon,
see R.
Bacon
1983; on the
Merton
School
or the Oxford
Calculators,
as
they
were
called,
see Reinterpreting
Galileo
1986, pp.
53-108
(Sylla);
Cambridge History 1982, pp.
540-63
(Sylla);
Clagett 1959;
Wallace
1972-, 1, pp.
53-62;
among
its
members
are
usually
included
Thomas
Bradwardine,
John
Dumbleton,
William
Heytesbury
and
Richard
Swineshead.
See
also
Dictionary of Scientific Biography
1970-80,
v, pp.
548-54
('Grosseteste');
1, pp.
377~85
('Bacon');
11, pp.
390-7
('Bradwardine');
vn, pp. 116-17
('Dumbleton');
vi, pp.
376-80
('Heytesbury');
xm, pp.
184-213
('Swineshead').
15.
Sometimes
referred
to as the Doctores Parisienses,
following
Duhem
1906-13
passim. On the
more
important
of
these
writers,
see Dictionary of Scientific Biography
1970-80,
11, pp.
603-8
('Jean
Buridan');
1, pp. 93-5
('Albert
of
Saxony');
ix, pp. 136-8
('Marsilius
of
Inghen');
x, pp.
223-30
('Nicole
Oresme');
for a
summary
of
their
contributions
and
their
influence
on
Galileo,
see
Wallace
1972-, 1, pp.
103-14
and 1981a, pp.
192-252,
303-19.
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