Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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not liberty as such, 288; when inapplica

ble, 289; grounded in utility “in the larg-

est sense,” 289; stated and explained,

290–293; why no exceptions to, 291, 294–

295

principle of reﬂection, Butler’s, 422

principles: of modern world (Mill), 297–

298; list of, in Butler, 450–451

principles of justice: Rawls’s close to Mill’s,

267; Rawls’s, stated, 267n

Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69; and formal struc-

ture of state of nature, 73–77; example

of, 74–75, 88–89

private property: natural right of (Locke),

119; in means of production, is basis of

exploitation (Marx), 350, 355; why Marx

rejects, 352. See also property

proﬁt, maximum, aim of capitalists (Marx),

328

promising: and Prisoner’s Dilemma, 75; in

state of nature, 75; does not enter utili-

tarian view, 161; and contracts, 179

property: God’s, 121; duty to respect, based

in natural law and not consent, 126; pre-

cedes government in Locke, but is not

basis of it, 128; right of, not basis of po-

litical power, 128, 142, 143–144, 145–146;

and the class state in Locke, 138–155; as

bundle of rights, 142–143; two uses of, in

Locke, 143; and natural right to means

of preservation, 145; liberty of use in

state of nature, 145; right of, is condi-

tional, 147; world given to mankind in

common (Locke), 147; foundation of

(Locke), 148; Locke’s two-stage account

of, 149–150; is conventional for Locke in

society, 149–150; principle of justice of

(Hume), 179; rules of, 181; in Locke vs.

Hume, 183–184, 187; origin of (Rous-

seau), 201; justiﬁcation of, and property-

owning democracy (Rawls), 320–321; in

means of production enables extraction

of surplus value (Marx), 330; private, and

exploitation, 350; private, why Marx re-

jects, 352. See also private property

property-owning democracy, in justice as

fairness, 320–321

provisos, in Locke’s account of property,

148

public good, 107n; in Hobbes, 92; no nec-

essary incompatibility with private in-

terest in Butler, 439–440

publicity, of rules of justice (Hume), 180–

181

public political culture, 6

public reason: idea of, originates in Rous-

seau, 231; deﬁned, 231n; and Mill’s prin-

ciple of liberty, 286, 287, 289; principle

of liberty as principle of, 291, 292,

293, 296; and admissible reasons,

296

Rashdall, Hastings, 397

rational, the: and acting for one’s interest,

54; contrasts with the reasonable, 56;

desire to be, 58–60; human being, as de-

ﬁned in Hobbes, 62; and social coopera-

tion, 63; as grounds of the reasonable,

66. See also practical reason; rational

choice; rationality

rational advantage: and a person’s good,

56; in Locke, 129

rational choice, principles of, 56, 58, 60

rational egoism, as method of ethics

(Sidgwick), 382, 383

rational intuitionism, Butler’s agreement

with, 423. See also intuitionism

rationality: in Locke, 129; collective, and

Pareto, 152; coalition, 152–153

rational social world (Marx), 361

realistic utopia, and role of political phi-

losophy, 11

reason: authority of, 2–3; and justiﬁcation to

reasonable and rational persons, 13–14;

defects of, in Hobbes, 36, 418; can be en-

emy of compassion (Rousseau), 200–204;

deliberative, and free will, 223, 224, 227,

231, 236–237, 243; and general will, 227,

243; and public moral opinion, 287–

288

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reasonable, the: as fair-mindedness, 54; and

Laws of Nature, 54; justiﬁed as rational

in Hobbes, 55; contrasts with the ratio-

nal, 56; and principles of fair social coop-

eration, 57; principles, 60; rational basis

of in Hobbes, 62, 64; and social coopera-

tion, 63; as collectively rational in

Hobbes, 66; and law of nature, 129

reasonableness: and practical reason, 54;

and self-restraint, 87; of desires, 88; and

minors, 217; and fair-mindedness (But-

ler), 428

reasonable person, has concern for fairness,

reasons: and general will, 234, 243; princi-

ple of liberty excludes certain kinds of,

291

rebellion, as contrary to reason (Hobbes),

reciprocity, 218; and fair terms, 56–57; and

social cooperation, 56–57, 87; principle

of, 61; principle of in Rousseau, 199;

principle of in Mill, 282, 304–305

reﬂective equilibrium, 452, 452n

relativism, in Hobbes, 161, 394

religion, 238; Hobbes on, 38; people’s inter-

est in, 48; doctrine of, provides back-

ground to Locke’s view, 121; and individ-

uality, 309; wars of, 309; delusory form

of ideological consciousness, 361

rent, nature’s produce taken by landlord

(Marx), 347

reputation, as power (Hobbes), 65, 91

resentment: in Butler, 433–434; not re-

venge, 434; proper role of, 436

resistance (Locke): right of, 122–123; condi-

tions of, 134–135

respect: and equality, 247; of others and of

self, 248. See also self-respect

revolution: Locke on, 172; of working class,

357–358

Ricardo, David, 162, 393

right, the, and utilitarianism, 176

right: of creation in Locke, 111; of execu-

tion, to punish wrongdoers, 118; of

property, as conditional, not absolute

(Locke), 147; abstract, and Mill, 293–

296. See also moral rights; natural

right(s); rights

rights: natural, list of in Locke, 118–119;

exchange of in social contract, 220–222;

and justice, 274; legal, two ways to jus-

tify, 277; basic, and Mill’s two-part crite-

rion for, 278–280; and aggregate utility,

278–280; equal, and Mill, 279; and util-

ity, 293; natural (abstract), 293–296; con-

cept of and interpersonal comparison

of utility, 404–405. See also moral rights;

natural right(s); right

Robespierre, Maximilien, 193

Roemer, John, 351n, 366

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 191–248

Rye House Plot, 108

Saint-Simonians, 252, 252n

sanctions: three kinds of, 274; and public

utility, 274

Scanlon, T. M., 246n; contractualism of,

125

scarcity of resources, 44

self-defense, right of, 117

self-development, and individuality (Mill),

308–309, 311

self-love: nature of, in Butler, 426, 440; rea-

sonable, not authoritative principle of

our nature, 429; no essential conﬂict be-

tween reasonable, and authority of con-

science, 429, 447; hedonistic vs. notion

of rational plan, 445; various kinds, 446;

vs. conscience, 453. See also amour de soi

self-preservation: as fundamental interest

(Hobbes), 46–47, 64, 70; not always

strongest desire, 47–48; end of, in

Hobbes, 65; right of, inalienable, 82;

right and duty of in Locke, 117, 118

self-realization: equal right to (Marx), 343–

344; and species-being (Marx), 363

self-respect: and equality, 245, 247; and

dignity (Mill), 265

Sen, Amartya, 406n, 411n

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sense of justice: and social cooperation, 57;

normal fact about people (Hume) 182;

our equal capacity for (Rousseau), 219; in

Mill, and principle of utility, 271–272

sensible knave, in Hume, 182, 185

Shaftesbury, Earl of, 105, 106, 108, 417, 418,

421, 453

Sidgwick, Henry, 162, 176, 375–415; jus-

tiﬁcation of principle of utility, 257

slavery (Marx on): and surplus labor, 324,

327; contract into, void under capitalism,

340; incompatible with capitalism, 340–

341

slaves, lack of will of, 217

Smith, Adam, 162, 393

social compact. See social contract

social contract: and legitimate political or-

der, 13–14; features of, 13–20; as idea of

reason in Kant, 14–15; actual vs. non-his-

torical, 14–15; different views of, 14–16;

actual vs. hypothetical, 15; as test of po-

litical legitimacy or obligation, 15; nature

of parties in, 16–17; initial situations in,

16–20; knowledge of parties within, 17;

involves normalization of interests, 226;

vs. utilitarianism, 399

social contract (Hobbes): and Hobbes’s ma-

terialism, 29–30; gives philosophical

knowledge of the Leviathan, 30;

Hobbes’s interpretation of, 30–35; as ana-

lytical device, 31; gives power to the sov-

ereign, 31; as authorization of the sover-

eign, 32–33, 80–82; hypothetical, not

actual, 33, 34; three possible interpreta-

tions in Hobbes, 34–35; lifts us out of

state of nature, 77, 90–91; sovereign is

not party to, 80–81, 91; terms of, in

Hobbes, 81–82; as pact of submission, 93

social contract (Locke): role of in Hobbes

vs. Locke, 107, 122, 160; give up natural

right to execute punishment, 118–119;

and fundamental law of nature (FLN),

119; Locke’s use of “social compact,”

123–124; unites the people into political

society, 123–124; originating consent in,

124–125; as test of political legitimacy,

128–129, 172; and “ideal history,” 129–

130, 131; hypothetical but historical,

131; by the people, not with the govern-

ment, 136; Locke’s account of property

in, 138–139; and class state, 150; ratio-

nality of class state in Locke’s, 153–155;

intuitive idea of, is agreement, 159;

Hume’s critique of Locke’s, 165–173;

has no correspondence to facts (Hume),

167; two parts to Locke’s account of,

171; Locke’s criterion, 174–175

social contract (Rousseau): the ﬁrst was

fraudulent, 202–203; relation to Rous-

seau’s Second Discourse, 206–207; prob-

lem of, 207, 214–215, 219–220; its as-

sumptions and the General Will, 214–

218; and political conception of justice,

215–216; Rousseau’s idea of, 216–222;

four assumptions of, 217–219; involves

normalization of interests, 226; achieves

moral and civil freedom, 235; assumes

social interdependence, 236, 240; pres-

ent-time interpretation, 236; society of,

can come about in many ways, 241–242;

and freedom, 241–244; and equality of

citizens, 246–247; and equality at high-

est level, 247–248

social cooperation: fair terms of, 20; re-

quires effective sovereign, 36; two

parts, rational advantage and fair

terms, 56; differs from efﬁcient coordi-

nation of social activity, 56; and reci-

procity, 56–57; capabilities for, 57; de-

ﬁned, 62–63; and reciprocity, 87; and

mutuality, 87

social institutions: do not change human

nature for Hobbes, 42; and human na-

ture, 48; reasonable self-restraint and

fairness essential to, 87

socialism: liberal, four elements of, 323;

consequence of Marx’s attitudes to jus-

tice for, 337; use of price-mechanism in,

350; no exploitation or unpaid labor un-

der, 364; ﬁrst defect, 366–367

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social power, Mill’s general equilibrium

view of, 315

social union, 369–370

society: possibility of well-regulated (Rous-

seau), 210–211; necessary for full expres-

sion of human nature (Rousseau), 218;

our personal interdependence in (Rous-

seau), 221–222; as natural and necessary

for us (Mill), 282; best state of (Mill), 302

sovereign, the: only remedy for civil war

(Hobbes), 33, 34; does not change hu-

man nature, 42; removes fear of violent

death, 44–45; role and powers of in

Hobbes, 55, 67–68, 73–88; right to resist,

in self-defense, 61; as artiﬁcial person, 67;

role of to stabilize society, 73, 88, 90, 92;

by institution or by conquest, 77;

changes background conditions for rea-

soning, 78; authorization of, 79; as arti-

ﬁcial person, 79; authorized as everyone’s

agent, 80–81; the people as, in constitu-

tional democracy, 86; Hobbes’s regress

argument for absolute, 86; personal vs.

constitutional, 86; references to, in

Hobbes’s Leviathan, 97–98; as assembly

of the people (Rousseau), 211

Spencer, Herbert, 389, 391, 400

stability: and assurance of law, 73; of soci-

ety as role of the sovereign, 73, 78; and

its ﬁt with happiness, 215; and general

will, 237; and motivation, 239, 241; and

equality, 247

stable equilibrium, in Prisoner’s Dilemma,

state, the, necessary for exploitation (Marx),

338

state of nature, 16; not actual in Hobbes,

30; and Hobbes’s materialism, 30; inter-

pretations of, 30–35; as state of war, 32;

would come about now without sover-

eign authority, 32; two ways to under-

stand, 35; as dissolved commonwealth,

39; no effective sovereign, 49; mutually

destructive, 73; and Prisoner’s Dilemma,

73–77, 89; and promising, 75; and rela-

tions between nation-states, 76; three

things needed to lift out of, 77; problem

of lifting ourselves out of, 77, 90; in

Locke, 114; as state of freedom and

equality, 115–116, 128–129; natural

property in, 119, 149; in Rousseau, 196–

197, 201, 203; three ways to understand

it, 196; Hobbes’s vs. Rousseau’s view of,

205–206; as primitive state, not state of

war (Rousseau), 209; Rousseau’s social

contract not made in, 219

state of war: nature of, in Hobbes, 49;

Hobbes’s psychological assumptions,

51–53

stationary state, in Mill, 316

Suarez, Francisco, 23

Subjection of Women, The (Mill), 297–299

Supreme Court, and judicial review, 4

surplus labor (Marx), exploitation of, 395–

396

surplus value (Marx): is unpaid labor time

in capitalism, 329; appropriation of, as

theft, 345; capitalists’ appropriation of,

345–346; extraction by owners of

means of production, 348, 349

sympathy: and moral judgment, 164–165;

Hume’s doctrine of, 178

Taylor, A. E., 37

teleological conception: perfectionism as,

397; utilitarianism as, 397, 398–399;

problem of moral notions in

maximand, 405–407

theological doctrine, at basis of Locke’s

view, 120

theory and practice (Marx), unity of, 372

Thirty-nine Articles of Anglican Church,

377, 377n, 379–380

time preference, none in principle of util-

ity, 401

Tindal, Matthew, 419

Tocqueville, Alexis de, 191, 252, 284

Toland, John, 419

toleration, Locke and Mill on, 309–310

Tolstoy, Leo, 347

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Tory party, 252; view of divine right, 165

totalitarianism, purportedly in Rousseau,

241

Trinity Formula, in Marx, 348–349

truth: about justice and Platonic view, 3;

permanent interest in knowing, 302–303;

knowing doctrine’s, always beneﬁcial,

303

Tucker, A. W., 73

United States, ﬁve liberal reforms needed

in, 11–12

unity (Mill): content of desire for, 282; de-

sire for, and equal consideration of inter-

ests, 283

utilitarianism: attacks Hobbes’s egoism, 26;

intuitive idea of, is the general interest,

161; three ways it differs from Hobbes,

161; general remarks on, 161–163; and

economics, 162; difference with Locke’s

social contract doctrine, 172–173, 174;

classical doctrine of, 176; in Hume, 187;

cannot account for general will, 229;

Mill’s and Sidgwick’s justiﬁcation of, 257;

and individual rights, 293; classical line

of Bentham, Edgeworth, Sidgwick, 375;

classical doctrine, 378; as method of eth-

ics, 383; and common sense, 386; domi-

nance of, 393; starts with reaction to

Hobbes, 394–395; deﬁned, 396; non-clas-

sical versions of, 397–398; possible varia-

tions and reﬁnements, 398–400; teleolog-

ical nature of, 397, 398–399; and pure

time preference, 401; Butler’s argument

against, 423

utility: Hume’s test of, vs. Locke’s social

contract test, 172–173, 174; principle of,

and political legitimacy, 175; principle of,

and absolutism, 175; and the good, 176;

and the right, 176; classical principle of,

176–177, 388–389, 396–400; public, jus-

tice based in (Hume), 180; rights derived

from (Hume), 184; principle of, and

Hume’s judicious spectator, 186;

Bentham’s principle of, 255; principle of,

and principles of justice in Mill, 267–

268, 283, 300; principle of, Mill’s argu-

ment for, 272; general, basis of moral

rights (Mill), 274–275; and rights, 277–

280; principle of, and equal consider-

ation of interests, 279; desire for (Mill),

280–288; principle of, and moral moti-

vation, 281; principle of, supported by

natural sentiment (Mill), 281–282; desire

for unity ultimate sanction of principle

of, 283; grounds principle of liberty,

289; and principles of justice and liberty,

299; maximizing, requires just and free

arrangement, 306–307, 308; three differ-

ent notions of, 375; Hume’s idea of,

376; diminishing marginal, in Hume,

377; how estimated, 389; principle of, as

ﬁrst principle of a rational method of

ethics, 390–391; and equality, 392; cardi-

nal measures of, 401–402; von

Neumann-Morgenstern measure not

cardinal, 402; correspondence rules for

aggregating, 402–408; moral notions in-

cluded in deﬁnition of, 405–406; con-

science not in accord with principles of

(Butler), 422–423

utopian socialists, 356, 357; as reactionar-

ies, 358

value, of commodities (Marx), 333

vanity, 210; Hobbes’s vs. Rousseau’s view

of, 206

veil of ignorance, 17–19, 152; different

views of, 19

virtue: Hume’s psychological account of,

183; life of, has natural compatibility

with happiness (Butler), 446; love of, as

“real benevolence,” 446

Vittoria, Francisco de, 23

Voltaire, François-Marie Arouet, 194

voluntary action: as deﬁned in Hobbes, 61;

and coercion, 71

voting: right to, 138, 140–142; property

qualiﬁcation for, 140–142; and bias of

particular interests, 226–227; and

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voting (continued)

fundamental interests of citizens, 230–

231; and fundamental laws, 232; and gen-

eral will, 234, 235

wage relation, not unjust if workers paid

full value of labor-power (Marx), 341–

342

Waldron, Jeremy, 13, 15n

Walzer, Michael, 2n, 7

war, 217; unjust, 117–118

Warrender, Howard, thesis of, 37

well-ordered society, 395; of justice as fair-

ness, 321

Whewell, William, 377

Whig party, 105–106, 122; rejected Locke’s

views, 137; and doctrine of consent,

165–166

William the Conqueror, 167

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 192

women: equal justice for, 12; rights of,

127n; not active citizens (Rousseau),

222n; equality of (Mill), 298–299

Wood, Allen, on Marx on justice, 337–339

workers: self-management (Mill), 316; so-

cial role of, to produce (Marx), 327

working class: aims of, 357–358; emanci-

pation of, 358

zero-one rule, in aggregating utility, 403–

404

[ 476 ]

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