Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

(2) Thus, henceforth, we assume that the weights are all = 1. We may

add here that this is true of all individuals, however far distant in space or

time; and since our actions are limited in their effects to the present or fu-

ture, we can say (letting bygones be bygones) that the pleasures of all future

persons have the same weights as those of present persons. There is then

no pure time preference: this means that if we discount future pleasures, ei-

ther our own or those of other people, this must be for some other reason

than mere location in time or space alone; otherwise we apply the principle

of utility incorrectly. For example, we must say: that some prospective plea-

sures are for various reasons more or less probable, their realization more

or less uncertain. If so, they may be discounted, or weighted according

to their estimated probability or likelihood; this gives the so-called mathe-

matical expectation. But this form of discounting does not imply pure

time preference: this discounting is based on reasonable estimates of un-

certainty (probability) and not simply on the fact that a pleasure is distant

(future) in time.

(3) Now for a few words about interpersonal comparisons. Evidently to ar-

rive at interpersonal comparisons of utility we need two things at least:

(a) A cardinal measure of utility for each individual (all n of them) and

(b) A way of matching up the measures of utility of distinct individuals

so that we can meaningfully relate and add: in short, we need correspon-

dence rules that tell us how to compare and weight the pleasures of differ-

ent persons.

To do (a) alone is not sufﬁcient; only if we can do both (a) and (b), and

do so in some satisfactory way, have we established a way to make interper-

sonal comparisons.

Some points about these cardinal measures: ﬁrst, in the classical doc-

trine the individual cardinal measures of utility were based on individuals’

estimates of their own happiness arrived at by introspection and reﬂection

and by their comparisons among their various states of well-being: the in-

tensity and duration of their states of agreeable or disagreeable conscious-

ness. In a word: individuals were thought (a) to be able to rank their various

levels of well-being in a consistent way; they could also say (b) the differ-

ence between the levels of states A and B is equal to (or greater or less

than) the difference between C and D. On these two assumptions, a cardi-

nal measure for each individual does exist; and such a measure is indepen-

dent from choices (preferences) involving risk or uncertainty. (Another pos-

[ 401 ]

Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

EXAM COPY

sible measure is based on a theory that goes back to Edgeworth; this

measure too is independent from risks and uncertainty.)

Thus the classical

measure is not to be confused with the von Neumann–Morgenstern mea-

sure of utility, which is based on consistent choices over lotteries (various

combinations of probability weighted alternatives). (Perhaps we can say

more on this later.)

Second, in setting up the correspondence rules so that we can add the

utility measures of distinct individuals, it is not necessary that we be able to

compare the levels (absolute levels) of the well-being of these individuals.

Unit comparability sufﬁces; level comparability is unnecessary. (Full compa-

rability = level plus unit comparability.) Since we are maximizing the sum

of well-being, all that matters is how much (by how many units) each indi-

vidual goes up or down, from where they are, as a result of realizing the

various feasible alternatives. Whether individual A, say, goes up or down n

units from a level higher or lower than the level of B does not matter, as-

suming unit comparability. The institution or policy or action that leads to

the largest net increase (balance of +’s and −’s) from the present situation

will maximize utility over those alternatives.

[ 402 ]

appendix

17. [In A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., section 49, p. 282, Rawls says the following: —Ed.

“There are several ways of establishing an interpersonal measure of utility. One of

these (going back at least to Edgeworth) is to suppose that an individual is able to distin-

guish only a ﬁnite number of utility levels. A person is said to be indifferent between alter-

natives that belong to the same discrimination level, and the cardinal measure of the utility

difference between any two alternatives is deﬁned by the number of distinguishable levels

that separate them. The cardinal scale that results is unique, as it must be, up to a positive

linear transformation. To set up a measure between persons one might assume that the

difference between adjacent levels is the same for all individuals and the same between all

levels. With this interpersonal correspondence rule the calculations are extremely simple.

In comparing alternatives we ascertain the number of levels between them for each indi-

vidual and then sum, taking account of the pluses and minuses. See A. K. Sen, Collective

Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), pp. 93f; for Edgeworth, see

Mathematical Psychics (London: Kegan Paul, 1888), pp. 7–9, 60f.”]

18. [See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., section 49, pp. 283–284, for a discussion of

the von Neumann–Morgenstern deﬁnition of utility and problems with interpersonal

comparisons of utility. —Ed.]

19. When economists speak of “adding utilities at the margin” they mean something

like this, and precisely this if we suppose that the gains and losses (measured in goods and

services) are sufﬁciently small so that the marginal utility of each individual stays approxi-

mately constant over the whole interval of possible gains and losses measured in goods

and services, etc. [This sentence was crossed out in Rawls’s handwritten lecture notes.

—Ed.]

EXAM COPY

§4. Philosophical Constraints on a

Satisfactory Measure of Interpersonal Comparisons

(1) There are at least two very important philosophical constraints on

any satisfactory set of correspondence rules for interpersonal comparisons.

Unless these are fulﬁlled, we have not yet deﬁned a plausible utilitarian

view. The ﬁrst constraint is that the correspondence rules must be both

meaningful and acceptable from the moral point of view as interpreted by

the particular form of utilitarianism in question—in the present case, the

strict classical doctrine. Not any kind of correspondence will be admissible.

Moreover, all correspondence rules seem to involve some rather strong eth-

ical assumptions, or at least assumptions with ethical implications, and

these presuppositions must accord with the view in question.

(2) To illustrate: there is the well-known zero-one rule. This says: assum-

ing that we have individual cardinal measures, and assuming that these

measures are bounded above and below, pair these corresponding lower

and upper bounds each with zero and one respectively. This sets up an in-

terpersonal cardinal measure, but is it a measure we want? Does it deﬁne an

aim that we want to maximize (given the utilitarian view)? Think about this

in the light of the following extreme (and no doubt non-serious) example:

this example has the merit of clearly exhibiting the difﬁculty. Consider a so-

ciety that at time t

consists of n people and m cats about equal in numbers

(each person has their cat, as it were). Including all sentient beings, write:

To maximize:

uu uu u

innnm

=+++ ++

∑

... ...

An amount of manna X falls each Hicksian week

(time period): how

to distribute it? Now, cats are more easy to get near the bliss point (u = 1)

than people (adopting the 0–1 rule), let’s assume. So, perhaps over time, we

maximize the sum of utilities by reducing the ratio of n/m so that at time t

(the optimum) there are relatively few people collecting and distributing the

manna to lots of nearly blissfully happy cats. (I assume the amount of

[ 403 ]

Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

20. [John R. Hicks (1904–1989), a British economist who won the Nobel Prize jointly

with Kenneth Arrow in 1972. —Ed.]

EXAM COPY

manna is ﬁxed at X for all t.) The explanation of this conclusion is that cats

are more efﬁcient producers of utility per unit of X, if we use the 0–1 rule.

This example is not offered as a serious objection, but rather to bring

home vividly the difﬁculty. Namely, just because we can establish some in-

terpersonal measure so far proves nothing: this measure must deﬁne an aim

that from a philosophical standpoint the theory says we should maximize,

or one that we can live with. If the interpersonal measure has unacceptable

implications, the utilitarian presumably has something else in mind. The

point then is this: any scheme of correspondence rules has, it seems, ethical

implications, (a) via the implications of the resulting principle, and (b) via

the embedding of ethical notions in the correspondence rules; and it has

ethical implications even if the scheme seems to involve no moral notions or

principles. It has these implications because it sets up an aim that we are to

maximize; and to maximize as the sole end of institutions and actions.

Moreover, sometimes it may be clear that some ethical conceptions are em-

bedded in the correspondence rules, e.g., is the 0–1 rule a way of saying

that sentient beings have equal rights, or (perhaps better) equal claims to

maximize satisfaction? For contrast this case with Mill’s reply to Spencer:

that pleasures qua their intrinsic properties of intensity and duration (say)

are equal regardless of whose pleasure they are. In the example above, we

say simply: the total range of human pleasures (over all individuals) equals

(by stipulation) the total range of feline pleasure (over all cats) regardless of

variations between human individuals or between individual cats, or be-

tween cats and people. What justiﬁes this stipulation? If we reject the 0–1

rule for cats and people, what is the correct ratio? Does the 0–1 rule hold

for all people? Should we aim for simple pleasures, as the 0–1 rule implies?

(3) Second, the correspondence scheme (for interpersonal comparisons)

must not involve any ethical notions or principles that depend upon the no-

tions of right or of moral worth. The reason for this is that the classical doc-

trine introduces the concept of right as that of maximizing some indepen-

dently deﬁned notion of good. (One clariﬁes this by giving examples: e.g.,

hedonism, human excellence, etc.)

We may have seen that the 0–1 rule may involve some ethical notion,

for example of equal rights or equal claims to (maximized) satisfaction. Of

[ 404 ]

appendix

21. [See A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., pp. 284–285, for a related discussion of the value

assumptions underlying interpersonal comparisons.]

EXAM COPY

course, this is no objection to the view that uses the resulting principle; but

what we need to be clear about is that this principle is no longer the classi-

cal principle of utility: it is something else. We introduced a principle of

equal claims for all sentient (or human) beings; and where did we get that?

Not from its being the best way to maximize utility; for we have used it in

deﬁning utility. So it is a basic ﬁrst principle perhaps; if so, then this needs

to be made explicit. Finally, why add utilities? Why not take the greater

product of utilities, which normally results in less inequality in the distribu-

tion of utility?

(4) Again, the standard assumptions that utilitarian writers often use

may be covert ways of introducing or adding ﬁrst principles.

This depends

on how these assumptions are used and justiﬁed. If they are followed irre-

spective of the actual facts of individual psychology, then to this extent they

are ﬁrst principles; and mean in effect: always treat people as if these as-

sumptions hold. If so, these ﬁrst principles must be explicitly noted; and

once again, we no longer have the strict classical doctrine.

(5) Finally, a more subtle instance of the same problem is this: we must

be careful to count among pleasures or satisfactions only states of con-

sciousness or feelings that are suitably characterized: that is, solely by the

good and by non-moral notions. Thus it is no argument against certain in-

equalities, say, from a utilitarian standpoint that people resent them; or that

these inequalities make them indignant. For resentment and indignation are

moral feelings: they imply that the individual afﬁrms some conception of

right and justice, etc., and presuppose a belief that the principles deﬁning

these conceptions are violated by these inequalities. Such an argument is

[ 405 ]

Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

22. See Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, pp. 399f. [See A Theory of Jus-

tice, rev. ed., p. 285, where Rawls says the following of this same reference: —Ed.] “Maine’s

assumptions on the standard utilitarian assumptions are apropos here. He suggests that the

grounds for these assumptions are clear once we see that they are simply a working rule of

legislation, and that this is how Bentham regarded them. Given a populous and reasonably

homogeneous society and an energetic modern legislature, the only principle that can

guide legislation on a large scale is the principle of utility. The necessity to neglect differ-

ences between persons, even very real ones, leads to the maxim to count all equally, and to

the similarity and marginal postulates. Surely the conventions for interpersonal compari-

sons are to be judged in the same light. The contract doctrine holds that once we see this,

we shall also see that the idea of measuring and summing well-being is best abandoned en-

tirely.”

23. Cf. Lionel Robbins, The Nature and Signiﬁcance of Economic Science (London:

Macmillan, 1932), p. 141.

EXAM COPY

not permitted by the constraints on the classical view. What a classical utili-

tarian must argue instead is that certain inequalities cause so much envy

and anguish, or so much apathy and depression (all, say, unpleasant states

of mind), that the greater balance of happiness is generally achieved by

eliminating these inequalities. Even if we take these moral feelings into ac-

count, we are to weight them solely by their intensity and duration as feel-

ings. Is that appropriate?

(6) A further example to illustrate the way in which moral notions may

be included in individual utility functions is the following. Suppose we in-

clude a variable that represents individuals’ appraisal of, or attitude toward,

the existing distribution of goods, or even of satisfaction (we assume that

all individuals know what this distribution is). And assume that, for this pur-

pose, the relevant feature of the existing distribution is based on the Gini-

coefﬁcient: each individual is pleased or displeased according to the degree

of inequality as measured by this coefﬁcient.

They are more pleased as

equality increases, ceteris parabis, although individuals may differ in the de-

sire for equality. Then each u

looks something like this:

= U

(X, I, G) and so maximize

∑

as deﬁned

where X is a vector of goods; I is income; and G is the Gini-coefﬁcient.

Here we can assume that (to simplify) we have, for each individual, in-

difference curves something like those in Figure 10.

This scheme can ﬁt into either an ordinal or coordinal theory. For our

purposes here, let’s assume that the indifference curves have meaningful

cardinal measures that mesh appropriately, via correspondence rules, with

the measures of other individuals (interpersonal comparisons are valid).

Now the point is this: we can formally proceed to maximize the net bal-

ance of utility. But the theory is no longer teleological in the required

sense:

(a) By including an entry for the Gini-coefﬁcient, individuals take distri-

[ 406 ]

appendix

24. [The Gini-coefﬁcient, attributed to Gini (1912), is a measure of inequality.

“There are various ways of deﬁning the Gini coefﬁcient, and a bit of manipulation . . .

reveals that it is exactly one-half of the relative mean difference, which is deﬁned as the

arithmetic average of the absolute values of differences between all pairs of incomes....

Undoubtedly one appeal of the Gini coefﬁcient, or of the relative mean difference, lies in

the fact that it is a very direct measure of income difference, taking note of differences be-

tween every pair of incomes.” Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality (Oxford: Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1997), pp. 30–31.]

EXAM COPY

bution into account. Offhand it looks as if they have a pattern principle of

the ﬁrst kind (a principle based on the pattern of distribution as represented

by some property computed from the distribution of goods and income

(the X’s and I’s)).

(b) We need to know on what basis individuals are really taking distri-

bution into account. Is it really that their response to G is based on:

(i) benevolence and sympathetic temperament

(ii) moral convictions springing from a view of the duties of

beneﬁcence

(iii)convictions of justice in distribution; and of what conception more

speciﬁcally

[ 407 ]

Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

Figure 10.

EH curve = maximum output (given Gini-coefﬁcient)

So H = maximum output (over all Gini-coefﬁcients)

So M = most preferred point (for individual i)

a. [notes on the graph: E labels the point of intersection between the verti-

cal axis and the EH curve; M labels the point of intersection between the EH

curve and II; H labels the point of intersection between the EH curve and I.

—Ed.]

b. Cf. William Breit, “Income Redistribution and Efﬁciency Norms,” in

Hochman and Peterson, Redistribution Through Public Choice (1974).

EXAM COPY

(iv)views about the advisability of greater equality for social stability

(v) views about general advisability of reducing envy and depression

(vi)views about insuring against possible losses in the future to oneself:

risk aversion to greater inequalities and so a wish to establish public

policy of less inequality

ﬁrst three, with the possible exception of the ﬁrst, (i), are not.

From the standpoint of moral theory, what we want to know is not on

what basis people actually do take distribution into account (presumably all

six above reasons and more inﬂuence this or that individual), but on what

basis they think they should take them into account. And what their moral

conceptions are in this respect. Thus, in particular, what allowance does

classical utilitarianism make for distribution?

§5. Some Points Regarding Greatest Numbers and

Happiness and Maximizing Total vs. Average Utility

(1) The phrase “the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers” occurs

ﬁrst, it seems, in Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and

Evil (1725), Sec. III, §8. This phrase has occasionally given rise to the con-

fusion as to whether the principle of utility directs us to maximize total

pleasure, or to maximize the number of persons, or some weighted mix

of both.

The classical doctrine is clear: we are to maximize total pleasure (net

balance of pleasure over pain). In the long run numbers (or the size of soci-

ety) is to be adjusted accordingly. This is what the classical view says. To

maximize a weighted mix of net pleasure (total) and numbers represents an

intuitionist view and is no part of the classical doctrine. Perhaps it should

also be said that the absurdity attributed to Bentham’s utilitarianism by von

Neumann and Morgenstern (in the 2nd edition of Theory of Games, 1947),

namely, that Bentham wanted to maximize two things at once, aggregate

happiness and numbers, is incorrect. Neither Bentham, Edgeworth, nor

Sidgwick would fall into this foolishness.

(2) Second, there is the question whether we are to maximize total util-

ity or average utility (well-being per capita over the members of society).

[ 408 ]

appendix

EXAM COPY

Here again the classical view is perfectly clear: we are to maximize total, not

average, utility. Of course, the two are the same in the short run with n

ﬁxed (n = population of society). But in the long run n is not ﬁxed, and un-

der certain conditions the total and average views give different results for

population policy or indeed for any social policies insofar as they inﬂuence

the size of population (e.g., via effects on birth rate, death rate, etc.). Cru-

cial among the conditions in determining population size is the relative rate

at which average utility decreases if population increases. If average utility

falls slowly enough, the loss in the average may always be less than the gain

in the total from greater numbers, so one can theoretically be led to a very

large population of very low (for each individual, positive > 0) utility;

rather than a far smaller population that would maximize average utility.

Perhaps, however, utilitarianism is not a feasible principle for population

policy in any case. If so, then the question is, how is the classical utilitarian

to get a complete view?

It is to be observed that Sidgwick is clear on both these points. (See ME,

pp. 415f.) This is, among other reasons, why I say Sidgwick is the best repre-

sentative of the classical view: he is aware of all these sorts of points and re-

solves them each time in ways consistent with that view. Note again that if

we say average rather than total utility is what should be maximized, we

seem to be introducing a new or distinct ﬁrst principle. For if pleasure alone

is the sole good, it seems clear that we are to maximize the sum of it. Why

in this case does the average matter at all?

§6. Concluding Remarks

(1) It is important to emphasize the point of the preceding remarks.

The introductory historical remarks are to highlight the long continuity of

the utilitarian tradition; its striking dominance (in at least three respects)

over the course of English (speaking) moral philosophy since the ﬁrst quar-

ter (at least) of the 18th century; and its close tie with social theory, espe-

cially political theory and economics: there is nothing else anywhere that

approaches this pattern of features.

Also, we must realize that, with some but not much qualiﬁcation, the

leading utilitarians attempted to work out, in reaction to Hobbes, an ac-

ceptable moral theory for a secular society with the features of the modern

[ 409 ]

Four Lectures on Henry Sidgwick

EXAM COPY

world. Their reaction to Hobbes (in contrast with the orthodox Christian

response, e.g. Cudworth) brings out this aspect of their work: they repre-

sent the ﬁrst modern moral and political theory.

(2) Also, second, I have discussed Sidgwick as the last of the leading

strict classical utilitarians: the Bentham-Edgeworth-Sidgwick trio. Sidgwick’s

presentation is the most detailed; he is fully aware of most (at least) of the

problems (as not even all contemporary utilitarians are). One needs to rec-

ognize the many complications in formulating what seems at ﬁrst sight a

rather simple principle (conception). Actually, the initial simplicity makes

the complexity easier to see.

(3) Finally, we went over quickly some of the matters that arise in estab-

lishing interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This was merely to high-

light the problems, to illustrate the difﬁculties. For example, the 0–1 rule is

not, I think, even approximately satisfactory over all sentient beings, though

it’s better over human beings. But it shows where many deep troubles lie.

We shan’t pursue these questions further now. Yet one must be aware of

the problems.

Appendix to Lecture III:

Regarding Cardinal Interpersonal Comparisons

Points: The main points are these:

(1) We need two things to apply utilitarian principle:

(a) A cardinal measure for each individual.

(b) Meaningful correspondence rules to correlate these measures: at

least unit comparability.

(2) Cardinal vs. Ordinal Measures:

(a) Ordinal simply deﬁnes a complete ordering of better and worse,

but not how much worse or better.

(b) Cardinal measure deﬁnes a zero and a unit and says how many

units between levels.

by positive linear transformation (e.g. temperature scales). In ordinal, posi-

tive monotonic transformation.

(3) In classical cardinal individual measures, e.g. Sidgwick: ME, Bk. III,

Ch. II:

[ 410 ]

appendix

EXAM COPY